Major General Chastellux to George Washington, 9 June 1781
From Major General Chastellux
Newport June 9 1781
dear general
I am very sorry to see that the resolve of our board of war did not appear to your eyes under a favourable light;1 but I cannot forbear complaining to your excellency with all the feelings of attachment and duty, that you could entertain the least suspicion upon the meaning of a step to which I gave my vote.2 the mention made of unanimity could have recalled to your memory, that there was in that board a man who was incapable of consenting to any measure which could cross your orders, nay your very wishes. I regrett that the hurry in which duke de Lauzun sat out prevented me to write to your excellency, but as he is my friend and well intentioned, I thought he might express my opinion better than a letter. I did not participate to those that he bore to your excellency.3 it may be that they failed in the explanation of our motives; but it is indeed very unhappy, if a measure proposed by the bravest and ablest officer of our navy, and supporteed by the true friends both of your excellency and of america, bore the appearance of a deviation from the disposition made by your excellency. we thought that the removal of the fleet was an evil attending a good and necessary operation, and we were persuaded to please your excellency by endeavouring to prevent that evil, and going beyond your expectation in preserving the fleet in the situation where, according to the opinion of its officers, it is more capable of conspiring to the execution of your plan. I wish sincerely that in the coalition of allyed forces no other mistake might take place; for I pledge my faith and my honour that it was dictated by an impulsion of mere zeal. this zeal did not subside at all in the new board of war; when it was intimated to them that your excellency saw some danger in the present station of the fleet, it was unanimously answered that danger was the lot of war, and ought to be counterballanced by the advantages of which it is productive. they thought that after your excellency had made his will Known about the destination of the land forces under your command, you was no more answerable for their fate.4 indeed this disposition occasioned an application for 500 militia more, but your excellency may observe that upon that point, there was no unanimity.5 I need not to say more upon that article, but I shall conclude this letter by entreating your excellency to place some confidence in my zeal and candour, and to be persuaded that i should rather exceed, if it were possible, than be backward in testifying my attachment to america and her great protector. I am with the most sincere respect dear general your most humble and obedient servant
le chr de chastellux
I think that the news lately arrived from west indies will make your excellency perfectly easy about the station of our fleet.6
We learn just now, that the convoy is arrived safe at marblehead.7 the alliance took a frigate of 22 guns and made several valuable prises, esteemed one million of livre the marquiss de le fayette is wanting, having quitted the alliance in a very bad squall.8
ALS, DLC:GW. GW replied to Chastellux on 13 June.
1. See GW to Barras and to Rochambeau, both 4 June; see also n.3 below and The Wethersfield Conference and Aftermath, 14 May–16 June, editorial note.
2. Brigadier General Lauzun later wrote that Chastellux had initiated the change of plan. The senior French officers “had no sooner arrived at Newport than the Chevalier de Chastellux, who is too hot-headed ever to stick to one idea for any length of time, thought that it would be more to our advantage if the fleet were to wait in Rhode Island roads, since the naval force that was promised us would be able to join it more easily in Chesapeake Bay, where it was probable that it would arrive. The Chevalier de Chastellux discussed this with various naval captains: several were of his opinion. He made M. de Rochambeau agree to speak of the matter to M. de Barras, and to propose to him that the point should be decided by a council of war, composed of officers of the land and sea forces. The council decided that the fleet should remain off Rhode Island” (, 199).
3. Lauzun carried the letters announcing the decision of the French council of war (see Rochambeau to GW, 31 May, and n.2 to that document; see also Barras to GW, same date, and the source note to that document).
4. See Proceedings of a Council of War, 8 June, printed as an enclosure with Barras to GW, this date.
5. For the request, see Rochambeau to GW, 31 May.
6. See Rochambeau to GW, 10 June, and n.1 to that document; see also Rochambeau to GW, 9 June, and n.10.
7. See Barras to GW, this date, n.5.
8. The Continental frigate Alliance had arrived at Boston on 6 June after being separated from the French privateer Marquis de Lafayette, which the British then captured (see William Heath to GW, 7 June, and n.4 to that document; see also Robert Morris to GW, 2 July, n.4).