From George Washington to Lieutenant General Rochambeau and Rear Admiral Ternay, 22 September 1780
III
To Lieutenant General Rochambeau and Rear Admiral Ternay
Hartford 22d Sepr 1780
Reponses du gnl Washington.
1er Une Superiorite Navale et Constante est Essentielle pour agir en Amerique d’une Maniere decisive.1
2ieme Newyork est Sans aucun doute le premier et le plus important object qu’on puisse avoir dans ce Continent.2
3me Avec la Superiorite Navale l’attaque de Newyork demande un nombre de troupes double de celui qu’y auront les ennemis. la garnison actuelle devroit donc etre attaquee par trente mille hommes. Mais Si l’on ne pouvoit en avoir que vingt quatre mille on pourroit encore entreprendre l’operation quoiqu’avec moins de certitude.3
4me la Reponse au premier article Renferme la Reponse de celui ci.4
5me de toutes les attaques celle de Newyork avec les Moyens Convenables doit Surement etre preferee.5
6me l’inferiorité de ⟨la flotte a⟩ Necessité Notre defensive, et a porté notre attention Sur le Soin de notre propre Sureté.6
7me la Situation de l’amerique Rend absolument Necessaire que Ses allies lui pretent un Secours vigoureux, et qu’à tant d’autres obligations; à tant d’autres preuves de Son genereux interest, Sa Majeste tres Chretienne ajoute celle, d’aider les etats Unis en envoyant ⟨encore⟩ des vaisseaux, des hommes et de l’argennt.7
8me les Reflexions Contenues dans cet article Sont de la plus parfaite justisse et la maniere proposee pour nous procurer la Superiorité Navale est la Meilleure qu’on puisse employer. un des points Surtout qui aura ⟨la⟩ plus importante influence Sur le Succès de la Campagne est que les Renforts nous arrivent de bien bonne heure.8
9me N’ayant pas encore arrête avec le Congrès les Calculs des troupes pour la Campagne prochaine, n’ayant pas mème Recue leur Reponse Sur les Moyens de Remplacer les troupes dont le tems finit Au mois de janvier, je n⟨e⟩ puis donner aucune idée fixe et je crains de hazarder une opinion Sur le nombre de troupes dont le Congrès Composera Son armée pour le pringtems prochain. je Regarde Comme très important que Sa Majesté très Chretienne veuille bien juger à propos d’augmenter le Corps français de la Maniere dont on fait mention dans Cet article. quant aux etats unis, j’espere que par un nouvel effort ils Se mettrent en etat de former le Surplus demandé pour l’attaque de Newyork.9
10. d’apres les Circomstances dont parle Cet article il est bien sûr que la guerre dans Ce païs-ci est plus Chere à proportion qu’elle ne l’est en europe. il est bien à desirer que—l’on fasse attention Aux demandes Relatives à le Sujet. de grandes Ressources de celle espece Sont la Base des operations de l’armée.10
Go: Washington
DS, in Lafayette’s writing, DLC:GW; LB, in French, DLC: Rochambeau Papers, vol. 7; LB, in French, DLC: Rochambeau Papers, vol. 8. Obscured material on the DS is supplied in angle brackets from the letter-book versions. Rochambeau and Ternay signed the DS below ten statements that Major General Lafayette wrote on their behalf in a column to the left of GW’s responses. There is no contemporary translation of GW’s reponses, but filed with the DS and presented in the notes below is a translation of the French statements by GW’s aide-de-camp Alexander Hamilton, which GW docketed: “Sundry matters proposed by the Count De Rochambeau & The Chevr de Ternay to Genl Washington for Consideration.” In his responses, GW essentially reiterated and concurred with the positions of his French allies.
1. “That there can be no decisive enterprise against the maritime establishments of the English in this country, without a constant naval superiority” (see source note).
2. “That of all the enterprises which may be undertaken, the most important and decisive is the reduction of New York, which is the center and focus of all the British forces.”
3. “That under whatever point of view we consider the establishment, which the English have made since five years at New York & with a garrison of fifteen thousand men, that place requires extensive means to make the seige of it—That with a decided maritime superiorty to block sandy Hook, and fight at sea, all the succours which may come from without during the course of the expedition, there must be also a land army of thirty thousand men, which may form two attacks on the works on New York and Long Island; and that we must calculate on an army of fifteen thousand men being able to make sorties with Six or 8 thousand men; that therefore each attack must be defended and garnished in proportion—That if we should be reduced to have no more than 24000 men, then we must content ourselves with a single attack, which however renders the operation less expeditious [and] more uncertain.”
4. “That every enterprise whether to the Southward or Northward exacts the same superiority by land and sea; since the troops which at present occupy the different posts may be reinforced by the fleet and army at New York, in proportion to the detachments which might be sent to attack them.” GW’s response invoked his reply to the first statement (see n.1 above).
5. “That we ought therefore to prefer the attack of New York to every other so soon as the King by his succours shall have enabled his allies to undertake it.”
6. “That in the state of the French fleet and army hitherto since their arrival, they have been obliged to remain on the strictest defensive and consider it as a happiness to have suffered no check.”
7. “That there results from all these considerations an indispensable necessity to reinforce the fleet and army here with ships troops and money.”
8. “That the number of ships for obtaining the naval superiority cannot possibly be fixed, since it must depend on the secrecy and the point from which they set out; but that the only means of having that superiority seeing that the English can detach from Europe in proportion to the French is to detach from the Islands [West Indies] in the month of April a fleet to reinforce the one here and give it a superiority. The Court of France can alone determine the number of vessels to be detached from Europe and from the Islands, as it cannot be known in America what number of vessels the enemy will be able to send here.”
9. “That in the circumstances in which General Washington finds himself, not having yet been able to combine with Congress the force of his army for the commencement of the next campaign—& not having yet received from Congress an answer concerning the means they propose to take to replace that part of his army whose times of service expire in January—he should fear to hazard a specification of the number of which the Congress will compose his army for the next spring; but that he thinks it very necessary, that His Christian Majesty be pleased to complete his army here to fifteen thousand, and that he hopes the states by a new effort will be able to supply the rest” (see also Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., to GW, 31 Aug., n.3).
10. “That independent of the funds destined for the army of fifteen thousand men & which will be insufficient if they are combined on the same scale by which the speculation for five thousand men was regulated—without having foreseen the extraordinary expence attending a war in this country, where each individual neither gives his house nor his field to incamp in without being paid for it—in hand; it is indispensable to add extra funds to supply the contingencies which cannot be foreseen, in order not to be stopped in the midst of an expedition once commenced.”