Aftermath of the Jay Treaty: Responses, Ratification, and Implementation: Editorial Note
Aftermath of the Jay Treaty:
Responses, Ratification, and Implementation
Once the treaty was signed on 19 November, Jay hurriedly sent dispatches to George Washington, Edmund Randolph, and others giving brief explanations of the treaty negotiations and terms of the treaty.1 Although he kept the terms of the treaty secret, he then wrote American diplomats in Europe (Thomas Pinckney, James Monroe, William Short and John Quincy Adams) of the successful conclusion, and authorized them to assure the European powers that there was nothing in the treaty that contradicted earlier treaties with France or other nations.2 Jay also responded to the comments and queries he received from Washington and Randolph after the treaty was signed.3 Considering his health too precarious to chance a winter voyage, Jay resolved to wait until he received news of the arrival of the treaty and planned to return in the early spring.4
Rushed efforts to get copies of the signed treaty on board the last few departing ships before winter so that they would arrive while Congress was still in session proved unavailing. Two copies were inadvertently placed on the same English packet, the Tankerville, which was captured by a French privateer, while the ship transporting the third text, carried by David Blaney aboard the Thomas (Captain Vickery), was long held offshore by westerly winds.5 Jay had little opportunity to provide further information before returning to America. He received Edmund Randolph’s criticisms and questions about his negotiations of 3 December, and answered them briefly on 6 February, while on 2 February, Jay sent Randolph copies of his correspondence with James Monroe, assuring him that the treaty did not violate the terms of the alliance with France. He wrote Washington on 25 February and 6 March answering criticisms. On 8 March, Randolph sent a hasty note announcing the arrival of the treaty, assuring Jay it would be kept secret until the opening of Congress in June, and requesting information on the oral discussions held with Grenville. However, Jay had no opportunity to reply before his return.6
Blaney had finally landed in Virginia with the treaty in late February and travelled overland to Philadelphia where he arrived four days after the end of the congressional session on 3 March 1795. Washington called for a special session of the Senate to meet in June to ratify the treaty. He and his cabinet resolved to keep the terms of the treaty secret until the Senate reassembled.7 Thus, when Jay arrived in New York on 28 May, little solid information was publicly available about the treaty, and he was given a warm welcome in New York where he awaited news of his election as governor.8 Jay reported his arrival, but stated his health did not immediately permit him to travel to Philadelphia; he agreed to travel to the capital to answer questions in time for the opening of Congress.9 He left New York on 8 June accompanied by senators Rufus King and Jacob Read. Little information is available about Jay’s activities in Philadelphia, but he did not testify before Congress. He remained until 17 June when he left for New York.10
Responses to the Treaty
After cabinet discussion of what information Washington would and would not present, the president sent the treaty to the Senate for ratification on 8 June along with copies of Jay’s instructions and correspondence during the negotiations.11 Senators were pledged to secrecy and were not allowed to divulge the terms of the treaty until after the session. The procedures and votes of the Senate but not the debates are recorded in the Senate Executive Journal. The Senate had a Federalist majority so prospects for ratification were good, but even supporters of the treaty opposed Article 12 because they considered the trade concession in the West Indies as vitiated by a prohibition of reexportation from the United States of commodities from all the islands of the West Indies, not just British ones, and that it interfered with a burgeoning export trade in American cotton.12 At the suggestion of Hamilton and King, the cabinet decided that rather than reject the whole treaty, the U.S. would propose suspending Article 12 until it could be renegotiated, and to go forward with ratification of the rest.13 Although Aaron Burr moved to postpone consideration of the treaty and submitted a list of further modifications of the treaty to eliminate or alter every concession made to Great Britain, his proposals were voted down on 23 June by a vote of 12–10.14 Republicans moved to seek compensation for the removed slaves, but failed by a vote of 15–12. The Senate then approved ratification of the treaty by a vote of 20–10. A last vote to reopen discussion on slave compensation failed in a 14–15 vote.15
Republicans then sought to appeal to public opinion to deter Washington from signing the treaty. Although the secrecy requirement was removed following ratification in the Senate, that body ruled that no copy was to be published or given out to the public. Hamilton and King persuaded Washington and Randolph that the treaty should be published to avoid triggering public suspicion, but before that could happen various senators leaked copies of it. Pierce Butler of South Carolina sent a copy to Madison, and Stevens T. Mason of Virginia released another. Benjamin Franklin Bache’s paper, the Aurora, published a summary on the treaty on 29 June before the official copy came out, and three days later published a full text in pamphlet form. Bache then set off for New York and New England spreading copies and commentary and arousing enough opposition to trigger mob action in Boston.16
Treaty opponents then mobilized public opinion in town meetings throughout the United States and sent resolutions and petitions to Washington to dissuade him from ratifying the treaty. Burnings of Jay in effigy, ritual beheadings, and burnings of copies of the treaty occurred in many cities, while 4th of July celebrations provided occasions for critical toasts and speeches.17 New York’s pro-French Republicans, under the leadership of some of Jay’s Livingston relatives, particularly Robert R., Brockholst, Edward, Peter R., and Maturin Livingston, were among the staunchest opponents of the treaty. Robert penned articles under the pseudonym “Cato” and sent a letter to Washington condemning the treaty,18 while Brockholst wrote articles as “Decius” and “Cinna” and was a leader of the anti-treaty town meeting held in New York in July at which Hamilton was pelted with stones.19 It was Edward, a member of the House of Representatives, who, after ratification, introduced a resolution demanding that Washington submit copies of Jay’s instructions and correspondence regarding the treaty to the House in an effort to block funding for its implementation. Washington refused on constitutional grounds to comply.20
Following his visit to Philadelphia, Jay played at most a behind-the-scenes role in public defense of the treaty. He left that task largely to Hamilton and King, who penned 34 articles under the signature “Camillus.” According to John Adams, citing King, Jay collaborated with them in the defense, but without himself writing any pieces.21 Only after the treaty was ratified did Jay defend his character from personal attack, denying that he was pro-British and anti-French in an appendix to a pamphlet printed by Senator Robert Goodloe Harper of South Carolina to defend his vote for the treaty to his constituents.22 Jay later also defended himself against allegations of excessive expenses as negotiator and charges that he had personally retained substantial amounts of the funds.23
Jay had correctly anticipated some of the points of opposition to the treaty, but had missed how controversial other items would prove. He had known that French officials and their supporters would bitterly oppose it despite his efforts to persuade the French that nothing in the treaty contradicted previous treaties.24 He also expected and received southern opposition on the issue of repayment of British debts and on his failure to obtain compensation for slaves removed by the British during the war of independence. Britain would not consider the issue of compensation for the slaves, he argued, and it was not worth losing the opportunity for a treaty by insisting upon it. Jay claimed that access to the British West Indies and evacuation of the posts were intended as partial offsets for the failure of compensation.25 Jay realized the time that would elapse before the western posts were evacuated would raise complaints, but insisted the British would not agree to an earlier date for commercial reasons and because they needed time to smooth relations with allied Indians in the area who were incensed by British abandonment of them.26
Jay failed to anticipate the opposition to trade provisions with the West Indies, believing the limitations he accepted to be temporary and that the few concessions he obtained were an opening wedge for better terms in future. He regarded them as the beginning of the end to British navigation policy. He suggested the restrictions on reexportation of West Indian products to Europe could be bypassed by landing goods on neutral West Indian islands and shipping them from there. He supported the prohibition on the sequestration of debts in wartime as useful because the threat of sequestration was discouraging British trade and investments in the United States. Considering the arbitration panels to be set up under the treaty an effective way of settling both debt claims and compensation for ships and cargoes seized by the British, he was surprised by the anger that more immediate compensation had not been obtained without the prior necessity of complicated and expensive judicial procedures. Jay had sought to obtain such direct payment from the British government, but Grenville faced strong political pressures against it and the measure was ultimately blocked. Jay also failed to anticipate the rage against his apparent concessions regarding the American policy that free ships made free goods; he faced claims he had tacitly abandoned American neutrality principles and paved the way for the intensified seizures of cargos the British adopted without warning early in April 1795.27
Opposition to the treaty was exacerbated by news that the British had renewed seizures of cargoes of provisions to France and its colonies under a secret Order in Council adopted 25 April 1795. This was perceived as a revival of the hated Order in Council of 6 November 1793 that had sanctioned the seizure of ships carrying the products of French colonies or provisions or supplies to them. Opponents argued that Jay’s concessions on neutral rights had emboldened British officials to renew their attacks on American shipping.28
Ratification
It was this renewal of seizures that led Washington to postpone ratification of the treaty. Randolph suggested that Washington should state he would not ratify until the new Order in Council was rescinded. Washington had Randolph prepare a memorial to British minister George Hammond to that effect. But soon made aware of Randolph’s disgrace in response to British exposure of French minister Fauchet’s captured dispatches that implied (at least as translated) that Randolph sought money from the French in return for his support, Washington decided to go forward with ratification. He signed the treaty on 14 August 1795. Confronted with the letter four days later, Randolph resigned from office. Washington also considered, but did not adopt, Hamilton’s proposal to delay exchange of the ratifications in Europe until the seizures were discontinued. In his seventh state of the union address on 8 December 1795, Washington promised to lay the treaty before Congress for appropriations as soon as the British response was received.29
There were differences of opinion on British motivations for the renewal of ship seizures. George Hammond told Washington that, following U.S. final repayments to France of revolutionary war debts, the French used the funds to make extensive purchases of provisions. Grenville claimed that the French were desperate for provisions and disguised their purchases as neutral property. He proclaimed that he would stop them from doing so. John Trumbull on the other hand contended the French had adequate food supplies and the British needed the food supplies for themselves. Although the British were seizing the provisions as enemy property not as contraband, they treated the captures legally as if they were contraband and paid for them as specified under the terms of the Jay treaty. This seemed to confirm to the treaty opponents that the Jay treaty tacitly recognized provisions as contraband, in contradiction of American policy on neutral rights and the terms of some of its treaties with other powers.30
The exchange of ratifications in Great Britain was postponed somewhat by a series of mishaps: the absence of Thomas Pinckney, then in Spain as special envoy; the belief that Chargé d’affaires William A. Deas lacked sufficient status to conduct the exchange; the failure of John Quincy Adams to reach England in time to participate, necessitating Deas’s having to conduct the exchange by the instructed October 1795 deadline; and problems with Deas’s sending of the texts of the final treaty, only a copy of which reached the United States, not a signed original. These events delayed plans to implement the treaty. Washington was finally able to inform Congress of the ratification at the end of February 1796.31
The Republicans had one last chance to block the treaty. Washington had to ask for an appropriation of $90,000, to pay for the salary and expenses of the arbitration commissioners. On 29 February 1796, Washington declared the treaty in effect, but did not yet request funding. Without consulting Madison, Edward Livingston then introduced a resolution demanding documentation of the treaty instructions and negotiations. Following the decision by a Federalist caucus to oppose this demand on the grounds that the House of Representatives had no authority over treaties, the Republicans submitted a resolution declaring the right of the House to sanction or refuse treaties which contained stipulations affecting any of the powers vested in the House, particularly appropriations. Washington continued to refuse to submit the documents, and the Republicans, having realized they had enough votes, determined to defeat the treaty.32
The Federalists then mobilized public opinion and exerted various forms of personal pressure on individual congressmen. Philip Schuyler in New York, John Marshall in Virginia, and James McHenry in Maryland roused supporters in their respective states. The bank presidents in Philadelphia reportedly threatened to deny discounts to those who did not sign Federalist petitions, while insurance companies, facing the possibility of war, declined to provide ship insurance policies. The British in turn asserted they would not withdraw from the posts unless the treaty was implemented. The Federalists did not claim that the British would declare war if the treaty was not signed, only that they would adopt policies like retaining the posts, increasing seizures and impressments, and stirring up western Indians, that would ultimately provoke war. Gradually, the Federalists reduced the number of supporters for Republican measures in the House.33
Republicans continued to insist there would be no military conflict between the two nations. The United States would return to its embargo and nonintercourse policies. Since Britain and the West Indies were dependent on American markets and supplies, Republicans argued, Britain could not resort to war. The British need for bread would prevent it.34 Federalists disagreed that the U.S. possessed that much leverage and feared the outbreak of war would split the union. Fisher Ames of Massachusetts gave a famous, widely circulated oration on that theme, and dramatically presented the risk of frontier violence should war erupt. Albert Gallatin, Republican leader in the House, then favored withdrawing the anti-treaty resolutions, but opted for suspending the treaty until the British stopped interfering with neutral nations. However, the vote for treaty implementation passed by a vote of 51–48.35
Washington credited the public petitions for the victory, while historians variously credit the petitions, oratory, senatorial threats, and personal pressure placed on delegates. Washington asserted that the treaty would bring twenty years of peace, which, combined with increases in population and resources, would then enable the U.S. to bid defiance to any nation on earth. Republicans thought the U.S. already strong enough to defy Britain, and that it did not need to purchase peace with what they considered national humiliation.36 Partisan battles over the treaty therefore continued, and contributed to the establishment of the American party system. Such conflicts were especially heated during the Quasi-War with France, and during the presidential elections of 1796 and 1800 and the gubernatorial election of 1798 in New York, then calmed down until the termination of the treaty in 1805. Then the failure to renew or replace the treaty led to the Embargo of 1807, the Nonintercourse Act of 1809, and ultimately to the War of 1812.37
Implementation of the Treaty
Following ratification came the task of implementing the treaty. Evacuation of the British-held posts progressed smoothly in 1796, greatly increasing support for the treaty. Washington queried Jay, among others, for advice on instructions to the diplomat who would be assigned to renegotiate Article 12 regarding West Indian trade. Jay responded on 3 June 1796 by suggesting efforts to raise the tonnage limits specified by Article 12 from 70 to 100, but warned that British anger at American popular opposition to the treaty and support for France made the times unpropitious for further negotiations. He also recommended further consideration of Lord Loughborough’s proposals regarding rights of aliens and rules of evidence in inheritance cases involving citizens of both nations.38 Jay also continued to correspond with Grenville, warning him that British resumption of ship seizures and the impressment of American seamen were jeopardizing the improved Anglo-American relations they sought to achieve when negotiating the treaty. He also corresponded with Rufus King when he became minister to Great Britain, and with Americans involved with the arbitration commissions, especially John Trumbull, Christopher Gore, and Samuel Bayard, to keep abreast of how effective procedures for implementing the treaty were, and to give advice as needed.39
With the support of the new British minister to the United States, Robert Liston, the first of the commissions to accomplish its mission was the commission to settle the St. Croix River portion of the boundary with Canada. This commission consisted of David Howell of Rhode Island, Egbert Benson of New York, and Thomas Barclay of Annapolis, Nova Scotia. It met in St. Andrews, New Brunswick, on 4 October 1796, secured surveyors to make an extensive survey of the disputed region, and adjourned until August 1797. Meeting then in Boston, the commission took testimony from John Adams and obtained a written deposition from Jay on what they intended when they negotiated the peace treaty. After further examination of documents and witnesses, the commission again adjourned until October 1798 by which time it had received copies of the surveyors’ map. After meeting daily for ten days, on 25 October the commissioners signed a unanimous award indicating that the Schoodic River was the intended boundary.40
Efforts to settle American ship claims in British courts at first went badly, but after the treaty was ratified, Grenville, Lord Loughborough, and other British officials intervened to limit illegal seizures and gave more assistance to challenges to prize court decisions. They supported the right of the commission established to arbitrate cases of British seizures to determine its own jurisdiction. The ability of the commissioners to challenge decisions based on current English law if they were contrary to the law of nations was affirmed by Loughborough, who affirmed that “the construction of the American gentlemen is correct. It was the intention of the high contracting parties to the treaty, to cloth the commission with power paramount to all the maritime courts of both nations— a power to review, and (if in their opinion it should appear just) to reverse the decision of any or of all the maritime courts of both.”41 British commissioners John Nicholl and John Anstey, and American commissioners Christopher Gore of Massachusetts and William Pinkney of Maryland, and John Trumbull of Connecticut, who was selected by lot as the fifth commissioner, were allowed not to restore prizes but rather to award compensation for damages despite the decisions in British admiralty courts. The commission’s deliberations then worked well until interrupted by the breakup of the third commission—the one established in Philadelphia to review the claims of British debtors.42
The American commissioners in Philadelphia, Thomas Fitzsimons and James Innes43 (later replaced by Samuel Sitgreaves) were outnumbered 3 to 2 by those selected by the British (Thomas Macdonald and Henry Pye Rich) and John Guillemard, an Englishmen residing in America chosen by lot as the fifth commissioner. When the commissioners failed to reach acceptable compromises on the legal ground rules, especially the question of whether it was necessary to have previously brought a claim before the courts, and how to determine whether a defendant was capable of repaying a debt, the American commissioners withdrew from the commission, rendering it unable to vote. The breakup of the debt commission in July 1799 led in retaliation to the temporary shutdown of the claims commission until the dispute was resolved by a new convention signed by Rufus King and Lord Hawkesbury in January 1802 under which the United States government agreed to a lump sum payment of £600,000 ($2,664,000) to be divided among British debt claimants. The seizure commission was then reinstated. When the claims commission concluded its business on 24 February 1804, it had awarded $11,650,000 to American claimants for ships and cargoes seized by the British and $143,428.14 to British claimants for losses derived from French privateers armed or operating from American ports in violation of American neutrality.44
1. JJ to ER, and to RK, both 19 Nov. 1794, above; JJ to AH, 19 Nov. 1794, ALS, DLC: Hamilton (EJ: 10771); DftS, UkWc-A (EJ: 00049); , 2: 237–38; , 4: 135; , 17: 390–91; and JJ to GW, 19 Nov. 1794, ALS, DLC: Washington (EJ: 10638); Dft, NNC (EJ: 08454); WJ, 2: 236–37; , 4: 133–35; , 17: 173–75.
2. See JJ to Thomas Pinckney, 19 Nov. 1794, Dft, NNC (EJ: 09471); and Pinckney to JJ, 20 Nov. 1794, above; JQA to JJ, 21 Nov. 1794, above; JJ to William Short, 24 Nov. 1794, Dft, NNC (EJ: 08918); JJ to ER, 2 Feb. 1795, enclosing copies of JJ’s letters to James Monroe, of 24, 24 and 28 Nov. 1794, above; Short to JJ, 7 Jan. 1795, above; Monroe to JJ, 17 Jan. 1795, ALS, NNC (EJ: 90541); C, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04299); , 3: 207; JT to JJ, 23 July 1795, below.
3. ER to JJ, 3 Dec. 1794, LS, marked Duplicate, NHi: Jay (EJ: 00619); NNC: JJ Lbk. 8; ASP: FR, 1: 509; and 15 Dec. 1794, LS, NHi: Jay (EJ: 00620); ASP: FR, 1: 509–12; JJ to ER, 7 Jan. 1795, LS, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04345); ASP: FR, 1: 512; and JJ to ER, 2 and 6 Feb. 1795, both above; GW to JJ, 18 Dec. 1794, ALS, NNC (EJ: 07257); Dft, DLC: Washington (EJ: 10639); LbkCs, DLC: Washington; , 17: 286–89; JJ to GW, 25 Feb. 1795, ALS, DLC: Washington (EJ: 10642); Dft, NNC (EJ: 08455); and E of first four paragraphs, NHi: Henry V. O’Reilly (EJ: 00691); , 17: 577–80; and JJ to GW (private), 6 Mar. 1795, below.
4. JJ to SLJ, 21 Nov. 1794, above.
5. See Grenville to JJ, 11 May 1795, below; ER to JJ, 8 Mar. 1795, below; Lloyd’s List (London), 28 Nov. 1794, and 21 Apr. 1795; Boston Gazette, 23 Mar. 1795. For the Tankerville, see Grenville to JJ, 11 May 1795, below.
6. See ER to JJ, 8 Mar. 1795, below.
7. Blaney to JJ, 20 Sept. 1795, ALS, NNC (EJ: 05504). For GW’s summons of the Senate to meet on 8 June, see GW to JA, 3 Mar. 1795, , 17: 609.
8. For JJ’s arrival and election, see John Jay’s Address upon his Arrival in New York, 28 May 1795, below; Report on the Address of the Committee of Canvassers to John Jay and his Reply, with a Copy of the Certificate of his Election, 8 June 1795, below.
9. ER to JJ, 26 Apr. 1795; and JJ to ER, 28 May, and 1 June 1795 (two letters), all ALS, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04295; EJ: 04294; EJ: 04292); ASP: FR, 1: 519.
10. On JJ’s trip to Philadelphia, see Dunlap and Claypoole’s American Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia), 11 June 1795; Argus, Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser (New York), 20 June 1795.
11. On the discussion of what documents to send to the Senate and on GW’s message to the Senate forwarding the treaty, see , 1: 177–91; , 4: 653–86; , 18: 200–202; and, for the documents submitted to the Senate, see , 4: 2370–2534; and ASP: FR, 1: 470–520.
12. For a summary of the arguments against the treaty and Senate opposition to Art. 12, see , 152–58.
13. For the endeavors of AH and RK to gain senate approval for treaty ratification without the inclusion of Art. 12, see AH to RK, 11 June, and to William Bradford, 13 June 1795, , 18: 370–73, 373–76; , 2: 14; , 31.
14. On Burr’s role on the ratification issue and his resolutions on revising the treaty of 22 June 1795, see , 1: 211–14, 218–21; , 161; and , 31–32.
15. For the Senate votes, see , 32.
16. On the publication of the treaty, see , 162; and , 33.
17. See , 162–63; and , 33–34.
18. For RRL’s 16 essays as “Cato”, drafts of which are in NHi: Livingston, see Argus, Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser (New York), 15, 17, 22, 25, 31 July; 7, 11, 17, 22, 26, 29 Aug.; and 2, 10, 16, 23, 30 Sept. 1795; and , 1: 114–22, 147–74, 219–52; 2: 3–13; 3: 63–67. For RRL’s letter to GW and the reply, see RRL to GW, 8 July 1795, and GW to RRL, 20 Aug. 1795, , 18: 300–303, 569–70.
19. On the role of Brockholst Livingston, see James Duane to JJ, 31 July 1795, below; and , 18, 477 and note 13. For the five “Decius” essays, see Argus, Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser (New York), 10, 11, 13, 14 and 16 July 1795, and , 2: 18–40, 154–59. For the six “Cinna” pieces, see Argus, Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser, 4–5, 11, 15, and 18 Aug. 1795, and , 3: 75–101, 219–52. On their authorship, see RRL to Monroe, 25 Aug. 1795, ALS, DLC: Monroe; , 3: 426–27. On the New York town meeting, see James Duane to JJ, 31 July 1795, and notes, below; , 2: 16–17; and , 33–34.
20. On Edward Livingston’s role in the House of Representatives’ efforts to block implementation of the treaty, see , 39.
21. See the “Introductory Note: The Defense No. 1,” , 18: 475–79, and for the “Camillus” essays, see , 18–20: passim. For JA’s statement on JJ’s involvement, see , 2: 12–13.
22. JJ to Robert Goodloe Harper, 19 Jan. 1796, and notes, below.
23. On JJ’s expenses, see JJ to TP (private), 19 Apr. 1797; and JJ to the Public, 25 Apr. 1797, both below.
24. On the French response to the treaty, see RK to JJ, 10 Jan. and 6 Feb. 1797, both below; TP to JJ (private), 23 Jan. 1797, and JJ to TP (private), 31 Jan. 1797, both below; and the editorial note “John Jay and the Response to the XYZ Affair in New York,” below.
For JJ’s expectations and for his other responses to criticism of the Jay Treaty, see JJ to GW (private), 6 Mar., to Henry Lee, 11 July, to TP (private), 17 Aug., to GW (private), 3 Sept., to James Duane, 16 Sept. 1795, and to Daniel Coxe, 4 Apr. 1796, all below; JJ to ER, 1 June 1795, ALS, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04294); ASP: FR, 1: 519; JJ to Peter Thacher, 26 May 1796, Dft, NNC (EJ: 08961); JJ to John Drayton, 6 Sept. 1797, below. JJ continued to comment on the legal aspects of implementing the Jay Treaty, but declined to reveal details of his negotiations to other than authorized officials. See JJ to Abraham Cuyler, 13 Nov. 1795, below.
25. For JJ’s comments on the opposition based on the issues of slave compensation and British debts, see JJ to Duane, 16 Sept. 1795, below.
26. For JJ’s comments on western posts and Indian affairs, see ibid.
27. On access to West Indian trade, see JJ to GW (private), 6 Mar., and (private), 3 Sept. 1795, both below. For JJ’s views on the treaty’s ban on sequestration of debts, JJ to ER, 19 Nov. 1794, above, and , 154. On opposition to the need to go through British courts first before appealing to the arbitration commission, see , 152. Samuel Bayard, however, reported that following news of the ratification of the Jay Treaty, British courts responded more favorably to American claims. See Bayard to JJ, 25 Feb. 1796, below.
28. On the renewal of ship and provision seizures, see JT to JJ, 23 July 1795, below; and , 164–70; Charles R. Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution: British Policy toward the United States, 1783–1795 (Dallas, 1969), 299, 354; 414–16; and , 28: 391, 392n.
Josiah T. Newcomb argues that the Order in Council of 25 Apr. 1795, was, contrary to American perception, not similar to that of 8 June 1793. The first order was based on the Rule of War of 1756 and provided for the confiscation of all neutral vessels bound for French ports with cargoes of corn, flour, or meal. The order of April 1795 was based on the ancient right of Consolato del Mare or law of the sea and called for the seizure of enemy property disguised as neutral goods on neutral ships. Newcomb asserts, and Bradford Perkins, among other historians, agrees that the promulgation of the April order almost led to the defeat of the Jay Treaty in the United States. See Newcomb, “New Light on the Jay Treaty,” American Journal of International Law, 28 (1934): 687–88; Bemis, Jay Treaty, 156; , 35–36.
29. For ER’s recommendation to postpone ratification, see ER to GW, 12 July 1795, , 18: 312–326; for AH’s recommendation to postpone exchange of ratifications if the order remained in effect, see AH to Wolcott, 10 Aug. 1795, , 19: 111–12. On ER’s dismissal and its impact on ratification, see TP to JJ (private), 14 Aug. 1795, and JJ’s reply (private) of 17 Aug., both below; and , 166–70. For ER’s resignation, see ER to GW, 19 Aug. 1795, , 18: 563–65. On GW’s difficulty finding a replacement for ER as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and the ultimate appointment of Timothy Pickering, see , 37. On TP’s role as Secretary of State, see Gerard Clarfield, “Postscript to the Jay Treaty: Timothy Pickering and Anglo-American Relations, 1795–1797,” 23 (January 1966): 106–20.
30. On the motivations for the renewal of ship seizures, see JT to JJ, 23 July 1795, below; Tench Coxe to TJ, 30 July 1796, , 28: 421–23; , 163–65; and , 34–36.
31. On the delays in the exchange of ratifications, see JJ to GW (private), 26 Jan.; RK to JJ, 29 Jan.; and JA to JJ, 31 Jan. 1796, all below; and , 37–38.
32. On the actions in the House of Representatives following promulgation of the ratified treaty in February 1796, see , 5: 426–783, 940–1292; , 2: 39–45; , 16: 247–48, 286–87; , 29: 9–11, 55–57; and GW to JJ, 31 Mar., and JJ to GW (private), 18 Apr. 1796, both below; , 39–40; and , 171–80. On the instructions given to JJ, see the editorial note “The Jay Treaty: Appointment and Instructions,” and AH to JJ, and ER to JJ, both 6 May 1794, , 5: 609–21, 631–36, 636–47. For GW’s refusal to send the instructions and reports on the negotiations to the House, see GW to the House of Representatives, 30 Mar. 1796, , 19: 635–38.
33. On Federalist mobilization of support, see , 40–42; and Todd Estes, “Shaping the Politics of Public Opinion: Federalists and the Jay Treaty Debate,” Journal of the Early Republic 20 (Fall 2000): 393–422. On the Federalist fear of war, and Republican insistence that rejection of the treaty would not lead to war, see , 182–84. For JJ’s perception of British determination to continue the war with France and unwillingness to make concessions that Britain thought would jeopardize the war effort, see JJ to GW (private), 6 Mar. 1795, below.
34. On the view that food supplies from the United States were essential to the economies of Britain and the British West Indies, see , 183.
35. On Fisher Ames’s speech, see Todd Estes, “’The Most Bewitching Piece of Parliamentary Oratory’: Fisher Ames’ Jay Treaty Speech Reconsidered,” Historical Journal of Massachusetts 28 (Winter 2000): 1–22; and Sandra Gustafson, Eloquence Is Power: Oratory and Performance in Early America (Chapel Hill, N.C. and Williamsburg, Va., 2000), 235–46. For the text of the speech, see The Speech of Mr. Ames in the House of Representatives of the United States, When in Committee of the Whole, On Thursday, April 28. 1796 (Philadelphia, 1796; , series 1, no. 47701); and Seth Ames, ed., Works of Fisher Ames, 2 vols. (Boston, 1854), 2: 1142–82. On the reasons the House ultimately voted funding for implementing the treaty, see , 183–89. For the suggestion that a vote on funding for the building of Washington, D.C., was tied to the vote for the implementation of the treaty, see Kenneth R. Bowling, Creation of Washington, D.C.: The Idea and Location of the American Capital (Fairfax and Lanham, Va., 1991), 232–33 and 278n53; , 16: 247, 286; , 29: 9–11, 55–57.
36. For GW’s statement on the importance of the period of peace, see GW to Charles Carroll, 1 May 1796, ALS, ViMtvL; and , 187. On the Republican contention that the U.S. was already strong enough to confront Great Britain, see , 188–89.
37. See the editorial notes “John Jay Wins Reelection as Governor in 1798” and “John Jay and the Response to the XYZ Affair in New York,” both below; and , 188. On the Jay Treaty and the 1796 presidential election, see Jeffrey L. Pasley, The First Presidential Contest: 1796 and the Founding of American Democracy (Lawrence, Kans., 2013), esp. 101–81.
38. On the successful transfer of posts, see , 47–48. For alien rights, property ownership, and inheritance, see Article Proposed by the Lord Chancellor (Loughborough), [c. 9 Oct. 1794], above; JJ to Loughborough, 9 Oct. 1794, above; JJ to GW (private), 3 Sept., and (private), 4 Sept. 1795, both below; and JJ to TP, 6 June 1796, below.
39. For JJ’s correspondence with Grenville, especially on the issues of ship seizures, relations with Indians, and impressments, see JJ to GW (private), 3 Sept. 1795, below; JJ to Grenville, 1 May 1796, and 4 June 1797, both below; Grenville to JJ, 17 Mar. 1796, below; and 9 July 1796, NNC (EJ: 08549). For JJ’s correspondence with Samuel Bayard, agent for settling the ship claims, see Bayard to JJ, 6 Jan. 1796, ALS, NNC (EJ: 12535); C, enclosed in JJ to GW, 25 Mar., 1796, below; 25 Feb. 1796, below; 16 May 1796, below; 11 Oct. 1796, ALS, NNC (EJ: 12542); JJ to Bayard, 25 Mar. 1796, below.
For JJ’s correspondence with JT as a member of the commission, see JT to JJ, 7 Sept. and 16 Dec. 1796; 20 July and 7 Aug. 1797, 20 Sept. 1798, all below; 25 Mar., ALS, NNC (EJ: 07211); LbkC, DLC: Trumbull (EJ: 10359); and 3 June 1799, ALS, NNC (EJ: 07212); LbkC, DLC: Trumbull (EJ: 10360); JJ to JT, 20 Oct. 1796, LbkC, N: Governor’s Lbk. 1 (EJ: 03050); and 27 Oct. 1797, below, and 6 June 1800, ALS, Harlan Crow Library. See also Christopher Gore to JJ, 24 Oct. 1796, and 13 Nov. 1797, below; RK to JJ, 29 Jan., 25 Aug. 1796, and 12 Nov. 1796; and 10 Jan. and 6 Feb. 1797, all below; and TP to JJ, 10 Oct., and JJ to TP, 14 Oct. 1795, both below. JJ’s correspondence with merchant Daniel Coxe also discussed the treaty. See JJ to Coxe, 4 Apr. 1796, and Coxe to JJ, 30 Nov. 1796, both below.
40. On the St. Croix commission, see TP to JJ, 16 July 1796, with enclosed TP to AH of the same date, above; JJ’s Testimony regarding the St. Croix River, [21 May 1798], and notes, below; , 1: 1–44; , 1: 1–514; 2: 1–406; , 48–53; 265–68. See also JJ’s Project for a Treaty with Great Britain, 30 Sept. 1794, above, note 17.
41. Francis Wharton, ed., A Digest of the International Law of the United States taken from Documents Issued by Presidents and Secretaries of State and from Decisions of Federal Courts and Opinions of Attorney-Generals, 3 vols, (Washington, D.C., 1888), 3: 329a.
42. On the activities of the debt commission in Philadelphia and the ship claims commission in London, see , 1: 271–98, 299–349, 3: 18, 95–97; , 3: 1–517; 4: 1–551; , 191–98; 428–52; , 53–56, 117–19: , 439–41; 268–76, 276–80; , 30: 623–25; Samuel Bayard to JJ, 25 Feb. 1796, below; Grenville to JJ, 9 July 1796, cited above; RK to JJ, 25 Aug., 12 Nov. 1796, 10 Jan. and 6 Feb. 1797, all below; JT to JJ, 7 Sept. and 16 Dec. 1796, below; Christopher Gore to JJ, 24 Oct. 1796, below; 13 Nov. 1797, below; and 26 Feb 1798, ALS, NNC (EJ: 08479; EJ: 08484); TP to JJ (private), 13 Dec. 1797, below; and JJ to TP, 23 Dec. 1797, below; Gore to JJ, 12 Jan. 1802, ALS, NNC (EJ: 08485). See also JJ’s letters of recommendation for Gore of May 1796, Dfts, NNC (EJ: 08957). For Bayard’s complaints about the British lack of cooperation regarding ship claims in the immediate aftermath of the signing of the treaty, and his reports on the greater British support given following ratification, see 408–24; JJ to GW, 25 Mar., enclosing Bayard to JJ, 6 Jan. 1796, below; and Bayard to JJ, 16 May 1796, below; and 11 Oct. 1796, ALS, NNC (EJ: 12542).
43. James Innes (1754–98) of Virginia.
44. See the Convention Regarding Articles 6 and 7 of the Jay Treaty and Art. 4 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace signed at London January 8, 1802, in Hunter Miller, ed., Treaties and other international acts of the United States of America vol. 2 Documents 1–40:1776–1818 (Washington, D.C., 1931): 488–91. On the awards given on debt claims and ship seizures, see , 237–38; , 213n19; 452; 275, 280.
For 19th-century Jay correspondence on the Jay Treaty, see PAJ to JJ, 14 Jan. 1809, ALS, NNC (EJ: 06139), and 26 June 1812, ALS, NNC (EJ: 06165); and JJ to PAJ, 17 Jan. 1809, Dft, NNC (EJ: 06140).