Major General Lafayette to George Washington, 3 June 1781
From Major General Lafayette
Camp Betwen RappaaHanock and North Anna [Va.]
june 3d 1781
My Dear General
inclosed you Will find the Copy of a letter to General Greene1—He at first Had Requested I would directly write to you, Since Which His orders Have Been different, But He directed me to forward you Copies of My official Accounts2—So Many letters are lost in their Way that I do not Care to Avoid Repetitions—I Heartly wish, My dear General, My Conduct May Be Approved of particularly By You—My Circumstances Have Been peculiar, and in this state I Have Some times Experienced Strange disappointements—two of them the Stores at Charlotte’s ville, and the Delay of the penslvan. detachement Have Given me Much Uneasiness and May Be Attended With Bad Consequences3—there is Great Slowness and Great Carelessness in this part of the world—But the intentions Are Good, and the people Want to Be Awakened—Your presence, My dear General, would do a Great deal—should these detachements Be increased to three or four thousand, and the french Army Come this Way, leaving One of our Generals at Rhode island, and two or three about New york and in the jersays You Might Be on the offensive in this Quarter, and there Could Be a Southern Army in Carolina—Your presence would do immence good, But I Would Wish you to Have a large force—General Washington Before He personally Appears must Be strong Enough to Hope Success. Adieu, My dear General, With the Highest Respect and Most tender Affection I Have the Honor to Be Yours
Lafayette
If you persist in the idea to Come this Way you May depend upon About 3000 Militia in the field Relieved Every two months—Your presence will induce them to turn out with great Spirit.4
ALS, DLC:GW; copy, PEL. GW replied to Lafayette on 29 June.
1. The enclosure has not been identified, but Lafayette wrote Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene on this date that after the junction of the armies under Lt. Gen. Charles Cornwallis and Brig. Gen. Benedict Arnold he had “retired towards Richmond, and waited for Lord Cornwallis’s movement. His regular force being so vastly superior to mine—reinforcements from below having still increased it, and his Cavalry being Ten to one—I could not think to bring into action, a small Body of eight or nine hundred men, that preserved the shadow of an army, and an inconsiderable Body of Militia whose defeat was certain, and would be attended with a Fatal loss of arms.
“Lord Cornwallis had at first a project to cross above Richmond, but desisted from it, & landed at Westover. He then proposed to turn our left Flank, but before it was executed we moved by the Left to the Forks of Chickahomony. The Enemy advanced twelve miles, and we retreated in the same proportion. They crossed Chickahomony and advanced on the road to Fredericksburg. We marched in a parellel with them keeping the upper part of the Country. Our position at Mattapony Church would have much exposed the Enemies Flank, on their way to Fredericksburg, but they Stopped at Cooksford on North Anna River, where they are for the present. … We have moved back some distance, and are cautious not to indulge Lord Cornwallis with an action with our present Force.
“The intentions of the Enemy are not as yet well explained. … It is possible they mean to make a Stroke towards Charlotteville. This I would not be uneasy for had my repeated directions been executed but instead of removing Stores from there to Albermarle Old Courthouse where Baron de Stuben has collected Six hundred Regulars, and where I ordered the Militia South of James River to rendesvous, It appears from a letter I received this evening that the State Stores have been contrary to my directions collected there, least they should mix with the continentals, but my former letters were so positive, and my late precautions are so multiplied that I hope the precious part of the Stores will have been removed to a safer place.”
Lafayette’s letter concluded: “I was untill late ignorant of your orders, that the new Continentals and Militia under Baron de Stuben be united with this part of your Army, & the Baron intended shortly to march to the Southward. When united to General Wayne I shall be better able to command my own movements & those of the other Troops in this State. Had this expected junction taken place sooner, matters would have been very different.
“The Enemy must have five hundred men mounted, and their Cavalry increases daily. It is impossible in this Country to take horses out of their way, and the neglect of the Inhabitants, dispertion of houses, and robberies of Negroes (should even the most vigorous measures Have been taken by the Civil Authority) would have yet put many horses into their hands. Under this cloud of light Troops it is difficult to reconnoitre, as well as to counteract any rapid movements they choose to make” (, 4:162, 164–65; see also Lafayette’s first letter to GW, 24 May).
2. See Greene to Lafayette, 1 and 14 May, in , 4:74–75, 96, 98.
3. For the stores at Charlottesville, Va., see n.1 above. For the delay in the march of the Pennsylvania line, see Anthony Wayne to GW, 7 May. The detachment had marched for Virginia on 26 May (see Wayne to GW, that date).
4. GW chose not to come to Virginia at this time with part of the northern army (see his letter to Thomas Jefferson, 8 June).