John Jay Papers
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From John Jay to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Robert R. Livingston), 17 November 1782

To the Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Robert R. Livingston)

Paris 17th. November 1782.

Dear Sir

Although it is uncertain when I shall have an opportunity either of finishing or transmitting the long particular ^Letter^ which I am now undertaking to write, I think the matter it will contain is too interesting to rest only in my Memory, or in short Notes, which nobody but myself can well unfold the meaning of.1 I shall therefore write on as my health will permit, and when finished shall convey this Letter, by the first prudent American, that may go from hence, to Nantes or L’Orient.

My reception here was as friendly as an American Minister might expect from this polite and politic Court; for I think they deceive themselves, who suppose that these kinds of Attentions are equally paid to their private, as to their public Characters.

Soon after the enabling Act was passed, I was shewn a Copy of it, and I confess it abated the Expectations I had formed of the intention of the British Ministry to treat in a manly Manner, with the United States, on the footing of an unconditional acknowledgment of their Independence. The act appeared to me to be cautiously framed to elude such an acknowledgment, and therefore it would depend on future Contingencies, and on the terms and nature of the bargain they might be able to make with us.2

Mr. Grenville indeed told the Count de Vergennes, that His Majesty would acknowledge our Independence unconditionally; but, on being desired to commit that Information to writing, he wrote that his Majesty was disposed to acknowledge it— This had the appearance of Finesse.

About this Time, that is in June last, there came to Paris a Mr. Jones and a Mr. Paradise, both of them Englishmen, the former a learned and active Constitutionalist. They were introduced to me by Doctor Franklin, from whom they solicited Recommendations for America. The Story they told him was, that Mr. Paradise had an Estate, in the Right of his Wife, in Virginia, and that his presence there had been rendered necessary to save it from the penalty of a Law of that State, respecting the Property of Absentees.3 Mr. Jones said he despaired of seeing constitutional Liberty reëstablished in England, that he had determined to visit America, and in that happy and glorious Country to seek and enjoy that freedom which was not, to be found in Britain. He spoke, in raptures, of our Patriotism, Wisdom, &c &c. On speaking to me, some Days afterwards, of his intended voyage, he assigned an additional Reason for undertaking it, viz.t that his long and great friendship for Mr. Paradise had induced him to accompany that Gentleman, on an occasion which both as a Witness and a friend, he could render him most essential Services in Virginia.

I exchanged three or four visits with these Gentlemen, and in the mean time was informed, that Mr. Jones was a rising Character in England, that he had refused a very lucrative appointment in the Indies, and had, by his Talents excited the notice of Men in power.

In conversing one Morning with this Gentleman on English Affairs he took occasion to mention the part he had taken in them, and, at parting, gave me two Pamphlets he had published.

The first was a second Edition of “an Inquiry into the legal mode of suppressing Riots &c.” first published in 1780,4 to which was added, “A Speech on the nomination of Candidates to represent the County of Middlesex, on the 9th. of September, 1780” and this second edition contained also a Letter, dated the 25th. of April 1782 from Mr. Jones to Mr. Yeates, the Secretary to the Society for constitutional Information of which Mr. Jones is a member:5 The other was a Speech to the assembled Inhabitants of Middlesex and Surry &c. on the 28th. of May 1782.

As it appeared to me a little extraordinary that a Gentleman of Mr. Jones’ rising reputation and expectations, should be so smitten with the charms of American Liberty as “to leave all and follow her”,6 I began, on returning to my lodgings to read these Pamphlets with a more than common degree of Curiosity, and I was not a little surprised to find the following paragraphs in them:

In his Letter to Mr. Yates of last April, he says, “My future Life shall certainly be devoted to the support of that excellent Constitution which it is the object of your Society to unfold and elucidate, and from this resolution, long and deliberately madé, no prospects, no Connexions, no Station here or abroad, no fear of danger or hope of advantage to myself shall ever deter or allure me.”

He begins his Essay on suppressing Riots, by saying “It has long been my Opinion, that, in times of national adversity, those Citizens are entitled to the highest praise, who, by personal exertions, and active valor, promote, at their private Hazard, the general welfare.”

In his Speech of last April, are these Paragraphs— In the first, speaking of his being Sick, He says—“It would prevent my attendance, for in Health or in Sickness, I am devoted to your Service— I shall never forget the words of an Old Roman, Ligarius, who, when the liberties of his Country were in imminent danger, and when a real friend to those liberties was condoling with him on his illness, at so critical a time, raised himself from his Couch, seized the Hand of his friend, and said, if you have any business worthy of yourselves, I am well.”

“Since I have risen to explain a sudden thought, I will avail myself of your favorable attention, and hazard a few words on the general Question itself— Numbers have patience to hear, who have not time to read— And as to myself, a very particular and urgent occasion, which calls me some months from England, will deprive me of another opportunity to communicate my Sentiments, until the momentous object before us shall be made certainly attainable through the Concord, or forever lost and irrerecoverable, through the disagreement of the Nation.”

To make Comments on these Extracts would be to waste time and paper. On reading them, I became persuaded that Mr. Paradise and American liberty were mere pretences to cover a more important Errand to America, and I was surprised that Mr. Jones’s vanity should so far get the better of his prudence, as to put such Pamphlets into my Hands at such a Time.

I pointed out these Extracts to Doctor Franklin; but they did not strike him so forcibly as they had done me. I mentioned my apprehensions also to the Marquis de la Fayette, and I declined giving any Letters, either to Mr. Paradise or to Mr. Jones.7

I am the more particular on this Subject, in order that you may the better understand the meaning of a paragraph in my Letter to you, of the 28th. of June last, where I inform you “that, if one may judge from appearances, the Ministry are very desirous of getting some of their Emissaries into our Country, either in an avowed, or in a private Character; and, all things considered, I should think it more safe not to admit any Englishman, in either Character, within our Lines, at this very critical Juncture.”8

Mr. Jones and Mr. Paradise went from hence to Nantes in order to embark there for America— Some Weeks afterwards I met Mr. Paradise at Passy. He told me Mr. Jones and himself had parted at Nantes, and the latter had returned directly to England. How this happened I never could learn. It was a Subject, on which Mr. Paradise was very reserved. Perhaps the sentiments of America, on General Carleton’s overtures, had rendered Mr. Jones’s voyage unnecessary—but in this way I may be mistaken for it is mere Conjecture.9

On the 25th. of July 1782, the King of Great Britain issued a Warrant, or order directed to his Attorney, or Solicitor General, in the words following Vizt. George R

Our Will and pleasure is, and we do hereby authorize and command you, forthwith to prepare a Bill for our Signature to pass the great Seal of Great Britain, in the words, or to the effect, as follows Vizt.

George 3d. &c To our trusty and well beloved, Richard Oswald, of our City of London, Esquire Greeting—

Whereas by virtue of an Act passed in the last Session of Parliament entitled an Act to enable His Majesty to conclude a Peace or Truce with certain Colonies in North America; therein mentioned, it is recited that it is essential to the Interest, welfare and prosperity of Great Britain and the Colonies, or the Plantations of New Hampshire &c. (naming the thirteen States) in N. America that Peace, Intercourse, Trade and Commerce should be restored between them— Therefore, and for a full manifestation of our earnest wish and desire, and of that of our Parliament, to put an end to the Calamities of War, it is enacted that it should and might be lawful for us to treat, consult of, agree and conclude, with any Commissioner of Commissioners named or to be named, by the said Colonies or Plantations, or with any body or Bodies, corporate or politic, or any Assembly or Assemblies, or description of Men, or any persons whatsoever, a Peace or a Truce with the said Colonies or Plantations of any of them, or any part or parts thereof, any Law, Act or Acts of Parliament, matter or thing to the contrary in anywise, notwithstanding: Now Know Ye, that We, reposing a special Trust in your Wisdom, Loyalty and Diligence, and Circumspection in the management of the Affairs to be hereby committed to your Charge, have nominated and appointed, constituted and assigned, and by these Presents, do nominate and appoint, constitute and assign You the said Richard Oswald to be our Commissioner in that behalf, to use and exercise all and every the Powers, and Authorities, hereby intrusted and committed to your Care, during our Will and Pleasure and no longer, according to the Tenor of these our Letters Patent, and it is our Royal Will and Pleasure, and we do hereby authorize, empower and require you, the said Richard Oswald, to treat, consult of, and conclude with any Commissioner or Commissioners named, or to be named by the said Colonies or Plantations, and any Body or Bodies, corporate of politic, or any Assembly of Assemblies, or description of Men, or any Person or Persons whatsoever, a Peace or a Truce with the said Colonies or Plantations, or any Part or Parts thereof, any Law, Act, or Acts of Parliament, matter or Thing to the contrary in any wise, notwithstanding. And it is our further Will and Pleasure, that every Regulation, Provision, Matter or Thing, which shall have been agreed upon, between you the said Richard Oswald, and such Commissioner or Commissioners, Body or Bodies, corporate or politic, Assembly or Assemblies, Description of Men, Person or Persons as aforesaid, with whom you shall have judged meet and sufficient to enter into such Agreement, shall be fully and distinctly set forth in Writing, and authenticated by your Hand and Seal on one side, and by such Seal or other Signature on the other as the occasion may require, and as may be suitable to the Character and Authority of the Commissioner or Commissioners &c. as aforesaid so agreeing, and such Instrument, so Authenticated, shall be by you transmitted to us, through one of our principal Secretaries of State. And it is our further will and pleasure, that you the said Richard Oswald, shall promise and engage for us and in our Royal Name and word, that every Regulation, Provision, matter or Thing, which may be agreed to and concluded by you, our said Commissioner, shall be ratified and confirmed by Us, in the fullest manner and extent, and that we will not suffer them to be violated or counteracted, either in whole or in part, by any person whatsoever. And we do hereby require and command all our Officers, Civil and Military, and all other, our loving Subjects whatsoever, to be aiding and assisting unto you, the said Richard Oswald, in the execution of this our Commission and of the Powers and Authorities, herein contained— Provided always, and We do hereby declare and ordain, that the several Offices, Powers, and Authorities, hereby granted, shall cease, determine and become utterly null and void on the 1st July which shall be in the Year of our Lord 1783. Although we shall not otherwise, in the meantime, have revoked and determined the same. In Witness &c. And for so doing this shall be your Warrant— Given at our Court at St. James’s the 25th. July 1782 in the 22.d Year of our reign. By His Majesty’s Command

(signed) Thomas Townshend.

To our Attorney

Or Solicitor General

A Copy of this Warrant was sent by Express to Mr. Oswald with an Assurance that the Commission should be completed and sent him in a few Days— He communicated this Paper to Doctor Franklin, who, after shewing it to me,10 sent it to the Count de Vergennes. The Count wrote to the Doctor the following Letter on the Subject.11

Je reçois, Monsieur, la lettre de ce jour, dont vous m’avez honoré et la Copie de Pouvoir, que M. Oswald vous a communiquè. La forme dans la quelle il est conçue n’etant pas celle qui est usiteé, je ne puis pas arreter mon opinion a une premiere vue. Je vais examiner avec la plus grande attention, et si vous voulez bien vous rendre ici Samedi matin, je pourrai en conferer avec vous & avec M. Jay, s’il lui etoit commode de vous accompagner. J’ai l’honneur, &c. Versailles le 8. aout 1782.[”]

Translation

I have received, Sir, the Letter of to-day, with which you have honored me, and the Copy of the Powers which Mr. Oswald communicated to you. The form in which it is conceived, not being that which is usual, I can not form my Opinion on the first view of it. I am going to examine it with the greatest Attention, and, if you will be pleased to come here on Saturday Morning, I shall be able to confer about it with you and Mr. Jay, if it should be convenient to him to accompany you. I have the Honor to be, &c.

Versailles 8th August 1782.12

On the 10th. August we waited upon the Count de Vergennes, and a Conference between him and us, on the Subject of Mr. Oswald’s Commission, ensued.

The Count declared his opinion, that we might proceed to treat with Mr. Oswald under it, as soon as the original should arrive. He said it was such as one as we might have expected it would be, but that we must take care to insert proper Articles in the Treaty, to secure our Independence and our limits against all future Claims.

I observed to the Count that it would be descending from the Ground of Independence to treat under the description of Colonies— He replied, that names signified little; that the King of Great Britain’s stiling himself the King of France, was no obstacle to the King of France’s treating with him; That an acknowledgment of our Independence, instead of preceding, must in the natural Course of Things be the Effect of the Treaty, and that it would not be reasonable to expect the Effect before the Cause.13 He added, that we must be mindful to exchange Powers, with Mr. Oswald, for that his acceptance of our Powers, in which we were stiled Commissioners from the United States of America, would be a tacit admittance of our Independence.14 I made but little reply to all this singular reasoning. The Count turned to Doctor Franklin and asked him what he thought of the matter. The Doctor said he believed the commission would do15 He next asked my Opinion— I told him that I did not like it, and that it was best to proceed cautiously.

On returning, I could not forbear observing to Doctor Franklin, that it was evident the Count did not wish to see our Independence acknowledged by Britain, until they had made all their uses of us. It was easy for them to foresee difficulties in bringing Spain into a Peace on moderate Terms, and that if we once found ourselves standing on our own legs, our Independence acknowledged, and all our other Terms ready to be granted, we might not think it our Duty to continue in the War for the attainment of Spanish objects. But, on the contrary, as we were bound by Treaty to continue the war ’till our Independence should be attained, it was the Interest of France to postpone that event, until their own views and those of Spain could be gratified by a Peace—and that I could not otherwise account for the Minister’s advising us to Act in a manner inconsistent with our dignity, and for reasons, which he himself had too much understanding not to see the fallacy of.16

The Doctor imputed this Conduct to the moderation of the Minister, and to his desire of removing every obstacle to speedy negociations for Peace. He observed that this Court had hitherto treated us very fairly and that Suspicions to their disadvantage should not be readily entertained. He also mentioned our Instructions, as further reasons for our acquiescence in the advice and Opinion of the Minister.—17 A day or two afterwards I paid a visit to Mr. Oswald, and had a long Conversation with him respecting his Commission.18 On the resignation of Mr. Fox many reports to the prejudice of Lord Shelburne’s Sincerity, on the subject of American Independence, had spread through France, as well as through Great Britain.19 His Lordship, fearful of their effect on the Confidence with which he wished to inspire the American Commissioners, conveyed, by Mr. Benjamin Vaughan, to Doctor Franklin an Extract of certain Instructions to Sir Guy Carleton, of which the following is a Copy vizt.

[“]June 25th. 1782.20 It has been said, that “great effects might be obtained by something being done spontaneously from England” Upon this and other Considerations, his Majesty has been induced to give a striking proof of his Royal magnanimity and disinterested wish for the restoration of Peace, by commanding his Majesty’s Ministers to direct Mr. Grenville, that the Independence of America should be proposed by him in the first Instance, instead of making ^it^ the condition of a general Peace.”

“I have given a confidential Information to you of these particulars, that you may take such measures as shall appear to you ^most^ advisable for making a direct communication of the Substance of the same either immediately to Congress, or through the medium of General Washington, or, in any other manner, which you may think most likely to impress the well disposed parts of America, with the fairness and liberality of his Majesty’s Proceedings in such great and spontaneous Concessions.”

“The advantages which we may expect from such Concessions are, that America once apprized of the King’s disposition to acknowledge the Independence of the thirteen States, and of the disinclination in the French Court to terminate the War, must see that it is from this moment to be carried on with a view of negotiating points in which she can have no concern, whether they regard France, or Spain and Holland, at the desire of France; but some of which, on the contrary may be in future manifestly injurious to the Interests of America herself.”

“That if the Negociation is broke off, it will undoubtedly be for the sake of those Powers, and not America, whose object is accomplished the Instant she accepts of an Independence, which is not merely held out to her, in the way of Negociation by the Executive Power; but a distinct unconditional offer, arising out of the resolutions of Parliament, and therefore warranted by the Sense of the Nation at large.”

“These facts, being made notorious, it is scarce conceivable that America, composed as it is, will continue efforts under French Direction, and protract the distresses and calamities, which it is well known that War has subjected her to. It is to be presumed, that from that moment, she ^will^ look with jealousy on the French Troops in that Country, who may, from Allies, become dangerous Enemies.”

“If however any particular States, Men, or description of Men, should continue, against the general inclination of the Continent, devoted to France, this Communication will surely detect their views, expose their motives, and deprive them of their influence, in all matters of general concern and exertion. You will, however, take particular care in your manner of conducting yourselves, not only that there should not be the smallest room for suspicions of our good faith and Sincerity; but that we have no view in it of causing dissensions among the Colonies, or even of separating America from France, upon terms inconsistent with her own honor. You must therefore convince them, that the great object of this Country is not merely Peace, but reconciliation with America on the noblest Terms and by the noblest Means.”21

In the course of the before mentioned Conversation with Mr. Oswald, I reminded him, that the judgment and Opinion of America respecting the disposition and views of Britain towards her must be determined by Facts and not by professions. That the enabling Act, and the Commission granted to him in pursuance of it, by no means harmonized with the language of these Instructions to Sir Guy Carleton: That, unless the offers and promises, contained in the latter, were realized by an immediate declaration of our Independence, America would naturally consider them as specious appearances of magnanimity, calculated to deceive and disunite them, and, instead of conciliating, would tend to irritate the States. I also urged, in the strongest terms, the great impropriety and consequently the utter impossibility of our ever treating with Great Britain on any other than an equal footing, and told him plainly, that I would have no concern in any negociation, in which we were not considered as an independent people.

Mr. Oswald upon this, as upon every other occasion, behaved in a candid and proper Manner. He saw, and confessed the propriety of these remarks. He wished his Commission had been otherwise; but was at a loss how to reconcile it with the King’s dignity, to make such a declaration, immediately after having issued such a Commission. I pointed out the manner in which I conceived it might be done. He liked the thought, and desired me to reduce it to writing. I did so, and communicated it to Doctor Franklin, and, as we corrected it, is as follows vizt.

[here Jay embedded the text of his draft of a patent of 15 August 1782, above]

Mr. Oswald approved of the draft and said he would recommend the measure to the Minister.22 The next Day, however, he told me that he had an Instruction which he thought enabled him to make the declaration, but that it would be necessary to obtain the previous Consent of the Minister for that purpose— He then read to me the 4th. Article of his Instructions, of which the following is a Copy, Vizt.

“In Case you find the American Commissioners are not at liberty to treat on any terms short of Independence, you are to declare to them, that you have our Authority to make that Cession; Our ardent wish for Peace disposing us to purchase it at the Price of acceding to the complete Independence of the Thirteen Colonies,23 namely New Hampshire &c. (naming them)—” 31st. July 1782. He said he would immediately despatch a Courier to London, and would press the Ministry for permission to acknowledge our Independence without further delay, which he accordingly did.24

At this time, the Commission, under the great Seal, had arrived, and Doctor Franklin and myself went to Versailles to communicate that Circumstance to the Count de Vergennes, and, (agreeably to our Instructions) to inform him of what had passed between Mr. Oswald and us.25

The Count and myself again discussed the propriety of insisting that our Independence should be acknowledged previous to a Treaty. He repeated that it was expecting the Effect before the Cause; and many other similar remarks, which did not appear to me to be well founded. I told the Count, that a declaration of our Independence was, in my Opinion, a matter of very little Consequence; that I did not consider our Independence as requiring any aid or validity from British Acts, and provided that nation treated us, as she treated other Nations, vizt., on a footing of equality, it was all that I desired. He differed with me also in this Opinion. He thought an explicit acknowledgment of our Independence, in Treaty, very necessary, in order to prevent our being exposed to further Claims. I told him we should always have Arms in our hands to answer those Claims, that I considered mere Paper fortifications as of but little Consequence; and that we should take care to insert an Article in the Treaty whereby the King of Great Britain should renounce all claims of every kind to the Countries within our limits.

The Count informed us he had delayed doing business with Mr. Fitzherbert, until we should be ready to proceed with Mr. Oswald, and that he expected to see him the next Day or the Day after.

Mr. Fitzherbert went the next Day to Versailles, and immediately despatched a Courier to London.

The answer of the British Ministry to Mr. Oswald is contained in the following Extract of a Letter to him from Mr. Townshend, dated Whitehall, 1st. September 1782.

“Sir,

I have received and laid before the King your letters of the 17th. 18 & 21st. Ult: and I am commanded to Signify to you his Majesty’s approbation of your Conduct in communicating to the American Commissioners the 4th. Article of your Instructions; which could not but convince them that the negociation for Peace and the Cession of Independence to the 13 United Colonies, were intended to be carried on and concluded with the Commissioners in Europe:

Those Gentlemen, having expressed their satisfaction concerning that Article, it is hoped they will not entertain a doubt of his Majesty’s determination to exercise, in the fullest extent the Powers with which the Act of Parliament has invested him, by granting to America, full, complete, and unconditional Independence, in the most explicit manner, as an Article of Treaty.”26

When Mr. Oswald communicated this Letter to me, I did not hesitate to tell him that his Court was misled by this, for that the language of Mr. Townshend corresponded so exactly with that of the Count de Vergennes, and was, at the same time, so contrary to that of the Instructions to Sir Guy Carlton, as to be inexplicable on any other principle. I also told him, I suspected that the Courier despatched by Mr. Fitzherbert on his return from Versailles had been the means of infusing these Ideas. He smiled, and after a little pause said, “Why Count de Vergennes told Mr. Fitzherbert that my Commission was come and that he thought it would do, and therefore they might now go on, and accordingly they did go on to discuss certain points, and particularly that of Newfoundland.”—

Mr. Oswald did not deny or contradict the Inference I drew from this, vizt., that Mr. Fitzherbert, struck by this Conduct of Count de Vergennes, and finding that the Commission given to Mr. Oswald was deemed sufficient by him, thought it his Duty directly to inform his Court of it, and thereby prevent their being embarrassed by our Scruples and Demands on a point, on which there was so much reason to think that our Allies were very moderate.

For my own part I was not only persuaded that this was the Case, but also that the ill success of Mr. Oswald’s application was owing to it.27

These Considerations induced me to explain to him what I supposed to be the natural Policy of this Court on the Subject, and to shew him that it was the Interest of Britain to render us as Independent on France as we were resolved to be on her.28 He soon adopted the same opinion, but was at a loss to see in what manner Great Britain, considering what had just past, could consistently take further Steps at present. I told him that nothing was more easy, for that the issuing of another Commission would do it. He asked me if he might write that to the Ministry— I told him he might— He then desired, in order to avoid mistakes, that I would give it to him in writing, which I did as follows, vizt.

[Here Jay embedded the text of his draft of proposed alterations to the commission of 9 September 1782, above]

I then reminded him of the several Resolutions of Congress, passed at different Periods, not to treat with British Commissioners on any other footing than that of absolute Independence;29 and also intimated that I thought it would be best to give him our final and decided determination not to treat, otherwise, in writing, in the from of a Letter, He preferred this to a verbal Answer, and the next day I prepared the following draft of such a Letter.

[Here Jay embedded the text of his draft of his letter to Richard Oswald of 10 September 1782, above.]

I submitted this Draft to Doctor Franklin’s Consideration. He thought it rather too positive, and therefore rather imprudent, for that in Case Britain should remain firm, and future Circumstances should compel us to submit to their mode of treating, we should do it with an ill Grace after such a decided and peremptory refusal.30 Besides the Doctor seemed to be much perplexed and fettered by our Instructions to be guided by the Advice of this Court.31 Neither of these Considerations had weight with me; For as to the first, I could not conceive of any Event which would render it proper, and therefore possible, for America to treat in any other Character than that of an independent Nation—and as to the second, I could not believe that Congress intended we should follow any Advice, which might be repugnant to their Dignity and Interest.

On returning to Town, Mr. Oswald spoke to me about this Letter. I told him that I had prepared a Draft of one, but that on further Consideration, and consulting with Doctor Franklin, we thought it best not to take the liberty of troubling his Court with any Arguments or Reasonings, which without our aid must be very evident to them.

He appeared disappointed, and desired me to let him see the Draft. I did. He liked it. He requested a Copy of it. But as I doubted the propriety of such a Step I told him I would consider of it, and give him an Answer the next Day.

It appeared to me, on further Reflection that no bad Consequences would arise from giving him a Copy of this Paper; That, though unsigned, it would nevertheless convey to the Ministry the Sentiments and Opinions I wished to impress, and that if finally they should not be content to treat with us as independent, they were not yet ripe for Peace or Treaty with us. Besides, I could not be persuaded that Great Britain, after what the House of Commons had declared after what Mr. Grenville had said, and Sir Guy Carlton been instructed to do, would persist in refusing to admit our Independence, provided they really believed that we had firmly Resolved not to treat on more humble Terms.

I gave him a Copy, and also Copies of the various Resolutions of Congress, which evince their adherence to their Independence. These Papers he sent by Express to London, and warmly recommended the issuing a new Commission to remove all further delay. This matter was not communicated to the Count de Vergennes, at least to my Knowledge or Belief, by either of us.

I might now enumerate the various expedients proposed ^by Count de Vergennes^ and the Marquis de la Fayette to reconcile our Difficulties— Such as Mr. Oswald’s writing a Letter to us, signifying that he treated with us as Independent &c. &c. &c. But as our Independence was indivisible, there could not easily be contrived a half way mode of acknowledging it, and therefore any Method of doing it short of the true and proper one, could not bear examination.

Being convinced that the Objections to our following the Advice of the Count de Vergennes were unanswerable, I proposed to Doctor Franklin that we should state them in a Letter to him, and request his Answer in Writing, because, as we were instructed to ask and to follow his advice on these Occasions, we ought always to be able to shew what his Advice was.

The Doctor approved of the Measure and I undertook to prepare a Draft of such a Letter.32

I must now remind you of what some of my former Letters informed you, vizt. The Propositions made to me by the Count d’Aranda33 on the part of Spain. It is necessary that I should in this Place go into that detail, because they will be found in the Sequel, to be strongly connected with the Subject more immediately under Consideration.

On my arrival at Paris in June last, it being doubtful whether if I made a visit to Count d’Aranda he would return it, I thought it most advisable to avoid that Risk, and to write him the following Letter.

[Here Jay embedded the text of his letter to Aranda of 25 June 1782, above.]

The following is a Copy of the Count’s Answer.

[Here Jay embedded the text and translation of Aranda’s reply of 27 June 1782, above]

It having been intimated to Doctor Franklin that if we paid a Visit to Count d’Aranda, it would be returned. We waited on him ^on^ the 29th. of June.34 He received us in a friendly manner, and expressed his Wishes that closer connexion might be formed between our Countries, on Terms agreeable to both.

He returned our Visit the next Day, and gave us an Invitation to Dine with him a few Days afterwards. On that Day I was taken Sick, and continued so for many Weeks, nor indeed am I yet perfectly recovered from the Effects of that illness, having a constant pain in my Breast and frequently a little Fever.

Hence it happened that I did not meet Count d’Aranda on business ’till a Month afterwards, when, agreeably to a previous Appointment, I waited upon him.35

He began the Conference by various Remarks on the general principles, on which contracting Nations should form Treaties— On the magnanimity of his Sovereign, and on his own disposition to disregard trifling Considerations in great matters— Then opening Michell’s large Map of North America, he asked me what were our Boundaries; I told him that the Boundary between us and the Spanish Dominions was a Line drawn from the Head of Mississippi, down the middle thereof to the thirty first Degree of North Latitude, and from thence by the Line between Florida and Georgia.

He entered into a long discussion of our Right to such an Extent; and insisted principally on two Objections to it—1st. That the Western Country had never belonged to, or been claimed as belonging to, the ancient Colonies;— That previous to the last War it had belonged to France, and after its cession to Britain, remained a distinct part of her Dominions,36 until, by the Conquest of West Florida and certain Posts on the Mississippi and Illinois, it became vested in Spain. 2dy. That supposing the Spanish Right of Conquest did not extend over all that Country, still that it was possessed by free and independent Nations of Indians, whose Lands we could not with any Propriety consider as belonging to us; He therefore proposed to run a longitudinal Line on the East side of the River, for our Western Boundary; and said that he did not mean to dispute about a few Acres or Miles, but wished to run it in a manner that would be convenient to us;37 For though he could never admit the extent we claimed, yet he did not desire to crowd us up to our exact Limits.

As it did not appear to me expedient to enter fully into the Discussion of these Objections, until after he had marked the Line he proposed, I told him I would forbear troubling him with any Remarks on the Subject until the Points in Controversy should be reduced to a certainty and therefore, I Desired him to mark on the Map, the line he proposed, and to place it as far to the West as his Instructions would possibly admit of. He promised to do it, and to send me the Map with his proposed Line marked on it, in a Day or two.

I then gave him a Copy of my Commission, and shewed him the Original. He returned it to me with expressions of Satisfaction,38 and then changed the Subject, by desiring me, if after receiving his map and examining his Lines, I should find it in any Respect inconvenient, that I would mark such other Line on it as would, in my Opinion, be more agreeable to America, assuring me that he had nothing more at heart, than to fix such a Boundary between us as might be satisfactory to both Parties— I told him that, on receiving his Map, I would take all that he had said into Consideration and take the earliest opportunity of acquainting him with my Sentiments respecting it. I then observed that I hoped his Powers to treat were equal with mine. He replied that he had ample Powers to confer, but not to sign ^anything without previously communicating it to his Court, and receiving their Orders^ for the purpose—but to my surprise be did not offer to shew me any Powers, of any kind.

A few Days afterwards he sent me the same map, with his proposed line marked on it in red Ink— He ran it from a Lake near the Confines of Georgia, but East of the Flint River, to the Confluence of the Canaway with the Ohio, thence round the Western Shores of Lakes Erie and Huron, and thence round Lake Michigan to Lake Superior.39

On the  th.40 of August I carried this Map to the Count de Vergennes and left it with him. Doctor Franklin joined with me in pointing out the extravagance of this Line; and I must do him the justice to say, that, in all his Letters to me, and in all his conversations with me, respecting our western Extent, he has invariably declared it to be his Opinion, that we should insist upon the Mississippi as our Western Boundary, and that we ought not, by any means, to part with our Right to the free Navigation of it.41

The Count de Vergennes was very cautious and reserved; but Mr. Rayneval, his principal Secretary, who was present, thought we claimed more than we had a right to.42

Having thus clearly discovered the views of Spain, and that they were utterly inadmissible, I had little hope of our ever agreeing; especially as the Mississippi was and ought to be our Ultimatum.

It was not long before I had another Interview with Mr. Rayneval.43 He asked me whether I had made any progress in my negociations with the Count d’Aranda. I told him, that the Count had not yet shewn me any Powers from his Court to treat. He expressed surprise that I should have any difficulties on that Head; especially considering the Public, as well as private Character of that Nobleman. I replied, that I was very sensible of the respectability, both of his public and private Character, but, that neither the one nor the other authorised him to negociate Treaties with the United States of America; and consequently, that his Court would be at liberty to disavow all his proceedings in such business: That it was my duty to adhere to the forms usual in such Cases, and that those forms rendered it proper for Ministers to exchange Copies of their Commissions before they proceeded on the business, which was the Object of them.

The Count d’Aranda was very urgent that I should mark, on his Map, some Line or other to the Eastward of the Mississippi, to which we could agree; and on the 26th. of August we had another Conference on these Subjects. I told him, frankly, that we were bound by the Mississippi, and that I had no authority to cede any Territories, East of it, to his Catholic Majesty, and that all I could do, relative to it, was, to transmit his Proposition to Congress for their Consideration.

He affected to be much surprised that I should have no discretionary Authority on that Subject, and observed, that he had supposed I was a Minister Plenipotentiary. I told him that few Ministers Plenipotentiary had discretionary Power to transfer and cede to others, the Countries of their Sovereigns. He denied that the Countries in question were our Countries, and asked what right we had to Territories, which manifestly belong to free and independent Nations of Indians. I answered that those were points to be discussed and settled between us and them; That we claimed the Right of preëmption with respect to them, and the Sovereignty with respect to all other Nations. I reminded him that Mexico and Peru had been in the same predicament, and yet that his Catholic Majesty had had no doubts of his right to the Sovereignty of those Countries.

He then desired me to write him a Letter on the Subject, in order that he might, with the greater accuracy, convey my Sentiments to his Court.

On the 4th. of September I received the following Letter from Mr. de Rayneval:

[Here Jay embedded the text and translation of Rayneval’s letter of 4 September 1782, above]

I accordingly waited on M. de Rayneval. He entered into a long disquisition of our Claims to the Western Country. It is unnecessary to repeat, in this place, what he said on those Subjects, because I shall insert in this Letter a Copy of a paper, which, at my request, he wrote to me on them. That paper will speak for itself. You will be at no loss to form a judgment of the mode in which he proposed to reconcile us, by what he called a conciliatory line. We discussed, very freely, the propriety of my objecting to proceed with the Count d’Aranda; and, among other Reasons which induced him to think I ought to go on, was my having already conferred with him on those Subjects. My answer to this was obvious, vizt. that though I had heard Count d’Aranda’s Propositions, yet that I had offered none, of any kind whatever.

On the 6th. of September Mr. de Rayneval wrote me the following Letter.

[Here Jay embedded the text and a translation of Rayneval’s letter to him of 6 September 1782, above]

I must desire you not to let the perusal of the following memoir make you forget the Postscript of the above Letter—for, in the sequel, you will find it of some importance.

[Here Jay embedded a copy in French of Rayneval’s “Memoir on Boundaries between Spain and the United States” printed above under the date of 6 September 1782]

I did not return Mr. Rayneval any answer to his Letter, nor any remarks on his Memoir, but the first time I saw him afterwards, I told him, I had received his Letter and memoir he had done me the honor to write and that I should send a Copy of it to our secretary for foreign Affairs.

As both the Letter and Memoir were ostensibly written by him, in a private Character, it did not appear to me expedient, or necessary to enter into any formal discussions with him on those Subjects.

The perusal of this memoir convinced me—

1st.— That this Court would, at a Peace, oppose our extension to the Mississippi.

2dy.— That they would oppose our Claim to the free Navigation of that River.

3dy.— That they would probably Support the British Claims to all the Country above the 31st. degree of latitude and certainly to all the Country North of the Ohio.

4thly.— That in Case we should not agree to divide with Spain, in the manner proposed, that then this court would aid Spain in negociating with Britain for the Territory she wanted, and would agree that the residue should remain to Britain.

In my Opinion it was not to be believed that the first, and Confidential Secretary of the C. de Vergennes would, without his Knowledge and Consent, declare such Sentiments and offer such propositions, and that too, in writing. I therefore considered Mr. Rayneval as speaking the Sentiments of the Minister, and I confess they alarmed me, especially as they seemed naturally to make a part of that System of Policy which I believed induced him rather to postpone the acknowledgment of our Independence by Britain, to the conclusion of a general Peace, than aid us in procuring it at present.

You will now be pleased to recollect the Postscript to Mr. Rayneval’s Letter.

On the 9th. of September I received certain Information that on the 7th. Mr. Rayneval had left Versailles and was gone to England; That it was pretended he was gone into the Country, and that several precautions had been taken to keep his real destination a Secret.44

A former page in this Letter informs you, that a little before this, Mr. Oswald had despatched a Courier with Letters, recommending it to his Court to issue a new Commission stiling us United States, and that I had agreed to prepare a Letter to the Count de Vergennes, stating our Objections to treat with Mr. Oswald under his present one.

This therefore was a period of uncertainty and suspense, and whatever part Britain might take must necessarily be followed by very important Consequences. No time was therefore to be lost in counteracting what I supposed to be the object of Mr. Rayneval’s journey. But before I enter into that detail, I must here insert a Copy of the Letter, which I wrote to the Count d’Aranda, agreeably to his request herein beforementioned.

[Here Jay embedded a copy of his letter to Aranda of 10 September 1782, above]

To this Letter the Count returned the following answer.

[Here Jay embedded the text and translation of Aranda’s letter to him of 11 September 1782, above]

On the same Day, vizt., the 10th. of September a Copy of a translation of a Letter from Mr. Marbois to the Count de Vergennes, against our sharing in the Fishery, was put into my hands. Copies of it were transmitted to you, enclosed with my Letter of the 18th. of September, of which a Duplicate was also forwarded.45

I also learned from good Authority, that, on the morning of Mr. Rayneval’s departure, the Count d’Aranda had, (contrary to his usual practice) gone with Post-Horses to Versailles, and was two or three Hours in Conference with the Count de Vergennes and Mr. Rayneval, before the latter set out.46

All these Facts, taken together, led me to conjecture, that Mr. Rayneval was sent to England for the following purposes—

1st.— To let Lord Shelburne know, that the demands of America, to be treated by Britain as independent, previous to a Treaty, were not approved or countenanced by this Court, and that the offer of Britain, to make that acknowledgment, in an Article of the proposed Treaty, was in the Count’s Opinion, sufficient.

2d.— To sound Lord Shelburne on the Subject of the Fishery, and to discover whether Britain would agree to divide it, with France, to the exclusion of all others.47

3d.— To impress Lord Shelburne with the determination of Spain to possess the exclusive navigation of the Gulph of Mexico, and of their desire to keep us from the Mississippi; and also: to hint the propriety of such a Line, as on the one Hand, would satisfy Spain, and, on the other, leave to Britain all the Country North of the Ohio.

4th.— To make such other verbal overtures to Lord Shelburne, as it might not be advisable to reduce to writing: And to judge from the general tenor of his Lordship’s answers and Conversation, whether it was probable that a general Peace, on terms agreeable to France, could be effected, in order that, if that was not the Case, an immediate Stop might be put to the negociation.

Having, after much Consideration, become persuaded that these were Mr. Rayneval’s Objects, I mentioned his journey to Mr. Oswald, and after stating to him the first three of these Objects, I said every thing, respecting them, that appeared to me necessary, but at the same Time, with a greater Degree of Caution than I could have wished, because I well knew it would become the Subject of a long Letter to the Ministry.48 On reflecting, however, how necessary it was that Lord Shelburne should know our Sentiments and Resolutions, respecting these matters, & how much better they could be conveyed in Conversation than by Letter, and knowing also, that Mr. Vaughan was in confidential Correspondence with him, and he was, and always had been strongly attached to the American Cause, I concluded it would be prudent to prevail upon ^him^ to go immediately to England.

I accordingly had an interview with Mr. Vaughan and he immediately despatched a few lines to Lord Shelburne, desiring that he would delay taking any measures with Mr. Rayneval, until he should either see, or hear further from him.

Mr. Vaughan agreed to go to England, and we had much previous conversation on the points in Question; the Substance of which was.

That Britain, by a Peace with us, certainly expected other advantages than a mere suspension of hostilities, and that she doubtless looked forward to Cordiality, Confidence, and Commerce.

That the manner, as well as the matter of the proposed Treaty, was therefore of importance, and that if the late assurances, respecting our Independence were not realized by an unconditional Acknowledgment, neither Confidence nor Peace could reasonably be expected. That this measure was considered by America as the touchstone of British Sincerity, and that nothing could abate the suspicions and doubts of her good faith, which prevailed there.

That the Interest of Great Britain, as well as that of the Minister would ^be^ advanced by it; for as every Idea of Conquest had become absurd, nothing remained for Britain to do, but to make friends of those whom she could not subdue. That the way to do this, was by leaving us nothing to complain of either in the negociation, or in the Treaty of Peace, and by liberally yielding every point, essential to the Interest and Happiness of America, the first of which points was, that of treating with us on an equal footing.

That if the Minister really meant to make Peace with us, it was his Interest to make us believe so, and thereby inspire us with a certain degree of Confidence, which could not otherwise be obtained. That his Enemies charged him with insincerity on this very point and that it must be useful to him to convince all the World that such a Charge was groundless.

That it would be vain to amuse themselves with expectations from the affected moderation of France on this Head; for that America never would treat on any but an equal footing, and therefore, although such expectations might cause delay, they would ultimately be fruitless.

That a little reflection must convince him, that it was the Interest and consequently the policy of France to postpone, if possible, the acknowledgment of our Independence to the very conclusion of a general Peace, and, by keeping it suspended until after the War, oblige us, by the terms of our Treaty and, by regard to our safety, to continue in it to the End.

That it hence appeared to be the obvious interest of Britain immediately to cut the Cords, which tied us to France; for that, though we were determined faithfully to fulfil our Treaty and Engagements with this Court, yet it was a different thing to be guided by their or our Construction of it.

That among other things we were bound not to make a separate Peace or Truce, and that the assurance of our Independence was avowed to be the Object of our Treaty. While, therefore, Great Britain refused to yield this Object, we were bound, as well as resolved, to go on with the War, although perhaps the greatest obstacles to a peace arose neither from the demands of France nor America— Whereas, that Object being conceded, we should be at liberty to make Peace, the moment that Great Britain should be ready to accede to the terms of France and America, without our being restrained by the demands of Spain, with whose views we had no concern.

That it would not be wise in Great Britain to think of dividing the Fishery with France and excluding us, because we could not make Peace at such an expense and because such an attempt would irritate America still more, would perpetuate her Resentments, and induce her to use every possible means of Retaliation by withholding Supplies in future to the Fishery, and by imposing the most rigid restraints on a Commerce with Britain.

That it would not be less impolitic to oppose us on the point of Boundary and the navigation of the Mississippi.

1st.— Because our Right to extend to the Mississippi was proved by our Charters and other Acts of Government; and our Right to its navigation was deducible from the Laws of Nature, and the Consequences of Revolution, which vested in us every British territorial right. It was easy therefore to foresee what opinions and sensations, the mere attempt to dispossess us of these Rights, would diffuse throughout America.

2dy.— Because the profits of an extensive and lucrative commerce, and not the possession of vast tracts of wilderness, were the true objects of a commercial European nation.

That by our extending to the Mississippi, to the West, ^and to the^ Proclamation bounds of Canada to the North, and by consenting to the mutual free navigation of our several Lakes and Rivers, there would be an inland navigation from the Gulph of St. Lawrence to that of Mexico, by means of which the Inhabitants, West and North of the mountains, might, with more ease, be supplied with foreign Commodities, than from Ports on the Atlantic, and that this immense and growing Trade would be in a manner, monopolized by Great Britain, as we should not insist that she should admit other nations to navigate the Waters that belonged to her. That therefore the Navigation of the Mississippi would in future be no less important to her than to us, it being the only convenient outlet, through which they could transport the productions of the Western Country, which they would receive in payment for Merchandize vended there.

That as to retaining any part of that Country, or insisting to extend Canada, so as to comprehend the lands in Question, it would be impolitic for these further Reasons. Because it would not be in their power, either to settle or Govern that Country; that we should refuse to yield them any aid; and that the utmost exertions of Congress could not prevent our People from taking gradual possession of it, by making establishments in different parts of it. That it certainly could not be wise in Britain, whatever it might be in other nations, thus to sow the Seeds of future War in the very treaty of Peace, or to lay in it the foundation of such distrusts and Jealousies as on the one hand, would forever prevent confidence and real friendship, and, on the other, naturally lead us to strengthen our Security by intimate and permanent Alliances with other Nations.

I desired Mr. Vaughan to communicate these remarks to Lord Shelburne, and to impress him with the necessity and policy of taking a decided and manly part respecting America.

Mr. Vaughan set off the evening of the 11th. of September— It would have relieved me from much anxiety and uneasiness to have concerted all these Steps with Doctor Franklin; but on conversing with him about Mr. Rayneval’s Journey, he did not concur with me in sentiment respecting the Objects of it; but appeared to have a great degree of Confidence in this Court, and to be much embarrassed and constrained by our Instructions.

Nothing now remained to be done, but to complete the Letter we had agreed to write to the Count de Vergennes, stating our Objections to treat with Mr. Oswald under his present Commission. I accordingly prepared the following draft of such a letter, and it was under Doctor Franklin’s Consideration, when the news of our Success in England rendered it unnecessary.

[Here, Jay embedded the text of his letter to Vergennes, c. 11 September 1782, above.]

I think it was on the 24th. of September that I was informed of the Intention of the British Court to give Mr. Oswald such a new commission as had been recommended.49

On the 26th. of September I went to pay a Visit to the Count de Vergennes at Versailles. I found the Marquis de la Fayette in the Ante Chamber, and the Ambassador of Spain shortly after entered. After some common Conversation the Ambassador asked me when we should proceed to do Business. I told him as soon as he should do me the Honor of communicating his Powers to treat. He asked me whether the Count de Florida Blanca had not informed me of his being authorized. I admitted that he had, but observed that the usual mode of doing business rendered it proper that we should exchange Certified Copies of our respective Commissions. He said that could not be expected in our Case, for that Spain had not yet acknowledged our Independence. I replied, that we had declared it, and that France, Holland and Britain had acknowledged it. Here the Marquis de la Fayette took up the Subject, and it continued between him and the Ambassador, ’till the Count de Vergennes came in. The Marquis told the Ambassador among other things, that it would not be consistent with the Dignity of France for her Ally to treat other wise than as independent. This Remark appeared to me to pique the Count d’Aranda not a little.50

The Count de Vergennes, in coming in, finding the Conversation earnest, inquired whether we could not agree. The Ambassador stated my Objections. The Count said I certainly ought to treat with the Ambassador, and that it was proper we should make a Treaty with Spain in the same manner that we had done with France. I told him, I desired nothing more, and that the Commission to Mr. Gerard and the Reason assigned by this Court to the King of Great Britian for entering into Alliance with us, pointed out both the manner and the principles, which were observed and admitted on that Occasion. The Count did not seem pleased with my allusion to the Communication made of our Alliance to England. He observed, that Spain did not deny our Independence, and he could perceive no good Reason for my declining to confer with the Ambassador about a Treaty, without saying any thing about our Independence, an acknowledgment of which would naturally be the Effect of the Treaty proposed to be formed. I told the Count that, being Independent, we should always insist on being treated as such, and therefore it was not sufficient for Spain to forbear denying our Independence, while she declined to admit it, and that notwithstanding my Respect for the Ambassador and my Desire of a Treaty with Spain, both the Terms of my Commission and the Dignity of America forbid my treating on any other than an equal footing.

The Count carried the Ambassador into his Cabinet, and when he retired, I was admitted.

The Count commenced the Conversation by explaining the reason of sending Mr. Rayneval to England, which he said was, that by conversing with Lord Shelburne about Peace and matters connected with it, he might be able to judge whether a pacific Disposition really prevailed in the British court, and therefore whether any Dependence might be placed in his Lordship’s Profession on that Head—that he was satisfied with Mr. Rayneval’s Report, and that he believed that Lord Shelburne was sincerely desirous of Peace.

A few words then passed about Mr. Oswald’s new Commission, the Count observing in general Terms, that as it removed our former Objections, we might now go on to prepare our preliminaries.

The conversation next turned to our negociation with Spain, and to her Claims East of the Mississippi. Nothing new passed on the first Topic; as to the latter, the Count made only some very general Remarks, such as that he hoped we should on conferring further about the matter, approach nearer to each other; that those Limits ought to be settled, and while they remained in Contest a Treaty with Spain could not reasonably be expected— That as soon as we should agree upon those points, Count d’Aranda would have a further or more formal Commission to conclude the Treaty, &c.

I remarked that these Claims of Spain were of recent date, for that on my first arriving in Spain, the Count de Florida Blanca told me, that the Success of my Mission would probably turn upon one single point, vizt the Cession of our Rights to the Navigation of the River Mississippi; from which, as well as from their subsequent and uniform Demands on that head, it was evident, that they then considered that River as our Boundary; for it would have been very strange indeed, that they should insist on our forbearing to navigate a River whose waters washed no part of our country, and to which we could not of consequence have any pretence of Claim.51

The Count smiled, but avoided making any direct Reply; he hoped we should, nevertheless agree, and that we must endeavor to approach and meet each other. I told him I could not flatter myself with such expectations while Spain continued her Claims to those Countries, for that we Should be content with no Boundary short of the Mississippi.

I went from the Count’s to Mr. Rayneval’s Chamber, for I had not seen him since his return from England. He gave me the same Reason for his Journey which I had just received from the Count. We then talked of his Memoir52 and the Spanish Negociation. He said much in favor of the conciliatory Line he had proposed, and of the advantages of placing the Indian nations on the West side of it under the Protection of Spain, and those on the East, under that of the United States. That the Rights of those nations would be thereby secured, and future Disputes between us and Spain avoided. I replied that so far as our Claims might affect those Indian nations, it was a matter solely between us and them; and that admitting them to be independent, they certainly had a right to choose their own Protectors; and therefore that we could have no right, without their Knowledge or Consent, to choose for them. I also made the same Remark to him respecting the recency of these Spanish Claims, which I had just before done to Count de Vergennes. He said it was a Subject which Count de Florida Blanca had not understood, and imputed their former Ideas of our extending to the Mississippi, to their Ignorance respecting those matters. Hence it became evident from whom they had borrowed their present Ideas.

On the 27th. of September, Mr. Vaughan returned here from England with the Courier that brought Mr. Oswald’s new Commission, and very happy were we to see it. Copies of it have already been sent to you, so that I will not lengthen this Letter by inserting it here.53 Nor will I add any thing further on this Head at present than to assure you that Mr. Vaughan greatly merits our acknowledgments.

The next thing to be done was to prepare and draw up the proposed Articles.54 They were soon completed and settled between us and Mr. Oswald, by whom they were sent to his Court with Letters declaring his Opinion that they ought to be accepted and agreed to—but they differed with him in Opinion.

The following is a Copy of them.

[See Preliminary Articles: First Draft, 5–8 October 1782, Above]

These articles, for very obvious Reasons were not communicated to the Count de Vergennes.

Mr. Oswald did not receive any Opinion from his Court relating to our Articles until the 23d. of October, when Letters from the Minister informed him that the Extent of our Boundaries, and the Situation of the Tories &c. caused some objections, and the Minister’s Secretary was on the way here to confer with us on those Subjects.55

On the 24th. of October I dined at Passy with Doctor Franklin, where I found Mr. Rayneval. After dinner, we were in private with him a considerable Time. He desired to know the state of our negociation with Mr. Oswald. We told him that difficulties had arisen about our Boundaries, and that one of the Minister’s Secretary’s was coming here with Papers and Documents on that Subject.56 He asked us what Boundaries we claimed. We told him the River St. John to the East, and ancient Canada as described in the Proclamation to the North. He contested our Right to such an Extent to the North, and entered into several Arguments to shew our Claim to be ill founded. These arguments were chiefly drawn from the ancient French Claims, and from a Clause in the Proclamation restraining Governors from making Grants in the Indian Country &c.57

He inquired what we demanded, as to the Fisheries. We answered that we insisted on enjoying a Right in common to them with Great Britain. He intimated that our views should not extend further than a Coast Fishery, and insinuated that Pains had lately been taken in the Eastern States to excite their apprehensions and increase their Demands on that Head. We told him that such a Right was essential to us, and thus our People would not be content to make Peace without it; and Doctor Franklin explained, very fully, their great Importance to the Eastern States in particular. He then softened his manner, and observed, that it was natural for France to wish better to us than to England; but as the Fisheries were a great nursery for Seamen, we might suppose that England would be disinclined to admit others to share in it, and that for his part he wished there might be as few obstacles to a Peace as possible. He reminded us also that Mr. Oswald’s new Commission had been issued posterior to his arrival at London.

On the 26th. of October Mr. Adams arrived here, and in him I have found a very able and agreeable Coadjutor.

When I began this Letter, I did not flatter myself with being able to write this much before Captain Barney would leave us; and I now find myself too much exhausted to proceed with further Details, and must therefore refer you to the Letters you will receive from Mr. Adams and Doctor Franklin.

The same Reason also prevents my writing to you and Mr. Morris on other Subjects by Captain Barney; and I hope the length of this Letter and the disagreeable State of my Health will apologize for my not writing even to my own Family by this opportunity.

I am sensible of the impression which this Letter will make upon you, and upon Congress, and how it will affect the Confidence they have in this Court. These are critical Times, and great necessity there is for Prudence and Secrecy.

So far and in such matters as this Court may think it their Interest to support us, they certainly will, but no further in my opinion.

They are interested in separating us from Great Britain, and, on that point we may, I believe depend upon them, but it is not their Interest that we should become a great and formidable People, and therefore they will not help us to become so.

It is not their Interest that such a Treaty should be formed between us and Britain, as would produce Cordiality and mutual Confidence. They will therefore endeavor to plant such Seeds of Jealousy, Discontent, and Discord in it, as may naturally and perpetually keep our Eyes fixed on France for Security. This Consideration must induce them to wish to render Britain formidable in our Neighbourhood, and to leave us as few resources of wealth and power as possible.

It is their Interest to keep some point or other in contest between us and Britain to the end of the War, to prevent the possibility of our sooner agreeing, and thereby keep us employed in the War, and dependent on them for Supplies. Hence they have favored, and will continue to favor, the British Demands, as to matters of Boundary and the Tories.

The same views will render them desirous to continue the War in our Country as long as possible, nor do I believe they will take any measures for our repossession of New York, unless the Certainty of its evacuation should render such an attempt advisable. The Count de Vergennes lately said that there could be no great use in Expeditions to take places, which must be given up to us at a Peace.

Such being our Situation it appears to me advisable to keep up our Army to the end of the War, even if the Enemy should evacuate our Country; nor does it appear to me prudent to listen to any overtures for carrying a part of it to the West Indies, in case of such an Event.

I think we have no rational dependence except on God and ourselves; nor can I yet be persuaded that Great Britain has either Wisdom, Virtue or Magnanimity enough to adopt a perfect and liberal System of Conciliation. If they again thought they could conquer us, they would again attempt it.

We are, nevertheless, thank God, in a better situation than we have been. As our Independence is acknowledged by Britain, every obstacle to our forming Treaties with neutral Powers, and receiving their Merchant Ships, is at an end so that we may carry on the War with greater advantage than before, in case our negociations for Peace should be fruitless.

It is not my meaning, and therefore I hope I shall not be understood to mean, that we should deviate in the least from our Treaty with France; our Honor and our Interest are concerned in inviolably adhering to it. I mean only to say, that, if we lean on her love of liberty, her affection for America, or her disinterested magnanimity, we shall lean on a broken reed, that will sooner or later pierce our Hands, and Geneva as well as Corsica justifies this Observation.

I have written many disagreeable things in this Letter, but I thought it my duty. I have also deviated from my Instructions, which, though not to be justified, will I hope be excused, on account of the singular and unforeseen Circumstances which occasioned it.

Let me again recommend Secrecy, and believe me to be, Dear Sir, &c.

(signed) John Jay.58

P. S. I have neither seen nor heard anything of Mr. Laurens, nor of the cypher you mention to have sent by him.59

LbkCs, DNA: PCC, item 110, 2: 142–262 (EJ: 4230); NNC: Jay Lbks. 1 and 2; CSmH (EJ: 3482). E, MH (EJ: 5337).

1JA and his secretary John Thaxter, assisted JJ in making copies of this letter. JA reported, in a letter to Jonathan Jackson of this date, that he had found JJ “in very delicate Health, in the midst of great affairs and without a Clerk.” See PJA description begins Robert J. Taylor, Gregg L. Lint, et al., eds., Papers of John Adams (16 vols. to date; Cambridge, Mass., 1977–) description ends , 14: 61, 64n1 and n4, whose editors suggest that the experience may have prompted JA to keep his own “Peace Journal”.

2On the Enabling Act, see “The Status of the Peacemaking on John Jay’s Arrival in Paris” (editorial note) on pp. 5–6. Madison commented that it seemed “to make eventual provision for our Independence, without betraying any purpose of acknowledging it.” See PJM description begins William T. Hutchinson, William M. E. Rachal, Robert A. Rutland et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison, Congressional Series (17 vols.; Chicago and Charlottesville, Va., 1962–91) description ends , 4: 241.

3See John Jay’s Diary of the Peacemaking, 23–28 June, entry for 27 June 1782, above. Paradise’s wife was Lucy Ludwell, sister-in-law of William Lee. For BF’s intervention on behalf of the pair, see PBF description begins William B. Willcox et al., eds., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (40 vols. to date; New Haven, Conn., 1959–) description ends , 35: 26.

4William Jones, An Inquiry into the Legal Mode of Suppressing Riots. With a Constitutional Plan of Future Defence. 2nd ed. (Printed for C. Dilly, in The Poultry, London, 1782).

5Charles James Fox and other Wilkites established the Society for Constitutional Information in 1780 to advocate for substantive political reform including the secret ballot and annual general elections. See the reference to the society in “United Kingdon: Domestic Responses to the American Revolution” Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 17 Aug. 2010, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/134315/Society-for-Constitutional-Information.

6Jones was, in fact, hoping for an appointment of some significance from the new ministry. See Garland Cannon, Oriental Jones (London, 1964), 95–96, 99–100, 101–4, 108–9.

7BF had been in contact with Jones since 1779. Fears that Britain was sending “artful Emissaries” to America were based on French intelligence. See PBF description begins William B. Willcox et al., eds., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (40 vols. to date; New Haven, Conn., 1959–) description ends , 29: 524; 37: 629–31, 704–5, 37: 344.

9On suspicions that Jones was going to America in some official capacity, see Garland Cannon, “Sir William Jones and Anglo-American Relations during the American Revolution,” Modern Philology 76, No. 1 (August 1978): 41–44. On rebuffs by Washington, Congress, and the states to Carleton’s attempts to initiate peace negotiations, which were regarded as attempts to seduce the United States from its alliance to France, see Gouverneur Morris to JJ, 6 Aug. 1782, above; PJM description begins William T. Hutchinson, William M. E. Rachal, Robert A. Rutland et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison, Congressional Series (17 vols.; Chicago and Charlottesville, Va., 1962–91) description ends , 4: 240–43, 258; and LDC description begins Paul H. Smith et al., eds., Letters of Delegates to the Continental Congress, 1774–1789 (26 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1976–98) description ends , 18: 513–14, 516.

10JJ did not disclose that Richard Oswald had personally presented him with the copy of his commission and the letter from Thomas Townshend explaining why he had sent a copy without signature or seal. See Oswald’s Notes on Conversations with Benjamin Franklin and John Jay, 7[–9] Aug. 1782, above; and PBF description begins William B. Willcox et al., eds., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (40 vols. to date; New Haven, Conn., 1959–) description ends , 37: 712–13.

11Vergennes to BF, 8 Aug. 1782, PBF description begins William B. Willcox et al., eds., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (40 vols. to date; New Haven, Conn., 1959–) description ends , 37: 713.

12For the exchange of correspondence between BF and Vergennes of 8 Aug. 1782, see PBF description begins William B. Willcox et al., eds., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (40 vols. to date; New Haven, Conn., 1959–) description ends , 37: 712–14. In letters to La Luzerne of 9 and 12 Aug. 1782, Vergennes described the commission as being “in the form of letters patent: . . . conceived like all the domestic acts of the English government; but that the Colonies were presented neither as rebels nor as subjects of the British crown.” Unsigned “Reflections on Richard Oswald’s Commission,” [c. 25 July 1782], echo this assessment but also provide evidence that suggests an implicit recognition of independence. The document then suggests that the commissioners respond to Oswald’s commission with a declaration demanding the Court of London accept the “full power” sent its commissioners by Congress and that “nothing will later be inferred contrary to the independence of the said United States from the tenor of the said act. . . .” See Giunta, Emerging Nation description begins Mary A. Giunta et al., eds., The Emerging Nation: A Documentary History of the Foreign Relations of the United States under the Articles of Confederation, 1780–1789 (3 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1996) description ends , 1: 473–75, 525.

13In his dispatch to La Luzerne of 12 Aug. Vergennes described Shelburne’s reversal of the policy of granting immediate and direct recognition of American independence as an attempt to “inspire acts of perfidy in the Americans,” as an “oblique and conspicuous course” followed “to the edge of complete dishonesty.” He reported further developments on 22 Aug. and 7 Sept., where he commented that it was “necessary, in politics, to know to yield on the form when one has reason to be satisfied with the substance.” Ibid., 1: 524–27, 541, 559. For JJ’s intended response to his position, see his draft letter to Vergennes of 11 Sept., above.

In a dispatch of 11 Oct. 1782, Oswald informed Townshend that he knew Vergennes had always wanted the Americans to progress no faster in their treaty than the French did “And indeed, that the main Question regarding America should not be quickly determined. Or rather the Grant to be postponed, so as to close with the final determination of both. For this I had the best authority, by a quotation of the Ministers expressions on the Subject. Viz Why they should not seek for the Effect before the Cause; meaning the progress of the Treaty &c.” See Giunta, Emerging Nation description begins Mary A. Giunta et al., eds., The Emerging Nation: A Documentary History of the Foreign Relations of the United States under the Articles of Confederation, 1780–1789 (3 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1996) description ends , 1: 611.

14For the American peace commissioners’ refusal to exchange commissions with Oswald until the independence of the United States had been satisfactorily recognized, see the editorial notes “The Status of the Peacemaking on John Jay’s Arrival in Paris” and “John Jay Proposes Altering Richard Oswald’s Commission” on pp. 1–9, 108–11. For the future significance of this issue, see the editorial note “Signing the Definitive Treaty” on pp. 426–63.

15BF had previously and with Vergennes’s concurrence rejected the commission issued to Thomas Grenville to treat with France and “her Allies” without specifically identifying them. He had then insisted that he would not consider Grenville authorized without a “special Commission,” which he supposed the King was reluctant to grant since it would be de facto acknowledgement of American independence. See the editorial note “The Status of the Peacemaking on John Jay’s Arrival in Paris” on pp. 1–6; and PBF description begins William B. Willcox et al., eds., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (40 vols. to date; New Haven, Conn., 1959–) description ends , 37: 319, 434–35.

16Matthew Ridley noted that JJ placed “no Confidence in Comte De Vergennes,” and saw “very clearly” that his policy was “to keep America in leading Strings.” JJ had, he said, “brought Dr. Franklin to join with him in getting out of them.” See “Ridley’s Diary,” description begins Herbert E. Klingelhofer, ed., “Matthew Ridley’s Diary during the Peace Negotiations of 1782,” WMQ 20 (1963): 95–133 description ends 101.

17See Congress’s Instructions to the Ministers Plenipotentiary to Negotiate a Treaty of Peace, 15 June 1781, JJSP, 2 description begins Elizabeth M. Nuxoll et al., eds., The Selected Papers of John Jay, Volume 2, 1780–82 (Charlottesville, Va., 2012) description ends : 469–71.

18For Oswald’s appraisal of this conversation and his struggle to understand JJ’s insistence that the peace must be such that it would not be “the Interest of either party to violate it,” see his notes of 7[–9] Aug. 1782, above.

19For Shelburne’s belief that American independence would be a “dreadful blow to Britain’s greatness . . . and that when it should be established, the sun of England might be said to have set,” see PBF description begins William B. Willcox et al., eds., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (40 vols. to date; New Haven, Conn., 1959–) description ends , 37: 598.

20The date of Shelburne’s letter was 5 June. Shelburne had allowed Benjamin Vaughan to make extracts of it. See BF to JJ, 16 Aug. 1782, above. For the full text of it, see Giunta, Emerging Nation description begins Mary A. Giunta et al., eds., The Emerging Nation: A Documentary History of the Foreign Relations of the United States under the Articles of Confederation, 1780–1789 (3 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1996) description ends , 1: 421–22. Carleton had arrived in the United States on 5 May as commander of the British forces. He and Admiral Robert Digby had been appointed to “the Commission of Peace.” See LDC description begins Paul H. Smith et al., eds., Letters of Delegates to the Continental Congress, 1774–1789 (26 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1976–98) description ends , 18: 509–11.

21William Smith commented that Carleton’s object was “Reunion upon any Terms that can be got to wean the Continent from the French.” See William H. W. Sabine, ed., Historical Memoirs, of William Smith, Historian of the Province of New York, Member of the Governor’s Council and Last Chief Justice of That Province under the Crown, Chief Justice of Quebec (2 vols.; New York, 1956–58), 2: 504.

22For Oswald’s correction of the draft, see his Notes on Negotiations with John Jay, 15–17 Aug. 1782, above.

23For the instructions to Oswald, 31 July 1782, see Giunta, Emerging Nation description begins Mary A. Giunta et al., eds., The Emerging Nation: A Documentary History of the Foreign Relations of the United States under the Articles of Confederation, 1780–1789 (3 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1996) description ends , 1: 481–84. Ridley noted that Oswald had been instructed to get permission previous to revealing these instructions.

24See Oswald to Townshend, 17 Aug. 1782, ibid., 1: 529–30.

25See Congress’s instructions to the peace commissioners of 15 June 1781, JJSP, 2 description begins Elizabeth M. Nuxoll et al., eds., The Selected Papers of John Jay, Volume 2, 1780–82 (Charlottesville, Va., 2012) description ends : 469–71. The conversation described here seems to have occurred in the course of the meeting of 19 Aug., also discussed below.

26Townshend also stated that the Enabling Act did not allow the King to cede independence “unconnected with a Truce or Treaty of Peace,” and that it was “expressly mentioned to be offered by His Majesty as the price of Peace.” For the complete text of this letter, see Giunta, Emerging Nation description begins Mary A. Giunta et al., eds., The Emerging Nation: A Documentary History of the Foreign Relations of the United States under the Articles of Confederation, 1780–1789 (3 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1996) description ends , 1: 545–47; for a summary of its substance, see the notes to JJ’s Draft of an Alteration in Oswald’s Commission, 9 Sept. 1782, above.

27Ridley concurred with JJ’s opinion in this matter. See “Ridley’s Diary,” description begins Herbert E. Klingelhofer, ed., “Matthew Ridley’s Diary during the Peace Negotiations of 1782,” WMQ 20 (1963): 95–133 description ends 104.

28For Ridley’s view that Spain’s and France’s increasing claims against Britain would have been checked by British recognition of American independence, see ibid., 104, 111.

29See, for instance, Congress’s insistence on this in the negotiations with Lord Howe in September 1776, PBF description begins William B. Willcox et al., eds., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (40 vols. to date; New Haven, Conn., 1959–) description ends , 22: 597–605; the Instructions to the Peace Commissioner adopted 14 Aug. 1779, JCC description begins Worthington C. Ford et al., eds., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789 (34 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1904–37) description ends , 14: 957; and Instructions of the Continental Congress to the Ministers Plenipotentiary for Negotiating a Treaty of Peace, 15 June 1781, JJSP, 2 description begins Elizabeth M. Nuxoll et al., eds., The Selected Papers of John Jay, Volume 2, 1780–82 (Charlottesville, Va., 2012) description ends : 469–71; and JJ’s discussion in his letter to Vergennes, c. 11 Sept. 1782, above.

30For Ridley’s report that BF had refused to sign the letter, see the notes to JJ to Oswald, 10 Sept. 1782, above.

31The instructions to the peace commissioners of 15 June 1781, JJSP, 2 description begins Elizabeth M. Nuxoll et al., eds., The Selected Papers of John Jay, Volume 2, 1780–82 (Charlottesville, Va., 2012) description ends : 469–71.

32See JJ’s draft letter to Vergennes, c. 11 Sept. 1782, above, which cites the congressional resolutions referred to here.

33The clerk who copied this letter erroneously wrote “d’Yranda” for Aranda in all parts of this letter. This has been corrected for clarity’s sake. In the margin next to this first occurance is a note in another hand, reading: “This should be D’Aranda everywhere. D’Yranda was a very different person Th. J.”

34See the notes to Aranda to JJ, 27 June 1782, above.

36Under the Proclamation Line of 1763. As JJ notes, the United States claimed for itself the territory won by the British in the Treaty of Paris of 1763. For France’s desire to revise this treaty significantly in matters that affected itself, see the editorial note “The Status of the Peacemaking on John Jay’s Arrival in Paris” on p. 5.

37See Aranda’s remarks to Vergennes to this effect described in his Notes on Negotiations with John Jay, 19–30 Aug. 1782, above.

38Aranda makes no mention of JJ’s commission in his notes for 3 Aug., above. In his notes for 19 Aug. he states that he had noticed that JJ’s commission did not contain any powers to negotiate boundary concessions, but did not wish to call attention to it because it would have allowed JJ to assert that he was not authorized to accept anything less than the Mississippi. On 15 Sept. he informed Floridablanca that he did not think American representatives should be treated as those of other sovereign powers until Britain had recognized American independence. See Bemis, Diplomacy of the Am. Rev. description begins Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution (Indianapolis, Ind., 1965) description ends , 216n5.

39Ibid.

40Probably a copiest’s error. Aranda’s notes of 19–30 Aug. and Benjamin Vaughan to Shelburne 24 Aug., both above, refer to a meeting with Vergennes of 19 Aug.

41See BF to RRL, 12 Aug. 1782, PBF description begins William B. Willcox et al., eds., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (40 vols. to date; New Haven, Conn., 1959–) description ends , 37: 733.

42Aranda had agreed to allow Rayneval to mediate his negotiations with JJ. See Aranda’s Notes on Negotiations with John Jay, 19–30 Aug., above.

43In his letter of 4 Sept. 1782, above, Rayneval asked to meet with JJ at Versailles the following day. For Aranda’s summary of the discussion of 26 Aug., see his notes of 19–30 Aug., above.

44Rayneval announced his absence in a postscript to his letter to JJ of 6 Sept. 1782, above; Ridley notified JJ that he had been sent to England. While the Austrian minister, count Ludwig Graf von Cobenzl, and Aranda had been apprised of it, neither the British nor the American commissioners had been informed. Ridley considered Rayneval’s mission a mistake, and argued that if the Americans sent someone to counter it, it would be “throwing the power of Peace or War into the hands of English.” Ridley’s diary also reports that Lafayette tried to determine what the Americans knew about the mission. Ridley suspected Lafayette of relaying information about the Americans to Vergennes and to his relative, the marquis de Castries. See “Ridley’s Diary,” description begins Herbert E. Klingelhofer, ed., “Matthew Ridley’s Diary during the Peace Negotiations of 1782,” WMQ 20 (1963): 95–133 description ends 104, 105, 106, 107, 111–12.

46Bemis contends that this meeting did not consider matters related to the United States. Rather it was the occasion on which Aranda delivered Spain’s reaction to peace proposals regarding the European belligerents attributed by de Grasse to Shelburne, proposals which Rayneval had been sent to England to verify. See his “Rayneval Memorandum,” 40; and the editorial note “The Rayneval and Vaughan Missions to England” on pp. 95–99.

47On the accuracy of this assumption, see the editorial note “The Rayneval and Vaughan Missions to England” on p. 96.

48For Oswald’s suspicions about Rayneval’s mission, see ibid. BF believed that Vergennes had sent Rayneval to England to determine whether Shelburne was serious about peace negotiations. See his letter to RRL of 14 Oct. 1782, PBF description begins William B. Willcox et al., eds., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (40 vols. to date; New Haven, Conn., 1959–) description ends , 38: 222–23.

49On the arrival of the new commission, see Oswald to Townshend, 2 Oct. 1782, above.

50For Lafayette’s involvement in persuading Floridablanca to give Carmichael diplomatic status in Spain, see his letter to JJ of 15 Feb. 1783, and notes, below.

51See Notes on John Jay’s Conference with Floridablanca, 11 May 1780, JJSP, 2 description begins Elizabeth M. Nuxoll et al., eds., The Selected Papers of John Jay, Volume 2, 1780–82 (Charlottesville, Va., 2012) description ends : 104–10. Floridablanca became more assertive both with regard to rejection of American claims to navigation of the Mississippi and to Spanish claims to territory in “east Lousiana” after Bernardo de Gálvez’s conquest of Mobile in March 1780, and of Pensacola in 1781.

53For a copy of the commission, see JJUP, 2 description begins Richard B. Morris et al., eds., John Jay, vol. 2, The Winning of the Peace: Unpublished Papers, 1780–1784 (New York, 1980) description ends : 360–62. In his letter to La Luzerne of 23 Nov. 1782, Vergennes described “the reformation of the English plenipotentiary’s power, in which the thirteen provinces are styled the United States,” as “the only useful thing” the Americans had obtained. See Giunta, Emerging Nation description begins Mary A. Giunta et al., eds., The Emerging Nation: A Documentary History of the Foreign Relations of the United States under the Articles of Confederation, 1780–1789 (3 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1996) description ends , 1: 683.

54Ridley reported that, on 1 Oct., BF had suggested to JJ that they begin drawing up the preliminaries so that they could be shown to Vergennes. In reply, JJ expressed his opposition “to communicating anything relative to them” to Vergennes because he “merited no such Confidence.” JJ added that the French did not inform the Americans of their secrets and that the commissioners had still not been informed about the reason for Rayneval’s mission to England “and many other matters and he would by no means consent to their interfering in our Affairs.” See “Ridley’s Diary,” description begins Herbert E. Klingelhofer, ed., “Matthew Ridley’s Diary during the Peace Negotiations of 1782,” WMQ 20 (1963): 95–133 description ends 117, 118.

55See Shelburne to Oswald, 21 Oct. 1782, in Giunta, Emerging Nation description begins Mary A. Giunta et al., eds., The Emerging Nation: A Documentary History of the Foreign Relations of the United States under the Articles of Confederation, 1780–1789 (3 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1996) description ends , 1: 620–22.

56For Shelburne’s instructions to Henry Strachey, see ibid., 1: 619–20.

57For arguments on which Rayneval based his recommendations for boundaries, see his Memoir on Boundaries between Spain and the United States, 6 Sept., above.

58The General Washington (Captain Joshua Barney) took this letter, its enclosure, John Jay’s Diary of the Peacemaking (see above, 23–28 June, 25–26 July, and 12 Oct. 1782), and JJ to RRL of 14 Dec. 1782, to Philadelphia along with the preliminary articles, numerous other dispatches from the American Peace Commissioners dated from 4–24 Dec., and the first installment (600,000 l.t.) of France’s loan for 1783 to the United States. The General Washington sailed from France under a British passport, several days before the general peace was concluded on 20 Jan. 1783. See PJM description begins William T. Hutchinson, William M. E. Rachal, Robert A. Rutland et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison, Congressional Series (17 vols.; Chicago and Charlottesville, Va., 1962–91) description ends , 6: 328, 330n; and PBF description begins William B. Willcox et al., eds., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (40 vols. to date; New Haven, Conn., 1959–) description ends , 38: 560–61. On Congress’s reaction to this dispatch, see the editorial note “Congress Debates the Commissioners’ Conduct” on pp. 334–40.

59RRL had mentioned the cipher sent with John Laurens in his letter to JJ of 18 Sept. 1782, ALS, NNC (EJ: 7940). As noted in JJ to Laurens, 2 May 1781 (JJSP, 2 description begins Elizabeth M. Nuxoll et al., eds., The Selected Papers of John Jay, Volume 2, 1780–82 (Charlottesville, Va., 2012) description ends : 443–44), JJ never received any of the mail for him that Laurens brought and arranged with BF to be forwarded by post.

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