1. While the present document gives no hint of the dynamics or discussion at the cabinet meeting it records, an unaddressed four-page letter in James Monroe’s hand, dated 3 July 1814 and now to be found in Monroe’s papers at the Library of Congress, suggests that the members of JM’s cabinet differed significantly in their opinions on how best to deal with the looming threat of British invasion. There is no evidence that JM ever received this letter, but its contents indicate that it was intended for him, and Monroe probably communicated at least some of its substance to the president during the summer of 1814.

Monroe wrote: “I had written the enclosed and intended to add a paragh. or two to it, and Deliver it to day to Mr Gales, who had called to receive it, when Mr Campbell called to confer about his loan. We conferr’d together on his subject; after which, I told him that I was glad to have an opportunity of reading to him what I had written for the Intelligencer, to convey unofficially the sentiments of the govt. on the present crisis of affrs, to the public. I read this paper. His decided opinion was that it would give too great an alarm, one, beyond the real danger, & which would defeat the loan. I replied that if the loan was taken & the danger occurr’d, the contractors might not be able to comply; in which case, by not rousing the nation, & taking the lead on the part of the govt., we should not only be charged, with supineness, & negligence in a great emergency, by which the nation would be taken by surprise, but gain no advantage from our contract; that he might possibly get on with the treasury a month, without any loan, after which, if the danger disappeard, he might make a much more advantageous contract than he could do at this time; and if it occurrd, that the Congress being then in session, as I really wished it to be, would be prepard, to take such legislative measures, as the nature of the crisis might require. His idea was that no danger whatever existed; that G Britain would send very few men here, and with none of the views imputed to her; that true wisdom consisted, in making the best bargain now that could be made, and not lessening the price of our stock, by publications or other acts tending to excite alarms: in other words, that as stock would sell well if the prospect of peace was good, and as he thought that it was good, his opinion was that we ought not to darken the prospect. I suppressd the paper, being quite willing to take no step, not dictated, on the most mature consideration, by the manifest interest of the country, and the concurrence of all.

“I have since reflected further on this subject, and am persuaded, that it would be safest to act on the presumption, that the dangers which are possible, will occur. I think I see manifest advantages resulting from it, without any real loss, under any circumstances that may occur. Suppose the troops should not arrive, in which case only will there be any objection to the course suggested. I have no doubt that this course, which made an appeal to the nation, & shewed decision would give support to our negotiation. The present appears to me to be a time, when silence on the part of the govt., can be justified, by confidence & certainty only, that no danger exists. If that were really the case, the fact ought to be stated. The mov’ment on the other side is active & vigorous, as we see by the proceedings Eastward. That movment has more effect, in consequence of our inactivity, even before the danger shews itself, and while there is a hope that we possess information of our security not known to the public. Even in this state the govt. shakes to the foundation. Let a strong force land any where, and what will be the effect? We have a great majority of the nation with us. But to give energy to our cause, we must take the passions of the people with us also.

“In looking to the worst my idea really is that the Congress shod. be conven’d for the purpose of providing more ample funds, preventing the exportation of specie from the country, establishing a national bank, and doing every thing that will give energy to the govt., & success to the war. This little supply in view, on which every thing is suspended, is so temporary in its nature as to be comparatively a trifling object. It appears to me the more so, because, if the basis on which [it] rests, should fail, the supply itself would fail.

“I have put together in haste these thoughts for your consideration, without any anxiety as to myself, that they should obtain the result they contemplate. I wish only that the subject may be profoundly weigh’d.”

For communications to the State Department suggesting that Great Britain would soon invade the United States in force, see Monroe to JM, ca. 25 June 1814, and Memorandum on Cabinet Meeting, 27 June 1814, PJM-PS, description begins Robert A. Rutland et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison: Presidential Series (8 vols. to date; Charlottesville, Va., 1984–). description ends 7:585 and nn. 1 and 3, 591 and n. 1. Despite some discussion of this possibility in the Daily National Intelligencer in July 1814, no statement of the kind Monroe described here was published in that paper during that month. A paragraph, probably provided by the administration, appeared, however, on 12 July, characterizing the War Department’s recent call on the governors for militia (see JM to John Armstrong, 2 July 1814, and n. 2) as “a measure of prudential preparation for a state of things which there is some reason to apprehend,” while noting that the troops would likely not be brought into service “unless the enemy should attempt to execute his threats of invasion.”