His Excellency General Washington having signified to The Count de Barras, that after having considered the deliberations of the Council held on Board the Duke de Burgogne the 31st of May—he again recommended the conducting the Squadron to Boston as a port more safe, under all possible circumstances, than Newport could be after the principal part of the French Army shall have been withdrawn—and that he desired that affair might be again taken into consideration1—The Count de Barras has demanded a new Council to be assembled composed of the principal Officers of the Navy and Army to consider the matter a second time.

The Council assembled—and the two first propositions of the meeting of the 31st of May having been again deliberated upon, they unanimously persisted in what had been before determined upon, and that for the reasons before adduced, to which they have added the following considerations, that His Excellency may be enabled to judge at one view of what passed relative to the matter.

scarcely had the Count de Barras arrived at Newport when the Count de Rochambeau and himself desired to have an interview with His Excellency to make him acquainted with the Means which they had it in their power to employ and to know what would be his intentions in consequence of that communication.2 But the delay of the arrival of the Convoy and the fear that the squadron of the enemy, which had gone out of New York, should make an attempt upon that Convoy, determined him to go out himself. As he was to set sail the same day upon which the Count de Rochambeau departed he requested him to carry to His Excellency his opinions upon the uses of the Marine force, and made him his Proxy.3 His Excellency judging, that the necessity of acting with the land forces either for the attack of New York, or for a powerful diversion in favor of the southern States, required their separation from the Squadron, it was concluded at that time, that, after the orders of the King, it should sail for the port of Boston where it would be in more security than at Newport.4

It was clear that the object of his Excellency was to make a diversion with the land forces and that the destination of the Squadron was an affair of precaution and a momentary sacrifice of the aid of the Naval forces to the plan of operations which he had proposed.

But the intelligence which has since been received of the weakening of the Garrison of New York,5 and of the tendency of all the efforts of the enemy towards the south having considerably diminished the probability of an attack upon Rhode Island and the extreme desire which animates all those who compose the French force in America to assist equally and efficaciously the common cause, have given rise to new Reflections—They have thought that the kind of retreat of the Squadron into the port of Boston while the land Army is marching towards New York would appear to the enemy a step very contradictory of what an offensive movement by land ought to produce—After these reflexions they have judged that, the departure of the land forces having being determined upon by His Excellency, that of the Squadron cannot have.6

That precaution being no longer judged necessary by the Marine of the King, they are desirous of not being an obstacle to the general System of the Campaign, to which they hope to give aid by their stay at Newport, and more so by the facility with which they can act as soon as the succours which they expect from France arrive.7 The sole obstacle which can oppose itself to this new proof of Zeal on their part arises from certain Articles contained in some instructions, always respectable; but of which the old date and the distance at which we are from Europe may justify us in modifying8—It is to relieve himself from those shackles that the Count de Barras has called a Council of War, not to propose plans different from those which have been fixed upon at Wethersfield, but to authorise himself to aid them in a manner more noble and more efficacious.

This Council of War in voting unanimously for measures the most firm and most useful, appear to have fulfilled the double object of giving a free Carreer to the Zeal of the two French Generals9 and to encourage the delicacy of His Excellency to which, without doubt ought to be attributed the desire which he has shewn of submitting his judgment to the examination of a Council of War.

The Council have judged that the squadron will not be hazarded at Newport—But however just their opinion may be, his Excellency will always consider it as the pure effect of their Zeal.