Propositions for a Treaty with Spain, 22 September 1781
Propositions for a Treaty with Spain
[St Ildefonso 22d. Septr. 1781]
As the Time allowed Mr. Jay for offering such Propositions as may become the Basis of the proposed Treaty between his Catholic Majesty and the United States of North America, is very short:1 he should fear the Consequences of Haste and Inaccuracy, if he was not persuaded that the Candor with which they will be received will secure him from the Inconveniences to which those Circumstances might otherwise expose him.
Mr. Jay presumes that it is not expected he should offer a Plan of a Treaty drawn at Length, but only General Propositions, which may be so modified and enlarged, as on due Consideration and Discussion, may appear expedient. With this view he begs Leave to present the following as the Basis of a Treaty of Amity and Alliance, vizt.
| Remarks | Propositions |
| 1st. | |
| That there shall forever subsist an inviolable & universal Peace & Friendship between his Cath. Majesty & the united States, & the Subjects & Citizens of both— | |
| 2. | |
| That every Priviledge Exemption & favour, with Respect to commerce, navigation & personal Rights, which now are, or hereafter may be, granted by either to any the most favoured nation, be also granted by them to each other. | |
| 3. | |
| That they mutually extend to the Vessels, Merchants and Inhabitants of each other all that Protection, which is usual & proper between friendly & allied nations. | |
| 4. | |
| That the Vessels, Merchants, or other Subjects of his Cath. Majesty and the United States, shall not resort to, or be permitted (except in Cases which Humanity allows to Distress) to enter into any of those Ports or Dominions of the other, from which the most favored nation shall be excluded—2 | |
| 5. | |
| On this proposition Mr Jay can offer nothing but an assurance of his being ready to concur in every reasonable Regulation that may be proposed.3 | That the following Commerce be prohibited and declared Contraband between the Subjects of his Cath. Majesty & the United States, vizt. |
| All such as his Catholic Majesty may think proper to specify. | |
| 6. | |
| The Impressions made upon the United States by the magnanimity of his Majesty’s Conduct towards them— The assistance they hope to recieve from the further Exertions of the same magnanimity— The deep wound which an alliance with so great a monarch would give to the Hopes & Efforts of the Enemy—the strong Support it would afford to their Independence—the favorable Influence which the Example of such a King would have on other nations—and the many other great & extensive good Consequences which would result, at this interesting Period, from his Majesty’s taking so noble and decided a Part in their Favor—have all conspired in prevailing upon Congress to offer to relinquish in his Favor, the future Enjoyment of this territorial & national Priviledge; the Importance of which to their Constituents, can only be estimated by the Value they set upon his Majesty’s Friendship. | The United States shall relinquish to his Catholic Majesty, and in future forbear to use, or attempt to use the navigation of the River Mississippi from the 31 Degree of North Latitude, that is, from the Point where it leaves the united States, down to the ocean— |
| By this Proposition the united States offer to forego all the advantages & Conveniences which nature has given to the Country bordering on the upper Parts of that River, by ceasing to export their own, & recieving in Return the Commodities of other Countries by that only Channel—thereby greatly reducing the Value of that Country, retarding its Settlement, & diminishing the Benefits which the united States would reap from its Cultivation. | |
| Mr Jay thinks it is his Duty frankly to confess that the Difficulty of reconciling this measure to the Feelings of their Constituents has appeared to Congress in a serious Light, and they now expect to do it only by placing in the opposite Scale, the Gratitude due to his Catholic Majesty, and the great and various advantages which the United States will derive from the acknowledgment and generous Support of their Independence by the Spanish Monarchy, at a Time when the Vicissitudes, Dangers & Difficulties of a distressing war, with a powerful, obstinate and vindictive nation, renders the Friendship and avowed Protection of his Cath. Majesty in a very particular Manner interesting to them. | |
| The offer of this Proposition therefore, being dictated by these Expectations, and this Combination of Circumstances must necessarily be limited by the Duration of them; & consequently that if the acceptance of it should, together with the proposed alliance be postponed to a general Peace, the united States will cease to consider themselves bound by any Propositions or offers which I may now make in their behalf—4 | |
| Nor can Mr Jay omit mentioning the Hopes & Expectations of Congress, that his Majesty’s Generosity & Greatness of mind, will prompt him to alleviate as much as possible the Disadvantages to which this Proposition subjects the United States, by either granting them a free port under certain Restrictions, in the vicinity, or by such other Marks of his Liberality & Justice as may give him additional Claims to the Affection & Attachment of the United States—5 | |
| 7. | |
| That his Catholic Majesty shall guarantee to the United States all their respective Territories— | |
| 8. | |
| That the United States shall guarantee to his Catholic Majesty all his Dominions in North America. | |
| Lastly | |
| Nothing on Mr. Jays Part shall be wanting to expedite the happy Conclusion of this Business by adhering constantly to the Dictates of Candor Frankness & unsuspecting Confidence— | As the aforegoing Propositions appear to Mr. Jay the most essential, he omits proposing those lesser & subordinate ones, which seem to follow of course. he therefore concludes this Subject with a General Offer and Propositions to make and admit all such articles as in the course of this negociation shall appear conducive to the great objects of the proposed Treaty. |
| He is ready to recieve the Treaty between the united States & [ |
The Subject of Aids either by Subsidy or Loan, as may be most convenient to His Majesty, will require a particular convention; but as the Manner Extent and Terms, with depend on his Majesty’s Pleasure, it is impossible for Mr. Jay, without some Knowledge of it, to offer Propositions adapted thereto. All that he can at present say on that Subject, is that Congress are ready to do every thing in their Power. He will not however endeavour to conceal their Incapacity to do much in the way of Compensation, while the Enemy continue to make the United States the Theatre of a devastating War, and the Object of their predatory Operations. But when those Obstacles shall cease, it will be in their Power, as well as their Inclination, to make Retribution & render important Services to his Majesty— Mr Jay will therefore continue to decline attempting to induce his Majesty to take any Measures, however favorable to his Country, by delusive Promises or rash Engagements But on the other Hand he is ready to enter into such reasonable ones as he may have good Reason to say shall be faithfully and punctually performed.7
A particular treaty regulating the Conduct to be observed by his Cath. Majesty & the United States towards each other, during the War also appears to Mr. Jay important to both. But as the proper Plan and articles of such a treaty can only result from a free Conference & Communication on the Subject, he can upon this Occasion, only express his Readiness to concur in every Provision which may be calculated to give Energy & Success to the operations & objects of both.8
John Jay
DS, SpMaAHN: Estado, leg. 3884, exp. 13, doc. 3 (EJ: 12113). Enclosed in JJ to Floridablanca, 22 Sept., above. C, in French, FrPMAE: CP-E, 605: 420–25. C, embedded in JJ to the President of Congress, 3 Oct. 1781, below, DNA: PCC, item 89, 427–34 (EJ: 11912). LbkCs, DNA: PCC, item 110, 1: 485–95 (EJ: 4177); CSmH (EJ: 3426); NNC: JJ Lbks. 1 and 6.
1. Floridablanca had asked for these propositions on 19 Sept. See Notes on John Jay’s Conference with Floridablanca of that date, above.
2. These propositions are based on the principle of most-favored-nation status embodied in the treaty of commerce concluded with France in February 1778 rather than on the plan of treaties submitted to Congress in July 1776 by the committee headed by JA. The stated goal of this plan was trade on equal terms for the nationals of the allied powers. See articles 1, 2, and 6 of the treaty with France, , 5: 576–90; 11: 423, 425. In 1780 Spanish authorities had authorized flour imports managed by Robert Morris. Thereafter, Cuban authorities had allowed a limited trade to continue. After the peace treaties were signed in 1783, however, Spain closed its possessions to American trade and, since distress was a frequent pretext for contraband trade, excluded vessels seeking admission to its American ports for that reason as well. See , 8: 62–70.
3. See JJ’s comments on this proposition in his letter to the President of Congress of 3 Oct. 1781, below.
4. See the President of Congress to JJ, 15 Feb. 1781, above. In his dispatch to Vergennes of 2 Oct. 1781, Montmorin reported that JJ had consulted him about how to present Congress’s position on the Mississippi and that he had urged JJ to put forth all that his instructions authorized him to offer, since he was certain that Floridablanca was fully informed about what they contained. He also advised JJ to mention the conditions under which the concession might be withdrawn. Montmorin predicted that the concession would not persuade Spain to conclude a treaty before a general peace and added that JJ also believed this. Montmorin noted that JJ was so discouraged by his lack of progress that he was contemplating abandoning his mission. Montmorin remarked that he himself had often wished that Spain’s policy was not so obvious. Floridablanca, he reported, gave him no opportunity to discuss the matter either. He also mentioned that he had been unable to convince Floridablanca that nothing could be gained by totally alienating the Americans, since the Spanish minister believed that Americans were tied to England by indissoluble bonds, could never be trusted allies, and might become dangerous enemies. See FrPMAE: CP-E, 606: 8r–11r.
5. See JJ’s comments on this proposition in his letter to the President of Congress of 3 Oct. 1781, below.
6. For Floridablanca’s statement that the Franco-American treaty of alliance could never be made the basis of a treaty between the United States and Spain, see Notes on John Jay’s Conference with Floridablanca, 23 Sept. 1780, above.
7. Montmorin reported that there was no prospect of a subsidy from Spain, which was currently struggling to raise funds to cover its own expenses for the next campaign. See his dispatch of 2 Oct. 1781, FrPMAE: CP-E, 606: 12r.
8. Montmorin forwarded a copy of these propositions to Vergennes under cover of his dispatch of 2 Oct., cited in note 7, above.