Plan for the Surprise of the Enemy’s Posts on the North End of Manhattan Island, June 1781
Plan for the Surprise of the Enemy’s Posts on the North End of Manhattan Island
[June 1781]
Detachment1
The detachment above, makes two Battalions of 8 Companies each—A company will consist of 40 or 50 rank & file, according to the agregate number which shall be deemed adequate to the enterprize in view.
Fig. 2. The numbers and ranks of troops proposed for the attacking force against British posts in northern Manhattan Island. (DLC:GW)
The parts composing these Battalions, and intended for the different Services above ennumerated, may be drawn out at different times, under various pretexts, that the real object may be hid, as much as possible, even from the Army itself. To relieve & strengthen the Post at Dobbs’s ferry, may be the pretence for drawing out the detachment for Spiten devil and the Bridge2—To relieve the Jersey Troops at Sedman’s,3 & to cover the Stores at Ringwood &ca, may serve for the detachment for the No. Redoubt4—To reinforce the Troops on the lines may cover the detachment for Fort Washington—That for Laurel hill must be deferred till the last moment5—or it may be formed as a light Corps next for detachment to the Southward or to act here as occasion may require.
To detach Officers & Soldiers for the Batteaux, and Assembling the Boats without giving suspicion, will be most dificult—nor do I see how it can be done, unless it is under a pretext of rescuing the Boats from ignorant hands, where, at present, they are undergoing continual abuse, and placing them in those who know how, and will take care of them. If a general order of this kind would envite proper persons to undertake the business, & not imply neglect in the Q.M. Genl it would be desirable. At all events, this, or some such expedient must be adopted to draw forth the Number of Watermen which will be wanted.6
The Watermen, under their own Officers, are, after the debarkation to act as a guard to the Boats.
The several detachments being made, or ordered, a time & place, or places, if the design can be the better covered by it, must be appointed for the embarkation by detachment, in the order of attack, and the whole, from that moment, to be under the orders of the Officer who is to conduct the enterprize—The embarkation is to take place about dusk & in as concealed a manner as possible.
From dusk till day break, or a little before it, there are not more than Seven hours; and taking the chance of Tides and Wind, we ought not to calculate upon rowing more than 2½ Miles in the hour, or 17 Miles in the course of the Night—and Verplanks being the lowest point of departure, the detachment could not, from this place, get below Dobbs’s ferry the first night, & ought to stop sooner if they cannot reach it by 3 o’clock—a little below the lower battery at Dobbs’s ferry (in the Wood) would be a proper place to lye concealed at during the day.
Before an Officer or Soldier is suffered to put a foot on shore they are to be charged not to make fires or talk loud—and are to be charged moreover under pain of instt death not to stir 20 yds from their Arms (wch are to be stacked near the Boats[)] but not within view of the opposite shore—The Boats are to be concealed with boughs—and the men not suffered to walk where they can be seen—In a word, they are to lye down—sleep—and refresh themselves for the fatiegues of the ensuing night.
Towards Sundown the business is to be disclosed to the principal Officers of the detachment, and those who are to command the different Attacks are to have their orders in writing, that no possible misconception of them may happen—At this time also, the precise hour is to be ascertained, and the Watches made to agree to a moment—the hour of attack is likewise to be fixed upon and ought, if practicable, to be at the same instant, at every point.
Every matter, & thing, must be clearly settled, & fully understood, before the embarkation at this place—The Arms and Ammunition are to be inspected—the pieces searched, & not one suffered to be loaded. The Troops will again embark by detachment in the following order. That for Fort Knyphausen first—Fort Tryon next—Fort George on Laurel hill next—and those for Cox hill (at the Mouth of Spiten devil) & Prince Charles’s redoubt by the bridge last—and in this order they will proceed with the utmost secresy & silence under the shade of the Jersey shore till they come opposite to the enemy’s works when they are—except the last detachment—to cross directly over to the landing immediately under Fort Knyphausen which lyes in a small cove or Bason 2 or 300 yards above our old Battery at the point known by the name of Jeffreys Rock.7
Very particular attention must be given to the tide at the time of crossing, for if it should happen to ebb the Boats may be driven so near Jeffreys rock as to be discovered by the Sentry from a Sergts guard which mounts there at Night—On the other hand, the flood tide may heave the Boats up the river, so as to be discovered by a Corporals guard above the Palisading or Stockade on the North River at Fort Tryon—The detachment before excepted, should make for the low land between Fort Tryon & Cox’s hill where there has been a Wood landing, and from whence a good road leads immediately both to Cox’s hill & the redoubt at the bridge.
When the Boats approach near to the place of debarkation, the Troops in them are to lie low—if they should notwithstanding be discovered, & hailed, they must endeavor to pass for deserters or Traders, but rather the former, having brought off a number of Boats which they mean to deliver up, for pay; after landing & forming into a solid column by detachment as aforesaid, they will proceed to the proper points of seperation; when each detachment will move rapidly (but in good order) to acquire the honor, & sieze the advantages which they are in pursuit of. The Column before seperation, and each party afterwards, should be preceeded by a small guard who should pass as long as possible for friends—decoy Sentries—and announce the approach of a reinforcement for the Works towards which they are Marching. or have recourse to some other device which the exigency of the momt may dictate.
As the combining of many attacks all of which being to be made at the same moment and a deviation in point of time in any one May give the alarm to the rest and defeat the whole the following enterprize will be found more simple—more practicable—and perhaps equally important, as the redoubt by King’s bridge & that at the Mouth of Spiten devil would not remain in the hands of the enemy long if we possessed their Works at the barrier.
Detachmt for this Service8
If the enemy’s Armed Vessels and guard Boats in the North river cannot be eluded the enterprize fails of course, and the Detachment must return; because an Alarm from the Water will give such timely notice as to render a surprize impracticable—and without it, the Works cannot be carried without great loss, if at all.
If the guard Boats are passed undiscovered, the deception will be the greater if the detachment continues along the Jersey shore ’till it gets opposite to Morris’s white House9 where, in some obscure place, it may land & form—and march in the most undiscoverable way to the proper point of seperation when the detachments for Forts Knyphausen & Tryon will file to the left & that for Fort George, or Laurel Hill, to the Right & each move rapidly for their object calling themselves a reinforcement for the Works they are Marching towards, and endeavouring to pass as such.
Previous to, or about the time of embarking the detachment, parties of Horse and foot should be ordered to way lay every avenue on both sides of the River by which the enemy may obtain intelligence of the
Fig. 3. The detachment GW considered to take Fort Tryon, Fort Knyphausen, and Fort George on Laurel Hill. (DLC:GW)
movement of the detachment and every precaution used that can be thought of to conceal the attempt & give success to the Enterprize.10
AD, DLC:GW. The docket reads: “Thoughts on, & a plan for the Surprize of the Enemy’s Posts upon the North end of York Island June—1781.”
1. Two tables follow, one below the other, showing the numbers and ranks of troops proposed for the attacking force. The assault troops for each objective would be carried in boats, and each boat would have five oarsmen. Two artillery companies—each composed of one captain, two subalterns, three sergeants, and twenty-five rank and file—carried in two boats, would accompany the attacking force.
In the first table, GW calculated the numbers required if the companies assigned to the assaults were made up of a captain, two subalterns, three sergeants, and fifty rank and file. The total strength in this case was 903 officers and infantrymen and 168 officers and men for thirty-two boats. In the second table, which he labeled “Upon a smaller Scale,” he calculated the total numbers if the assaulting companies were composed of the same number of officers and sergeants but only forty rank and file. The total strength in this case was 743 officers and infantrymen and 138 officers and men for twenty-six boats.
Each table listed the same objectives. One field officer would command both the assault on the defenses of Spuyten Duyvil Creek and the assault on King’s Bridge, with one company assigned to each attack. Four boats (three in the case of the smaller companies) commanded by one subaltern would carry the troops. GW assigned two companies commanded by a field officer to the attack on the north redoubt on Manhattan Island (see n.4 below). Four boats (three in the case of the smaller companies) commanded by one subaltern would carry these troops. For the assault on Fort Washington (Fort Knyphausen), GW designated four companies with two field officers. Eight boats (seven in the case of the smaller companies) commanded by a captain and a subaltern would carry these troops. For the assault on the fort at Laurel Hill, GW assigned eight companies commanded by three field officers. Sixteen boats (thirteen in the case of the smaller companies) commanded by a field officer and three subalterns would carry these troops.
2. The British defensive works along Spuyten Duyvil Creek and at King’s Bridge included the fort on Cox Hill at the mouth of Spuyten Duyvil Creek and Fort Charles just south of King’s Bridge.
3. For this detachment, see Francis Barber to GW, 12 February.
4. GW evidently refers to Fort Tryon, a defensive work south of the fort on Cox Hill and just north of Fort Washington.
5. The British had constructed and garrisoned Fort George on Laurel Hill (see Henry Knox and Rufus Putnam to GW, 6 Oct. 1776, n.1). A wall connected Fort George with Fort Tryon (see Anthony Wayne to GW, 18 Nov. 1779, n.3).
6. See General Orders, 19 June 1781; see also GW to Samuel Darby, 28 June, and General Orders, 29 June.
7. Jeffrey’s Hook, or Jeffrey’s Rock, now Fort Washington Point, N.Y., was a small promontory just southwest of Fort Washington. A lunette battery, part of the outer defenses of Fort Washington, was constructed at the site in 1776 (see , 303). During a reconnaissance, GW described the fortification on the hook as “a small Work” manned by “a Sergeants guard” with a “Guard House standing within” (entry for 18 July 1781 in , 3:394).
8. A single table follows at this point similar to those described in n.1 above. This table showed only three objectives: Fort Tryon, Fort Knyphausen, and Fort George on Laurel Hill. Each company contained fifty rank and file with one captain, two subalterns, and three sergeants. A field officer with two companies would assault Fort Tryon. Two field officers with six companies would attack Fort Knyphausen. Three field officers with eight companies would strike Fort George. Thirty two boats—each with five oarsmen—commanded by one field officer, one captain, and six subalterns would carry the assault forces. Two additional boats would transport two artillery companies, each artillery company having one captain, two subalterns, three sergeants, and twenty-five rank and file.
9. The house of Roger Morris was located on high ground about one mile south of Fort Washington (see Rufus Putnam to GW, 3 Sept. 1776, n.1).
10. For orders to execute this plan, see GW to Benjamin Lincoln, 1 July 1781.