John Jay Papers

Richard Oswald’s Notes on Conversations with Benjamin Franklin and John Jay, 7[–9] August 1782

Richard Oswald’s Notes on Conversations
with Benjamin Franklin and John Jay

Paris Wednesday, 7th:[Friday–9] August 1782.

Yesterday Evening, at 7’o’Clock, the Courier Roworth arrived; and brought my Commission, for treating with the Commissioners of the Colonies: and the King’s instructions &c.1

This forenoon I went out to Passy, and carried a Copy of the Commission to Dr. Franklin. after perusal, he said he was glad it was come. That he had been at Versailles yesterday. and Monsr. de Vergennes had ask’d about it; and upon the Doctor telling him it was not come, he said he could do nothing with Mr. Fitzherbert till it arrived; as both Treaties must go on together hand in hand.

I shewed him Mr. Townshend’s2 Letter accounting for a Copy being only sent; as the Chancellor and Attorney General were at a distance in the Country. The Doctor seemed to be satisfied, and said, as on a former occasion, He hoped we should agree; and not be long about it. There were no particulars touched upon. and after sitting about a quarter of an hour, I proposed calling upon Mr. Jay, the only other Commissioner at Paris.— The Doctor said it was right, and returned me the Copy of the Commission to be left with Mr. Jay, which he would bring back to the Doctor, as he was to dine at Passy.

I accordingly returned to Paris, and called on Mr. Jay. He is a man of good sense; of frank, easy, and polite manners.— He read over the Copy of the Commission, and Mr. Townshend’s Letter accounting for it’s not being under Seal:3 and then said, By the Quotation from the Act of Parliament in the Commission, He supposed it was meant, that Independence was to be treated upon. and was to be granted perhaps as the price of Peace.— That it ought to be no part of a Treaty. It ought to have been expressly granted by Act of Parliament; and an order for all Troops to be withdrawn; previous to any Proposal for Treaty.— As that was not done, the King, he said, ought to do it now by Proclamation, and order all garrisons to be evacuated; and then close the American War by a Treaty. He said many things of a retrospective kind; such as the happy Effects a Declaration of that nature at earlier periods would have produced; if Great Britain had handsomely, and nobly, made this Grant, before such deep wounds had been given to that Bias and attachment, which till then subsisted all over that Country in favour of G. B. even in spite of their Petitions being repeatedly rejected. That in such Case, they would undoubtedly have concerted such Plan of Treaty, as would have not only restored Peace; but would have laid a solid Bottom of amity and Conciliation, and such as would have obliterated from their memory in a short time all Remembrance of preceding Acts of Distress and Violence.

But by the continued Enforcement of the same cruel Measures, the Minds of the People in general all over that Continent were almost totally alienated from G. B. so that they detested the very name of an Englishman.

That it was true a number of the older People had not forgot their former Connections; and their Inclinations might still lean towards England.— But when they were gone; and the younger Generation came to take their place, who had never felt any of those Impressions, those Inclinations would be succeeded by Grudge and resentment of every kind, upon reflecting ^on^ what they had seen, and their Parents had suffered; that few of them but could recollect the loss of Blood of some relation or other; Devastation of their Estates and other Misfortunes.4

On which occasion he run into a Detail of particulars, as unnecessary as unpleasant here to be repeated and which I would not have touched upon, if I did not think that a full Exposure of the Features of this Conversation may help to form a Judgement of what may be expected in the Issue, from the Determination of this Commissioner, and consequently what concessions on this very critical occasion it may be safe and proper to propose or insist upon.

As information, respecting the real Sentiments of those Gentlemen, was the object I principally aimed at, in the Commencement of this Business, I allowed Mr. Jay to go on without Interruption; remarking only upon the whole, That supposing there had been capital Mistakes in the Direction as well as in the Execution of our Measures, it would be hard to bring the Charge home to the Nation in general: and there was a good deal to be said even Excuse of the Ministers who presided over the Conduct of those Measures considering that they were not personally acquainted with the Circumstances of that Country, and therefore could not but naturally listen to the Information they received from those who were so acquainted; who came over from America as Refugees, and who had upon all occasions insisted, that we had so great a proportion of Friends in all the Colonies, as to require only a temporary support from Government to bring every thing back to the original state of Peace and Subordination. That it was the Search after those friends of Government which, in consequence of personal Interference and correspondence in writing, has kept up and encouraged a Continuance of the Measures of Coercion complained of, untill they brought on at last, the present unfortunate Crisis.

Mr. Jay admitted that some Blame was justly to be imputed to the Mis-representation of the Refugees, and other Correspondents abovementioned; Who he said, at least many of them, were in a particular manner concerned on account of their private Interest, to have things brought back, by any means to their original State. As to the Military Men, I said it was natural for them to give Credit to those Representations; and they were in general so inattentive to Circumstances out of the Line of their profession, that I had heard them insist, that with a few Battallions, they could go from one End of the Continent to the other; and that I had upon such occasions told them, that under the orders of a French or Spanish Court, they might surprize a defenceless Country, and by Massacre and Devastation might terrify the People and compleat the Conquest. But having so done, it would be only for the present time, in such a Country as North America. But as Troops would receive no such orders from Great Britain, even a temporary Conquest of any Extent could never be made, by any Armies We could support in that Country. Mr. Jay admitted this to be true, without taking Notice of what might have been the Conduct of the abovementioned Foreign Nations, in the Reduction of revolted Countries.—

He returned to the subject of Independence as not being satisfied with its being left as a Matter of Treaty. I wished much to get him off it; and for that purpose said, that the Method proposed was much the same as what he meant, and perhaps such as the nature of the British Constitution made necessary.

Independence on Great Britain in the most compleat sense would be granted without any reserve; always supposing that their states should be equally independent of other Nations.5— And so the Treaty might proceed in the Course which was this marked out for it, untill it ended in Peace. He said Peace was very desirable, and the sooner the better.— But the great point was to make such a Peace as should be lasting.

This brought back my attention to the same Expression in Monsr. de Vergennes’s Discourse in April, when I first had the Honour to wait on him.6— And the more so, that almost in every Conversation I have had with Dr. Franklin, he has made use of the same Words, and delivered as in the way of aphorism; and as an indispensable principle in the foundation of a final Settlement between them and France.

I never at these times chose to ask for an Explanation, having no right to do so; I thought it was then too early to venture on such delicate ground; and so I remained at a loss as to the intended meaning of the Words; although I strongly suspected the Expression pointed at some unpleasant or unfavorable Limitations on the Conduct of Great Britain.

But now being in a somewhat different Situation, and having so fair an opportunity, which I wish’d not to miss of, in order to guess at the meaning of this phrase, I replied that such long Intermission of War was certainly very desirable.— But what Security could there be given for a Continuance of Peace, but such as generally put an End to all Wars, being that of Treaty? But which was often found to be a very inadequate Security; as was the Case of the last Treaty concluded at this Place, only about 20 years ago.

To this Mr. Jay replied, He would not give a farthing for any Parchment Security whatever— They had never signified any thing since the World began, when any Prince or State, of either Side, found it convenient to break through them. But the Peace he meant was such, or so to be settled, that it should not be the Interest of either Party to violate it.— This he said was the only Security that could be proposed to prevent those frequent Returns of War, by which the World was kept in perpetual Disturbance.7

I could guess what he meant by the present Parties being bound by motives of Interest to be quiet; and ask’d for no Explanation.

As I happened to mention the last Treaty of Paris, Mr. Jay said, We had taken great advantage of the French in that Treaty. I did not ask him as to the articles he objected to. But further to try his Sentiments on these Subjects, I said I wondered that he, being of America, should complain of that Treaty, as if the French had not been tenderly enough dealt with in it: Since that long and expensive War, to which it put a Period, was entered into entirely on account of America; and to save them from the Consequences of that constant Course of Hostility which the French were avowedly carrying on against them on their Western Frontiers, in the times of profound Peace in every other Quarter of the World, and to which they were solemnly bound by the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle.

Notwithstanding which, he very well knew, that in that Interval, there was no intermission in their Endeavors to disturb the quiet of the Colonies by their constant intrigues amongst the Savages of all the Tribes from Canada, down to the Chicassaws, on the Gulph of Mexico.

That these Savages, prompted, paid, and supported by the French continually lay upon the Borders of our Colonies, to take advantage of the defenceless State of the back settlers, to surprize and cut their throats as opportunities offered.— That to repress the unceasing practice of those cruelties by the Savages, as well as from the French Settlements of Canada, that War was entered into and continued at great Expence, untill the Colonies were put out of the reach of all farther Danger, by the Conquest of Canada and the total Expulsion of the French from that quarter of the World.— I therefore said, I thought it odd that the Treaty should be complained of, which put a legal Period to that War, by which the future safety and quiet of the Inhabitants of every part of North America was thus firmly established, and which cou’d not have been effectually done by any other means. Whether We ought to have been so tender of their Safety as to run into that extensive Scheme of Exertion, was a Question I also ventured to touch upon, but needless to be repeated here.

To all this Mr. Jay made answer, That at that time North America being considered as ^a^ part of the British Empire, as much as England or Ireland, had an equal Title to the protection of Government as any other part of the Dominions. and therefore We could plead no merit by way of distinction, so as to have any particular Claim on america.

I admitted that america on that occasion had the same right to protection, in proportion to Circumstances, as the County of Kent had; and only thought it hard that, in america, there should be such Feelings for the Conditions to which the French were bound by a Treaty which concluded a War so necessary for its present and future Safety.

On this occasion I could not help thinking that Mr. Jay fell below the Idea I wished to entertain of his Candour and Impartiality, regarding Objects not strictly american: and so We passed to other Subjects.

At one or other of the periods of this Conversation he said, you seem to think that France ought to consider the Independence of our States, as a sufficient Indemnification for all her Expenses in the War. (This however I had never said to him, although I had often said so to Dr: Franklin.) But, continued Mr. Jay, that ought not to be admitted, as it in the first place, put us under a greater obligation to France than We incline to, as if to her alone We are indebted for our Independence.— And in the next place, (I have forgot the precise terms, but it was to this purpose,) that in the Course of the War, France had made Conquests, and they the americans had a Treaty with them, by which they were bound not to give us Peace but in concurrence with our Settlement with them.— What the Conditions might be, He cou’d not say: He believed We should agree: But that France had in the Course of the War made Conquests; and We could not expect to get back all we had lost.— They of america must fulfill their Treaty.— They were a young Republic just come into the World, and if they were to forfeit their Character at the first outset, they would never be trusted again, and should become a proverb amongst Mankind. All this is true, I replied; But your Treaty does not oblige you to support their Demands after your Independence is acknowledged.—8 He seemed to say they would think themselves obliged to support them in their Settlement with us, in general: only at last he said, unless unreasonable;—then indeed—and paus’d—but afterwards went on and said— France had been very kind to them, and had lent them money very liberally &Ca.

After enlarging on these obligations, and the Gratitude they owed to France, He proceeded to Spain and Holland, and talk’d also, though in a more general way, of their alliances with them; and their great obligations to them for advance of Money; and as if by the Conditions of Treaty, they could not conclude or have Peace with Great Britain separately from those other two Powers.

I did not think it right to be over inquisitive as to their intentions regarding them; but it appeared to me as if he considered those two Courts as much under their Protection as that of France; and as if they, the Commissioners of the Colonies, would agree or refuse to close with us according as they should consider, the Terms which those two last Powers shall insist on, to be reasonable or unreasonable.

I don’t recollect any thing more, of material Consequence, that passed in the Course of this Conversation.

As beforementioned I think it best to give these Minutes, in the loose way in which they run; as in that dress I can keep more easily and closely to the precise strain of Conversation, than if formed into a proper State of official Correspondence.—and therefore I hope to be excused for this Time.

Upon the Contents of the beforementioned representation, I beg leave to make the following observations, Vizt.

1st.— On the forenoon of the 7th being the next day after the Receipt of my Commission, I went out to Dr. Franklin with a Copy of it, as already mentioned—when he said very kindly, He hoped We should do very well, and not be long about it: as he ^had^ said to me upon a former occasion.

2nd.— In an hour afterwards, I called on Mr. Jay at his House in Paris: a sensible Man of plain yet civil manners, apparently humane, and of a calm obliging Temper.— After reading the Commission, He said he hoped some good would be done— I replied, if I did not think so I should not be here— He said he was so informed by Dr. Franklin; and then began upon the article of Independence, and continued the Conversation in the manner as has been mentioned, in the coolest unreserved method, and determined Stile of Language, that any common Subject could be treated; and with a freedom of Expression, and disapprobation of our Conduct at home and abroad, respecting America, as shews We have little to expect from him in the way of Indulgence: And I may venture to say that although he has lived till now as an English Subject, though he never had been in England, he may be supposed (by anything I could perceive) as much alienated from any particular Regard for England, as if he had never heard of it in his Life. I sincerely wish I may be mistaken, but think it proper to make this Remark, as Mr. Jay is Dr. Franklin’s only Colleague, and being a much younger Man, and bred to the Law, will of Course have a great share of this Business assigned to his Care.

3d.— I thought it remarkable that so soon after I left Dr. Franklin, I should have found this Gentleman’s plan of Settlement with Great Britain, so much less liberal, or at least so much more incumber’d with relative Connections, Concerns and Interests, than had been insinuated in any Conversation I ever had with Dr. Franklin; or rather, on the contrary, seemingly very materially different, Excepting only in that making such a Peace as should be lasting: which the Dr. always said he aimed at.

4th.— The Doctor and Mr. Jay having been today (the 8th.) to see Mr. Fitzherbert, they called upon me, when the Doctor told me he had sent a Copy of my Commission to Monsr. de Vergennes at Versailles.— They said no more, nor was there any notice taken of any Conversation having passed between Mr. Jay and me, the day before; nor any thing else of Business.9

5th.— From what has been said, and from any thing I could ever learn while I have been here, there is good reason to apprehend that the Colony Commissioners think much less of their own Concerns than of those of Foreign Nations: or rather that they consider their Business as good as settled: and that though the Dignity of their Congress may require a formal acknowledgement of Release from their Dependence on Great Britain, yet they are not so much concerned about it, as to propose to give peace to G. B. but on Condition of our settling with these other Nations.— At First France was only named: But now Spain and Holland are included.— Sometime ago, I believe France declared that they must be included in their Treaty,10 no doubt in Expectation of being supported in that Claim by the Commissioners of the Colonies: and by Mr. Jay’s Conversation with me, it would appear they seriously intend it.—and although he had not said so, it might have been understood, since he has concluded a similar Treaty with the Ambassador of Spain now here, to that settled with France in America in 1778.— For which I had the Authority of Doctor Franklin some days ago. And I make not the least doubt they have connected themselves in the same manner with Holland.

The Business therefore of those Commissioners at this place, seems to point at a superintendency over the general Peace: and not only to bring it to a Conclusion, but upon such terms and conditions, as to them shall seem just and reasonable— Two words, which I remember Mr. Jay made use of, when we happened to touch upon that subject.

In so far the Congress (in the Persons of their Commissioners,) have assumed the right of arbitration between Great Britain and those Foreign States. and I wish I may be mistaken in thinking that they have taken those States also under such Protection, as that they shall not likewise before the Close of the Business be found to act the part of Dictators to Great Britain, believing that they can safely do so, without any new act or Determination of their Congress; and only by going on as they do now in a Course of hostilities by Sea and Land, in consequence of their Treaties with those Foreign Powers; to which they profess such sacred Respect, and also without any Regard to the Conduct of Great Britain, although We should cease Hostilities by Sea, as we have done by Land.— A State of Dilemma, I am inclined to think not a little embarrassing to Great Britain.— By Land though We are inactive We may defend ourselves, and so can hardly suffer. But by Sea We must continue to act; Since by a Cessation We could gain nothing upon the good Will of the Congress or others in America; they being bound to go on with the War, by Virtue of their Treaties with our other Enemies.

When We set out upon this Business of Peace, We justly thought that a Relinquishment of the Sovereignty of America which France so strongly pleaded for, would have had some Weight in the scheme of Pacification with them: and that such Grant of Independence would have also fully satisfied the Colonies; and then, that by a few Exchanges or Concessions of little Consequence, in the Course of the Negotiation with France, the whole might have been quickly ended.— But the affair seems to have taken a different Turn.— France very wisely, I don’t say consistently, disowns the Grant of Independence; as being no Concern of theirs.—and Mr. Jay will not allow them to share in the merit of it; lest the Colonies should be brought under a greater Obligation to France, than they should chuse; or more than they can easily discharge, by a Repayment of the Money borrowed of them.— Which his Colleague some time ago told me could be easily done, as their Taxes were coming in fast.

Thus France comes into Conference, with all her acquisitions in hand, clear of any Charge against her on account of North America; and out of the Reverence of any Concessions expected from us, but that of the little Island of St. Lucia; and a few Settlements on the Continent of India.—and therefore before she will listen to our Desire of Peace, is under no difficulty in telling us that We must agree to submit to great alterations, respecting different quarters of the World, (besides others) as settled by the Treaty of Paris. And Mr. Jay on the part of the Americans, in support of that demand, feelingly complains of France having been hardly dealt with in that Treaty, as beforementioned.

To gain the Americans, We have nothing in hand but what they say they are possessed of; or if any formality is wanting, they insist it is so much their Right, that it ought not to stand as part of a Treaty.— If in their Interposition in favour of Foreign States, We pretend to remonstrate, They plead Treaties, Conscience, & Character, under such Constructions of Determination as appears good to them, without any apprehension of Controul, whilst they are gaining, and We losing by a continuance of the War.

So much I have presumed to say as to my Ideas of the State of the present depending Treaty at this Place: which I am unwillingly led to, with a view of paving the way to some modification in the Articles of His Majesty’s Instructions, in case this Negociation should proceed in it’s intended Course.

But before I quit this Article, I beg leave in justice to myself, as to former Advices relative to my Conversations with Dr. Franklin, particularly in my Letter of the 10th. July, as well as for the farther Information of His Majesty’s Ministers to remark that there is a great Difference between those said-advices, and the Strain of Mr. Jay’s Conversation of yesterday’s date. I never chose to teize Dr. Franklin with many questions, yet at different times he has freely declared; that having got the Grant of Independence, their Treaty with France was at an end:11 and on the 10th. of July explicitly specified the Conditions which he thought must necessarily be granted, to obtain a Peace of any kind with the Colonies; but if granted, would have that Effect: adding at the same time others, as discretionary or adviseable; which if complied with, would not fail to diffuse a temper of Reconciliation all over the Country.— These were the Doctor’s Sentiments and Conditions of Settlement on the said 10th: of July;12 and which he read to me from a Minute in writing; and only declined putting it into my hands, from a Motive of Delicacy regarding his Colleague then but just arrived. And so consistent the Doctor still appears to be, that upon the production of my Commission on the 7th. Instant, he repeated the Words which he had us’d on a former Occasion “That he hoped, We should do well enough, and not be long about it”—as already mentioned— That could not but be very agreeable to me; if my Expectations had not been so soon after dampt by the said unpleasant Reception from Mr. Jay.

Having given my opinion as to what appears immediately to concern the present Treaty, I must take the Liberty to touch upon another Subject, principally regarding future Times; which I think is deserving of notice, and ought to be mentioned on this occasion, as the Object of it is perhaps intended by the American Commissioners, as well as the French Minister, to be connected with, and even inserted in the Body of the foreign Treaties now depending, whenever they are concluded.— I mean a supposed Intention of some particular Scheme, of settling those Treaties in such a manner, as in their opinion shall make the Peace uncommonly solid and lasting.

Dr: Franklin, as I have said, had often touched upon this Subject in a general way: “That Peace could not be too dearly bought; and always ending with a wish that it could be made lasting; and at same time observing that England, in a State of Peace for a hundred years, would become a perfect Garden.”— I did not clearly perceive the meaning of the proposal; yet I own I did not much like any of these prescriptions of Quietism; as believing they would not be entirely suitable to the English taste, or Interest; nor did I foresee any Benefit intended for England, by what Monsr. de Vergennes, in Dr. Franklin’s hearing, humanely proposed in April, of settling the Peace solidement, and for a long standing; which I then suspected as an Intimation of an intended Scheme of some sort for putting the Naval power of England under some unusual and particular Limitation.

On those occasions with Dr. Franklin, I never chose to say much, or to ask for an Explanation as to his Idea of the effectual means of preventing the return of War.

But upon Mr. Jay’s mentioning the same proposal the other day of their Design of settling the depending Treaty on such a solid foundation, as that the Peace should be lasting; I asked him, how a sufficient Security could be found, to make it so. He answer’d as beforementioned: The best Security in the World Vizt: that it shall not be the Interest of either party to break it.

There was no Explanation necessary here, as I knew he could not mean Treaty; since he had just before declared, that he made no account of any Treaty whatever, when any Prince or State found it convenient to break it. And therefore I concluded he must mean a Guarantee of some intermediate Power who he thought would not chuse to be Principals in any War, and yet (in that State of Neutrality respecting their own Concerns) might be capable of controuling other States, by adopting the cause of those in whose safety they might be particularly interested, or to whom protection was due, under the Stipulations of a general Guarantee.

This Power or State I now conceive could be meant to be no other than their American Congress: who taking upon them the Guarantee of the general Peace intended to be settled at this Place, The Commissioners of the Colonies possibly suppose, that they can make it stand for almost any length of Time they please; as believing that the united power of their Confederacy will be of such weight, as to make it in the Interest of either of the present belligerent Powers to desist from the War whenever they chuse to interpose; and consequently that the same being once understood, the said Powers would perceive, that it would not be for their Interest to break the Peace.

On this Occasion, to speak one’s Sentiments freely, it is a fair Question, whether such States as are interested in Commerce, Navigation, and foreign Plantations (as is the Case of England, France, Spain and Holland,) would not, if at War among themselves, be obliged to give way, and put an End to the Quarrel, in case of a Declaration of the American Congress, against any one or more of them.

One may even go further than supposition, and I think may venture to say, that in Case of either of those parties persisting, and the Americans were called upon by their Guarantee, under the authority of the Congress to take a Side, the Objects of Prize and Depradation would bring forth from all parts of that Continent, such Swarms of armed adventurers, as would distress the Commerce and Settlements of the resisting party or Parties to such Degree, as to determine them without Delay to put an End to the War; and consequently knowing that this must ultimately be their fate, they would find, as Mr. Jay says, that it would not be their Interest to break the Peace.

This Capacity in the American Colonies, if admitted to exist at this time, must continue to increase, and become more decisive, from year to year, in proportion to the quick Increase of population in that Country; which abound in every necessary material for the equipment of Shipping, and every Conveniency of safe Roads and Harbours for their Reception.— And where also they run no risk of suffering within Land, or on their Coasts, any such Danger, in the way of Reprizal or Retaliation, from any Power in Europe, as shall prevent their enforcing and supporting the Effect of any guarantee they may think fit to enter into as has been mentioned.

That I humbly own is my opinion, and I have always thought so since I came to have any knowledge of the particular Circumstances of these Colonies; and have, I may say, trembled at, ever since I came to despair of our recovering them.

In these Sentiments I cannot but be sincerely sorry, that any such System of naval power should, in a State of Combination, have rose in competition with that of England: And more particularly that the application of the proposed Check thereof, (if really intended as suspected) should be thought of at this time. Which being undoubtedly and visibly so much courted by France, and our other Enemies, it is to be feared will unreasonably give the Colony Commissioners a predominancy in settling the Conditions of Peace with those foreign Nations, that may not be convenient for England: Besides the Effect it must have in determining the Frame of their own Treaty almost at their Pleasure.

For if the Commissioners of the Colonies are determined to carry through this Scheme of Conditional Interference, into real Execution, and to have it administer’d on this occasion, either by inserting their Guarantees as Parties in those foreign Treaties, or by Stipulation of Guarantee in separate Treaties of offensive and defensive alliance, I can not possibly see how they can be prevented.13

As yet, their Intention has come out only in the unexplained manner which I have mentioned; But as something, (as has been said) was hinted by Monsr. de Vergennes, so early as in April, and has been from time to time since then, repeated by Dr: Franklin in the same way, and at last in a manner openly declared by Mr. Jay, upon the first perusal of my Commission, I think it my Duty to Say the same, (as far as I can yet judge of it) before His Majesty’s Ministers, so as such Resolutions may be taken, and the necessary Instructions given in consequence thereof, as to their Wisdom may seem fit. Paris 9th. Augst: 1782

Richard Oswald

To the Right Honble Thomas Townsend
One of His Majesty’s Principal Secretaries of State.14

C, UkLPR: FO 95/ 511, 139–54. Endorsed: “Sundry Observations / 9th. Augt. 1782. / (Copy)”. C, MiU-C: Shelburne 70.

1For the text of the commission, not under seal and dated 25 July 1782, see JJ to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 17 Nov. 1782, below, where the background for Oswald’s discussion with JJ is discussed. JJ’s concerns about the commission issued to Oswald on the basis of the Enabling Act matched or surpassed BF’s previously expressed concerns about Grenville’s commission. Acutely sensitized by his experiences in Spain to any resistance to acknowledging American independence, he demanded revisions to Oswald’s commission and rejected Vergennes’s suggestion that an exchange of powers between Oswald and the American commissioners would constitute “tacit admittance” of American independence. Concerned that Vergennes might seriously compromise American interests at the peace table if Britain did not acknowledge independence before treaty negotiations began, JJ was compelled to search for an alternative that would allow the Shelburne ministry to remain within the bounds set by the Enabling Act while conferring on the United States and her commissioners a status commensurate with acknowledged independence.

After the change in ministry in July 1782, Vergennes noted that it was now obvious that American independence was “no longer presented as a separate subject . . . and as not having any longer to be a condition of peace; on the contrary, it is put forward as having to be the price of peace, and it is asked in consequence that all things be placed on the footing on which they were by virtue of the Treaty of 1763.” See Vergennes to La Luzerne, 12 Aug. 1782, in Giunta, Emerging Nation description begins Mary A. Giunta et al., eds., The Emerging Nation: A Documentary History of the Foreign Relations of the United States under the Articles of Confederation, 1780–1789 (3 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1996) description ends , 1: 524–25. For an overview of JJ’s reaction to these developments, see his letter to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 17 Nov. 1782, below. JJ’s fears that ministerial changes in Britain and France might prompt France to recede from insistence on American independence may have been heightened by Silas Deane’s comments on France’s failure to support the American cause as fully as he believed they should. See “Silas Deane: A Worrisome Correspondent” (editorial note); and Deane to JJ, 16 Oct. and 16 Nov. 1780, and 8 Apr. 1781, JJSP, 2 description begins Elizabeth M. Nuxoll et al., eds., The Selected Papers of John Jay, Volume 2, 1780–82 (Charlottesville, Va., 2012) description ends : 243–46, 301, 349–51, 421–22.

JA emphatically agreed with JJ on the need for prior recognition of independence and equality of status for the negotiators. See JA to JJ, 13 Aug. 1782, below.

2See Townshend to Oswald, 3 Aug. 1782, UkLPR: FO 95/ 511.

3The commission first issued to David Hartley to negotiate the definitive peace treaty was similarly not under the Great Seal. See “Negotiating a Trade Agreement” (editorial note) on pp. 374–75.

4BF had evidently communicated to JJ the substance of a previous discussion he had had with Oswald, on which see the editorial note “The Status of the Peacemaking on John Jay’s Arrival in Paris,” on pp. 1–9.

5Oswald’s assurance here is based on Shelburne’s letter to him of 27 July which, however, had also specified that acknowledgement of independence would not be made in advance of the treaty. See ibid., on pp. 7, 8–9n21.

6For a summary of this conversation, see Vergennes to Montmorin, 18 Apr. 1782, in Giunta, Emerging Nation description begins Mary A. Giunta et al., eds., The Emerging Nation: A Documentary History of the Foreign Relations of the United States under the Articles of Confederation, 1780–1789 (3 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1996) description ends , 1: 352–55.

7On the impermanence of the settlements of 1763 and 1783, see the editorial note “The Status of the Peacemaking on John Jay’s Arrival in Paris,” on pp. 1–9; and François Furstenberg, “The Significance of the Transappalachian Frontier in Atlantic History,” AHR description begins American Historical Review description ends 113, no. 3 (June 2008), 647–77.

8For BF’s assertion of this position, see the editorial note “The Status of the Peacemaking on John Jay’s Arrival in Paris,” on pp. 4–5. For further discussion of the United States as a guarantor of a treaty between Britain and France, see Oswald’s Notes on Conversations with Benjamin Franklin and John Jay of 15–17 Aug. 1782, below.

10See the editorial note “The Status of the Peacemaking on John Jay’s Arrival in Paris,” on pp. 4–5.

11For other assertions that American obligations under the treaty with France were limited, see Oswald to Townshend, 15 Nov., note 3, below.

12BF’s “necessary” and “advisable” articles, on which see the editorial note “The Status of the Peacemaking on John Jay’s Arrival in Paris,” on pp. 7, 8–9n21. On 8 Aug. Fitzherbert reported this conversation to Townshend as a “violent altercation with Mr. Jay, wherein the latter let fall some very indecent expressions of animosity against Great Britain,” an assessment that appears to convey more hostility than Oswald reports here.

Harlow argues that, contrary to Jay’s intentions and his belief that the United States should cut itself adrift from its allies and realign with Britain, his critique of British conduct, his implied threat to support French demands for territorial concessions, and BF’s “intimacy” with Vergennes, made the British suspect that BF’s claim that the United States wanted a genuine reconciliation with Great Britain was insincere. This, he said, “disillusioned the British negotiators, stiffening their attitude when opportunity arose, so that after protracted and fruitless wrangling the Americans secured less than they could have had almost two months earlier.” What they could have had is not specified. Shelburne’s letter to Oswald of 27 July and Townshend’s letter of 1 Sept. both indicate willingness to make peace on the basis of BF’s “necessary” conditions, not his “advisable” ones. See Fitzherbert to Townshend, 8 Aug. 1782, MiU-C: Shelburne; Harlow, Second British Empire description begins Vincent T. Harlow, Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763–93 (2 vols.; London and New York, 1952–64) description ends , 1: 276–79; and Oswald to Shelburne, 10 July, Shelburne to Oswald, 27 July, and Townshend to Oswald, 1 Sept., in Giunta, Emerging Nation description begins Mary A. Giunta et al., eds., The Emerging Nation: A Documentary History of the Foreign Relations of the United States under the Articles of Confederation, 1780–1789 (3 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1996) description ends , 1: 462, 479, 545. For Oswald’s further reflections on his initial meeting with JJ, see his notes of 15–17 Aug., below.

13Oswald reported further discussion of this topic with JJ in his notes of 15–17 Aug., below.

14Oswald’s notes and letters through 18 Aug. as well as letters from Fitzherbert were taken by courier to England on or about that date. Both men informed Shelburne and Townshend that the Americans were now suggesting that prior acknowledgement of independence could be achieved by making it a preliminary article of a peace treaty “to be Signed and Sealed as a ratified Deed, come of the Subsequent Articles, what may.” See Giunta, Emerging Nation description begins Mary A. Giunta et al., eds., The Emerging Nation: A Documentary History of the Foreign Relations of the United States under the Articles of Confederation, 1780–1789 (3 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1996) description ends , 1: 529–37. Townshend responded to these communications in a letter to Oswald of 1 Sept., on which see the editorial note “John Jay Proposes Altering Oswald’s Commission” on p. 109.

For JJ’s subsequent assurance to Oswald that the United States would not consider itself bound to support any of France’s commitments to Spain, see Oswald to Thomas Townshend, 2 Oct., below.

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