John Sullivan to George Washington, 11 June 1781
From John Sullivan
Philadelphia June 11th 1781
Dear General
My being on a Committee appointed to Confer with the Minister of France upon European affairs and to Draw up Instructions for our Minister appointed to Negotiate a peace has Deprived me untill now of the pleasure of Acknowledging the receipt of your Excellencys Letter of the 29th Ulto or rather the Duplicate1—altho I am not pleased at the originals falling into the Enemys hands I Think that Instead of being of advantage to them it will only Serve to Embarrass them. The object mentioned in mine to which that was an answer is by no means Discoverable from any thing in your Excellencys Letter.2 The Situation of our affairs as therein represented they were not Ignorant of. The only thing then that they can derive advantage from is the Idea held up of Attacking Newyork & this will only anticipate the Intelligence which our preparations would have demonstrated in a few Days & Even this may afford Some relief to the Southern States—I am Extremely mortified at having so many Mails taken & am not without Suspicion That There must be some hidden Influence in it. I find by your Excellencys reasoning that the Plan I proposed as at present impracticable I shall Therefore wave the Motion—I find also that the reasons for Invading Newyork were reasons of Necessity and was the only practicable attempt in our present Circumstances—I have however some Doubts respecting the probability of Success your Excellency may rest assured that Congress will use Every Exertion to promote the Success of so important an object3—we have very favorable Accounts from General Green which I Suppose will be Sent to your Excellency by this Express.4 we have not yet received any official Accounts yet I think it may be relied on that a Fleet from England Consisting of a 74 two frigates Several Sloops of war and Eighty four Transports with 4000 Troops on board arrived in Chassapeak Last Thursday This will make the Enemy 10 000 Strong in Virginia and Enable them to do much mischief to that State.5 I have the honor to be with the most perfect Esteem Dr General your Excys most obedt & very Humble Servant
Jno. Sullivan
ALS, DLC:GW; copy (extract), enclosed with GW to Rochambeau, 19 June, CtY-BR:R. Sullivan wrote “pr Express” on the cover of the ALS and also signed his name. GW’s aide-de-camp Tench Tilghman penned the extract, which consists of the last two sentences preceding the close. A French translation of the extract is in DLC: Rochambeau Papers, vol. 12. Another French translation of the extract, in Rochambeau’s writing, is in CtY-BR:R. GW evidently sent another extract, which has not been found, to Rear Admiral Barras (see GW to Barras, 19 June).
1. See GW to Sullivan, 29 May, and the source note to that document.
On 25 May, Congress received a memorial from French minister La Luzerne and referred it to a five-member committee that included Sullivan and delegates John Witherspoon, John Mathews, Joseph Jones, and Daniel Carroll. Congress ordered the committee to “confer with the superintendant of finance on such parts” of the memorial “as relates to money matters” (, 20:533).
La Luzerne’s memorial, written at Philadelphia on 25 May, related that “the second division of the troops commanded by the Count de Rochambeau of the fleet destined for the protection of the coasts of the United States could not be expedited” or “expected this campaign. Measures however are taken to reinforce the corps now at Rhode Island, and to despatch some vessels of force to join the squadron and enable it to put to sea.” La Luzerne requested Congress “to name a committee to whom he will communicate the causes of this change.” The memorial also indicated that King Louis XVI had agreed to grant the United States financial assistance that included a “subsidy of six millions livres tournois” (, 20:557–59, quotes on 557–58; see also John Laurens to GW, 24 March).
After meeting La Luzerne, the committee reported on 28 May that the French minister had “communicated some parts of a despatch” of 9 March from French foreign minister Vergennes and discussed the latest Russian and Austrian efforts to mediate disputes involving European belligerents, Great Britain, and the United States. The committee report continued: “The minister communicated to the committee several observations respecting the conduct of Mr. [John] Adams; and in doing justice to his patriotick character, he gave notice to the committee of several circumstances which proved it necessary that Congress should draw a line of conduct to that minister of which he might not be allowed to lose sight. The minister dwelt especially on a circumstance already known to Congress, namely, the use which Mr. Adams thought he had a right to make of his powers to treat with Great Britain. The minister concluded on this subject, that if Congress put any confidence in the king’s friendship and benevolence; if they were persuaded of his inviolable attachment to the principle of the alliance, and of his firm resolution constantly to support the cause of the United States, they would be impressed with the necessity of prescribing to their plenipotentiary a perfect and open confidence in the French ministers, and a thorough reliance on the king; and would direct him to take no step without the approbation of his Majesty; and after giving him, in his instructions, the principal and most important outlines for his conduct, they would order him, with respect to the manner of carrying them into execution, to receive his directions from the Count de Vergennes, or from the person who might be charged with the negotation in the name of the king.” La Luzerne advised the committee that the “most perfect independency is to be the foundation of the instructions to be given to Mr. Adams.” La Luzerne “desired the committee to press Congress to have this done with all possible despatch” and to have Congress “recommend to their plenipotentiary to adopt a line of conduct that would deprive the British of every hope of causing divisions between the allies.” La Luzerne further “desired the committee to inform Congress, that in case the offer of mediation from the two imperial courts should become so serious and so pressing as to oblige the king to give a decisive answer, his Majesty would accept of it conditionally for himself and for the United States. … The minister concluded the conference by observing, that a great object was to secure the United States from the proposition of uti possedetis: that the surest way to obtain that end was to reduce the English to confess that they are not able to conquer them. That present circumstances require great exertions from the Confederation; and that it was plain that every success gained by the army of Congress would infinitely facilitate the negotiations of their plenipotentiaries” (, 20:562–69, quotes on 562–64, 567–69; see also Sullivan to GW, 28 May, and John Witherspoon’s Speech, c.9 June, in , 17:305–9).
Congress debated instructions to John Adams in early June. The committee instructions and a congressional resolution adopted on 11 June directed Adams to agree to advice from French officials and instructed him to acquiesce to a truce in the event that a treaty was not possible (see , 20:625–26; see also , 173–78).
2. Sullivan refers to his proposal to invade Canada (see his letter to GW, 2 May).
3. For allied plans to attack the British around New York City, see The Wethersfield Conference and Aftermath, 14 May–16 June, editorial note.
4. On this date, Congress read letters of 10, 14, and 16 May that Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene had written Samuel Huntington, president of Congress (see , 20:620). The letter dated 10 May announced a prisoner exchange cartel, and the ones on 14 and 16 May announced British surrenders at Orangeburg and Fort Granby, S.C. (see , 8:234–35, 250–54, 271; see also Greene to GW, 10 and 16 May).
5. The preceding Thursday was 7 June. For this fleet, which sailed from Cork, Ireland, on 27 March, see GW to Rochambeau, 19 June, n.4, and to Barras, 27 June, n.1.