I fear, from the purport of the letter you did me the honor to write from Newport, on the 9th, that my sentiments respecting the Council of War held on board the Duke de Burgoyne (the 31st of May) have been misconceived;1 and I shall be very unhappy if they receive an interpretation different from the true intent & meaning of them—If this is the case, it can only be attributed to my not understanding the business of the Duke de Lauzen perfectly.2 I will rely therefore on your goodness & candor to explain & rectify the mistake, if any has happened.

My wishes perfectly coincided with the determination of the Board of War to continue the Fleet at Rhode Island—provided it could remain there in safety with the force required; and did not impede the March of the Army towards the north River; but when Duke Lauzen informed me, ⟨that my opinion of the propriety, & safety of this measure was required by the Board, & that he came hither at the particular desire of the Counts Rochambeau & de Barras, to obtain it. I was reduced to the painful necessity of delivering a sentiment different from that of a most respectable board, or of forfeiting all pretensions to candor by the concealmt of it—upon this ground it was I wrote to the Generals to the effect I did, and not because I was dissatisfied at the alteration of the plan agreed to at Weathersfield.3 My fears for the safety of the Fleet—which I am now perswaded were carried too far—were productive of a belief that the Generals, when seperated, might feel uneasy at every misterious preparation of the enemy, and occasion a fresh call for Militia—this had some weight in my determination to give Boston—(where I was sure no danger could be encountered but that of a blockade) a preference to Newport—⟩where, under some circumstances though not such as were likely to happen, something might be enterprized.

The Fleet being at Rhode Island is attended, certainly, with many advantages in the operation proposed—And I entreat that you, and the Gentlemen who were of opinion that it ought to be risqued there for these purposes4 will be assured, that I have a high sense of the obligation you meant to confer on America by that resolve—and that your Zeal to promote the common cause, & my anxiety for the safety of so valuable a fleet, were the only motives which gave birth to the apparent difference in our opinions.5

I set that value upon your friendship and candor—and have that implicit belief in your attachment to America, that they are only to be equalled by the Sincerity with which I have the honor to be. Dr Sir—Yr Most Obedt & Obliged Hble Servt