The Secretary of the United States for the Department of Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred a letter of the 4th March last, from the Honble John Adams Esquire,1 together with the papers that accompanied it reports …

[Section one: On State Violations of the Treaty with Great Britain]

… On considering the before recited papers2 these important questions present themselves—

1st. Whether any individual State has a right, by Acts of their own internal Legislature, to explain and decide the sense and meaning, in which any particular Article of a National treaty shall be received and understood within the limits of that State?

2d. Whether any & which, of the Acts enumerated in the List of Grievances do violate the treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain?—

3d. In case they or any of them should be found to violate it, what measures should be adopted in relation to Great Britain? and

4th. What measures should be adopted in relation to the State or States which passed the exceptionable Acts?

Of these in their Order, and

1st. Of the right of an individual State to enact in what sense a National treaty shall be understood within its particular Limits—

Your Secretary considers the thirteen independent sovereign States as having, by express delegation of power, formed and vested in Congress a perfect though limited sovereignty for the general and national purposes specified in the Confederation. In this Sovereignty they cannot severally participate (except by their Delegates) or have concurrent jurisdiction, for the 9th. Article of the Confederation most expressly conveys to Congress the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on war and peace, and of entering into treaties and alliances, &c. &c.

When therefore a treaty is constitutionally made, ratified and published by Congress, it immediately becomes binding on the whole nation, and superadded to the laws of the land, without the intervention, consent or fiat of State Legislatures. It derives its obligation from its being a compact between the Sovereign of this, and the Sovereign of another Nation, but Laws or statutes derive their force from being acts of a Legislature competent to the passing of them. Hence it is clear that treaties must be implicitly received and observed by every member of the nation; for as State Legislatures are not competent to the making of such Compacts or treaties, so neither are they competent in that capacity, authoritatively to decide on or ascertain the construction and sense of them. When doubts arise respecting the construction of State Laws, it is common and proper for the State Legislatures by explanatory or declaratory Acts to remove those doubts; but when doubts arise respecting the construction of a treaty, they are so far from being cognizable by a State Legislature, that Congress itself has no authority to settle and determine them. For as the legislature only which constitutionally passes a law has power to revise and amend it, so the Sovereigns only who are parties to the Treaty have power by posterior Articles and mutual consent to correct or explain it.—

All doubts, in cases between private individuals, respecting the meaning of a treaty, like all doubts respecting the meaning of a law, are in the first instance mere judicial questions, and are to be heard and decided in the Courts of Justice having Cognizance of the causes in which they arise; and whose duty it is to determine them according to the rules and maxims established by the laws of Nations for the interpretation of treaties—

If this reasoning and these principles be right, as your Secretary thinks they are, it follows of consequence, that no individual State has a right by legislative Acts to decide and point out the sense in which their particular Citizens and courts shall understand this or that Article of a treaty. A contrary doctrine would ^only^ not militate against the common and received principles and ideas relative to this Subject, but would prove as ridiculous in practice, as it appears irrational in theory; for in that case the same Article of the same treaty may by law mean one thing in New Hampshire, another in New York, and neither the one nor the other in Georgia—

It would be foreign to the object of this report to enquire how far such legislative Acts are valid and obligatory even within the limits of the State passing them. Much might be said on that head—certain however it is, that they cannot bind either of the contracting Sovereigns, and consequently cannot bind their respective Nations—

2nd. Whether any and which of the acts mentioned in the list of Grievances, do violate the treaty with Great Britain?

It is to be observed that the violations complained of are confined to three Articles of the treaty vizt the 4th. 5th.3 & 6th4—Your Secretary will therefore proceed to arrange and consider these acts in that order

The 4th. Article of the treaty is in these Words—“It is agreed that the Creditors on either side, shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.”—

This Article in the opinion of your Secretary establishes this point vizt. that bona fide debts theretofore contracted remained unextinguished by the war. The propriety of making this remark will appear from adverting to the distinction there is between cases where the rights of Creditors survived the war, and cases where Creditors having been divested of their rights in the course of the war, are restored to them by the treaty of peace. In the former case, his right remains precisely as it was, but in the latter case, it may sometimes be questionable whether the treaty restores that right wholly, or only in part; and such questions are only to be decided by recurring to the Article of restoration. This distinction is introduced for the purpose of casting light on the question whether interest is, or is not payable on or comprized in the bona fide debts mentioned in the Article before us: For if the Article considers these debts or Contracts as being in their original state of extent and obligation, there can be little doubt but that when a stipulation to pay interest makes a part of the Contract, every attempt to invalidate that particular part must be in opposition to the treaty. But on the other hand, if the Article is to be considered as restoring Creditors to rights they had lost in the War, then inasmuch as it provides only for the recovery of the bona fide debts without making mention of the interest accrued on them, it may be a question with some, whether the right to recover the interest is so attached to the right of recovering the principal, as that a restoration of the latter necessarily implies and restores the former—for nothing being said in the Article to exclude interest, the only question is whether the revival of the principal debt does or does not operate as a revival of the interest?—but this is only a secondary question and to be asked only in case it should appear that both principal and interest were lost in the War, and restored by the treaty under the denomination of bona fide debts, which words some construe as including both principal and interest, and others think can intend only the principal5—

Those who consider this Article as being restoratory, must insist and ought to shew, that the debts said to be restored were actually lost to the Creditors in the course of the War. If that was the case they must have been so lost either by extinction, remission or confiscation, and that either tacitly and silently by the laws of War, or expressly by National Acts.—

Your Secretary is not informed of any laws of War among civilized nations whereby all debts before subsisting between the people of belligerent nations are immediately and silently either extinguished, remitted or confiscated, and it would he conceives be useless to adduce the obvious reasons which induce him to think that there neither are nor ought to be any such Laws. If this be so, it follows that the 4th Article cannot be considered as restoratory on the principle that the debts in question were lost by the silent operation of such Laws.—

The next inquiry then is whether belligerent powers have a right by express Acts to extinguish, remit or confiscate such debts. Your Secretary thinks that the Laws of Nations strictly and rigidly considered will authorize it; but that since mankind have become more enlightened and their manners more softened and humanized it has not been common as well for those reasons, as for others suggested by the interest of Commerce and mutual intercourse, to practice such severities.—

But admitting that the United States had a right to extinguish, remit or confiscate debts due from their Citizens to british Subjects, it still remains to be required whether, and in what manner, and by what Acts they exercised that right—for if they did not exercise this right at all, then it will follow that these debts were neither extinguished, remitted nor confiscated, and consequently that the Article cannot be considered as restoratory, nothing being more clear than that Restoration always implies previous deprivation.—

Here a very important question presents itself vizt. whether the State Legislatures can derive a right from the existence of War between their Sovereign and a foreign one, to extinguish, remit or confiscate, by their Acts, debts due from their Citizens to the Subjects of that foreign Sovereign.—

The rights to make War, to make peace, and to make treaties appertaining exclusively to the National Sovereign, that is, to Congress, your Secretary is of opinion that the thirteen State Legislatures have no more authority to exercise the powers, or pass Acts of Sovereignty on those points, than any thirteen individual Citizens. To execute the laws or exercise the rights of War against a national enemy belongs only to the National Sovereign or to those to whom the National Sovereign may constitutionally delegate such authority—so that whatever right each State individually considered, may have to sequester or confiscate the property of their own proper Citizens, yet with respect to the common enemy of the nation they can separately do no act of national Sovereignty; for surely a thirteenth part of a nation can with no propriety assume a power of doing national Acts proper only to the National Sovereign. However recent may be the date of the Confederation, yet an union founded in Compact and vesting the rights of War and peace in Congress preceded it; and your Secretary is exceedingly mistaken if there ever was a period since the year 1775 to this day when either of the then Colonies, now States, were in capacity to pass State laws for sequestering or confiscating the debts or property of a national enemy. It was then and afterwards, by virtue of national Commissions, that the Enemy’s property on the Sea was liable to be captured and confiscated, and equal authority was necessary to justify the confiscation of their property found on the land. Whatever State Acts therefore may have ^been^ passed during the War, exercising rights accruing to the Sovereign from the Laws of Nations respecting War; they cannot in the opinion of your Secretary be obligatory on either of the belligerent Sovereigns, and consequently not on any of their respective Citizens or Subjects.—

Your Secretary would not have it inferred from these remarks, that the States have passed general laws for confiscating british debts due from their Citizens—His design in these remarks is to obviate any arguments that might be drawn from certain other Acts less general and direct, but in his opinion equally improper such for instance as those whereby certain british Subjects were declared Traitors, and whereby, as a consequence of treason the debts due to them became payable to the State to which those british Subjects were declared to be Traitors—for such laws, however absurd, do exist. There are also certain other Laws authorizing the payment of debts due to certain Individuals to be made at the State treasury in paper money &c: &c:—

The question then again recurs, did Congress do any Act for extinguishing, remitting or confiscating debts due from Americans to British Subjects?

In an Act of South Carolina passed in their Senate the 26th. February 1782 and entitled “An Act for disposing of certain estates, and banishing certain persons therein mentioned”—your Secretary finds the following recital vizt. “Whereas the good people of these States having not only suffered great losses and damages by captures of their property on the Sea, by the Subjects of his britannic Majesty, but by their seizing and carrying off much property taken on the land. In consequence of such proceedings of the british Crown and those acting under its authority, the honorable Congress of the United States, after due and mature consideration, authorised the seizing and condemnation of all property found on the Sea, and belonging to the Subjects of Great Britain and recommended to the several States in which her Subjects had property, to confiscate the same for the public use.”—

This recommendation is not specified by its date. Your Secretary has taken pains to find it in the Journals of Congress, but without success, nor does the Secretary of Congress recollect it. Admitting however that there was such a recommendation yet he cannot think that a recommendation to confiscate such british property as might be in particular States, can with any propriety be construed to extend to the debts due from the people of such States to persons in Britain. Nay, the very act which recites this recommendation and which does confiscate the property of several british Subjects, makes an express exception of debts

In short your Secretary does not know of any Act of Congress whereby debts due from Americans to Britons were either extinguished, remitted or confiscated, and therefore he concludes that the 4th. Article of the treaty must be understood not as reviving, or restoring, those debts, but as considering them to be and remain exactly and precisely in their pristine and original state, both with respect to extent and obligation.—If this conclusion be just, your Secretary can perceive no ground for the singular reasonings and questions that have prevailed respecting the payment of the interest claimed by british Creditors in virtue of express Contracts between them and their American debtors. However harsh and severe the exaction of this interest, considering the War and its effects, may be and appear, yet the treaty must be taken and fulfilled with its bitter as well as its sweets, and although we were not obliged to accept peace on those terms, yet having so accepted it, we cannot now invalidate those terms or stipulations; nor with honor or justice refuse to comply with them. Much better would it be for the United States either severally or jointly by their bounty, to relieve those suffering and deserving Individuals on whom the performance of this Article may press too hard, than by reasonings and comments which neither posterity or impartial Contemporaries can think just, to permit our national reputation for probity, candor and good faith to be tarnished.—

Your Secretary will conclude what he has to say on the subject of interest with a few short remarks. It appears to him that there are only three cases in which interest can with justice be demanded; and that in the first of the three the Courts of Justice are not, and ought not, to be at liberty to refuse it—Vizt:

• 1st. In all cases where interest is fairly and expressly contracted and agreed to be paid. In such cases the debtor is unquestionably bound to pay it, and ought not to be absolved or excused from it by any Act of Legislature. In the opinion of your Secretary every Legislature deviates from the reason and limits of their institution, when they assume and exercise the power of annulling or altering bona fide Contracts between Individuals—
• (2.) Interest may be claimed in certain cases by Custom—vizt. in cases where it has long been usual for Merchants to expect, and to allow interest on debts after the stipulated term and time of Credit and Payment has expired. This Custom in the ordinary course of things is reasonable, for equity demands that he who does not pay at the appointed day, should thereafter pay interest to his Creditor, as well by way of compensation for the disappointment as for the use of the money. Whether the reason of this custom can apply in time of War, or whether the equity of the demand of interest in virtue of the Custom, is or is not overbalanced by the equity of refusing it by reason of the effects of the War, are questions proper for the consideration of the Jury, and your Secretary sees nothing in the treaty to prevent their deciding as to them shall appear just and right—
• (3.) Interest may be demanded and is often given under the idea of damages for wrongful and vexatious delays of payment. Every case of this kind must stand on its own merits, and the treaty leaves the Jury at liberty to give such a verdict as their opinion of those merits may dictate.

Your Secretary will now proceed to examine the Acts complained of as infractions of this Article.—6 …

From the aforegoing review of the several Acts complained of, it is manifest that the 4th. and 6th. Articles of the treaty have been violated by certain of them—

[Section 2: Regarding British Destruction of American Property for Carrying Away of Slaves]

The next inquiry in order, seems to be, whether these violations can be justified or excused by any prior ones on the part of Britain?

There is no doubt but that Britain has violated the 7th. Article which provides that “his Britannic Majesty shall with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction or carrying away any Negroes or other property of the American Inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garrisons and fleets from the said United States, and from every port, place and harbour within the same”—

The violations of this Article alluded to; are these Vizt.

1st. That on the evacuation of New York, Negroes belonging to American Inhabitants were carried away—

2nd. That his britannic Majesty’s Garrisons have not been withdrawn from, but still keep possession of certain posts and places within the United States—

With respect to the Negroes, it may be proper to distinguish them into three Classes—

1st. Such as in the course of the War were captured and disposed of as booty by the Enemy—

2nd. Such as remained with and belonged to American Inhabitants within the british lines—

3d. Such, as confiding in proclamations and promises of freedom and protection, fled from their Masters without, and were received and protected within the british camps and lines—

The stipulation, “not to carry away any Negroes or other property of the American Inhabitants” cannot in the opinion of your Secretary be construed to extend to, and comprehend the first Class. By the laws of War all goods and Chattels captured and made booty flagrante Bello became the property of the Captors. Whether Men can be so degraded as under any circumstances to be with propriety denominated Goods and Chattels, and under that idea, capable of becoming booty, is a question on which opinions are unfortunately various even in Countries professing Christianity and respect for the rights of mankind. Certain it is that our Laws assert, and Britain by this Article as well as by her practice admits, that Man may have property in Man. If so, it is fair reasoning to conclude that this like other moveable property is capable of changing Owners by capture in War. The Article places “Negroes and other property of the American Inhabitants” on the same footing; so that if it means, that captured negroes shall not be carried away, it must also mean that no other captured property shall be carried away—which would in other words amount to an agreement that the british fleet and army should leave behind all the booty then in this Country, which they, had taken from American Inhabitants at any period of the War. It would be a task beyond the abilities of your Secretary to raise such a Construction of the Article on any principles capable of supporting it.—

As to the Second Class, to wit, such as belonged to and remained with American Inhabitants within the british lines, they seem clearly to be within the design and meaning of the Article; for as the enemy had never taken them from their masters nor treated them as booty, the property remained unchanged; and the like reasoning applies to all other negroes kept as Slaves within their lines, and respecting whom the enemy had done no act which divested their masters of the property—

Your Secretary also thinks that the third Class are clearly comprehended in the Article and for the same reason Vizt. because they still remained as much as ever the property of their Masters. They could not by merely flying or eloping extinguish the right or title of their Masters—nor was that title destroyed by their coming into the enemy’s possession, for they were received, not taken, by the enemy—they were received not as Slaves but as friends and freemen, by no Act therefore either of their own or of their friends was the right of their Masters taken away, so that being, the property of american Inhabitants, it was an infraction of the 7th. Article of the treaty to carry them away.—

Whenever the conduct of Nations or of Individuals becomes the subject of investigation, truth and candor should direct the enquiry. The circumstances under which these last mentioned negroes were carried away make a strong impression on the mind of your Secretary, and place that transaction before him in a point of view less unfavourable to Britain, than it appears in to his Countrymen in general. He is aware that he is about to say unpopular things, but higher motives than personal considerations press him to proceed.—

If a War should take place between France and Algiers, and in the course of it France should invite the American Slaves there to run away from their Masters, and actually receive and protect them in their Camp, what would Congress and indeed the world think and say of France, if on making peace with Algiers she should give up those American Slaves to their former Algerine masters? Is there any other difference between the two Cases than this Vizt. that the American Slaves at Algiers are white people, whereas the African Slaves at New York were Black people?

It may be said that these remarks are made out of season, for whether they be well or ill founded, the fact is that Britain expressly agreed to give them up, and therefore, ought to have done it.—

How far an obligation to do wrong may consistent with morality be so modified in the execution as to avoid doing injury and yet do essential justice, merits consideration. By the agreement Britain bound herself to do great wrong to these Slaves, and yet by not executing it, she would do great wrong to their masters. This was a painful dilemma; for as on the one hand, she had invited, tempted and assisted these Slaves to escape from their Masters, and on escaping had received and protected them, it would have been cruelly perfidious to have afterwards delivered them up to their former bondage, and to the severities to which such Slaves are usually subjected—so on the other hand, after contracting to leave these Slaves to their masters, then to refuse to execute that Contract and in the face of it to carry them away, would have been highly inconsistent with justice and good faith. But one way appears to your Secretary in which Britain could extricate herself from these embarrassments; that was to keep faith with the Slaves by carrying them away, and to do substantial justice to their Masters by paying them the value of those Slaves. In this way neither could have just cause to complain, for although no price can compensate a man for bondage for life, yet every Master may be compensated for a runaway Slave.—

In the opinion therefore of your Secretary, Great Britain ought to stand excused for having carried away these Slaves, provided she pays the full value of them; and on this he thinks the United States may with great propriety and justice insist. Indeed there is an intimation in one of Mr. Adams Letters that the British Minister did not object to it—

But however capable of palliation the conduct of Britain respecting these Negroes may be, it unquestionably was an infraction of the 7th. article—

It is equally clear that her continuing to hold the posts from which by that Article she agreed to withdraw her garrisons, is also a decided violation of the Treaty—

It appears then that there are violations of the Treaty justly chargeable on both parties, but as the present enquiry is whether our violations can be justified by antecedent ones on the part of Britain, their respective dates must be ascertained—

It is but just to observe that Britain withdrew her fleet and Army from New York before the treaty was ratified. She evacuated that place on the 25 November 1783, and it was not until the next year that the treaty was ratified—

The first violation that (to the knowledge of your Secretary) we complain of, happened when the british forces left New York, for they then carried away with them the negroes in question, so that the first violation on the part of Britain was on the 25th. November 1783

The famous trespass Act of New York was passed 17th. March 1783, and is still in force—

The Act of Pennsylvania which impeded the recovery of british debts was passed 12th. March, 1783—

The Ordinance of South Carolina for disposing of certain estates &c: was passed 17th March 1783—

All these Acts were in force on and long after the day of the date of the treaty, Vizt. 3d. September 1783—

In whatever light therefore deviations from the Treaty prior to its final conclusion and ratification may be viewed, it is certain that deviations on our part preceded any on the part of Britain, and therefore instead of being justified by them, afford excuse to them

As to the detention of our posts, your Secretary thinks that Britain was not bound to surrender them until we had ratified the treaty. Congress ratified it 14th. January 1784 and Britain on the 9th. April following. From that time to this, the 4th. and 6th. Articles of the treaty have been constantly violated on our part by legislative Acts then and still existing and operating—7

Under such circumstances, it is not a matter of surprize to your Secretary that the posts are detained, nor in his opinion would Britain be to blame in continuing to hold them, until America shall cease to impede her enjoying every essential right secured to her, and her people and adherents by the treaty—

Your Secretary has heard another reason or excuse assigned to justify deviating from the 4th. Article and restraining british Creditors in the recovery of their debts, Vizt.—that by giving time to the Debtor, he became more able to pay the debt; and as that additional ability was a benefit to the Creditor, the latter ought not to complain of the restraint which produced it—

Although this argument may be somewhat ingenious, it unfortunately proves too much. By the treaty a british Creditor has a right to sue when he pleases, and by the common law a Farmer has a right to plough when he pleases, a Merchant to send out his Vessels when he pleases, and every Man to eat and drink when he pleases.—

Admit that a british Creditor would do better to delay his Suits, that a Farmer was about to plough in an improper manner or season—that a Merchant had ordered his Vessels to sea when a hurricane was expected or that a certain Gentleman injured his health by intemperance,—admit these facts—Would it thence follow that every or any good natured officious man, who might think himself more judicious and prudent, has a right to hinder the Creditor from Suing, the Farmer from ploughing, the Merchant from despatching his Vessels, or the bon vivant from indulging his Appetite? Surely not.

In short as your Secretary is uninformed of any facts or matters that can justify the violations on our part, the only question which seems to remain to be considered is

What is to be done?

The United States in Congress Assembled have neither committed, nor approved of any violation of the treaty. To their conduct no exceptions are taken, but to their justice an appeal is made relative to the conduct of particular States. The United States must however eventually answer for the conduct of their respective Members; and for that and other reasons suggested by the nature ^of their^ Sovereignty and the Articles of Confederation your Secretary thinks they have good right to insist and require that national faith and national treaties be kept and observed throughout the Union; for otherwise it would be in the power of a particular State by injuries and infraction of treaties to involve the whole confederacy in difficulties and war—

In his opinion it would highly become the dignity of the United States to act on such occasions with the most scrupulous regard to justice and candor towards the injured Nation, and with equal moderation and decision towards the delinquent State or States.—

In the present case he thinks it would be proper to resolve—

1st. That the Legislatures of the several States cannot of right pass any Act or Acts for interpreting, explaining or construing a National treaty or any part or clause of it; nor for restraining, limiting, or in any manner impeding, retarding nor counteracting the operation and execution of the same, for that on being constitutionally made, ratified and published they became in virtue of the Confederation part of the law of the land, and are not only independent of the will and power of such Legislatures, but also binding and obligatory on them—

2nd. That all such Acts or parts of Acts as may be now existing in either of the States repugnant to the treaty of peace ought to be forthwith repealed; as well to prevent their continuing to operate as violations of that treaty, as to avoid the disagreeable necessity there might otherwise be of raising and discussing questions touching their validity and obligation—

3d. That it be recommended to the several States to make such repeal, rather by describing than reciting the said Acts, and for that purpose to pass an Act declaring in general ^terms^ that all such Acts and parts of Acts repugnant to the treaty of peace between the United States and his britannic Majesty or any Article thereof shall be, and thereby are repealed; and that the Courts of law and equity in all causes and questions cognizable by them respectively and arising from or touching the said treaty shall decide and adjudge according to the true intent and meaning of the same, any thing in the said Acts or parts of Acts to the contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding

The two first of these proposed resolutions do not appear to your Secretary to require any Comments—

He thinks the third would be expedient for several reasons—

As it is general and points at no particular State, it cannot wound the feelings of any—

The general Law it recommends he thinks preferable to a minute enumeration of the exceptionable Acts and Clauses because either omissions might accidentally be made in the enumeration or questions might be agitated and perhaps improperly determined respecting this or that Act or Clause which some may think exceptionable and others not. By repealing in general terms and obliterating all exceptionable Acts and Clauses as it were by one stroke of the pen, the whole business will be turned over to its proper department, Vizt. to the judicial, and the courts of law will find no difficulty in deciding, whether any particular Act or Clause is or is not repugnant to the treaty. When it is considered that the Judges in general are Men of Character and learning, that they stand in responsible situations, and feel as well as know the obligations of Office and the value of reputation, there is reason to presume that their conduct and judgments relative to these as well as other judicial matters will be wise and upright—

Your Secretary also thinks that in case these resolutions should be adopted it would be proper that a circular letter from Congress should accompany Copies of them to the States, but as the forming a draft or plan of such a Letter, seems not to belong to the department of foreign Affairs, he forbears to report one—

He is further of opinion that a Copy of this report should be transmitted to the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at the Court of London for his information; and that he be instructed candidly to admit that the 4th. & 6th. Articles of the treaty have been violated in America, as well as the 7th. has on the part of Great Britain.—

That he inform his britannic Majesty that the United States are taking effectual measures for removing all cause of complaint on their part.—

That he also be authorized to propose and conclude in the name and behalf of the United States a Convention with his Majesty whereby it shall be agreed that the value of the Negroes or other American property carried away contrary to the 7th. Article, be estimated by Commissioners and paid for, and that the said payment together with a surrender of all the posts and places now held by his Majesty within the limits of the United States, shall be made within   Months after all the Acts and parts of Acts existing in the several States and which violate the treaty are repealed, and due notice thereof given—

That he be also instructed to assure his Majesty that it will always give pleasure to Congress fairly and candidly to discuss and accommodate every difference or complaint that may arise relative to the construction or to the performance of the treaty. That they are determined to execute it with good faith, and that as this is the only instance in which any Complaints of that kind have ever come regularly before them, they flatter themselves that the frankness and candor of their conduct on this Occasion will create in him the same confidence in the purity of their intentions, which they repose in his assurance “that whenever America shall manifest a real determination to fulfil her part of the treaty Great Britain will not hesitate to co-operate in whatever points depend upon her for carrying every Article into real and complete effect.”—

It might also be well to instruct Mr. Adams to endeavour to have an Article inserted in the Convention for the remission of the interest or a portion of it which became due on private contracts during the War; but your Secretary apprehends from the general and great impropriety of such interference with private contracts, that his endeavours would be fruitless—

He also thinks it might be proper to instruct Mr. Adams to obtain if possible an Article, to fix the true construction of the declaration for ceasing Hostilities, and stipulating that compensation be made for all captures contrary to it, but he likewise fears that as this may be considered as a judicial question, and as the balance of the captures so circumstanced is in favor of Britain, that her consent to such an Article would not be easy to obtain—

It appears to your Secretary that this system ought to give perfect satisfaction to the Court of London, unless perhaps in one point, vizt—that the Individuals who have suffered by our violations are left without compensation for their losses and sufferings—

Although strict justice requires that they who have wrongfully suffered should as far as possible receive retribution and compensation, yet as it would be very difficult if practicable to prevail on the States to adopt such a measure, he thinks it best to be silent about it, especially as the United States have neither the power nor the means of doing it, without their concurrence—

Besides as the detention of the posts has been and continues injurious to the United States, the Consequences of the respective violations may be set against each other, and although the account may not be exactly balanced, yet it cannot be well expected that in the Affairs of such magnitude the same regard can be had to minutiæ as in transactions between Individuals—

This report is on a subject no less new and singular than important—your Secretary is not conscious of any errors in it, and yet there may be some. He hopes the facts are not mistaken or misstated—he believes his reasoning on them to be just, and he flatters himself whatever mistakes relative to either, may be discovered, that they will be treated with Candor, and ascribed neither to want of attention, nor of care; but to that fallibility, from which few, if any even of the wisest and most able, are wholly exempt.8—