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Richard Oswald’s Notes on Conversations with Benjamin Franklin and John Jay, 15 and 17 August 1782

Richard Oswald’s Notes on Conversations
with Benjamin Franklin and John Jay

Paris 15th & 17th August 1782.

In the Conclusion of the Papers of the 13th Inst:1 I said that Dr. Franklin & Mr Jay were to call on me as Yesterday to exchange Credentials, but they did not call I went out therefore this Morning to the Doctor to inform him that the Commission had come to hand, of which I told him I would have informed him sooner, if I had not expected him Yesterday. He excused himself on account of Company coming in which made it too late for coming into Paris that forenoon, but that Tomorrow he & Mr Jay would certainly call. He said he was glad the Sealed Commission was come.2 There was nothing material said on the subject of Business.

I returned to Paris & called on Mr Jay to inform him in like manner of the Commission being arrived. At Meeting with this Gentleman I own I was under some Concern on account of Our former Conversation; but, I was agreeably disappointed, having found him in the best humour, & disposed to enter into a friendly discussion on the Business I came about.

He did not seem desirous of going back upon past Transactions as on the former occasion & chiefly pointed at the object of a present Settlement. He said We had it now in Our power to put a final period to the Misfortunes We complained of by carrying into execution what had been solemnly intimated to them, & which Sir Guy Carleton had Orders to communicate to the Congress in America, a Copy of whose Instructions they were in possession of. One Article of which says, that His Majesty was to grant unconditional Independence to the Thirteen States of North America,3 but that the way proposed of making the same rest upon the Events and Termination of a Treaty did not come up to that description and was a mode of Performance which would not give Satisfaction to the Congress or People of America, & could not be considered by them as absolute and unconditional, if only standing as an Article of a depending Treaty, and upon the whole that they could not treat at all until their Independence was so acknowledged as that they should be on an equal footing with Us, and might take Rank as Parties to an Agreement. That in this they had a fair precedent in the Settlement of the Dutch with the Spaniards who refused to enter into any Treaty until they were declared Free States.4 That if We wished for Peace that was the only way to obtain it, & if done with a becoming Confidence & magnanimity, We should not only get Peace in the result, but by the concurrence of better management hereafter, he also hoped that a happy Conciliation and Friendship would be restored and perpetuated between both Countries, notwithstanding all that had happened, which he said would give him great Pleasure: but, that if We neglected this Opportunity, & continued in Our Hesitation on that head as We had done, We should then convince them of the Justice of their Suspicions of Designs, which he would not name, & should force them into Measures which he supposed I had discernment enough to guess at, without coming to further Explanation, that he should be extremely sorry to see things run into that strain, & therefore, as the Method proposed was indispensable, he could not but seriously advise and recommend it.

A good deal more this Gent: said to the same purpose without any Appearance ^of Resentment^ or Disgust, on the Contrary he delivered his Sentiments in a manner the most expressive of a sincere & friendly intention towards Great Britain. I should not do him Justice if I said less, & I am the more inclined to be particular in this part of the report that I was so free in my Remarks on his former Conversation, especially in my suspicions of an actual, or premeditated Connection with Foreign States, on account of his particular Idea of guarding against the Violation of Treaties, as mentioned in the preceding Papers, but which altho’ I could perceive was present to his mind on this occasion also yet I am now convinced had gone no farther than Speculation, &, as he said himself & which I really believe he would be heartily sorry they should be forced to have recourse to.

At proper times I said what occurred to me as necessary to bring this Question to some sort of desireable period & in particular wished to have Mr Jay’s Idea of such way of declaring this unconnected ascertainment of Independence as would satisfy them.

His former proposal of doing it by Proclamation he gave up, as liable to sundry Objections needless to be here repeated, he then proposed it should be done by a particular & separate Deed, or Patent under the Great Seal, in which my Commission for a Treaty might also be narrated, & that such Patent should be put into the possession of the Commissioners to be by them sent over to the Congress & accordingly Mr Jay brought me a Draft of the Patent.5 As I could see no other way of satisfying those Gentlemen, and it appearing highly necessary that some beginning should be made with them, since until that was done the Foreign Treaty could not proceed in its course, I agreed to send the Draft over to His Majesty’s Secretary of State, by a Courier Express for that purpose with my own Opinion rather in favor of the proposal than otherways: & so it was settled with the Commissioners. However afterwards on casting my eye upon the preamble of the Draft, where it is stated as if Sir Guy Carleton had orders to propose Treaties of Peace &c. to the Congress, and believing this to be a mistaken Quotation of memory from the Copy of Sir Guy’s Instructions in the possession of the Commissioners, & as such inferring an unjust Imputation on the Consistency of the Conduct of Administration & apprehending also that the Commissioners entertaining a Doubt of this nature, might have been the reason why they wished to be guarded with all this Caution in requiring this special Acknowlegement under the Great Seal, besides keeping their minds in suspense in all future proceedings where Confidence in good faith ought to smooth the Path on many Occasions to a happy Termination.

I say in reflecting on these things I thought it my Duty, & I confess I was on my own particular Account, a little anxious to have an Explanation of this matter, & therefore after it had been agreed in the presence of Dr Franklin & Mr Jay that I should send off the Draft, I took the liberty to point out to them the said preamble, telling them that there might be a possibility of mistake or misquotation in the last part of the Paragraph, Mr Jay said he had not the Copy of Sir Guy’s Instructions, & acknowledged he had inserted those Words from a general Impression that remained on his Memory & could not positively say but there might be some mistake. Dr Franklin said he had the Copy of the Instructions and would send a Duplicate to Mr Jay in a few Hours;6 he did so & I waited on Mr Jay to see the Papers. Upon the Perusal, he owned he had been mistaken & that Sir Guy’s Instructions went no further than an Order of Communication, to inform the Congress & General Washington that His Majesty intended (or had given Directions) to grant free and unconditional Independence to the Thirteen States &c.—7

Finding this Prejudice entirely removed & that Mr Jay was perfectly satisfied that the whole Course of proceeding in this matter was fair & consistent, I asked him what occasion there was then for this Extraordinary Caution of insisting on the Solemnity of such separate Deed under the Great Seal &c. since a preliminary Clause or Article in the Treaty, as always intended might do the whole Business by making it absolute & not depending in the view of ascertainment on the event of other or subsequent Articles, & which might be so expressed as to remove every Doubt as to the Independence being as free and unconditional as they desired it to be. In Confirmation of the greater expediency & dispatch of this method & that it was the sincere Intention of His Majesty to make this Grant in the precise way they desired I thought myself warranted in telling him that I had a full power in my Instructions to give them entire Satisfaction on this head & make no scruple in shewing it him, as it stood in the 4th Article thereof.8 Upon the Perusal Mr Jay said that was enough & he was fully satisfied, & there was no occasion for any other Writing on the Subject,9 that resting upon this would save time & he was happy also that the discovery of this mistake prevented their asking of His Majesty any farther proof of his good Intentions towards them than what were actually meant and conveyed in those my Instructions. Upon this I promised immediately to send off this Representation & also to desire leave & permission to make an absolute Acknowlegement of the Independence of the States to stand invariably as the first Article of the proposed Treaty with those Gentlemen. Mean time I think it proper to send enclosed the intended Draft (tho’ now of no use here) to shew by the Words scored in the preamble the ground of those Gentlemens hesitation & what gave occasion to their insisting on a Separate Deed under the Great Seal.10

I have now to add, in relation to my last Conversation with Mr Jay, that after having quitted the Subject of their particular Affairs, & thinking myself at liberty to enter into a greater freedom of Conversation I wished to take the Opportunity of saying something relative to Foreign Concerns to a man of good sense & temper, who in his present & future Situation may have it in his power here & elsewhere to exemplify by his good Offices, those favorable Inclinations respecting Great Britain which he so freely and warmly expressed on the present Occasion.

Accordingly at proper periods I made no scruple in throwing out the following Observations. That after settling with them which I hoped would end to the Satisfaction of both Parties our next Concern regarding a Settlement with France & other Foreign Nations: that as yet I understood We could make no guess as to what France aimed at. They kept themselves on the reserve perhaps, partly with a view of being in some measure governed in their Proposals by the manner in which Our Settlement of American Affairs may proceed.

That in the course of the American War they had taken the Opportunity of making separate Conquests for themselves & encouraged by this late Alteration in Our System, it may be supposed they were projecting some hard terms of Settlement for Us, by their delay in coming to particulars. Excepting only their Declaration of having no interest or concern in the Article of American Independence, & consequently that in every view of Equivalent, it is to have no place in abatement of their Claims of retention or further Requisition.11

That having taken the Spanish and Dutch Concerns also under their Cover, & so as not to treat but jointly, or in concurrence with them, the prospect of a speedy and favorable Settlement for Great Britain became still the more unpromising, unless they, the Commrs of the Colonies should interfere to check the Exorbitancy of the Terms which thus might be expected to be insisted on by such formidable Combination of Foreign States.

And this prospect I said was still the worse that I understood he himself (Mr Jay) had concluded, or was about to conclude a Treaty with Spain on the same footing with that which the Congress had settled with France; that the restraining Clause in those Treaties regarding Truce or final Peace between England & America, until there was also a final Settlement with those Foreign States was a most unlucky Circumstance, & therefore the more of those Treaties the Commrs entered into, so much the worse for England.

A great deal more I said, but being of a speculative kind, regarding future times & the different Situation We should be in from what We had formerly been, & the need We should feel of a friendly Attention on the part of the Colonies, with other things of so general a nature not necessary to be repeated here.

In answer, Mr Jay replied to the following purpose. That We had only to cut this Knot of Independence to get rid of many of those Apprehensions, that if We looked better to Our Conduct for the future We might be sure of recovering & preserving a solid and beneficial friendship with the Americans,12 that for the last 20 Years he could not say much for Us, yet he said more particularly regarding the fairness & sincerity of Our Professions, than I chuse to repeat.

He continued by saying that England under a wise Administration was capable of great things— Such a Country such a People & blessed with such a Constitution had nothing to fear, & in Thirty Years would forget all her present Difficulties, &c. &c.

That as to the Spanish Treaty he had not proceeded far in it, & unless We forced them into those Engagements, he did not see that the People of America had any Business to fetter themselves with them & in the mean time he assured me he would stop as to this of Spain:13 which I was ^very^ glad to hear of.

He said he supposed the Terms of France would be moderate, & in that Case he would give his Advice, that when they came to light that the Court of England would consider them with temper; and after making a deliberate Estimate of the Price they can afford to give for Peace, to strike at once without haggling about it.

That if their Independence was once settled, he hoped that next Winter would put an End to the War in general: that it was true there was a look here towards another Campaign, & what might be the possible Consequences of the Operations in the interim, & touched upon the East Indies, as if great Expectations from thence were entertained at this Court &c.

Amongst other things I omitted when We were talking of Independence that I mentioned by the bye, as if it was understood that when America was Independent of England, they would be so also of all other Nations. Mr Jay smiled & said that they would take Care of that, & seemed in his Countenance to express such disapprobation of any question being put on that head, as would make me cautious as to the manner in which any Stipulations on that Subject should be proposed to those Gentlemen

Richard Oswald

C, UkLPR: FO 95/ 511, Endorsed. Marked: “Copy”. C, MiUC: Shelburne 70.

2The official copy of Oswald’s commission, dated 7 Aug. 1782. For an explanation of JJ’s reaction to it, see his letter to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 17 Nov. 1782, below.

3Ibid. On the manner in which the Americans had obtained a copy of Carleton’s instructions, see BF to JJ, 16 Aug., below.

4For a detailed presentation of this argument, see JJ to Vergennes, 11–18 Sept. 1782, below.

5See JJ’s Draft of a Patent, 15 Aug. 1782, above.

6Enclosed in BF to JJ, 16 Aug. 1782, below.

7Both JJ and BF had insisted on the clarification of Carleton’s apparently competing role as peacemaker in America. In a letter to Shelburne of 21 Aug. 1782 (Giunta, Emerging Nation description begins Mary A. Giunta et al., eds., The Emerging Nation: A Documentary History of the Foreign Relations of the United States under the Articles of Confederation, 1780–1789 (3 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1996) description ends , 1: 538–39), Oswald noted that one of the two commissioners suspected that Carleton’s instructions of 25 June 1782 indicated that Britain had intended to ignore their commissions and negotiate through him instead. Oswald removed the doubt by showing them the fourth article of his instructions (ibid., 1: 482), quoted by JJ in his letter to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 17 Nov. 1782, below.

8Oswald enclosed his notes on these conversations to Thomas Townshend in a letter of 17 Aug., in which he reported that “the American Business” was now at a point the “Independence must be absolutely & unconditionally granted otherways all farther Correspondence with the Commissioners must cease.” He noted further that the commissioners had given up their demand that the grant be certified by a separate deed or patent under the Great Seal. He added that neither JJ nor BF had left copies of their powers with him on 15 Aug., which he understood to show their determination not to treat until their independence was acknowledged. In his reply of 1 Sept., Townshend commended Oswald for showing BF and JJ the 4th article of his instructions, and conveyed the king’s reaction to BF’s “necessary articles” of peace. See Giunta, Emerging Nation description begins Mary A. Giunta et al., eds., The Emerging Nation: A Documentary History of the Foreign Relations of the United States under the Articles of Confederation, 1780–1789 (3 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1996) description ends , 1: 529–30, 545–46.

9Either Oswald overestimated the degree to which JJ’s concerns had been resolved by clarification of Carleton’s instructions or JJ’s suspicions were again aroused by Rayneval’s secret mission to England, for, after Townshend’s response to Oswald’s communication of 17 Aug. arrived on 3 Sept., JJ again indicated that the American commissioners would not negotiate unless their independence were acknowledged in the first instance. If BF concurred, he proposed that this might be accomplished by so wording Oswald’s commission as to signal royal recognition that negotiations were to be with the “Thirteen United States of America,” thus making it clear that the negotiating parties— Britain and America—enjoyed equal status. See John Jay’s Draft of a Proposed Alteration in Oswald’s Commission, 9 Sept. 1782, below. On the new commission, and the British interpretation of it, see “The Rayneval and Vaughan Missions to England” (editorial note) on pp. 95–99.

10See John Jay’s Draft of a Patent, 15 Aug. 1782, above.

12For similar sentiments previously expressed by BF, see “The Status of the Peacemaking on John Jay’s Arrival in Paris” (editorial note) on pp. 2–5.

13On the impasse in negotiations with Aranda, see JJ to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 17 Nov. 1782, below.

14Oswald enclosed these notes in his letter to Townshend of 17 Aug. 1782, on which see “John Jay Proposes Altering Richard Oswald’s Commission” (editorial note) on p. 109.

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