George Washington to Major General Benjamin Lincoln, 1 July 1781
To Major General Benjamin Lincoln
[Peekskill, 1 July 1781]
Sir
The object of your present command consisting of two Regiments (formed into 4 Battalions) under the command of Colo. Scammell and Lieut. Colo. Sprout—of a detachment of Artillery under the command of Capt. Burbeck—of the Corps of Watermen under the command of Major Darby, and the Water Guard under the command of Capt. Pray, is to attempt the surprize of the enemy’s posts upon the North End of York Island.1
My Ideas as to the most probable mode of attaining this object have been minutely detailed in the several conversations we have had upon the subject, and you have been furnished with such papers as I have been able to collect, and upon which my judgment has been formed: But it is not my wish or desire that these should be any restraint upon you. Your own observation and the circumstances of the moment must, in a great degree, govern.
The success of your enterprize depending absolutely upon secrecy and surprize, it will be wrong to prosecute it a moment after you are discovered, unless that discovery is made so near the Works, that you may, by a rapid movement, gain them before the enemy have time to recollect and put themselves in a posture of defence.
Fort George upon Laurel Hill ought to be your primary object, because success at that place will open a communication with the Main—afford an Asylum to the troops which may be disappointed in other attacks, and secure a retreat, in case of necessity, to the Main Body of the Army.
Should you carry Fort Knyphausen and Fort Tryon only—you cannot, without infinite risque, hold them, as we shall not be in a situation to support you from without. I would therefore recommend your damaging them as much as you possibly can, upon a sudden, and relinquishing them.2
The Artillery Men will be proportionably divided to the three attacks. Each party of them will be provided with two Lanthorns3 and two Rockets, one of which is to be fired in each work as soon as it is carried.
If compleat success should attend the enterprize, not a moments time should be lost, in drawing the Boats across the Island from the North River into Harlem Creek, and securing them under the Guns of Fort George, if circumstances will admit of it.4 But in case of a disappointment and being obliged to retreat by Water, and not being able to pass the enemy’s ship and Boats—the dernier resort must be a push over to the Jersey shore and an abandonment of the Boats, if they cannot be drawn up the Bank and carried off in Carriages.
It will be very essential that I should be made acquainted, and as early as possible, with your success and the extent of it. If compleat—you will announce it by firing of 13 Cannon at one minutes interval, after all lesser firing and confusion have ceased. If Fort George only is carried—6 Cannon are to be fired in the same manner. For Fort Knyphausen or Tryon or both of them you need not give signals because you are, as before directed, immediately to relinquish them.
The foregoing is upon a supposition that the principal object, the attempt upon the Works on York Island, is carried into execution. But should you, upon reconnoitering the Enemy tomorrow find it unadvisable to prosecute the plan, or should you be obliged to give it over on account of an early discovery by the enemy’s shipping or Boats; I would then have you turn your attention to the support of an attempt which is also to be made on the morning of the 3d by the Duke de Lauzun upon Delancey’s Corps laying at Morrisania5—To effect this, you will land your Men at any convenient place above the mouth of Spiten Devil Creek and march to the High Grounds in front of Kings bridge, where you will lay concealed untill the Dukes attack is announced by firing or other means. You may then dispose of your force in such a manner in view of the enemy as to make them think your party larger than it is, which may have the double effect of preventing them from coming over the Bridge to turn the Dukes right, and also of preventing any of Delanceys party from escaping that way. Your further operations must depend upon the movements of the enemy and other circumstances.
In case you land upon the East side of the River above the mouth of Spiten devil Creek you will send your Boats up under the East shore. If Major Darby receives no particular directions from me he will proceed with them to Kings ferry.
I expect I shall be myself in the Neighbourhood of Kings bridge early in the morning of the 3d with the remainder of the Army. I shall, as soon as possible, open a communication with you and give you such orders as the general state of matters may require.
If you land, send an Officer and a small party up the main Road to meet me.6 Given at Head Quarters near Peekskill this 1st day of July 1781.
Go: Washington
LS, in Tench Tilghman’s writing, MH; Df, DLC:GW; Varick transcript, DLC:GW.
GW appears to have established the main parameters of this operation as early as 28 June (see his entry for that date in Plan for the Surprise of the Enemy’s Posts on the North End of Manhattan Island, June. The operation involved three movements: Lincoln’s attack, GW’s march south with the rest of the Continental army, and French brigadier general Lauzun leading an assault on Col. James De Lancey’s Loyalist corps camped near Morrisania. Lauzun’s force consisted of his own legion, Col. Elisha Sheldon’s legion, Capt. Richard Sackett’s New York state troops, and Brig. Gen. David Waterbury’s Connecticut state troops. For orders given the commanders, see GW to Sackett, 30 June; to Waterbury, 30 June and this date; and to Lauzun and to Sheldon, both this date. GW advised Rochambeau of the operation (see his letter to Rochambeau, 30 June; see also GW to David Cobb, same date).
, 3:385–87). For his initial thoughts on Lincoln’s role, seeGW valued surprising, taking, and holding Fort George, Fort Charles, and the fort on Cox Hill. Anticipating a British counterattack and knowing the forts could not be held without immediate reinforcements, GW was prepared to call in New York militia for support (see GW to George Clinton, 30 June; see also GW to Henry Knox and to Alexander McDougall, both 2 July).
Lincoln embarked his troops in boats at Teller’s Point after dark on this date. Between 3:00 and 4:00 A.M., the men disembarked at the western landing of Dobbs Ferry and took cover in a nearby wood while Lincoln and Col. Alexander Scammell reconnoitered the British defenses. Looking across the river from Fort Lee, the two officers discovered conditions that made an attack on the forts impracticable. Lincoln then shifted to his secondary mission (see Lincoln to GW, 2 July). GW approved the change and ordered Lincoln to take the high ground in front of King’s Bridge to support Lauzun’s attack on Morrisania (see GW to Lincoln, 2 July). Lincoln’s detachment crossed the Hudson River before daylight on 3 July, landed near the Philipse Manor house, and marched south to occupy hills where the ruins of Fort Independence stood on the north side of Spuyten Duyvil Creek.
After learning of his part in the operation, Lauzun departed Bedford, N.Y., with his own legion, Sheldon’s legion, and Sackett’s troops on the evening of 2 July (see the entry for that date in French lieutenant Clermont-Crèvecœur’s journal in
, 1:31–32). These units met Waterbury’s troops at Clapp’s tavern, and the whole began their march to Morrisania.While Lauzun’s and Lincoln’s forces moved, GW started his march from Peekskill with the rest of the Continental army at 3:00 A.M. on 2 July to be in position to support or exploit the attack. Pressing ahead all that day and through the night with just two short breaks, the army reached Valentine’s Hill “about Sun rise” (entry for 2 July in , 3:388).
Events soon deflected Lauzun’s force from its primary mission. To achieve surprise, GW wanted Lauzun to have his corps at Westchester (about four miles from Morrisania) before sunrise. But by the early morning of 3 July, Lauzun’s combined brigade had reached only Eastchester, where firing was heard to the north. Rightly presuming that Lincoln’s force had become engaged and surprise had been lost, Lauzun abandoned the attack on De Lancey’s corps and marched his command north to aid Lincoln.
Germans manning the King’s Bridge defenses did not discover GW’s operation until near midnight on 2 July. Lt. Col. Andreas Emmerich had marched from King’s Bridge with forty British and sixty Hessian infantry at 9:00 P.M. intending to attack the crews of three armed whaleboats that came down the Hudson River from Dobbs Ferry every morning to gather fruit and vegetables at the Philipse Manor house. After reaching the house, they waited in ambuscade for the boatmen. Two hours after Emmerich marched, Major General Lossberg, the commander at King’s Bridge, received intelligence of GW’s advance. Dispatching a messenger to recall Emmerich, Lossberg ordered 200 jägers and 30 or 40 cavalrymen under Lt. Col. Ernst Carl von Prueschenck to cover Emmerich’s return and observe the Continentals approaching from the north. Meanwhile, Emmerich had spotted Lincoln’s force but remained concealed as the boats passed his position to a landing below. His troops became known when they fired on and scattered a fifty-man scouting unit from Lincoln’s command. Emmerich then retreated toward King’s Bridge (see the entry for 3 July in , 2:556–58, and , 449).
Lt. Johann Schäffer, commander of the jägers’ van, “detached a noncommissioned officer and ten jägers to reconnoiter, by different routes, the hill of the old Fort Independence. This was before daylight. Lieutenant Schäffer got to within fifteen paces of the rebel detachment, which had formed behind the demolished works, and had to withstand a whole volley” (The New-York Gazette: and the Weekly Mercury for 16 July reported that the jägers returned fire “and fell back to a proper distance. Lieut. Colonel Prueschenck immediately, and with great resolution and presence of mind endeavoured to gain the height in the rear of the fort, and tho’ he received the enemy’s whole fire, succeeded so far as to take possession of the ruins of a house which was formerly fortified by Colonel Emmerich; from whence he attacked the rebels in their advantageous position, intending to dislodge them, but observing a battalion with flying colours in the fort, finding their superiority of numbers, being furiously attacked, with the bayonet, and at the same time seeing no possibility of gaining any ground, to his advantage, resolved to fall back under the cannon in Charles redoubt, but the rebels pressing t[o]o hard upon him, and his infantry, on account of the narrow passage, began to loose ground.”
, 449). An account inPrueschenck ordered “thirty mounted jägers” to “charge the pursuing rebels.” It “was effective” and prompted “a second attack, which made the enemy abandon their position in order to gain the height at Devoe’s house.
“Immediately thereafter Lieutenant Colonel von Wurmb advanced with the rest of the Jäger Corps” (
, 449–50).Lincoln had drawn his force back while skirmishing with the jägers in hopes of enticing them further north where Lauzun’s corps, now approaching, could cut them off from Fort No. 8, the British stronghold on the east side of the Harlem River. Realizing his command’s predicament, Wurmb moved north only far enough to join with Emmerich and retire across King’s Bridge. Maj. Gen. Samuel Holden Parsons’s division then took possession of the heights in front of King’s Bridge. Wurmb left only a small guard of infantry at the bridge (see GW to Samuel Huntington, 6 July, and the entry for 3 July in
, 2:558).British commander Gen. Henry Clinton later reported: “Upon my hearing that the enemy’s army was so near me, I immediately rode out to Kings Bridge to observe their motions and catch at any advantage that might offer. But I soon saw that nothing could be attempted—without risking a general action—with the troops on duty in the lines, as I had not time to bring up more” (
, 307–8).In the afternoon, De Lancey’s Loyalist troops at Morrisania, fearing a night attack, drove their cattle behind Fort No. 8 and sent their families across the Harlem River. Parties from De Lancey’s corps skirmished through the day to secure their position (see the entry for 3 July in
, 2:558–59).The Continental army now controlled all the ground north of King’s Bridge.

Map 12. The execution of a detailed plan to surprise British posts on the north end of Manhattan Island fell short of GW’s hopes. (Illustrated by Rick Britton. Copyright Rick Britton 2022)
GW, accompanied by Brigadier General Duportail and some dragoons, reconnoitered the British works from the heights above Spuyten Duyvil Creek. The enemy observed the reconnaissance: “About 1 o’Clock two of the Enemy’s dragoons appeared on Spikendevil hill, and having observed that all was clear there, they returned; soon after which about 20 horsemen came on the hill, apparently with an intention of reconnoitring the position. Tis thought those persons were Washington, with some French Officers, and their attendants. A few Cannon shot were fired at them from Cox-hill Redoubt and Prince Charles’s, on which they immediately retired” (entry for 3 July in
, 2:558; see also GW to Huntington, 6 July). In the afternoon, GW moved the Continental army back to Valentine’s Hill. Lauzun’s legion and Waterbury’s state troops remained east of the Bronx River “on the East Chester road” (entry for 3 July in , 3:389; see also map 43 in , 2:238–39).Calculating from “the accounts of Prisoners & deserters, and from those of some of our own Officers,” British major Frederick Mackenzie, then stationed in New York City, placed American losses at “3 Officers and about 15 or 20 men, killed; & between 30 & 40 wounded. We took 10 prisoners.” He gave British and German casualties as “2 Jagers, killed; 1 Lieut 1 Serjt and 25 wounded, and 5 Missing” (entry for 3 July in
, 2:559). A modern estimate based on contemporary sources puts American casualties at 6 killed and 52 wounded (see , 87).For other accounts, see James Robertson to Lord Amherst, 5 July, in
, 206–8; the entry for 4 July in , 426; , 365–68; and , 350–52.Lauzun’s recollection of his role in the operation is at variance with GW’s diary entries and other reports. “The length of Duke Lauzens March & the fatiegue of his Corps, prevented his coming to the point of Action at the hour appointed,” GW wrote in his diary entry for 3 July (
, 3:388). Lauzun claimed to have “arrived punctually at the place appointed” and that GW personally delivered his orders to assist Lincoln. Lauzun blamed Lincoln for prematurely firing around King’s Bridge and alerting the Loyalists. He then insisted that his command rescued Lincoln, whose troops had retreated “in considerable disorder” and suffered “two or three hundred” casualties ( , 200–201; see also , 202–4).To his credit, GW achieved operational surprise. Mackenzie wrote in his diary entry for 3 July that the British lacked “the smallest information of their movement or approach until two hours after Emmerich marched” (Elias Dayton to GW, 26 June, n.3). Clinton later wrote: “Mr. Washington’s force being by this time assembled on the east side of the Hudson, it is obvious I could not venture to undertake” a planned offensive operation “before I should receive a reinforcement from the Chesapeake, as I might otherwise risk the extensive post of New York by detaching too largely from it. And, indeed, it was not long before the American chief let me know he was apportée to seize any advantage that should present itself, as he appeared in considerable force before my foreposts on the 3d of July, when a smart skirmish took place between his avant garde and about 200 Jägers supported by some refugees” ( , 307).
, 2:559). Another benefit was the deepening of Clinton’s fears (see1. For the strength of these units, see the entry for 28 June in , 3:385–86; see also Plan for the Surprise of the Enemy’s Posts on the North End of Manhattan Island, June, notes 1 and 8.
2. For more on forts George, Tryon, and Knyphausen, see Plan for the Surprise of the Enemy’s Posts on the North End of Manhattan Island, June, notes 4–5.
3. GW refers to lanterns.
4. GW interlineated the preceding six words on the draft, which also is in Tilghman’s writing.
5. See GW to Lauzun, this date.
6. Only the LS includes the two preceding paragraphs.