Drafts of a Message to Congress, [ca. 19 September 1814]
Drafts of a Message to Congress
[ca. 19 September 1814]
In every sacrifice which the war may require, we have the animating recollection that it was our choice, neither in its origin nor in its continuance. It was long made on us before it was returned on the Enemy. Besides a catalogue of other wrongs, we had borne the capture of nearly a thousand ships, and the impressment of thousands of our seafaring Citizens. We had borne these aggressions in the hope, feeble as it had become, that a change in the British Councils would put an end to them. This languishing hope, this apology to our pride and our honor, for so unexampled a forbearance, was at length wrested from us. We were explicitly told*1
We can recollect with like satisfaction, that the reluctant appeal to arms was immediately followed by a proposal to the British Government, of an armistice which might lead to an adjustment of the differences; on the sole condition that an order should be issued suspending the impressments during the armistice. It was soon followed by another proposal, admitting instead of such an order, an informal understanding on the subject. Both of these proposals were rejected.2A third,† which was thought to leave no plea for hesitation, as the only preliminary for our Minister at the Court of London, was that he should find in the British Govt. a sincere disposition to accommodate that difference on fair conditions, was evaded on a ground to which a desire of either peace or truce would not have resorted.3
Having no choice under those circumstances, but to invigorate the war; we still did not lose sight of the object of all just war, a just peace. The Emperor of Russia having offered his mediation for that purpose, it was instantly & cordially accepted by this Government. The British Government refused it. The Emperor, in his benevolence, repeated his invitation. The British Govt. persisted in its refusal. It proposed at length a direct negociation with the U. States.
This Govt. faithful to its views of honorable reconciliation, promptly accepted it; not doubting that the British Govt. would be equally prompt in giving effect to its own proposal. The American Envoys were appointed without delay, and arrived at Gottenburg, the destined seat of negociation as soon as the season admitted. The B. Govt. though regularly informed that no time would be lost on our part, suspended its appointments, untill the actual arrival of the Americans should be formally communicated. The pretension, extraordinary as it was, was not permitted to obstruct the path to peace. It was next proposed by that Govt. to change the seat of negociation from Gottenburg to Ghent. The change was agreed to. And our Envoys at the last dates, were awaiting the arrival of the British, who had not been long appointed; and who after a lapse of more than three months from the arrival of the American at Gottenburg, and more than 4from the substitution of Ghent for that place, had not left their own Country.5
To these facts, demonstrating, that G. B. not the U. S. is chargeable both with the origin of the war, and with the obstacles to peace, it may be added, that trusting to the prospect of durable peace to Great Britain afforded by recent events in Europe, during which the occasions will not exist for renewing her aggressions on a neutral Power, & during which also, there will be fair opportunities for preventing them by amicable arrangements, our Envoys were authorized to wave stipulations on the great subjects of controversy, particularly of impressment, which might otherwise have been indispensable precautions.
Whilst the war therefore proceeds, the Enemy alone will be answerable for it. And the U.S. in opposing his ambitious designs, and his cruel measures, with all the energies of a brave & free people, and with the undiminished desire of an honorable reconciliation, becoming a virtuous one, must carry with them the good wishes of the impartial world, & the best hopes of support from an omnipotent & kind Providence.
Partial draft (ViU: Madison Family Papers, 1768–1866, Special Collections); partial draft (DLC). First partial draft in Edward Coles’s hand; consists of one page numbered 6. Second partial draft in JM’s hand; consists of three pages numbered 7 through 9. Both partial drafts undated; second partial draft dated 20 Sept. 1814 in the Index to the James Madison Papers; conjectural date assigned here based on the assumption that these notes were part of a preliminary version of JM’s 20 Sept. 1814 annual message to Congress. He included only a few lines from these partial drafts in the final paragraph of the finished message, condensing the summary of U.S. peacemaking efforts that forms the body of the second partial draft into the single remark that his country had “manifested on every occasion, and in every proper mode, a sincere desire to arrest the effusion of blood, and meet our Enemy on the ground of justice and reconciliation.”
1. First partial draft ends here.
2. For U.S. offers to suspend hostilities in the early days of the war and Great Britain’s rejection of them, see Memorandum of a Conversation with Augustus J. Foster, 23 June 1812, and JM’s messages to Congress of 4 and 12 Nov. 1812, 4:501–3 and n. 8, 5:430, 453 and n. 1.
3. JM referred to James Monroe’s 21 Aug. 1812 instructions to London chargé d’affaires Jonathan Russell, which were delivered there to U.S. agent for prisoners Reuben G. Beasley after Russell’s departure for the United States. In the letter Monroe explained JM’s decision to decline the current British armistice offer (for the armistice, see JM to Thomas Jefferson, 17 Aug. 1812, 5:165–66 and n. 2), but stated that JM nevertheless believed the proposal showed a British inclination to negotiate, and that Russell was therefore authorized to conclude an armistice without an “explicit understanding” on impressment, if the British government showed “a sincere disposition to accommodate that difference on fair conditions.” Beasley reported to Monroe on 19 Nov. 1812 that, in Russell’s absence, he had opened the dispatch and sent an 11 Nov. 1812 note to Lord Castlereagh informing him of its contents. Castlereagh replied on 18 Nov. 1812, declining to act on this information because his government had already authorized Adm. Sir John Borlase Warren to negotiate an armistice in the United States (for Warren’s offer, see 5:385 n. 2), and because Beasley’s agency in the matter was unofficial (DNA: RG 59, IM, vol. 7; DNA: RG 59, CD, London). Monroe wrote Beasley on 25 Jan. 1813, rebuking him for having exceeded his authority (DNA: RG 59, IM, vol. 8).
4. Blanks left by JM.
5. For these reports, see Memorandum on Cabinet Meeting, 27 June 1814, 7:591 and n. 1; and Monroe to JM, 5 Aug. 1814, and nn. 1–2.