On 20 June, Jay presented Grenville his general power, after which the two men arranged a meeting on 27 June.1 Unusually, Jay proposed that no secretaries (John Trumbull and James Bland Burges) should be present, and that anything committed to paper be considered informal, with each party able to retract or change their opinion with liberty. As Trumbull recorded in his autobiography, Jay emphasized to Grenville “that this was not a trial of skill in the science of diplomatic fencing, but a solemn question of peace or war between two people, in whose veins flowed the blood of a common ancestry, and on whose continued good understanding might perhaps depend the future freedom and happiness of the human race.” Grenville agreed.2

Although Jay had hoped to begin broad and substantive discussions then, Grenville informed him that he would first have to confer with the cabinet, soon to be reorganized. Pitt was about to form a coalition with the prowar opposition Whigs surrounding the Duke of Portland.3 Jay was able, however, to use the opportunity to press for an end to British attacks on American shipping and to claim compensation for depredations that had already occurred. Handicapped by his own lack of proper evidence about them, he discovered, to his great surprise, that neither Grenville nor Pinckney had received any information on British captures of American vessels under the Order in Council of 6 November 1793. Documentation from Randolph did not begin to arrive until early July nor did the promised reports from Nathaniel Higginson, who had been sent to the West Indies to provide them.4 Nevertheless, on 3 July, Jay appealed to Grenville to issue temporary orders to reduce the number of captures and speed the flow of appeals. Although Grenville did not respond immediately, in letters to Rufus King, to Randolph, and to Washington, Jay cautiously expressed his satisfaction with the manner in which his discussions were proceeding.5 His plan, Jay told Randolph, was to accommodate, not to convict or convince, since men who signed their names to arguments could not easily retract them.6

Changes in the British ministry were announced on 11 July. They and setbacks for the British-led coalition in the European conflict claimed Grenville’s attention and brought a temporary halt to substantive discussions. Nevertheless, Grenville found time that day to listen to Jay’s concerns about Simcoe’s fortification of Fort Miamis at Detroit and British incitement of Indians.7 He pledged that British attacks on American territory would cease, that the status quo would be maintained, and that any prisoners or territory taken by British forces would be returned. On 15 July, Grenville gave Jay a letter of instructions he had written to Hammond codifying their agreement to end the unauthorized hostilities from Canada for Jay to enclose in his dispatches to Randolph for delivery to Hammond.8

By the end of July, Grenville was ready to engage with Jay on the principal objects of his mission. Jay prepared carefully. Having received some documentation on spoliations from Randolph, on 23 July, Jay informed Grenville that he was forwarding complete case files on some of the captures. On 27 July, he sent Grenville a draft of his planned representation, followed the next day by a letter covering a “General Statement by Captains of Vessels seized at Martinique” signed on 29 April, which he had inadvertently omitted from his letter of the previous day. During their meeting on 30 July, Jay presented the “official note on the object of his mission” in which he complained about the irregular captures, the improper condemnations of American vessels, and the “unusual personal severities” and impressment Americans had suffered at the hands of British forces in the West Indies. Grenville countered that he was besieged by British creditors, leading Jay to anticipate that resolution of the debt issue would be difficult. In his written response to Jay’s representation of 1 August, Grenville chose to concentrate on the maritime issues. Although he implied that Britain would not make concessions on what it considered legally defensible principles regarding the rights of neutral commerce and the definition of contraband, concessions for which the United States could offer nothing of comparable value, he stated that it was prepared to correct abuses. In a naval war of global proportions, he noted, some “inconveniences” to neutral commerce were inevitable, but added Americans would be given every opportunity to present their claims and that it was the king’s wish to do “complete and impartial justice” to all American citizens.9 Having addressed with relative success one of the primary objectives of his mission, Jay immediately dispatched copies of his representation and Grenville’s reply to Randolph.10

Next on the agenda were treaty issues. In advance of a meeting on 5 August, Grenville sent Jay an unofficial note indicating that he had reviewed Jefferson’s claim that Britain’s retention of the North American posts constituted the first treaty violation, thereby giving American acts complained of by Britain the cloak of legitimacy,11 a claim Grenville unequivocally rejected. He was, no doubt, aware that Jay had previously and publicly stated as secretary for foreign affairs that impediments various states had placed in the way of British creditors had constituted the first violation of the treaty. Although Jay did not explicitly agree to Grenville’s conclusion, he could not effectively contest it.12 Grenville, on his part, chose not to end negotiations before they began by pressing his case. Instead, the two men agreed to try to identify reciprocal concessions and to preface the treaty by stating that they had decided to terminate their differences without drawing their merits into question.13

Jay immediately followed up on this conference by presenting Grenville with a preliminary draft convention and treaty of commerce on 6 August.14 He first considered issues related to the peace treaty: identifying which river was the St. Croix River the peace negotiators intended as the northeastern boundary between the United States and New Brunswick; settling the northwestern boundary if the headwaters of the Mississippi River did not extend far enough north to meet a line passing through the Lake of Woods; and return of the western posts still held by the British. Here, Jay’s intimate knowledge of the intent of the treaty’s negotiators gave him an advantage. Furthermore, concessions on these matters would not diminish Britain’s ability to wage war against France, and would give the United States reason to remain neutral in the conflict. Jay concluded the convention portion of his draft with items on the rights of neutral commerce, spoliations, and debts. He then took up issues to be included in the treaty of commerce: in peace, admission of the United States to trade with the British West Indies, reciprocal duties, the carrying trade and commodities allowed in regular trade between the two nations;15 and in war, prizes when one of two nations was neutral, privateers when at war with one another; and finally, protection for citizens owning lands in the opposite nation, and a prohibition against sequestration or confiscation of debts.16

As he had led Jay to expect, Grenville did not respond immediately.17 Jay remained cautiously optimistic. On 8 August, he informed Randolph that his prospects were “not discouraging,” and, a day later, announced that he had hired William Scott, an eminent jurist with expertise on prize cases, to advise him on management of American appeals of prize court verdicts and claims for compensation.18 Jay also enclosed a copy of an Order in Council of 6 August that he had just received from Grenville instructing the king’s vice admiralty courts in the West Indies to admit appeals of condemnations of American vessels even if the time limit for so doing had lapsed.19 In mid-month, Jay politely tried to elicit a response on the draft that he had submitted to Grenville ten days earlier. Grenville, as politely, indicated that pressing business prevented him from giving it his full attention.20

Reassured by Grenville’s initial response on spoliations and impressments, on 21 August, Jay informed Randolph that he anticipated that his next conference with Grenville would produce something decisive, “at least on some of the great points,” even though affairs had come to a temporary halt.21 The numerous calls on Grenville’s attention had occasioned some delays, he reported, but he had no reason to think they could have been avoided. In this letter, Jay also noted that Monroe, the newly appointed American minister to France, had arrived at Paris.22

On 30 August Grenville delivered his two-part counter-proposal, significantly more developed than Jay’s original draft, with apologies for not having been able to send it sooner. His carefully chosen opening was an agreement to evacuate the posts. The concession, long-demanded by the United States, was not totally satisfactory, since Grenville specified that Britain would hold the posts until 1 June 1796. In place of the barrier state along the northern border Britain had long aspired to erect,23 Grenville added provisions that preserved property rights and provided for the free flow of goods and unimpeded cross-border access for British traders and Indians involved in the fur trade.24 He did not, however, provide an equivalent privilege for Americans, an omission Jay quickly called to his attention. Jay challenged these unequal privileges conceded to British traders without parallel benefits to Americans, and proposed additions that would have demilitarized the frontier.25

Grenville’s second article took up both of the border issues created by the unavoidably vague and erroneous maps on which the peace negotiators had had to depend. Two issues were still unresolved: boundaries related to the St. Croix River and the northern boundary west of Lake Superior. Where Jay’s draft of 6 August had proposed leaving both disputes to be resolved by commissions, Grenville’s solution to the northwestern boundary was a carefully couched demand to extend the boundary far enough south to give the British direct access to the headwaters of the Mississippi.26

The very next day Jay notified Grenville that several items in his draft, especially the article on the northwest boundary line might constitute “parting points,” and asked for a meeting to discuss them. When Grenville did not respond immediately, Jay wrote again on 4 September to emphasize the need for a meeting and enclosed a series of remarks on the boundary question for Grenville’s consideration. Grenville answered the next day. While he did not concede that his interpretation of the treaty was incorrect, he made a discreet retreat from it by allowing that Jay’s proposal for appointing commissioners, did not appear “ill adapted” to reaching a just solution to the dilemma, and set a meeting on 6 September to discuss all the issues that threatened the success of the negotiations.27 In advance of it, Jay sent a list of other points in Grenville’s draft he believed were in need of revision. The observations and alterations Grenville sent Jay under cover of a note of 7 September28 predicted that the discussion would be wide-ranging and substantive. A meeting to continue it was scheduled for several days later.29 Grenville balanced his conciliatory retreat on the boundary matter by calling Jay’s attention to what he and others considered the inappropriate professions of affection for France found in Monroe’s first address to the French National Convention of 15 August and in Randolph’s earlier correspondence with the Committee of Public Safety. Jay took this matter very seriously and so advised Randolph in a private letter accompanying his lengthy public report on the negotiations with Grenville.30

During their next meeting, sometime in mid-September, Jay presented Grenville with his proposal for resolving the Lake of the Woods controversy.31 The conversation that followed, Jay said, was “temperate and candid.” Grenville also indicated he would be willing to consider an article officially admitting American vessels to the British East Indies, and, in the spirit of reciprocity, offered to postpone payments awarded by the commissioners to British creditors until the posts were evacuated.32 It was probably in the course of this meeting that the decision was made to consolidate the two treaties into a single document.33

During the remainder of the month, Jay worked diligently to present a new draft, including, as he later reported to Randolph, most of the articles in Grenville’s two drafts as well as several additional articles he proposed for their “mutual consideration.” Jay presented his draft to Grenville on 30 September. Eager for a response, he wrote Grenville on 7 October to ask whether he would be able to tell Washington that progress toward a treaty was being made by the time the next packet departed in several weeks. Anticipating Grenville’s response, he noted that, having reviewed his draft, he had concluded that some of the articles he had suggested would have to be revised. Grenville promptly agreed. Jay’s “Contre projet,” he said, varied so much from the substance of the articles he had proposed that it would take more time than he had anticipated to resolve the differences and bring their negotiation to a satisfactory conclusion. He then invited Jay to meet with him the next day so he could identify the “leading points” that, if Jay insisted on them, would create “insurmountable obstacles” to the conclusion of the treaty.34 Shortly thereafter, Jay reviewed the draft of the treaty with Pinckney and with John Quincy Adams, then on his way to assume his position as minister to the Netherlands. None of them were enthusiastic about it, but they considered it preferable to war.35

Negotiations continued throughout the month. Jay met with Grenville on 24 and 28 October.36 The next day, Jay informed Randolph that Grenville had created a new draft37 that omitted some articles from Jay’s draft of 30 September and added others, removing some obstacles and lessening others, although some still remained. Grenville, he said, wanted goods for the Indian trade to enter the United States from Canada duty free, and to this he could not agree.38 He did not know whether the strong objections he had raised to Grenville’s attempt to remove alien tonnage and an impost would be sustained.39 On the positive side, Jay reported, Grenville had finally agreed to settle the northwest boundary by a survey and commission and would probably agree to admit American traders to Canada and its Indian trade, although he would not allow them to navigate the St Lawrence to the sea.40 He would not agree to advance the 1796 date set for evacuation of the posts,41 but had added a clause allowing the United States to extend its settlements anywhere within the treaty boundaries other than within the precincts of the posts.42 Jay also informed Grenville that Washington had expressed satisfaction with Jay’s reception by the king and confidence that the negotiations would result in a mutually beneficial treaty that he pledged to support.43 It would soon be decided, Jay thought, whether a treaty was possible or not.44

When discussion resumed on 30 October, Grenville presented an article on the Indian trade, and then proposed a substitute for it the next day. This, Jay immediately accepted and asked for a meeting during which he hoped they could complete the negotiation. He wrote Randolph on 5 November to say that it was “almost certain” that the treaty would soon be finished.45 After reading the copy of the treaty Grenville sent him on 10 November, Jay discovered one more problem that he did not specify in correspondence, but which was evidently resolved in person on the 11th. On 17 November, George III issued a formal commission to Grenville to conclude the treaty, and Jay sent Randolph a brief note to indicate that it had been agreed upon, would be signed either that day or the next, and sent by the packet.46 It was Grenville’s and Jay’s intent that the treaty should speed its way to the United States, and the packet had been held accordingly. Its departure was, however, delayed and the treaty did not arrive in the United States until 7 March 1795.

Jay and Grenville had both worked intensely and exhaustively to bring the treaty to a point where they could both accept it. Well aware from long experience that treaties recognize or codify reality but do not often enlarge it, Jay realistically anticipated that the treaty would not meet American expectations when it arrived in the United States.47 In his cover letter to Randolph he noted tersely that his opinion of the treaty could be deduced from the fact he had signed it. No better treaty, he said, could have been obtained. There followed an explanation of some of the difficulties and controversies he knew would arise: the agreement not to identify a first violator of the peace treaty; the delay in evacuating the posts; the Indian trade; some of the other commercial terms that he knew had already come in for criticism, actually by Hamilton though relayed through Randolph; the commissions; debts and sequestration; the West Indies trade; the definition of contraband; and Britain’s determination to insure that her vessels would not again be preyed upon by French privateers in American waters as they had been during the ministry of Genet.48 To King, he wrote that though he believed the treaty beneficial on the whole, he would be surprised if he entirely escaped censure; to Hamilton he wrote that, if this treaty were not ratified, he did not believe another could be negotiated. He told Washington who, unknown to Jay had already indicated his displeasure with some clauses, that the treaty must speak for itself and that confidence in Washington’s character had been important to the success of the negotiation.49

Uppermost in Jay’s mind, but understated in the long list of items in his instructions, was maintaining peace between the two nations.50 He had, he told Randolph, made room for conciliation by doing “essential Justice,” acknowledging to the British as he had already done to Americans the possibility that the United States could not always clearly claim that it had had right on its side, especially with regard to first violation of the treaty and British creditors. In the matters of the British removal of slaves, the degree to which neutral rights and definitions of contraband had been established in the law of nations, and the speed and terms under which British withdrawal from the posts could be expected, he had also admitted that the case made by Grenville was defensible, if not unassailable. He realized what others were reluctant to accept, that hopes for improvement of the conditions of trade between the United States and Britain had to be measured against Britain’s maritime and economic power and Americans’ lack of it; that concessions simply could not be forced. Jay was at his best when dealing with ambiguities in the peace treaty, where his involvement as negotiator gave him some authority, but even here, realities on the ground, the interests of British fur traders and their Indian allies, made it essential for him to accept terms that diminished the luster of the substantial benefits Americans realized from evacuation of the posts. The treaty was made possible by Britain’s recent setbacks in the war against France and its determination to continue it until victory was achieved. It came to pass because both nations had an interest in not going to war with one another, not because Jay or the United States had a strong hand to play. American potential, so strongly believed in by Americans, did not weigh heavily in Britain’s scale.