Soon after Lieutenant General Rochambeau arrived in the United States as commander of the French expeditionary army, he met GW at Hartford to plan how to take New York City from the British. An attack desired for the fall failed to materialize for lack of naval and troop reinforcements. Taking New York City remained a goal as the two men continued communications on strategy.1

Early in 1781, GW and Rochambeau corresponded about plans to dispatch a French fleet to the Chesapeake Bay, where it would cooperate with Major General Lafayette’s corps against British forces under Brig. Gen. Benedict Arnold. GW and Rochambeau discussed these naval operations at Newport in March.2 Their designs failed when a British fleet under Vice Adm. Marriot Arbuthnot overtook the French fleet at Cape Henry, Va., and denied the French access to the bay.3

Hopes for successful combined operations against British forces were revived when Rear Admiral Barras, appointed to command the French squadron, arrived in Boston on 6 May.4 Barras carried private dispatches addressed to Rochambeau from French officials with instructions on the upcoming campaign. The dispatches included King Louis XVI’s decision to grant the United States a significant monetary gift. The instructions also prohibited Rochambeau from marching his army from Rhode Island without securing Barras’s squadron at Newport or Boston. Significantly, the dispatches announced the departure from France of a fleet commanded by Lieutenant General de Grasse, bound for the West Indies, but then to operate with Rochambeau and Barras off the American coast in July or August. Rochambeau was instructed to hold this latter piece of information in the utmost secrecy.5 Breaching the injunction, Major General Chastellux imparted this intelligence to GW.6 The instructions prompted Rochambeau to meet GW to begin planning operations.7

On 13 May, after hearing from Rochambeau, GW selected Wethersfield—a small town south of Hartford and about halfway between his headquarters at New Windsor and the French headquarters at Newport—as the meeting place. A quiet town, Wethersfield was more suitable than Hartford, where the state legislature was in session. Once GW had determined on 21 May as the meeting date, Rochambeau began drafting proposals that reflected his discussions with Barras regarding naval operations.8

GW directed Ralph Pomeroy, deputy quartermaster general for Connecticut, to prepare accommodations in Wethersfield for the two parties.9 Accompanied by brigadier generals Henry Knox and Duportail, GW left New Windsor on 18 May,10 traveled through the Connecticut towns of Kent, New Milford, Washington, and Litchfield, dined in Farmington, and reached Wethersfield on 19 May.11

Newspapers announced GW’s arrival. One report described how the travelers were “escorted into town by a number of Gentlemen from Hartford and Wethersfield. As [GW] dismounted at his Quarters he was saluted by the discharge of thirteen Cannon.”12 From the time of his arrival until his departure on 24 May, GW lodged at the home of Joseph Webb, the owner of a tannery and shoe manufactory. Webb’s home, built in 1752, was located in the center of town. It was likely in one of the front parlors that GW and Rochambeau devised their campaign plans.13

Prior to Rochambeau’s arrival on 21 May, GW met privately with Connecticut governor Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., and Jeremiah Wadsworth, purchaser for the French expeditionary force. Trumbull and Wadsworth expressed confidence that the Americans could secure the men and provisions required for an “important offensive operation.”14 Trumbull recorded in his diary for Sunday, 20 May, that he “attended divine service with General Washington” at the Congregational church in Wethersfield, where the minister preached from Matthew 5:3: “blessed are the poor of spirit, for their’s is the Kingdom of Heaven.”15

Rochambeau and Chastellux left Newport for Wethersfield on 19 May.16 The generals “and their Suites, arrived at Wethersfield” on 21 May. “They were met at Hartford by his Excellency General Washington, the Officers of the Army, and a number of Gentlemen who accompanied them to Wethersfield, where they were saluted with the Discharge of Cannon. Every Mark of Attention and Politeness were shewn their Excellencies and the other Gentlemen of the allied Armies, whilst attending the Convention.”17 During their stay, the French officers lodged at Stillman’s tavern. Besides talks with GW, Rochambeau socialized with high-ranking officials, including the governor, who dined with the two generals on 22 and 23 May. GW and Rochambeau attended a choir concert in their honor on 21 May.18

The French contingent arrived without Barras, who stayed at Newport after British warships had been sighted off Rhode Island loaded with troops bound for the Chesapeake Bay. Barras also wanted to meet a convoy arriving from France with de Grasse’s squadron.19 The admiral’s absence did not hinder the conference because Rochambeau had discussed strategy and goals with Barras and represented his thoughts at Wethersfield.20

Lengthy discussions between GW and Rochambeau took place on 22 May. The primary question addressed was whether the allied armies should march overland and attack the British around the Chesapeake Bay or conduct offensive operations against the British garrison in New York City. As early as March, GW had held the view that without naval superiority or more French troops, the best prospects for success would come from an attack upon the enemy in New York, which he believed would divert British troops away from the southern theater.21 Aware that Barras was not prepared to transport French troops and military material to Virginia, and believing that the British garrison in New York City already had been weakened from the recent detachments,22 GW argued that Rochambeau’s corps should march to the Hudson River “& there, in conjunction with the American, to commence an operation against New York.” GW left open the option of an operation in Virginia if a superior French naval force were to arrive in American waters. Concerns over transportation expenses and potential troop losses during “long marches,” two risks associated with a southern offensive, were among the determining factors behind GW’s preference for operations against nearby New York.23

While at the conference, GW compiled an estimate of the force that would be available for operations against New York: 8,250 if the northern army’s regiments reached full strength. With New York as the objective, GW believed that he could raise an additional 2,000 men and that “there would be no want of Militia.” He approximated enemy strength at New York City at 7,500 regulars, Loyalists, and militia.24

Without a promise of troop reinforcements, Rochambeau was in no position to contest GW’s proposals. His principal objection was the impact that British subversion of the southern states might have on the rest of the country. He also believed that naval reinforcements would be necessary for a successful operation against either New York or Virginia, and he worried that large French ships might not be able to pass Sandy Hook bar. After the conference, Rochambeau revealed to French officials his preference for an offensive in Virginia. Rochambeau subsequently explained that he viewed such an expedition to be “more practicable, and less expected by the enemy.”25

With the conference between the two generals ended, Rochambeau left Wethersfield on 23 May. GW departed the following day for New Windsor, where he arrived “about Sunset” on 25 May. His itinerary included a meal at Farmington, an overnight stay in a tavern at Litchfield, and breakfast in another tavern at Washington.26

GW immediately began campaign preparations. He composed a circular letter that called on the executives of the New England states to raise their required troop quotas and to ready militia.27 Supply officers received requests to make arrangements, and GW consulted a board of general officers. Bateaux construction was begun.28 In addition, GW divulged the campaign strategy to some individuals—a decision that proved fateful when a number of those letters were intercepted by the enemy, revealing allied strategy to the British.29

Convinced that New York City was threatened, British general Henry Clinton wrote Lt. Gen. Charles Cornwallis, commander of the British army in the south, from New York on 19 June: “The intercepted letters which I had the honor to transmit to your Lordship with my dispatch of the 8th instant will have informed you that the French Admiral meant to escape with his fleet to Boston from Rhode Island … and that it was proposed the French army should afterwards join such troops as Mr Washington could assemble for the purpose of making an attempt on this post.

“I have often given it as my opinion to your Lordship that for such an object as this they certainly could raise numbers, but I very much doubt their being able to feed them. I am, however, persuaded they will attempt the investiture of the place. I therefore heartily wish I was more in force that I might be able to take advantage of any false movement they may make in forming it.” Clinton asked Cornwallis to send him reinforcements, if possible, and noted the strong probability that de Grasse would “visit this coast in the hurricane season and bring with him troops as well as ships.”30

In a letter dated 9–12 June, Clinton had written Lord George Germain from New York City that he hoped Cornwallis would attempt a campaign in Pennsylvania, “which I shall recommend immediately. But should his lordship have reasons for declining it and have no other to propose, I shall probably direct him to take such posts in the Chesapeak as he shall judge proper, keep troops sufficient for desultory water expeditions during the summer (when according to one of Mr Washington’s intercepted letters all land operation in the Chesapeak should stop), and draw what troops can be spared from thence to this post, with which I shall act offensively or defensively as circumstances may make necessary.”31 British major Frederick Mackenzie, stationed at New York City, wrote in his diary for 18 June that the Americans planned “to invest New York.” He added: “Every argument is using by Washington to induce the States Northward of the Delaware to contribute their quotas of Men, Money, Stores, provisions, Carriages, horses, &c, &c, to enable him, with the Assistance of the French, to carry this enterprize into immediate execution; but their resourses are so much exhausted, and there is so little unanimity among the people, that he is in great doubt of their complying with his demands.”32

Rochambeau commenced “arrangements for a movement of the troops” upon his return to Newport on 26 or 27 May.33 Like GW, he corresponded with officials about the conference. In a letter to French minister La Luzerne dated 27 May, Rochambeau transmitted in code the proceedings and decisions, and he advised La Luzerne that he had withheld the specific intelligence about de Grasse’s prospects of arriving on the American coast. He had briefly mentioned it only as a possibility. Rochambeau also noted that his troops would march to the Hudson River upon GW’s orders. The British intercepted this letter, which led Rochambeau to enclose a coded duplicate with a letter to LaLuzerne dated 9 June. In that missive, Rochambeau assured the French minister that the intercepted conference proceedings dated 27 May would be unintelligible to the enemy, having also been written in cipher.34 This hopeful conjecture was confirmed in a letter that Clinton wrote Germain regarding “a cipher one from Monsieur Rochambeau to the Chevalier la Luzerne which appears to be very material, but we have hitherto been foiled in our endeavours to discover a key to it.”35

Rochambeau wrote de Grasse on 28 May. According to the French general, GW estimated 8,500 British regulars and 3,000 enemy militia stationed in New York City. Rochambeau reported Barras’s inability to transport troops to the Chesapeake Bay, as well as plans for the allied troops to launch an attack on the British garrison at New York. The French general expressed concerns that both GW’s army and his own corps would prove weak before that British stronghold.36

In a letter dated 29 May, Rochambeau informed French war minister Ségur about a significant alteration to the decision made at the Wethersfield conference to send Barras’s squadron to Boston upon the march of the French army from Newport. At the end of May, a council of war resolved to keep Barras’s squadron at Newport and secure it with more militia. The decision was prompted by a fear that Americans might view the squadron’s anchorage at Boston as a retreat. Additionally, the council argued that at Newport the squadron would be closer to offensive operations.37 Rochambeau again wrote Ségur on 1 June to complain about troop shortages and warned that he would have fewer than 3,000 armed men to join GW’s army. Rochambeau believed that the arrival of the French troops in New York would increase American morale.38

The strategy determined at the Wethersfield conference was never fully implemented. Rochambeau’s army did march to Westchester County, N.Y., in June and formed a junction with GW’s army in early July. The allied troops operated around New York City and unsuccessfully attacked British posts on northern Manhattan Island.39 Lacking naval superiority, the allied armies could not put the British garrison under siege. When de Grasse sailed his fleet to the Chesapeake Bay rather than New York City in late summer, Rochambeau’s preference for an operation in the southern theater, and GW’s willingness to pursue offensive operations there with sufficient naval strength, led to what would become the successful Yorktown campaign.40