RC (DLC); edge chipped; endorsed by TJ as received 23 Oct. 1823 and so recorded in SJL. Enclosed in TJ to James Madison, 24 Oct. 1823, and Madison to TJ, 1 Nov. 1823. Enclosures: (1) George Canning to Richard Rush, British Foreign Office, 20 Aug. 1823, stating that although Spain has no hope of recovering her lost colonies, impediments ought not to be placed in the way of amicable negotiations between the mother country and her former dominions, that formal recognition of their independence is a matter of “time and circumstances,” and that Great Britain has no desire to acquire any of them and disapproves of the transfer of “any portion of them … to any other Power”; commenting that if, as he suspects, the United States shares these views, there is no reason not “to confide them to each other; and to declare them in the face of the world”; asking whether Rush is in a position to negotiate on the subject; and declaring that “there has seldom, in the history of the world, occurred an opportunity, when so small an effort, of two friendly Governments, might produce so unequivocal a good and prevent such extensive calamities” (Tr in DNA: RG 59, DD, Great Britain; between dateline and salutation: “Private & Confidential”). (2) Rush to Canning, London, 23 Aug. 1823, replying that the United States, having already recognized the aforementioned colonies, wishes their independence to be “maintained with stability, and under auspices that may promise prosperity and happiness to these new states”; hoping that Britain and the other European powers will extend their recognition as well; agreeing with all the points made in Canning’s letter; stipulating that the United States joins Britain in disavowing any interest in acquiring any of Spain’s newly independent colonies; regarding as “highly unjust, and fruitful of disastrous consequences, any attempt on the part of any European power to take possession of them by conquest, or by cession”; and saying that although he lacks the authority to undertake negotiations with Britain on this matter, he will immediately bring it to President Monroe’s attention (Tr in same; in Rush’s hand). (3) Rush to John Quincy Adams, London, 23 Aug. 1823, transmitting copies of the two preceding enclosures; hoping that Monroe will approve of his reply to Canning; expressing his desire neither to “implicate” the United States in “the federative system of Europe” nor offend France; and inferring that “the British Cabinet cannot be without its serious apprehensions that ambitious enterprises are meditated against the independence of the South American states. Whether by France alone, I cannot now say, on any authentick grounds” (RC in same; endorsed by a clerk at the Department of State as received 9 Oct.). (4) Canning to Rush, Liverpool, 23 Aug. 1823, advising him that he has been informed “that so soon as the military objects in Spain are achieved … a proposal will be made for a Congress, or some less formal concert and consultation, specially upon the affairs of Spanish America” (Tr in same; between dateline and salutation: “Private & Confidential”). (5) Rush to Canning, London, 27 Aug. 1823, recapitulating the points he made in his 23 Aug. letter; adding that the United States “would regard the convening of a congress … as a measure uncalled for, and indicative of a policy highly unfriendly to the tranquility of the world. It could never look with insensibility upon such an exercise of European jurisdiction over communities now of right exempt from it, and entitled to regulate their own concerns unmolested from abroad”; and giving his opinion that “could His Majesty’s government see fit to consider the time now arrived for a full acknowledgment of the independence of the South American states by Great Britain, it is my unequivocal belief, entertained not on light grounds, that it would accelerate the steps of my government in a course of policy intimated as being common to this government, for the welfare of those states” (Tr in same; in Rush’s hand). (6) Rush to Adams, London, 28 Aug. 1823, sending copies of the two preceding enclosures; revealing that, in exchange for British recognition of the former colonies, he is willing to avow publicly “in the name of my government that it will not remain inactive under an attack upon the independence of those states by the Holy Alliance”; presenting his opinion that such an announcement, especially if seconded by Great Britain, would forestall any such action; and offering to “take to myself all the reproach” if the United States finds it necessary to disavow his actions (RC in same; endorsed by a clerk at the Department of State as received 9 Oct.).