III. Lieutenant General Rochambeau’s Proposals with GW’s Replies, 23 May 1781
III
Lieutenant General Rochambeau’s
Proposals with GW’s Replies
Wethersfield 23d May 1781.1
Having given communication to the Count de Barras of my instructions, I have observed to him.
⟨1st⟩ That General Washington in the last conference we had here six Weeks ago, desired earnestly that the Squadron should transport all the French Corps, with all its Artillery, Bagage, and munitions to Chesapeake Bay,2 and that I did not doubt but His Excellency would desire it again, as the Enemy continued in the offensive to the Southward; Upon which observation having asked the Count de Barras, if he had the means of it, and if, in case there was a possibility of it, he looked on his Squadron as in a condition to escort a convoy, before the Enemy’s fleet, which being already superior in the engagement on the 16th march, had been reinforced, as the report goes, by a junction of 50s and 44 Gun Ships, and some frigates that were at Charles Town, and on the southern Coast,3 Mr de Barras has made Answer—that it was not possible to his squadron to escort a convoy with any surety with the french Army on board, its Artillery & Bagages, by reason of the superiority of the British fleet, that the English had recalled and assembled since the engagement all the 50 Gun Ships they have, & all their 44 Gun frigates, that as soon as they would know that the Army is embarking (there is not the least doubt of their being informed of it, the very first movement we should make) they would assemble yet a great number of frigates, that our squadron; if it meets with the Enemy would engage him, that all that can be expected from the Officers who have lately covered themselves with glory in defeating a superior fleet, is to fight them again. But what would become in the mean time of the Vessels that shall transport the Army? The Enemy shall detach the four 44 Gun Ships with their frigates, and shall make themselves masters of them, Mr de Barras says, that he can oppose only one frigate to these, that were he happy enough to defeat the British fleet, which seems very doubtful to him, considering its superiority, he would nevertheless have the sorrow to see the Enemy either take, sink or scatter the Vessels, that would transport the King’s Army, that this proposition is not admittable, and that it cannot be executed in the state of our Squadron.4
2nd Proposition.
If General Washington asks, that at the beginning of June, at which time the pastures will be forward enough to permit a land march the totality of the french Corps should go to join him upon the North River, that he may be in a condition to send by his right Corpses from his Army to defend Virginia, in that case, will the squadron be thought in great enough security at Rhode Island under the guard of a Corps of American Militia? It must be observed that in my secret instruction given me last year, and confirmed by the one I have received this year, I am forbidden to seperate the french Corps, except it be for detachments of short duration, that are to join again in a few days the principal Corps, a consequence natural to the little consistence of the small Corps that I command, and that will in its first march upon the North River be removed 80 Leagues from New Port.5 The Count de Barras has answered me; that the squadron would not certainly be secure, if the Enemy took possession of Rhode Island, that I could judge better than he, what defence Militia of all Nations are capable of, that besides, the instructions from the King of which I had given him communication, say, that if the land Army marches into the Continent, the King’s squadron, which he commands shall go to Boston, that the Marquis de Castries Minister of the Navy has confirmed verbally the same Order, before his departure from Brest, so that if the Army commanded by the Count de Rochambeau marches into the Continent, he shall get under sail to conduct his squadron to Boston.6
3d Proposition
What in that case does General Washington propose about Rhode Island? Does he intend it should be kept by a General Officer, and a Corps of American Militia? It must be observed, and it is suitable that it should be expressly remarked, that if in the hurricane Months7 the french fleet of the West Indies should come to stay more or less in these Seas, then the harbour of Rhode Island might be of use to the operations of our Squadrons, either for their reunion, if New York was so uncovered that something might be attempted against it, or for their retreat, in case of Misfortune.
4th Proposition.
If General Washington resolves absolutely to leave Rhode Island & consequently to destroy its works, does he look on the Artillery of seige and the Powder Magazines as likewise the other Big Stores of the French Army, that cannot follow it in a land March, does he look on them as being in security at Providence under the Guard of 200 frenchmen which with the Country Militia is all that we can leave? Because the English never went there, whilst they had possession of Rhode Island we must not infer from that, that a deposite so precious, and so very important, would not tempt them, and give them the desire to make an expedition to surprize it; Besides, then, Providence was in a warlike situation against the English at Rhode Island which made the expedition very difficult.8 Unless then General Washington be willing to keep there a Corps of Militia that is to be permanent, to join the 200 frenchmen in the defence of that Post, of which the Works that need at least 1000 Men to keep them, might be mended, and unless he looks on it as absolutely necessary and indispensable that the deposite of Artillery, Powder, and Munitions should remain at Providence; the Count de Rochambeau would look on them as more secure at Boston with the fleet, whose transports will always be necessary whatever operation may be done, when the circumstances may give us the naval superiority & the means of undertaking.
5th Proposition
In this last case; and that of the arrival in these Seas of the West Indies Squadron, which in all probability would be Announced before hand by a Frigate, what are the operations that might have in view at that Epocha—General Washington, upon the combination of his forces being united to the french Army.9
P.S. The 17th May after the Memorial was signed,10 the Count de Barras wanting to put to sail in order to give protection to the Convoy, applied to Count de Rochambeau for seven hundred Men11 to fill the deficiency in his crew: this was agreed directly.12 The 18th May, as the land forces were embarking aboard the ships, the English squadron was seen off Block Island.13 That squadron being stronger than the french Naval forces, this event will necessarily stop for some time the sailing of the fleet: this being the case, the Count who is bound by his instruction not to abandon the fleet, shall be constrained to stay at Rhode Island, he thinks it a duty to give notice of it, to His Excellency that he might not depend upon the marching of the french forces, but in the hypothesis that the fleet is gone to Boston.
2nd The fourth proposal is entirely out of the purpose, since there is no possibility to send the heavy Artillery to Boston—The transports that should be wanting for such a transportation being rather an incumbrance for the fleet, if it has an opportunity to put to sail. Not speaking of the time that such a like transportation should require, whilst the fleet is to take the first opportunity to get out. So that in the supposition of the fleet’s being gone we must stick at the plan to guard Rhode Island with a body of Militia or to repair the Works at Providence, and defend them with 200 french Soldiers, and so many Militia.14
le Cte de Rochambeau
Observations by Genl Washington15
1st. However desirable such an event might have been, the reasons now assigned by the Count de Barras are Sufficient to prove its impracticability.
2d.
It is General Washingtons opinion that the plan of Campaign will render it necessary for the French Army to March from Newport towards the North River as soon as possible,16 and that consequently it will be advisable for the Count de Barras (agreeable to his Instructions in that case provided) to seek the first favorable moment of removing the Squadron under his Command to Boston.
3d.
As the Harbour of Rhode Island may be useful to the Fleets of His Most Christian Majesty, it is General Washingtons opinion, that a force should be left for the security of Newport; but as the Enemy will not be in Condition, from the present circumstances of their Affairs, to detach any considerable body of Men to re-posses the Island—It has been agreed upon between His Excellency Count de Rochambeau & Genl Washington, that 500 Militia under a good Officer will be Sufficient for the Guards for the Works but in case of an enterprise against them a greater force shd be called for their defence.17
4th
In the former communications between His Excellency Count de Rochambeau and General Washington, it was understood that the French Fleet was to have remained in the Harbour of Newport after the removal of the Army, and therefore Providence was fixed upon as a safe and proper deposit of the heavy Artillery & spare Stores18—It now being determined that the Fleet shall embrace the first oppertunity of going round to the Harbour of Boston it is to be wished that the heavy Artillery & spare Stores should be sent round also; But General Washington being informed by His Excellency Count de Rochambeau that they have been already deposited at Providence, and that it will be impossible under the present circumstances of the Fleet and want of Transportation to remove them to Boston he is of opinion that they may safely remain there under the Guard of 200 French Troops, who will be aided by the Militia of the Country in case of need. The possession of Newport will add to their security.
5th.
The Enemy by several detachments from New York having reduced their force at that Post to less than half of the number which they had at the time of the former conference at Hartford in September last—it is thought advisable to form a junction of the French & American Armies upon the North river as soon as possible, and move down to the vicinity of New York to be ready to take advantage of any oppertunity which the weakness of the enemy may afford. Should the West India Fleet arrive upon this Coast—the force thus combined may either proceed in the operation against New York, or may be directed against the enemy in some other quarter, as circumstances shall dictate—The great waste of Men (which we have found from experience) in the long Marches to the Southern States—the advanced Season now to commence therein—and the difficulties and expence of Land transportation thither, with other considerations too well known to His Excellen[c]y Count de Rochambeau to need detailing, point out the preference which an operation against New York seems to have, in present circumstances, to attempt sending a force to the Southward.
Answer to the P.S.
The observation upon the 4th head sufficiently answers this, as the 500 Militia proposed to be Stationed at Newport may be dispersed of in any manner which His Excely Count de Rochambeau may think proper.
Go: Washington
DS, in David Humphreys’s writing and “Observations” in GW’s writing, CtY-BR:R; DS (retained copy), partly in GW’s writing, DLC:GW; DS, in French, partly in Rochambeau’s writing, NcD: Francis Warrington Dawson I and II Papers; LB, in French, DLC: Rochambeau Papers, vol. 12; French translation (incomplete), dated 16 May, FrPMAE; Varick transcript, DLC:GW. Both GW and Rochambeau signed the DS at DLC:GW, which GW docketed: “Result of a Conference with Count de Rochambeau at Hartford 23d May 1781.” Only Rochambeau signed the DS at NcD. Vice Admiral Barras interspersed signed comments on that document (see notes 6 and 9 below).
French documents with Rochambeau’s proposals and Barras’s comments, as well as similar documents written in a clerical hand but with some of GW’s responses, are in CtY-BR:R. These documents, which contain significant insertions in Rochambeau’s and Barras’s writing, are dated either 13 or 16 May, indicating that immediately after GW agreed to meet at Wethersfield, Rochambeau, while still in Newport, began drawing up proposals with Barras for the conference (see GW to Rochambeau, 13 and 14 May). After the conference, Rochambeau added French translations of GW’s responses. He also sent coded versions of the proceedings to French officials. The British intercepted some of these communications. Subsequently deciphered versions of the conference proposals and GW’s responses, in French, are in MiU-C: Shelburne Papers, and P.R.O.: 30/55, Carleton Papers.
1. GW wrote the dateline beneath his signature.
2. For these discussions at Newport, see the editorial note above, and n.2 to that document.
3. For reports of British ships sent from Charleston to reinforce the fleet near New York, see Rochambeau to GW, 7 May. The Battle of Cape Henry occurred on 16 March (see Destouches to GW, 19 March, source note).
4. A French document dated 13 May with these opinions from Barras regarding naval operations is in CtY-BR:R.
5. For these secret instructions, see Rochambeau to GW, 12 July 1780, n.16, and 11 May 1781, n.2.
6. Barras conveyed this information to Rochambeau on 14 May (see n.4 above). On the DS at NcD, Barras wrote and signed a statement in French that translates as “these were my answers to the Count de Rochambeau.”
7. Both the DS at NcD and the letter-book version have “hivernage,” which translates as “winter season.”
8. British forces occupied Newport in late 1776 and evacuated in October 1779 (see GW to Duportail and Alexander Hamilton, 30 Oct. 1779, and n.2 to that document).
9. On the DS at NcD, Barras wrote and signed a statement in French that translates as “I join Rochambeau in making the three last proposals to General Washington, since I was not able to be at the conference.” Rochambeau also signed this statement.
10. See the second paragraph of the source note above.
11. The number “1200” appears in the letter-book version.
12. Rochambeau provided 900 men (see Rochambeau to GW, 28 May). For the convoy, see Rochambeau to GW, 8 May, n.1, and Barras to GW, 9 June, postscript.
13. Rhode Island appears in the letter-book version and the DS at NcD; see also GW to Barras, 23 May, and n.1 to that document.
14. For the eventual decision to keep the French squadron at Newport with militia reinforcements, see Barras to GW, and Rochambeau to GW, both 31 May.
15. GW wrote this heading and all subsequent material.
16. Rochambeau’s army commenced its march from Rhode Island on 18 June (see Rochambeau to GW, 15 June, and n.2 to that document; see also General Orders, 30 June).
17. GW promptly requested these militia to secure Newport (see GW to William Greene, 24 May). A request then came for more militia (see Barras to GW, and Rochambeau to GW, both 31 May).
18. See Rochambeau to GW, 12 April.