George Washington to Benjamin Harrison, 27 March 1781
To Benjamin Harrison
Head Quarters New Windsor 27th March 1781.
Dear Sir
On my return from Newport, I found your favor of the 16th of February, with its inclosures, at Head Quarters.1 I exceedingly regret that I could not have the pleasure2 of seeing you, not only from personal motives, but because I could have entered upon the subject of your mission, in a much more free and full manner than is proper to be committed to paper.
I very early saw the difficulties and dangers to which the southern States would be exposed for resources of Cloathing—Arms and Ammunition, and recommended Magazines to be established, as ample as their circumstances would admit.3 It is true they are not so full of Men as the Northern States, but they ought for that reason to have been more assiduous in raising a permanent force, to have been always ready, because they cannot draw a head of Men together as suddenly as their exigencies may require. That policy has unhappily not been pursued either here or there, and we are now suffering, from a remnant of a British Army, what they could not, in the beginning, accomplish with their force at the highest.
As your requisitions go to Men—Arms—Ammunition and Cloathing, I shall give you a short detail of our situation and prospects as to the first, and of our supplies and expectations as to the three last.
By the expiration of the times of service of the old troops4—by the discharge of the Levies engaged for the Campaign only—and by the unfortunate dissolution of the Pennsylvania line,5 I was left, previous to the march of the detachment under the command of the Marquis de la Fayette, with a Garrison barely sufficient for the security of West point—and two Regiments in Jersey to support the communication between the Delaware and North River.6 The York troops I had been obliged to send up for the security of the Frontier of that State.7 Weak however as we were, I determined to attempt the dislodgment of Arnold in conjunction with the French Fleet and Army, and made the detachment to which I have alluded.8
In my late tour to the Eastward, I found the accounts I had received, of the progress of recruiting in those States, had been much exaggerated, and I fear we shall, in the end, be obliged again to take a great proportion of their quotas in Levies for the Campaign instead of Soldiers for three years or for the War. The Regiments of New York having been reduced to two, they have but few Men to raise.9 Jersey depends upon voluntary inlistments upon a contracted Bounty, and I cannot therefore promise myself much success from the mode10—The pennsylvania line you know is ordered to compose part of the southern Army. General Wayne is so sanguine as to suppose he will soon be able to move on with 1000 or 1200 Men, but I fancy he rather over rates the matter.11
You will readily perceive from the foregoing state, that there is little probability of adding to the force already ordered to the Southward. For should the Battalions from New Hampshire to New Jersey inclusive be compleated (a thing not to be expected) we shall, after the necessary detachments for the Frontiers and other purposes are made, have an Army barely sufficient to keep the Enemy in check in New York. Except this is done, they will have nothing to hinder them from throwing further reinforcements to the Southward, and to be obliged to follow, by land, every detachment of their Army, which they always make by sea, will only end in a fruitless dissipation of what may now be called the Northern Army. You may be assured that the most powerful diversion, that can be made in favor of the southern States, will be a respectable force in the neighbourhood of New York. I have hitherto been speaking of our own resources. Should a reinforcement arrive to the French Fleet and Army, the face of matters may be intirely changed.12
I do not find that we can, at any rate, have more than two thousand stand of Arms to spare, perhaps not so many:13 For should the Battalions which are to compose this Army be compleat or nearly so, they will take all that are in repair or repairable. The two thousand stand came in the Alliance from France, and I have kept them apart for an exigency.14
Our stock of Ammunition,15 tho’ competent to the defensive, is, by a late estimate of the Commanding Officer of Artillery, vastly short of an offensive operation of any consequence.16 Should circumstances put it in our power to attempt such an one, we must depend upon the private Magazines of the States and upon our Allies—On the contrary, should the defensive plan be determined upon, what Ammunition can be spared, will be undoubtedly sent to the Southward.
Of Cloathing we are in a manner exhausted.17 We have not enough for the few Recruits which may be expected, and except that which has been so long looked for and talked of from France should arrive, the troops must, next Winter, go naked unless their States can supply them.18
From the foregoing representation, you will perceive that the proportion of the Continental Army already allotted to southern service is as much as, from present appearances, can be spared for that purpose; and that a supply of Arms—Ammunition or Cloathing of any consequence must depend, in great measure, upon future purchases or importations.
Nothing which is within the compass of my power shall be wanting to give support to the southern States, but you may readily conceive how irksome a thing it must be to me to be called upon for assistance, when I have not the means of affording it. I am with the greatest Regard Dear Sir Your most obt and hble Servt
Go: Washington
LS, in Tench Tilghman’s writing, MiU-C: Clinton Papers; LS (duplicate), Vi; Df, DLC:GW; copy, P.R.O.: C.O. 5/102; copy, P.R.O.: 30/11/105, Cornwallis Papers; Varick transcript, DLC:GW. Tilghman, who wrote the duplicate, added a notation: “It is feared that the original miscarried with the last Weeks Mail, which ⟨is missing⟩, and is supposed to have been taken and carried into New York.” For the intercepted mail, see GW to Elias Dayton, 4 April, and n.2 to that document. The Virginia House of Delegates read the duplicate on 28 May and referred it “to the Committee of the whole House on the state of the Commonwealth” (, p. 3). Gen. Henry Clinton enclosed the copy in P.R.O.: C.O. 5/102 when he wrote Lord George Germain on 5–20 April (see , 19:82, 20:102–6).
William Smith, royal chief justice for New York, wrote in his memoirs for 3 April (a day he spent in consultation with Clinton and Andrew Elliot, Loyalist lieutenant governor of New York): “Washington’s Letter to Harrison at Richmond in Virginia shews his Necessities, his Hopes, and his Fears; and speaking of but 2 Regiments for the Defence of Jersey is the Incentive I believe to the Intended Invasion of that Province” (Sabine, Smith’s Historical Memoirs [1971], 396). Clinton then summoned Smith and others for a meeting on 8 April, after which Smith wrote in his memoirs for that date: “Our Opinion asked as to publishing Washington’s Letter to Harrison lately intercepted. I strongly for it. General Robertson yeilded, Elliot rather against it but gave Way” (Sabine, Smith’s Historical Memoirs [1971], 397). In his memoirs for 14 April, Smith wrote that “Washington’s Letters” were not published because, he believed, Maj. Gen. James Robertson, military governor of New York, had insinuated to Clinton, “both 3 and 8th Inst., that they who see Washington’s Letter to Harrison of 28 March may ask why Sir Henry don’t enter Jersey? Can the Governor and Elliot wish to prolong the War? I believe rather they have no System, and hence the Versatility of their Conduct. Steady only in the Love of Power, and a Jealousy of those who seem for the Moment to be in their Way” (Sabine, Smith’s Historical Memoirs [1971], 399).
1. The Virginia legislature had directed Harrison to request military assistance from Congress and to see GW on the same subject (see Harrison to GW, 16–c.20 Feb.). For GW’s trip to Rhode Island, see his letters to Alexander Hamilton, 7 March, source note, and to Rochambeau, 16 March, n.1.
2. Tilghman originally wrote “had not the pleasure” on the LS. He then inserted “could not” above the line, altered “had” to “have” with a strike-over, and neglected to cross out the following “not,” which is omitted from the transcription.
3. GW had advocated for magazines when he wrote Virginia governor Thomas Jefferson on 10 Oct. 1780.
4. Tilghman wrote “Men.” in the left margin of the LS next to the first line of this paragraph.
5. A number of soldiers had three-year enlistments that expired in 1780. Enlistments for six-month levies in Continental service had expired before 1 Jan. 1781 (see State of Matters Laid Before the Committee at Headquarters, c.25–31 May 1780, and Circular to the States, 2 June 1780). For the mutiny in the Pennsylvania line and the subsequent discharge and furlough of a large number of those troops, see Anthony Wayne to GW, 2 Jan. 1781, source note.
6. The new organization of the Continental army reduced the New Jersey brigade to two regiments (see General Orders, 1 Nov. 1780). For the detachment sent to Virginia under Major General Lafayette, see GW’s second letter to Lafayette, 20 Feb. 1781, source note.
7. For GW’s orders to send troops to secure the New York frontier, see GW to William Heath, 28 Nov. 1780, and n.4 to that document; see also James Clinton to GW, 19 Nov. 1780.
8. For GW’s plan for a cooperation between the French fleet and Lafayette’s corps against Brig. Gen. Benedict Arnold’s forces in Virginia, see GW to Philip Schuyler, 23 March 1781, and notes 5 and 6 to that document.
9. The new organization of the Continental army required two infantry regiments and one artillery regiment from New York (see General Orders, 1 Nov. 1780).
10. In December 1780, the New Jersey legislature passed a law that directed the enlistment of 300 volunteers into New Jersey’s Continental regiments before 1 March 1781. The law allowed each such recruit a bounty in the amount of £22.10 (see William Livingston to GW, 5 Jan. 1781, n.1; see also , pp. 19–23).
11. GW had ordered Brig. Gen. Anthony Wayne to take a detachment of the Pennsylvania line to Virginia (see GW to Wayne, 26 Feb.). For Wayne’s estimate regarding troops, see his letter to GW, 19 March.
12. GW still hoped for a second division of the French expeditionary army, but it never left France (see Rochambeau to GW, 1 Jan., and n.2 to that document, and Lafayette’s second letter to GW, 13 April).
13. Tilghman wrote “Arms.” on the LS in the left margin next to the first line of this paragraph.
14. The Continental frigate Alliance had arrived in August 1780 (see James Bowdoin to GW, 17 Aug.; see also Steuben to GW, 28 July, and n.2 to that document).
15. Tilghman wrote “Ammunition.” on the LS in the left margin next to the first line of this paragraph.
16. See Henry Knox to GW, 17 Feb. 1781, and the source note to that document.
17. Tilghman wrote “Cloathing.” on the LS in the left margin next to the first line of this paragraph.
18. Previously anticipated uniforms from France never arrived, but clothing came from Spain later that spring (see Edward Hand to GW, 18 Feb., and Richard Harrison to GW, 12 March, and n.1 to that document).
Some relief eventually arrived from France. North Carolina delegate William Sharpe wrote Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene from Philadelphia on 4 Sept. that “Colo. Laurens has arived from France and brought to Boston sixteen thousand eight hundred stand of arms, materials for near ten thousand suits of cloaths—a considerable quantity of military stores, medicines &c.” (, 18:12–13; see also James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, 3 Sept., in , 18:4–5).