My letter of the 25th April last by Mr; Toscan informed Congress that on the 30th day of January preceding, I had the honour of receiving their letters of the 6th. & 17 October 1780 the latter of which states particularly, and ably, the right of the United States to the free navigation of the river Mississippi, and enumerates the various reasons which induce them to decline relinquishing it—2

Among these reasons is the guarantee contained in the treaty with France— I hinted to Congress that it was more than probable, that the contents of this interesting letter were well known to the french Court, before it came to my hands—3 I am well persuaded that this was the case— Shortly after receiving it, I took occasion to converse generally with the Embassador on the subject of the Spanish pretensions to that navigation, & remarked as it were inadvertently, how unreasonable it was for them to expect that we should relinquish a territorial right which both justice, & the guarantee of France enabled us to retain— The thought did not appear new to him—but he strongly combatted this construction of the treaty, & endeavoured to explain it away by observing that the guarantee could not comprehend claims whose objects we had never possessed &c &c— I mention this only to shew how improper it would have been for me to have communicated this part of your Excellency’s letter to the Spanish Minister—4 It could have answered no good purpose, because as France would have disputed this construction, Spain could with propriety have refused to admit the force of any argument drawn from it; and it might have done much mischief, not only by bringing on an unseasonable explanation between France and us but also between Spain & France.

If I had given the Spanish Minister a copy of every other part of this letter, except those paragraphs which contained the reasoning in question, the omission might in future have been urged by France, who I verily believe has a copy of that whole letter, as an argument for my having yielded that point as not tenable; and tho’ my opinion might not be of much consequence, it appeared to me most prudent, to avoid doubts about it—for my own part I really did, and do think that this guarantee does comprehend the navigation in question, tho’ I also think, that no question should be raised about it at present—so circumstanced, I thought it most advisable to make no written communications of any part or parts of this letter but from time to time to press every argument contained in it in the course of conversations with the Spanish Minister, except those drawn from the Guarantee

The Minister however did not at any time enter into the merits of these arguments, nor appear in the least affected by them— His answer to them all was that the King of Spain must have the Gulf of Mexico to himself. That the Maxims of policy adopted in the management of their Colonies required it, and that he had hoped the friendly disposition shewn by this Court towards us would have induced a compliance on the part of Congress

As to a Free port below the Northern limits of West Florida, or anywhere else in the vicinity, the Minister sometimes wished certain regulations, some middle line might be devised, to reconcile the views of both parties, but he did not see how it could be done— The King had always been accustomed to consider the exclusive navigation of the Gulph of Mexico, as a very important object to Spain, more so indeed than even Gibraltar, and he was persuaded that his Majesty would never be prevailed upon to change his ideas on that Subject— At other times he spoke clearly & decidedly against it, saying that it was their desire to exclude all Nations from the Gulph, and that it made little or no difference whether they admitted all nations or only one

In my letter of the 25th April last,5 I informed your Excellency that on the 25th March preceding, the Minister sent me word that the money necessary to pay the Bills due in April could not be advanced to me— The constant inconsistency I experienced between the Minister’s promises & conduct often surprised, as well as embarrassed me— This last instance appeared to me to be really cruel or if he had intended to withhold the necessary supplies, he ought to have given me notice of it, and not by keeping up my expectations to within a few days before the holders of the Bills were to call upon me for their money (and the Bills of April amounted to 89,083 Dollars) reduce me to such imminent danger of being obliged to protest them— Speaking on this subject with the french Ambassador, he intimated that the Court expected I should have made them some further overtures respecting the Mississippi— I told him I had no authority to make any others than what I had already made— He replied that the Minister believed I had— At that time, I had received no letters public, or private which gave me the least reason to suspect that Congress had passed the resolution of the 15th Feby. last, and it was not before the 18th May, that a letter, I then received from Mr. Lovel enabled me to understand the reason of the Minister’s beleif—6 I then recalled to mind his frequent assurances of frankness, and of his speaking without reserve, often adding that he was well informed of our affairs, and had minute information of what was passing at Philadelphia— There can be no doubt but that some copies of the President’s letters to me have fallen into his hands, and that he supposed I had received others, tho’ this was not in fact the case.

Hence it appears, that the double miscarriage, if I may so call it, of these letters had an unfavourable influence on our hopes of pecuniary aids, for it is highly probable that in this instance they were so critically withheld on purpose to extort overtures from me, which the Minister, though mistaken, had reason to beleive I was in a capacity to make.

Your Excellency will perceive from this how important it is that your Letters, to & from your Ministers, be transmitted in a manner not subject to these inconveniences.

It was not, as I said before, until the 18 May that Mr. Lovels Letter, enclosing a copy of the resolution of Congress of the 15th of Feby, reached me— It was brought to Cadiz by the Virginia, and it is remarkable that none of the Journals or Gazettes, nor the letter from Congress which Mr Lovel gave me reason to expect, ever came to my hands. But as all the papers brought by the Virginia passed thro’ the hands of the Governor of Cadiz, and afterwards through the Post-office, the suppression of some of them may be easily accounted for.

As Mr. Lovel’s letter did not appear to be official nor the copy of the Instruction of the 15th of Febry. authenticated, I was much at a loss to determine how far it was to be considered as a measure finally concluded upon, and this difficulty was increased by another vizt—whether my having no letter on the subject from the President, was to be imputed to the miscarriage of it, or to a reconsideration of the Instruction in question—for I recollected that resolutions had in some former Instances, been reconsidered, and either altered or repealed a few days after their date; For these reasons, it appeared to me imprudent immediately to hazard overtures on the ground of this Instruction—

The next day Vizt: 19 May, I thought it expedient to wait upon the Minister, & again renew the subject of our proposed Treaty, expecting that if he was acquainted with the contents of my letter something might drop from him in the course of conversation, which would lead me to judge of what he might or might not know on that Subject, and others connected with it

He received me with more than usual cordiality—7 The conversation turned at first on the situation of the Southern States, the late combat between the fleets in the Chesapeake, and General Greene’s retreat—he appeared to apprehend much danger from what he called the delicate situation of our army there, and the blockade of the reinforcement intended for it, under the Marquis de la Fayette— I endeavoured to remove such of his fears as appeared to be illfounded, and (tho’ without leaving room to suppose that the operations of Spain were indispensable to our Safety) represented to him the good Policy & probable success of France & Spain’s seriously turning their attention and force to the Expulsion of the enemy from America— I then repeated what I had often before remarked to him respecting the influence which the hesitations and delays of Spain in forming a treaty with us must naturally have on the hopes & fears of Britain—8 I announced to him formally the completion of our confederation by the accession of Maryland9 and after dwelling on the advantages, which the States & their allies might expect from it, I endeavoured to impress him with an opinion that a cordial Union between France, Spain, Holland, and America, supported by vigorous measures, would soon reduce the Enemy to the necessity of listening to reasonable terms of peace— The Count replied generally that he was very minutely informed of the State of our affairs— That the good disposition of Congress towards Spain, had not as yet been evinced in a manner the King expected, and that no one advantage had hitherto been proposed by America to Spain, to induce the latter to come into the measures we desired; that the views of Congress were such as would not permit his Majesty to form a treaty with the States—but that the King was an honest man, and that I might again & again assure Congress, that he would never suffer them to be sacrified to Britain, but on the contrary, would with constancy maintain the friendship he had professed for them— That Britain had in vain attempted to deceive Spain—that Mr. Cumberland had been sent here for that express purpose, but that however possible it might be for Britain to vanquish, she would never be able to deceive, Spain— That he wished Congress had been more disposed to oblige the King: he knew indeed that opposition in Sentiments must necessarily prevail in public bodies, but that he hoped for the best— That I ought to preach to them forcibly, for that he thought a good preacher (un bon prédicateur) would do much good—thereby intimating, as I understood it, that Congress were not sufficiently apprised of the importance of Spain, & the policy of complying with her demands—

To all this I briefly remarked that his Excellency’s knowledge of American affairs must convince him, that it was not in their power to give his Majesty other proofs of their attachment than what they had already done—and that if he alluded to the affair of the Mississippi, I could only add one remark to those which I had often made to him on that head vizt: that even if a desire of gratifying his Majesty should ever incline Congress to yield to him a point so essential to their Interest, yet it still remained a question whether new delays and obstacles to a treaty would not arise to postpone it—

The Count smiled—said he always spoke frankly, and that whenever I should announce to him, my having authority to yield that point, I might depend on his being explicit, & candid: but that as matters stood at present, he could say nothing on that head—

He then informed me that Mr. Gardoqui would set out for America the beginning of June, he said it might be in my power to furnish some useful hints & observations relative to the objects & conduct of his mission, adding that he reposed full confidence in me, and wished that I would also consider whether there were any particular reasons which might render it advisable either to hasten or retard his going—

I suspected there was too much meaning in all this to admit of my entering into these discussions without time for further reflection; and therefore without seeming to avoid it, I told the Count I was happy to hear that Mr. Gardoqui was so near his departure— That I considered myself much honoured by his requesting my remarks relative to it, and that I was sure Congress would draw agreeable conclusions from his mission—that I should write by him to Congress, and as they would expect to learn from me the precise character in which they were to receive, & consider him it became necessary that his Excellency should favor me with that information, as well to enable me to transmit the proper advices to Congress, as to make the remarks which he had done me the honour to request— That I concieved this to be the more indispensable, because if Mr. Gardoqui should carry no public testimonials from this Court to Congress he could only be considered by them as a private Gentleman, and all his intercourse with Congress would of consequence be subjected to all the inconveniences resulting from it—

This topic carried the conversation off the delicate ground to which the Count had led it— He admitted the propriety of my being exactly apprized of the nature of Mr. Gardoqui’s commission—said that as yet it was not decided & therefore for the present, could only give me his opinion of what it would probably be—

He observed that circumstances did not render it proper that he should go as Minister, tho’ perhaps it might be proper to give him contingent powers— That it was the common practice, where Courts sent to each other Persons charged with their Affairs, in a character below that of Minister to give no other credentials than a letter of advice from the Minister of the Court sending, to the Minister of the Court sending & receiving the Person in question— That the same practice was about to be pursued by Spain towards Prussia, and had been observed in other Instances; therefore he beleived the like method would be adopted in this case— That if it should, be purposed to give Mr. Gardoqui a letter authenticating his being an agent of Spain, either to the President or to the Secretary of Congress, and asked me which of the two would be the most proper—

Whether he really was uninformed on this point, or whether he asked the question merely to try my candor ^cannot easily be determined,^ I told him honestly, that Congress had no Secretary or Minister of State for general purposes, nor for foreign affairs particularly;10 and that neither the President nor Secretary of Congress could regularly be considered in that light— That there was a Committee of Congress whose appointment came near to that of Secretary for foreign Affairs, but that I had heard Congress were about establishing a more proper & regular mode of conducting the affairs committed to that Committee, & had perhaps already done it—that therefore it was difficult for me to give his Excellency a clear and decided opinion on the subject, and the more so, as the letters which I daily expected to receive from the President, & which probably contained exact information relative to this very matter, had not yet come to my hands— He seemed very well satisfied, & extended his civilities so far, as to say, that if at any time the warmth of his temper had led him into any harshness of Expression, he hoped I would forget it— I told him, that was the fact, and that I did not recollect any part of his behaviour to me which required that apology—he desired me to wait upon him again on the Wednesday next—

As to the instructions of the 15th Feby. I had every reason to insist ^wish^ that it had been a Secret to the Ministry— The Propriety of them is a subject without my province— To give decided Opinions of the views & designs of Courts, always appeared to me hazardous, especially as they often change, and as different men will often draw different conclusions from the same facts— This consideration has constantly induced me to state facts accurately, and minutely to Congress, & leave them to judge for themselves, & be influenced only by their own opinions—

I could not forbear seeing the danger to which the proviso contained in that Instruction, exposed me. I have no reason to flatter myself, that more fortunate than others, the propriety and policy of my conduct will not be drawn, at least impliedly, into doubt. If I should, on a persuasion that this cession would be unalterably insisted upon by Spain, yield that point, I am certain that many little half created doubts, and questions would be cast into & cultivated in America— If on the other hand I should be of opinion that this point could be gained, and the Event prove otherwise, it would soon be whispered, what rich supplies, and golden opportunities the United States had lost by my obstinacy—

I permitted my mind to dwell on these considerations, merely that I might, by the utmost degree of circumspection, endeavour to render the uprightness and propriety of my conduct as evident as possible—

My only difficulty arose from this single question— Whether I could prudently risque acting on a presumption, either that Spain did not already, or would not soon be acquainted with the contents of this Instruction.

If such a presumption had been admissible, I should without the least hesitation have played the game a little further, keeping this Instruction in my hand as a trump card to prevent a separate peace between Spain & Britain, in case such an event should otherwise prove inevitable— Had Spain been at peace with our enemies, and offered to acknowledge, guarantee and fight for our Independence, provided we would yield them this point (as once seemed to be the case) I should for my own part, have no more hesitation about it now, than I had then— But Spain being now at war with Britain, to gain her own objects, she doubtless will prosecute it full as vigorously as if she fought for our objects— There was and is little reason to suppose that such a cession would render her exertions more vigorous, or her aids to us ^much^ more Liberal— The effect which an alliance between Spain & America would have on Britain & other Nations would certainly be in our favor, but whether more so than the free Navigation of the Mississippi is less certain— The cession of this navigation will in my opinion render a future war with Spain unavoidable, and I shall look upon my subscribing to the one as fixing the certainty of the other—

I say I should have played this game a little further, if the presumption beforementioned had been admissible, because it has uniformly been my opinion, that if after sending me here, Congress had constantly avoided all questions about the Mississippi, and appeared to consider that point as irrevocable, Spain would have endeavoured to purchase it by money, or a Free-Port, but as her hopes of a change in the Opinion of Congress were excited, & kept alive by successive Accounts of debates, & intended debates on that question, and as Congress, by drawing Bills without previous funds, had painted their distress for want of money in very strong colors, Spain began to consider America as a Petitioner, and treated her accordingly— But as, by the intervention of Doctor Franklin, our Bills for near six months were safe, and as after this resolution of the 15th of Feby, there was reason to expect that the Subject of it would not soon be resumed in Congress, I should, in case I could have depended on this instruction being, and remaining a Secret, have thought it my duty to have given the United States a fair tryal for the Mississippi, or at least for a free Port near it— With this view I should have appeared to give myself no concern about the Bills,—applied for no aids, made no offers, and on ^all^ proper occasions, have treated an alliance with Spain as an event, which, tho’ wished for, was not essential to our Safety, and as the price demanded for it appeared to us unreasonable, it was not probable we should agree— I think we should then have been courted in our turn, especially as the Minister was very desirous of having our Men of War on the Stocks—and that thus dealing with them on terms of equality, would have produced some concessions on their part as inducements to greater ones on ours— I am persuaded in my own mind that prudent self respect is absolutely necessary to those nations who would wish to be treated properly by this court, and I have not the least doubt but that almost any spirit will prosper more here, than that of humility & compliance— I had no doubt but that this plan of conduct would have been perfectly consistent with that part of the Instruction which orders me to make every possible Effort to obtain from his Catholic Majesty the use of the river aforesaid, &c. for whatever might have been, or may be my private Sentiments, they shall never in mere questions of Policy, influence me to deviate from those of Congress.

But on the other hand, there being abundant circumstantial Evidence to induce a firm persuasion that the Ministry were well acquainted with the Contents of this Instruction, this Plan would have been idle— The moment they saw that the cession of this Navigation was made to depend on their persevering to insist upon it, it became absurd to suppose that they would cease to persevere. All that remained for me therefore to do was in the next conference to break this subject as decently as possible, and in such a manner as would account for my not having mentioned this Instruction at our last meeting—

On Wednesday Evening, the 23d of May, I waited upon the Count agreeable to his appointment—

The Count seemed a little hurried in his spirits, and behaved as if he wished I had not come—he asked me rather abruptly, if I had any thing particular to communicate to him, and whether I had received any further letters,— I told him, I had received some private ones from L’Orient, but that none from the President of Congress had as yet reached me, tho’ I had reason to expect one by that opportunity, as well as by the vessel lately arrived at Cadiz— I informed him of my having received from Mr. Harrison a copy of his Memorial to the Governor of Cadiz, complaining that letters brought for him by the Virginia from Philadelphia, had been stopped at the Gates, on pretence that they must, agreeable to an ordinance for the purpose, be put into the Post Office, and charged with the like Postage as if brought from Spanish America— He said, he had not yet received a copy of the memorial, but that there was such an ordinance, and that it was highly proper, the admission of letters into the kingdom, especially in time of war, should be under the direction of Government— That letters from North America rendered new regulations necessary, & that he would turn his thoughts to this subject, and do what should appear equitable— This was another proof of what I before suspected, & looked like an indirect apology for opening my letters—11

It surprised me a little that he said nothing of the remarks he had desired me to make on Mr. Gardoqui’s going to America, especially as he had appointed this meeting for that purpose— To give him further time, I started a new subject, and begged he would take the earliest opportunity of compleating the business of the Dover Cutter— Notwithstanding all that had before passed between us about this affair, he affected to be very ignorant of it, and asked me a number of questions— I recapitulated the circumstances of the capture, my several applications to him on the subject, his promise finally to order the prize to be appraised, & the value to be paid to the Captors the arrival of one of them at Madrid &c &c. He replied with some degree of quickness & perplexity, that it was not a lawful prize, the crew not having authority to do what they did, that he ^had^ sent to the Canaries for particular Information respecting the value &c, that two of the packet boats had been taken; that he would pay some gratuity to the Captors, and wished I would give him another State of the whole case in writing, to refresh his memory; which I promised to do & have since done.12

He then resumed the subject of the letter which I expected from Congress—he expressed his regret at its not having arrived, said he was preparing Instructions for Mr. Gardoqui who would certainly depart in June, and that until I could give him precise information of the disposition of Congress, he could not enter into any further conversations on the subject of the proposed treaty. I joined in regretting the miscarriage of my public letter, and the more so as my private ones gave me reason to expect Instructions, which would enable me to comply so far with his Majesty’s views, as that I hoped no further delays would intervene to prevent a perfect Union between Spain & the United States— That my Correspondence had given me to understand that Congress viewed the speedy accomplishment of this Union as very important to the common cause, & therefore if Spain would consent forthwith to come into it, in that case they would gratify his Majesty by ceding to him the Navigation of the Mississippi below their territories, on reasonable terms—

He replied that he earnestly desired to see all difficulties on this point removed, but that the treaties subsisting between Spain & other Nations, as well as the particular policy & determination of Spain rendered it necessary, that she should possess the exclusive navigation of the Gulph of Mexico— After a variety of other remarks of little importance, he made a very interesting observation, which will help us to account for the delays of the Court—vizt—That all these affairs could with more facility be adjusted at a general peace than now, for that such a particular and even secret treaty with us might then be made, as would be very convenient to both— That he nevertheless wished to know exactly the views & Intentions of Congress, but that I must wait for the arrival of my Letters, & that he would in the mean time finish Mr. Gardoqui’s Instructions, whose going to America, he did not doubt would make a useful Impression on the English Court. I was beginning to reply to what he said, when he interrupted me, by mentioning his not having time at present to prolong the conference—

Throughout the whole of this conversation the Count appeared much less cordial, than in the preceding one—he seemed to want Self-possession, & to that cause I ascribe his incautiously mentioning the general peace as the most proper Season for compleating our political connections. I had nevertheless no reason to suspect that this change in his behaviour arose from any cause more important than those variations in temper and feelings which they who are unaccustomed to govern themselves often experience from changes in the weather, in their health, from fatigue of business, or other such like accidental causes.

As I had not as yet received any letter from the President either by the Virginia, or the vessel lately arrived at L’Orient, nor by Colonel Laurens, who, I was informed had brought letters for me, I concluded it would be most prudent to wait ten days, or a fortnight, before I proceeded to act on the copy of my Instruction received from Mr. Lovel, expecting that such other Letters as might then have arrived in France or Spain for me would reach me in the course of that Interval, if at all— And I determined, in case I should receive none, to proceed without further loss of time to make a formal overture to the Minister for a treaty on the ground of this Instruction— It happened however that the Minister was so occupied during the remaining time that the Court stayed at Aranjues, by the expedition preparing to sail from Cadiz, under the Duke of Crillon, and other Matters, that it was impossible to engage a moment of his attention to American Affairs— The removal of the Court to Madrid necessarily consumed some time—and as soon as they were well settled there I wrote the Count the following letter, none of the Letters expected from America having come to my hands—

[Here Jay embedded the text of his letter to Floridablanca of 2 July 1781, above.]

Altho’ it was sufficiently evident that the Court of France could not, for the reasons assigned in my letter to Congress of the 6th of Novr. 178013 openly & warmly interpose their good offices to bring about this treaty; it nevertheless appeared to me most prudent to behave on this occasion towards the Embassador, as if I knew nothing of those reasons, & therefore sent him a copy of the aforegoing letter to the Minister, enclosed in one of which the following is a copy—

[Here Jay embedded the text of his letter to Montmorin of 2 July 1781, above.]

The Instructions above alluded to are those, which Count de Vergennes in his letter to me of the 13th of March 1780, assures me should be sent to their Embassador here—14 I must confess to Congress that I very much doubt his ever having received any other Instructions than generally to favor the treaty, & to manage his interference in such a delicate manner, as without alarming the pride of Spain, to give both parties reason to think themselves obliged.

The French Embassador sent me no answer to this letter, which, in my opinion, gave ^gives^ a greater degree of probability to my conjectures—15 I must nevertheless do him the justice to say, that I have great reason to believe him to be in sentiment & with sincere attachment, a friend to our cause, & that he considers the honor & interest of France deeply concerned in the success & support of it

On the 11th July, having received no answer from the Minister, I waited upon him— He told me he had received my letter but that the short time the Court would remain at Madrid, & the multiplicity of business that he was obliged to despatch, would not admit of his attending to our affairs, until after the arrival of the Court at Saint Ildefonso— He then informed me that a vessel had arrived at Cadiz, which had brought despatches for me, and that his Courier had brought them to Madrid—he then delivered me a number of letters among which was one from his Excellency the President of the 28th May last—16

I need not observe that all these letters bore evident marks of Inspection, for that has uniformly been the case with almost every Letter I have received—

I do not recollect to have ^ever^ received a letter that gave me more ^real^ pleasure— When I considered that almost the whole time since I left America, had afforded me little else than one continued series of painful perplexities and Embarrassments, many of which I neither expected nor ought to have met with— That I had been engaged in difficult & intricate negotiations, often at a loss to determine where the line of prudence was to be found, & constantly exposed by my particular situation, to the danger of either injuring the dignity and Interest of my country on the one hand, or trespassing on the over-rated respectability and importance ^of this Court^ on the other— I say, Sir, That on considering these things, the approbation of Congress gave me most singular and cordial Satisfaction—

I was also happy to perceive from this letter, that the plan of my late letters to the Minister & french Embassador, of the 2nd July above recited, happens to correspond exactly with the views of Congress, respecting the manner of conducting this negotiation—

It appearing to me that the communications I was directed to make to this Court, could not be better made, than in the very words of this letter, which seemed exceedingly well calculated for the purpose, I recited them in a letter which I wrote two days after^wards^ to the Minister—viz—

[Here Jay embedded the text of his letter to Floridablanca of 13 July 1781, above.]

I also took the earliest opportunity of mentioning to the Embassador of France that my letters from America gave me reason to believe that our Union was daily growing more warm & intimate, and that Congress in writing of their affairs here, had expressed themselves in the strongest terms of attachment to his most christian Majesty, & not only approved of my communicating freely and confidentially with his Embassador here, but also directed me in express terms to endeavour in the course of my negotiations to include & promote the Interests of France.

The Embassador was much pleased— He told me his Letters assured him that the best understanding subsisted between the french & American troops, & that much good might be expected from the increasing harmony & intercourse between the two Countries—

The Court removed to Saint Ildefonso without the Minister’s having either given any Instructions to Mr. Gardoqui, answered my abovementioned Letters, or taken the least notice of my late representations to them about the Dover Cutter &c

The events of the Campaign were as yet undecided—and little money in the treasury—

On the 21 July, the Minister wrote me the following note in which there was ample field left open for Procrastination

[Here Jay embedded the text and translation of Floridablanca’s letter to him of 21 July 1781, above.]

On the 4th August, I arrived here— I did not see the Minister ’till the 8th, he being, as I was told, from home— He had made no communications to the King— He had been sick, he had been busy, and was so still— I requested to be informed when it would be most convenient for ^to^ him to confer with me on the Subject of my late Letters, & to give me such information relative to his Majesty’s Intentions as he might be prepared to communicate to me— He answered that he could not then fix a time being exceedingly hurried by pressing business— He asked how long I proposed to stay, I told him, ’till the Court removed— He then promised to take an early opportunity of conferring with me on the subject of our affairs & promised to send me word when he should be ready to receive me—

I remained in this State of suspense & expectation until the 18th August,17 when, having been for a week past very much indisposed with a fever and dysentery, & fearing lest that circumstance might become a ground of delay— I wrote the Count word “that my health would permit me to wait upon his Excellency, at any time & place he might do me the honour to name”—18

He replied two days afterwards in a manner which indicated his supposing I had gone to Madrid & had returned— He must have known better—for none of my family had been absent from hence, & one or other of them were almost daily about the Palace and Gardens—

[Here Jay embedded the text and translation of Floridablanca’s letter to him dated 20 August 1781, above.] October

On the 22 I sent him a note enclosing a news paper which contained an account of General Greene’s operations, the capture of Fort Watson &ca.19

The Count answered this Note by another, expressing his thanks for the Intelligence, but not a word of a conference

On the 30th of Augt Major Franks arrived here with interesting despatches, of which I must not here take notice, lest I interrupt the thread of this letter, which I devote particularly to the affair of our negotiations for a treaty—20

There was indeed among these despatches a very sensible letter from Mr: R. Morris to me about Money matters &ca, excellently well calculated for being shewn entire to the Minister—

I consulted with the French Embassador on the propriety of giving the Minister a copy of it— He advised me to do it, & much commended the letter— As it might have suffered from being carelessly translated, I had it put into very good french—21

I was very glad to see the Major— The nature of the dispatches he brought being a Secret, occasioned speculation, and gave me an opportunity of drawing further advantages from his arrival—22 His accounts of American affairs were favorable to us, and the manner of his behaviour and conversation has not done discredit to himself, nor prejudice to his Country—

The Embassador of France having assured me that the Minister had really been a good deal indisposed, I thought it would be best to write him a letter ^in a stile^ somewhat adapted to his Situation— He certainly appears to be fatigued, & worn down by business— He looks as I have seen some Members of Congress do after two years attendance—23

[Here Jay embedded the text of his letter to Floridablanca of 3 September 1781, above.]

On the 5th I received the following answer—vizt.

[Here Jay embedded the text and translation of Floridablanca’s reply of 5 September 1781, above.]

Your Excellency will be pleased to observe that the Minister in the above note intimates a desire ^that^ I should bring Major Franks with me— I thought it best to do so— But lest his presence should be a check upon business, and as it was natural to suppose that the Count would begin by asking him questions about our Affairs, I desired the Major to relate to him the impression made in America by that article in the Capitulation of Pensacola which permitted the Garrison to go to New-York—24 I also desired the Major to retire into the Antichamber & leave me alone with the Minister as soon as the latter should appear to have finished with him—

At the time appointed, vizt— The Evening of the 8th September, we waited upon the Minister—

The Count received us very politely—he spoke much of his want of health, & how greatly it incapacitated him for business— He then asked the Major several questions about our military Operations. The Major answered them clearly, and in speaking of the proposed siege of New-York, very naturally introduced an account of the surprise, and apprehensions occasioned by the permission given to the Pensacola Garrison to join that of New-York. The Count confessed it was ill done—said it was very unexpected, and that they ought to have been sent to Europe— That the like should not happen in future, and that proper orders upon that Subject should be dispatched to their Generals. He then observed that our fears were not alltogether well founded, for that those troops were restrained by The Capitulation from taking arms against the Allies of Spain ’till exchanged, and could not operate against our troops without also operating against those of France, who were joined with them, & who, it was well known, were the allies of Spain— The Major replied, that it was feared that the Enemy would attempt to evade this reasoning by insisting that the french troops in America were only to be considered as auxiliaries to the United States, & that though that argument might be fallacious, yet that in Matters affecting America, the Enemy had invariably neglected good faith, whenever they found it convenient.—

The Count asked how long the Major would stay here— I told him that I only detained him in expectation of being soon enabled by his Excellency to write something decisive by him to Congress on the Subjects under his consideration— He said he hoped in the course of next week to enter into serious conferences with me on those subjects, & that he would give me notice of the day. He offered to give the Major letters to the Spanish Embassador at Paris, and to do him any other Services in his power— He then rose from his chair in a manner indicating Indisposition, said he was unable to do business, and that Mr. Campo should inform me when it would be convenient for him that I should see him again— I expressed my regret at his illness, and gave him the French translation of Mr. Morris’ letter adding that I had intended to offer him some remarks on the Subject of it. He said he would read it with Pleasure: He spoke of Mr Morris’ appointment, and after conversing a few minutes about the good Consequences expected from it, and of the Services done by that Gentleman to Spain in some Business they had committed to his Care, we parted.—

Thus this conference ended as fruitless as the last.

Eight Days elapsed. before I heard nothing from the Minister—he was daily at Court, and every Evening took his Ride.

I repeatedly mentioned and complained of these Delays to the french embassador. He regretted them, promised to speak to the Minister on the Subject, but I believe did not. I appeared much dissatisfied, though not with him; and told him, that if Major Franks returned to America with no other Intelligence than that of repeated Delays, it was more than probable that Congress would be much hurt, as well as much disappointed. He had the same Fears, and advised me to detain the Major—

It became in my Opinion important that the Minister as well as the French Embassador should be seriously apprehensive of my dismissing the Major with Letters that would render Congress very little disposed to make Sacrifices to this Court. The Manner of doing this required some Caution. I could think of nothing better than to prepare a Letter to the Minister, and send the Embassador a fair Copy of my Draft for his Consideration and advice.

The following are Copies of that Letter, and of the one I sent with it to the Embassador

[Here Jay embedded the text of his letter to Montmorin of 16 September and the enclosed draft of his letter to Floridablanca, c. 16 September 1781, both above.]

The Embassador called upon me in the evening to answer my letter.

He observed that the delays of which I complained, were not singular, but that others and even himself experienced the like— That he had reason to believe this Court were really disposed to treat with us, though the time when might be doubtful— That the remarks made in the draft of my intended letter were but too just— That he feared they would give offence— That at any rate he thought I had better postpone it—and for the present write one less pointed, & more laconic— We had much conversation on the Subject, unnecessary to repeat— It ended in my consenting to pursue his advice—

It is observable that he did not offer to return me the draft of this letter though I had agreed to suppress it.25 [illegible]

The letter which agreeable to the Embassador’s advice, I substituted in the place of the other is in these words vizt.:

[Here Jay embedded the text and translation of his letter to Floridablanca of 17 September 1781, above.]

On the 19th I received the following answer from the Count—

[Here Jay embedded the text and translation of Floridablanca’s reply of 19 September 1781, above.]

I waited upon the Count at the time appointed.— The following is a copy of my notes of that conference

[Here Jay embedded the text of his Notes on John Jay’s Conference with Floridablanca of 19 September 1781, above.]

I was a little surprised that the Count should expect to receive from me in the course of three Days formal propositions on the several points stated in this conference— But it would not have been proper for me to desire further time—

On the 22nd Septr. I sent him the following Letter and propositions—

[Here Jay embedded the text of his letter to Floridablanca of 22 September 1781, above.]

The propositions alluded to, & sent enclosed in the preceding letter to the Count de Florida Blanca— Dated St. Ildefonso—22nd Septr 1781—

[Here Jay embedded the text of his Propositions for a Treaty with Spain, 22 September 1781, above.]

Your Excellency will be pleased to observe that among my remarks on the VIth. proposition I have limited the duration of the offer contained in it. I did this from a persuasion that such limitation was not only just & reasonable in itself, but absolutely necessary to prevent this Courts continuing to delay a treaty to a general peace— Besides what the Minister dropped upon this head in his conference with me at Aranjues, I think it probable that they still wish to adhere to that idea—26 To me they appear desirous of avoiding the Expense that the Aids which a treaty we should expect would render unavoidable, and which at present would not be very convenient for them— They wish to see our Independence established, and yet not be among the first to subscribe a Precedent that may one day be turned against them— They wish not to exclude themselves by any present engagements from taking advantage of the chances & Events of the war, not choosing on the one hand, that in case we sink, that we should be fastened to them by any particular ties—nor on the other in case we survive the Storm, to be so circumstanced as not to make the most of us— I think it is their design therefore to draw from us all such concessions as our present distress, & the hopes of aid may extort, and by protracting negotiations about the treaty endeavour to avail themselves of these concessions, at a future day when our Inducements to offer them had ceased— As this would evidently be unjust, I think the limitation in question can give them no offence, and I hope Congress will be pleased to communicate to me their Sentiments on the Subject.

I must also remark that after what has passed, and considering how well they are acquainted with my Instructions, it would not only have been useless, but absurd to have made these propositions otherwise than agreeable to those Instructions—

Congress may at first view be a little surprised at the Extent of the Vth Proposition, but when they compare it with the IInd. I am persuaded they will find it sufficiently restrained—

In forming these propositions, it was my determination to leave them so free from disputed, or disputable points, as that no plausible pretexts for delay should arise from the face of them— I am well apprised nevertheless that in the course of the Negotiation, it will be impossible for me to prevent their practising as much procrastination as they may find convenient— Almost the only hope I have of their seriously doing business, arises from their fearing that the Instruction respecting the Mississippi will be recalled the moment that either any very decided Successes on our part in America, may render a treaty with Spain of less importance to us, or a general treaty of peace give us different views & prospects.

These are my conjectures and Opinions—perhaps they may prove erroneous— As facts accompany them, Congress will be enabled to judge for themselves— I will add that, from every thing I can hear, the King is honestly disposed to do us good and were he alone to be consulted in this business, I believe it would soon be concluded—

On the 23d Septr: the foregoing Propositions were to be laid before the King— I heard nothing further from the Minister until the 27th. when he sent me the following note—

[Here Jay embedded the text of Floridablanca’s letter to him of 27 September 1781, above.]

I have been given to understand, tho’ not officially, that Mr. Del Campo, the Minister’s Secretary is the Person who will be appointed to confer with me, & tho that Gentleman is constantly about the Minister, yet it seems that a set of formal Instructions are to be prepared for him— When the Minister will be able to find either time or health to compleat them is uncertain27

There is reason to beleive that still less Progress would have been made in this affair had Major Franks not have arrived— I regret his detention, but I hope the reasons assigned for it will be deemed sufficient— I am perfectly satisfied with him—

Notwithstanding Congress had given me reason to expect that the plan of drawing Bills upon me had been laid aside, I have now Bills to the amount of between seventy and eighty thousand dollars to pay—and no funds provided— What am I to do?—

Doctor Franklin writes me that so far from being able to give me further aids, he does not expect to have it in his power even to pay our Salaries in future—28

From the facts stated in this letter, Congress will perceive that this Court neither refuse, nor promise to afford us further aid— Delay is their System— When it will cease, I cannot conjecture, for that is a question which I doubt whether they themselves have as yet determined—

I am indebted largely to Mr. Harrison for money advanced by him to distressed Seamen—he ought to be paid, and it is so far from being in my power to do it, that I have been reduced to the mortifying necessity of desiring him for the present to hold his hand— A great many of this valuable class of people are confined in English Gaols without other means of obtaining their enlargement than by entering into the Enemy’s Service— They complain bitterly of being neglected by their Country, and I really think not without reason— Retaliation ought to be practiced, and if we have not a sufficient number of Marine Officers & Seamen in our power to make the objects of it, why would it be improper to substitute Landsmen?—29

As to Portugal, I have more than once spoken to the Minister on the Subject— He admits the Justice of our being treated by that, as by other neutral Nations—he has promised to interfere in our behalf, but nothing efficacious has yet been done— To send an Agent there could do no harm, & might do good— I am therefore for it— The Embassador of France thinks with me that before that step is taken, it ought to be confidentially communicated to this Court, and I am persuaded difficulties will arise from it— I shall do my best—30

Mr. Gardoqui’s departure is uncertain—he is still attending the orders of the Court— I doubt his receiving them ’till the campaign closes, & perhaps not then.

I do not despair of seeing some good result finally from all this complication of political Solecisms— It would not surprise me if we should in the end be the gainers by them— My greatest fears are about the fate of the Bills— If protested, for want of payment, they will become the source of much evil— I have the Honor to be with great Respect & Esteem, Your Excellency’s Most Obedient and very Humble Servant31