Notes on Debates, 19 March 1783
Notes on Debates
MS (LC: Madison Papers). For a description of the manuscript of Notes on Debates, see V, 231–34.
,A letter was read from the Superintendt. of Finance inclosing letters from Docr. Franklin accompd. with extracts from the Ct. de Vergennes relative to money-affairs, the Supt. thereupon declaring roundly that our credit was at an end & that no further pecuniary aids were to be expected from Europe.1 Mr. Rutlidge denied these assertions & expressed some indignation at them.2 Mr. Bland said that as the Supt. was of this opinion it would be absurd for him to be Minister of Finance and moved that the come. on his motion for arranging the department might be instructed to report without loss of time. This motion was negatived as censuring the Come. but it was understood to be the sense of Congs. that they sd. report.3
The order of the day viz the letter from the Secretary of Fr. Afrs. was taken up.4
Mr. Wolcot conceived it unnecessary to waste time on the subject as he presumed Congs. would never so far censure the Ministers who had obtained such terms for this Country; as to disavow their conduct.5
Mr. Clarke was decided agst. communicating the separate article,6 which wd. be sacrificing meritorious Ministers, & wd. rather injure than relieve our national honour. He admitted that the separate article put an advantage into the hands of the Enemy,7 but did not on the whole deem it of any very great consequence. He thought Congress ought to go no farther than to inform the Ministers that they were sorry for the necessity which had led them into the part they had taken, & to leave them to get rid of the embarrassmt. as to the separate article in such way as they sd. judge best. This expedient would save Congress & spare our Ministers who might have been governed by reasons not known to Congress.8
Mr. Mercer said that not meaning to give offence anywhere he should speak his sentiments freely. He gave it as his clear & decided opinion that the Ministers had insulted Congress by sending them assertions without proof as reasons for violating their instructions, & throwing themselves into the confidence of G. B.9 He observed that France in order to make herself equal to the Enemy had been obliged to call for aid & had drawn Spain agst. her interest into the war: that it was not improbable that She had entered into some specific engagements for that purpose; that hence might be deduced the perplexity of her situation, of which advantage had been taken by G. B.—an advantage in which our Ministers had concurred for sowing jealousies between F. & U. S. & of which further advantage wd. be taken to alienate the minds of the people of this Country from their ally by presenting him as the obstacle to peace.10 The British Court he said havg gained this point may easily frustrate the negociation & renew the war agst. divided enemies. He approved of the conduct of the Count de Vergennes in promoting a treaty under the 1st. Commisson. to Oswald as preferring the substance to the shadow & proceeding from a desire of peace.11 The conduct of our Ministers throughout, particularly in giving in writing every thing called for by British Ministers expressive of distrust of France12 was a mixture of follies which had no example, was a tragedy to America & a comedy to all the world beside. He felt inexpressible indignation at their meanly stooping as it were to lick the dust from the feet of a nation whose hands were still dyed with the blood of their fellow-citizens. He reprobated the chicane & low cunning wch. marked the journals transmitted to congress,13 and contrasted them with the honesty & good faith which became all nations & particularly an infant republic. They proved that America had at once all the follies of youth and all the vices of old age: thinks it wd. [be] necessary to recall our Ministers: fears that France may be already acquainted with all the transactions of our Ministers, even with the separate article, & may be only awaiting the reception given to it by Congs. to see how far her hopes of cutting off the right arm of G. B. by supporting our revolution may have been well founded: and in case of our basely disappointing her, may league with our Enemy for our destruction and for a division of the spoils. He was aware of the risks to which such a league wd. expose France of finally losing her share, but supposed that the British Islands might be made hostages for her security.14 He said America was too prone to depreciate political merit, & to suspect where there was no danger: that the honor of the King of F. was dear to him, that he never wd. betray or injure us unless he sd. be provoked & justified by treachery on our part. For the present he acquiesced in the proposition of the Secy. of Fr. As. But when the question sd. come to be put, he sd. be for a much more decisive resolution.
Mr. Rutlidge said he hoped the character of our ministers wd. not be affected, much less their recall produced by declamations agst. them: and that facts would be ascertained & stated before any decision sd. be passed: that the Ct. de Vergennes had expressly declared to our Ministers his desire that they might treat apart; alluded to & animadverted upon the instruction which sumbmitted them to French Councils;15 was of opinion that the separate article did not concern France & therefore there was no necessity for communicating it to her; & that as to Spain she deserved nothing at our hands.16 she had treated us in a manner that forfeited all claim to our good offices or our confidence. she had not as had been supposed entered into the present war as an ally to our ally and for our support; but as she herself had declared, as a principal & on her own account.17 He sd. he was for adhering religiously to the Spirit & letter of the treaty with France, that our Ministers had done so; & if recalled or censured for the part they had acted, he was sure no man of spirit would take their place. He concluded with moving that the letter from the Secy. for F. A. might be referred to a special comme. who might enquire into all the facts relative to the subject of it. Mr. Holten 2ded. the motion.
Mr. Williamson was opposed to harsh treatment of Ministers who had shewn great ability. He said they had not infringed the Treaty,18 and as they had recd. the concurrence of the Ct. de Vergennes for treating apart, they had not in that respect violated their instruction. He proposed that Congress sd. express to the Ministers their concern at the separate article & leave them to get over the embarrassment as they shd. find best.
Mr. Mercer in answer to Mr. Rutlidge said that his language with respect to the Ministers was justified by their refusal to obey instructions, censured wth. great warmth the servile confidence of Mr. Jay in particular in the British Ministers. He said the separate article was a reproach to our character, and that if Congress wd. not themselves disclose it he himself would disclose it to his Constituents who would disdain to be United with those who patronize such dishonorable proceedings. He was called to order by the Presidt. who said that the article in question was under an injunction of secrecy & he cd. not permit the orders of the House to be trampled upon.19
Mr. Lee took notice that obligations in national affairs as well as others ought to be reciprocal & he did not know that France had ever bound herself to like engagements as to concert of negociation with those into which America had at different times been drawn:20 He thought it highly improper to censure Ministers who had negociated well, said that it was agreeable to practice & necessary to the end proposed, for Ministers in particular emergencies to swerve from strict instructions.21 France he said wanted to sacrifice our interests to her own or to those of Spain, that the French answer to the British Memorial contained a passage which deserved attention on this subject. She answered the reproaches of perfidy contained in that Memorial by observing that obligations being reciprocal, a breach on one side absolved the other.22 The Ct. de Vergennes he was sure was too much a master of negociation not to approve the management of our Ministers instead of condemning it.23 No man lamented more than he did any diminution of the confidence between this country & France, but if the misfortune should ensue it could not be denied that it originated with France, who has endeavoured to sacrifice our territorial rights, those very rights which by the Treaty she had guarantied to us.24 He wished the preliminary articles had not been signed without the knowledge of France but was persuaded that in whatever light she might view it, she was too sensible of the necessity of our Independence to her safety ever to abandon it. But let no censure fall on our Ministers who had upon the whole done what was best. He introduced the instruction of June 15. 1781 proclaimed it to be the greatest opprobrium and stain to this Country which it had ever exposed itself to, & that it was in his judgment the true cause of that distrust & coldness which prevailed between our Ministers & the French Court, inasmuch as it could not be viewed by the former without irritation & disgust.25 He was not surprized that those who considered France as the Patron rather than the ally of this Country should be disposed to be obsequious to her, but he was not of that number.
Mr. Hamilton urged the propriety of proceeding with coolness and circumspection. He thought it proper in order to form a right judgment of the conduct of our Ministers, that the views of the French & British Courts should be examined. He admitted it as not improbable that it had been the policy of France to procrastinate the definitive acknowledgmt. of our Independence on the part of G. B. in order to keep us more knit to herself & untill her own interests could be negociated. The arguments however urged by our Ministers on this subject, although strong, were not conclusive; as it was not certain, that this policy & not a desire of excluding obstacles to peace, had produced the opposition of the French Court to our demands.26 Caution & vigilance he thought were justified by the appearance & these alone. But compare this policy with that of G. B. survey the past cruelty & present duplicity of her councils, behold her watching every occasion & trying every project for dissolving the honorable ties which bind the U. S. to their ally,27 & then say on which side our resentments & jealousies ought to lie. With respect to the instruction submitting our Ministers to the advice of France, he had disapproved it uniformly since it had come to his knowledge, but he had always judged it improper to repeal it.28 He disapproved also highly of the conduct of our Ministers in not shewing the preliminary articles to our Ally before they signed them, and still more so of their agreeing to the separate article. This conduct gave an advantage to the Enemy which they would not fail to improve for the purpose of inspiring France with indignation & distrust of the U. S. He did not apprehend (with Mr. Mercer) any danger of a coalition between F. & G. B. against America, but foresaw the destruction of mutual Confidence between F. & U. S. which wd. be likely to ensue, & the danger which would result from it in case the war should be continued. He observed that Spain was an unwise nation, her policy narrow & jealous, her King old her Court divided & the heir apparent notoriously attached to G. B.29 From these circumstances he inferred an apprehension that when Spain sd. come to know the part taken by America with respect to her, a separate treaty of peace might be resorted to. He thought a middle course best with respect to our Ministers; that they ought to be commended in general, but that the communication of the separate article ought to take place. He observed that our Ministers were divided as to the policy of the Ct. of France, but that they all were agreed in the necessity of being on the watch against G. B. He apprehended that if the ministers were to be recalled or reprehended, that they would be disgusted & head & foment parties in this Country. He observed particularly with respect to Mr. Jay that altho’ he was a man of profound sagacity & pure integrity, yet he was of a suspicious temper, & that this trait might explain the extraordinary jealousies which he professed.30 He finally proposed that the Ministers sd. be commended & the separate articles communicated. This motion was 2ded. by Mr. Osgood, as compared however with the proposition of the Secy. for F. A. and so far only as to be referred to a Committee.31
Mr. Peters favored a moderate course as most advisable. He thought it necessary that the separate art: sd. be communicated, but that it wd. be less painful to the feelings of the Ministers if the doing it was left to themselves; and was also in favor of giving the territory annexed by the separate art: to W. Florida32 to such power as might be invested with that Colony in the Treaty of peace.
Mr. Bland said he was glad that every one seemed at length to be struck with the impropriety of the instruction submitting our Ministers to the advice of the French Court. He represented it as the cause of all our difficulties & moved that it might be referred to the come. with the several propositions which had been made. Mr. Lee 2ded. the motion.
Mr. Wilson objected to Mr. Blands motion as not being in order.33 When moved in order perhaps he might not oppose the substance of it. He said he had never seen nor heard of the instruction it referred to untill this morning; and that it had really astonished him; that this Country ought to maintain an upright posture between all nations. But however objectionable this step might have been in Congs. the magninimity of our Ally in declining to obtrude his advice on our Ministers ought to have been a fresh motive, to their confidence and respect. Altho they deserve commendation in general for their services; in this respect they do not. He was [of the] opinion that the spirit of the treaty with France forbade the signing of the preliminary articles without her previous consent; and that the separate article ought to be disclosed;34 but as the merits of our Ministers entitled them to the mildest & most delicate mode in which it cd. be done, he wished the communication to be left to themselves as they wd. be the best judges of the explanation which ought to be made for the concealment; & their feelings wd. be less wounded than if it were made without their intervention. He observed that the separate article was not important in itself & became so only by the mysterious silence in which it was wrapt up. A candid and open declaration from our Ministers of the circumstances under which they acted & the necessity produced by them of pursuing the course marked out by the interest of their Country, wd. have been satisfactory to our ally, wd. have saved their own honor, and would have not endangered the objects for which they were negociating.
Mr. Higginson contended that the facts stated by our Ministers justified the part they had taken.
Mr. Madison expressed his surprize at the attempts made to fix the blame of all our embarrassments on the instruction of June 15, 1781, when it appeared that no use had been made of the power given by it to the Ct. of France,35 that our Ministers had construed it in such a way as to leave them at full liberty; and that no one in Congs. pretended to blame them on that acct. For himself he was persuaded that their construction was just; the advice of France having been made a guide to them only in cases where the question respected the concessions of the U. S. to G. B. necessary & proper for obtaining peace & an acknowledgt. of Indepe.; not where it respected concessions to other powers & for other purposes. He reminded Congress of the change which had taken place in our affairs since that instruction was passed, and remarked the probability that many who were now perhaps loudest in disclaiming, would under the circumstances of that period have been the foremost to adopt it.*36 He admitted that the change of circumstances had rendered it inapplicable, but thought an express repeal of it might at this crisis at least have a bad effect. The instructions he observed for disregarding which our Ministers had been blamed, and which if obeyed would have prevented the dilemma now felt, were those which required them to act in concert & in confidence with our ally: & these instructions he said had been repeatedly confirmed in every stage of the revolution by unanimous votes of Congress;37 Several of the gentlemen present† who now justified our Ministers having concurred in them, and onex of them, having penned two of the Acts, in one of which Congs. went farther than they had done in any preceding act; by declaring that they would not make peace untill the interests of our allies & friends as well as of the U. S. sd. be provided for.38
As to the propriety of communicating to our Ally the separate article, he thought it resulted clearly from considerations both of national honor & national security. He said that Congress having repeatedly assured their ally that they would take no step in a negociation but in concert & in confidence with him, and havg. even published to the world solemn declarations to the same effect,39 would if they abetted this concealment of their Ministers be considered by all nations as devoid of all constancy & good faith; unless a breach of these assurances & declarations cd. be justified by an absolute necessity or some perfidy on the part of France; that it was manifest no such necessity could be pleaded, & as to perfidy on the part of France, nothing but suspicious & equivocal circumstances had been quoted in evidence of it; & even in these it appeared that our Ministers were divided;40 that the embarrassmt. in which France was placed by the interfering claims of Spain & the U. S. must have been foreseen by our Ministers, and that the impartial public would expect that instead of co-operating with G. B. in taking advantage of this embarrassment, they ought to have made every allowance & given every facility to it consistent with a regard to the rights of their Constituents; that admiting every fact alledged by our Ministers to be true, it could by no means be inferred that the opposition made by France to our claims, was the effect of any hostile or ambitious designs agst. them, or of any other design than that of reconciling them with those of Spain; that the hostile aspect wch. the separate art: as well as the concealment of it bore to Spain, would be regarded by the impartial world as a dishonorable alliance with our enemies against the interests of our friends; that notwithstanding the disappointments & even indignities which the U S. had recd from Spain it could neither be denied nor concealed that the former had derived many substantial advantages, from her taking part in the war & had even obtained some pecuniary aids; that the U. S. had made professions corresponding with these obligations: that they had testified the important light in which they considered the support resulting to their cause from the arms of Spain by the importunity with which they had courted her alliance; by the concessions with which they had offered to purchase it, and by the anxiety which they expressed at every appearance of her separate negociations for a peace with the common Enemy.41
That our national safety would be endangered by Congress making themselves a party to the concealment of the separate article, he thought could be questioned by no one. No definitive treaty of peace he observed had as yet taken place, the important articles between some of the belligerent parties had not even been adjusted, our insidious enemy was evidently labouring to sow dissentions among them, the incaution of our Ministers had but too much facilitated them between the U. S. and France; a renewal of the war therefore in some form or other was still to be apprehended42 & what would be our situation if France & Spain had no confidence in us: and what confidence could they have if we did not disclaim the policy which had been followed by our Ministers.
He took notice of the intimation given by the British Minister to Mr. Adams of an intended expedition from N. York agst. W. Florida, as a proof of the illicit confidence into which our Ministers had been drawn, & urged the indispensable duty of Congs. to communicate it to those concerned in it.43 He hoped that if a Come. sd. be appd. for wch. however he saw no necessity that this wd. be included in their report & that their report wd. be made with as little delay as possible.
In the event the Lettr from Secy of F. A. with all the despatches & the several propositions which had been made, were committed to Mr. Wilson, Mr. Ghorum, Mr. Rutlidge, Mr. Clarke & Mr. Hamilton.44
1. In his letter of 17 March 1783 to Congress, enclosing copies of Benjamin Franklin’s dispatches to him of 14 and 23 December, and a translation of Vergennes’ note of 15 December 1782 to Franklin, Robert Morris presented a most dismal account of the financial condition of Congress to warrant his conclusions that “there is no hope of any further pecuniary aid from Europe” and “our public credit is gone.” After expressing “a contempt” for critics who blamed him for this situation and after reminding Congress that the sorry state of affairs would have been avoided if his recommendations had been adopted, Morris added, “I pray to be dismissed” as superintendent of finance ( ., VI, 134–36, 140–41, 159–60, 308–11). On 19 March Morris submitted to Congress La Luzerne’s letter of equally discouraging tenor, written to him four days before (NA: PCC, No. 185, III, 58; No. 186, fol. 89).
2. John Rutledge, who evidently was much more hopeful than Morris that the states would come to the financial rescue of Congress, may also have quoted Franklin’s letter of 23 December 1782 to the effect that Vergennes had already supplied 600,000 of the French loan of 6,000,000 livres for 1783 and promised to pay the remainder “quarterly” during that year ( ., VI, 160). Morris, however, could retort that even that amount, which was 14,000,000 livres less than the total sought, had been loaned in the expectation that the war would continue and that Congress would assure itself of a sufficient “general revenue” to restore public credit (JM Notes, 12–15 Mar. 1783, n. 7).
3. After rejecting on 5 March Theodorick Bland’s motion to have a committee “devise the most proper means of arranging the department of finance,” Congress on that day appointed a committee, John Rutledge, chairman, “to devise the most proper steps to be taken in consequence of” the impending resignation of Morris ( , XXIV, 165–66, 168, and n. 1; JM Notes, 4–5 Mar. 1783, and nn. 4, 12). Bland evidently considered that this directive included the purport of his own unsuccessful motion. The journal for 19 March records neither the reference to that committee of Morris’ letter of 17 March 1783, nor Bland’s motion to have the committee report “without loss of time.”
4. JM Notes, 18 Mar. 1783, and nn. 12, 13.
5. Oliver Wolcott’s meaning will become clearer if “favorable” or a word of similar connotation is interpolated between “such” and “terms.”
6. JM Notes, 12–15 Mar., and nn. 6, 12, 13; 18 Mar.; JM to Randolph, 18 Mar. 1783, and n. 5.
7. That is, France would be alienated from the United States if, as seemed likely, Great Britain should reveal to Vergennes the secret article in her preliminary treaty of peace with the United States.
8. Abraham Clark’s proposal ran counter to that of Robert R. Livingston, secretary for foreign affairs, who wished to be authorized by Congress to inform La Luzerne of the secret article (JM Notes, 18 Mar. 1783).
9. John Francis Mercer probably was referring above all to John Jay’s long dispatch of 17 November 1782 and John Adams’ brief one of the next day, both addressed to Livingston ( ., VI, 11–49, 51–52). Granting that JM’s record is accurate, Mercer’s indictment of Jay for making “assertions without proof” was much too severe. Jay, however, had reminded Benjamin Vaughan, an agent of the Earl of Shelburne, that Great Britain’s own interest should impel her “to make friends of those whom she could not subdue” and “to cut the cords which tied us to France” (ibid., VI, 29–30). For Vaughan, see Comment by Jefferson, 25 Jan. 1783, and n. 1.
In their joint dispatch of 14 December to Livingston, the four American peace commissioners admitted that, by not always taking Vergennes into their confidence, they had “deviated from the spirit of our instructions” of 15 June 1781, but they justified their deviation by mentioning his resistance to what they were expected by Congress to achieve in regard to “the boundaries, the refugees, and fisheries” (JM Notes, 12–15 Mar. 1783, n. 6). In his dispatch of 18 November, Adams commented to Livingston that, if Congress really had wanted the American commissioners “to consult and communicate with French ministers upon all occasions and follow their advice,” it would have been “better to constitute the Count de Vergennes our sole minister, and give him full powers to make peace, and treat with all Europe.” As a guide to his own conduct, Adams assumed that Congress meant the instructions to accord with the demands of “reason, necessity, and the nature of things” ( ., VI, 52–54). See also ibid., V, 854–55.
., VI, 133;10. King Charles III of Spain concluded with France at Aranjuez on 12 April 1779 a secret “convention” wherein, among other guarantees, France pledged, if Spain entered the conflict, to continue the war until Great Britain agreed to retrocede Gibraltar to Spain. Although Charles III declared war on Great Britain in June 1779, he encouraged agents of the ministry of Lord North, for about three years thereafter, to believe that, if Great Britain would abandon Gibraltar, Spain would withdraw from the war ( , II, 223; 225, n. 2; 226; III, 130; 131, n. 3).
Among other “specific arrangements” stipulated in the convention of Aranjuez, France promised to help Spain recover Pensacola and Mobile from Great Britain and to admit Spaniards, but presumably no other foreigners, to the Newfoundland fisheries. On her part, Spain agreed neither to resist having the United States win her independence nor, except after consulting France, to make a pact with the United States or any other country about that independence (Richard B. Morris, The Peacemakers, pp. 14–16). For the convention of Aranjuez, see Henry Doniol, Histoire de la participation de la France à l’éstablissement des États-Unis d’Amérique (5 vols.; Paris, 1886–92), III, 806–9.
11. John Jay declined to negotiate with Richard Oswald under his commission of 7 August 1782, in which King George III designated him to be “our commissioner” to treat with the commissioner or commissioners of the thirteen “colonies or plantations.” Vergennes believed that this wording was satisfactory because “an acknowledgment of our independence, instead of preceding, must in the natural course of things be the effect of the treaty, and that it would not be reasonable to expect the effect before the cause” ( ., V, 613–14, 614 n.; VI, 14–15, 17–18; , V, 172, n. 13; 418, n. 17).
12. Although Shelburne no doubt had been aware of and fostered Jay’s and Adams’ “distrust of France,” he probably did not realize that at least two of the dispatches he received from Oswald had been largely drafted by Jay ( ., VI, 16–17, 19, 46).
13. For the journals referred to by Mercer, see JM Notes, 12–15 Mar. 1783, n. 1.
14. Although by joining with Great Britain in a renewed war, France would incur “risks” because her navy was feeble compared with that of her new ally, she might assure herself of “a division of the spoils” resulting from “our destruction,” by occupying the rich “sugar islands” of Great Britain in the Caribbean Sea.
15. For the instructions of 15 June 1781, see , III, 152, n. 10; 154, nn. 3, 5; V, 33–35; 35, n. 4; 36, n. 9; 466–67.
16. The “separate article” concerning the southern boundary of the United States did not affect France directly, but she had promised in the convention of Aranjuez to help Spain recover the coast of West Florida from the British (n. 10). See also , I, 218, n. 6; II, 135, n. 11.
17. , II, 108, n. 9; 196, n. 4; 239, n. 5; 273; III, 101–4; 104, n. 3; 142, n. 8; 170, n. 3; 196–97; 263, n. 6; 278–79; 280, nn. 11, 12; IV, 5–6; 168–69; 169, nn. 3, 5; 215; 216, n. 6; 230, n. 19; 342, n. 1; V, 14; 21, n. 4; 23–24; 35, n. 4; 416; 418, n. 19; 441–42; 444, nn. 7, 11.
18. That is, Article VIII of the Treaty of Alliance between the United States and France, pledging joint action in concluding “either truce or peace with Great Britain” ( , XI, 451).
19. The journal of Congress does not mention “the orders,” presumably of 12 March, enjoining secrecy respecting the separate article. About three months earlier the case of David Howell had demonstrated the inability of Congress to prevent a delegate from revealing secret information to the general assembly of his sovereign state ( , V, 419–20; 420, nn. 4, 6; 421, n. 10; JM Notes, 9–10 Jan. 1783, and nn. 21, 22).
20. If JM’s sentence to this point is hastily read, he will appear to have Arthur Lee take a position contrary to a stipulation in the Treaty of Alliance between the United States and France (n. 18). Lee most probably meant that Congress should have rescinded the instructions of 15 June 1781 limiting the American peace commission to actions approved by the court of France as soon as it became clear that King Louis XVI would not reciprocally circumscribe the freedom of Vergennes in the negotiations. Lee had tried without success to induce Congress to amend or cancel those instructions ( , IV, 435; 436–37; 438, nn. 2, 7; V, 15, nn. 3, 4; 33–35; 35, n. 4; 36, n. 9; 466–68; 469, n. 2).
21. In a recent letter to James Warren, Lee had extolled the conduct of John Adams and John Jay during the negotiations but charged “old Franklin” with “treachery” ( , VIII, 78). See also JM to Randolph, 1 Apr. 1783, n. 5.
22. Lee probably referred to “A Manifesto, published at Paris [1779], displaying the Motives and Conduct of his Most Christian Majesty toward England,” and “The Justifying Memorial of the King of Great Britain, in Answer to the Exposition, Etc. of the Court of France.” These were published in The Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature, for the Year 1779 (London, Printed for J. Dodsley, 1780), pp. 390–412, and esp. p. 391. The author of the French “Manifesto” charged that although his country had scrupulously observed every commercial stipulation in the Treaty of Utrecht, the “Court of London, and England” had violated it “daily.” On 29 July 1778 King George III, to vindicate “the honour of his Crown” had ordered “general reprisals” against France for seizing British ships and goods “contrary to the faith of treaties” (The Remembrancer, or Impartial Repository of Public Events, for the Year, 1778 [London: John Almon, 1778], pp. 118–20, 255). See also , XVIII, 818–19; , III, 240, 252; , II, 80, n. 1.
23. JM Notes, 12–15 Mar. 1783, and n. 7.
24. JM to Randolph, 18 Mar. 1783, and n. 7. As a Virginian, Lee must have been aroused by Jay’s well-founded suspicion, expressed in the minister’s dispatch of 17 November 1782, that France supported the Spanish aspiration to confine the United States by boundaries east of the Mississippi River ( ., VI, 25–27, 31, 46–47; Richard B. Morris, The Peacemakers, pp. 320–40). Articles V, VI, and XI of the Treaty of Alliance between France and the United States committed France to recognize American possession of conquered British territory “remaining in the northern parts of America, or the islands of Bermudas” ( , XI, 450, 451–52). At the time of the signing of the preliminary peace, Virginia troops effectively held the district of Kentucky and small areas north of the Ohio River, but most of the vast region between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River was not under American control; nor had France bound herself to recognize as valid the territorial claims to that area, based upon American interpretations of British royal charters.
25. JM Notes, 12–15 Mar. 1783, and n. 6; also n. 9, above.
26. ., VI, 27, 30, 45–46, 48, 49–51, 95 n., 107–8, 140, 150 n., 150–52, 166–68.
27. Hamilton could have cited examples ranging from the Earl of Carlisle’s mission in 1778 to the efforts of the British ministry in 1782 to have Washington or Congress negotiate with General Carleton and Admiral Digby for peace ( , III, 272, n. 2; V, 3; 5, n. 2; 39, n. 1; 46; 47, n. 4; 76; 247, n. 20; 258, n. 2; ., VI, 35–36).
29. Charles III, sixty-seven years of age, had designated his son Charles (1748–1819), Prince of the Asturias, as heir-apparent ( ., IV, 842).
30. JM Notes, 1 Jan. 1783, n. 2; ., V, 849; Richard B. Morris, The Peacemakers, pp. 235–36, 245–46, 297–303, 310.
31. In his motion Hamilton proposed that Livingston inform La Luzerne of the separate article and explain to the American peace commissioners the reasons justifying the disclosure ( , XXIV, 194). For the effect of Samuel Osgood’s qualifying second of the motion, see JM’s final paragraph.
33. The Bland-Lee motion was a violation of the fifteenth rule of the rules of procedure adopted on 4 May 1781. That rule barred the admittance of a new proposition “under colour of” an amendment to the original motion until the latter should be “postponed or disagreed to” ( , XX, 479).
35. Obeying the directions of Congress, Franklin had presented “the instructions relative to the negotiations for peace” to Vergennes in September 1781 ( ., IV, 511, 709).
36. Of these five members of the committee, which had been appointed on 28 May 1781, John Sullivan of New Hampshire, John Mathews of South Carolina, and John Witherspoon of New Jersey were no longer in Congress. Among these instructions, the paragraph which was central in the present debate had been drafted by Witherspoon and supported by JM as well as by many other delegates ( , XX, 562, 606, 627, 650). See also , V, 466–67, and citations in 469, n. 8; , VII, 111–17.
37. Congress “confirmed” the instructions of 15 June 1781 on 31 May and 4 October 1782, but only in the latter instance had the vote been clearly “unanimous” ( , XXII, 311–13; XXIII, 638; , IV, 302–4; V, 181; 182, n. 5). JM might have been more accurate if he had said that those instructions had repeatedly withstood the assaults of Arthur Lee and like-minded critics. See n. 20.
38. On 4 October 1782 Bland, Lee, and Rutledge were among the delegates who “Resolved, unanimously, That Congress … will inviolably adhere to the treaty of alliance with his Most Christian Majesty, and conclude neither a seperate peace or truce with Great Britain” ( , XXIII, 636, 638). This resolution was an outgrowth of a report by a committee, appointed on 24 September with James Duane, chairman, and JM and Rutledge among its other members. The report, adopted by Congress on 3 October, included: “That his Most Christian Majesty’s declaration to the British minister at Paris, that he will neither treat nor terminate any negotiation unless the interests of his allies and friends shall be considered and determined, is entirely correspondent to the part which these United States are resolved to take in any negotiation for peace” ( , XXIII, 603, 633). Based upon this report were the resolutions in the hand of Duane and JM, rather than Rutledge, adopted the next day ( , XXIII, 639, n. 1; , V, 180–81). They include the resolution quoted at the beginning of this note.
39. By adopting the report of 3 October 1782, Congress declared: “That they will hearken to no propositions for peace which shall not be discussed in confidence and in concert with his Most Christian Majesty, agreeably to the declaration made to his minister plenipotentiary on the 31 day of May last” ( , XXIII, 633). See also , IV, 302–4.
40. That is, Franklin seldom shared the distrust manifested by Jay and his “very able and agreeable coadjutor,” Adams, in the attitude and actions of Vergennes with regard to the best interests of the United States during the peace negotiations. Henry Laurens, of course, arrived in Paris too late to share importantly in this difference of outlook ( ., VI, 14–17, 20, 23–30, 47–48, 133). See also , V, 418, n. 17; 438, nn. 7, 9; 443, n. 2; JM Notes, 12–15 Mar., n. 4; JM to Randolph, 18 Mar. 1783, and n. 7.
41. , II, 273; III, 101–4; 104, n. 3; 105, n. 5; 170, n. 3; 263, n. 6; 280, n. 11; IV, 5–6; 14, n. 7; 168–69; 170, n. 5; 190; 215; 216, n. 6; 224, n. 3; V, 21, n. 4; 23–24; 35, n. 4; 418, n. 19; 424, n. 9; 444, n. 11; ., I, 442; II, 213, 304, 323, 390; III, 290, 335–37, 476, 603, 721–22; IV, 59, 66, 228, 346, 386.
42. JM Notes, 12–15 Mar., nn. 7, 8; Delegates to Harrison, 12 Mar., and nn. 15–18; JM to Randolph, 18 Mar. 1783.
43. From a conference with Richard Oswald on 2 November 1782, Adams concluded that, upon evacuating New York City, the British troops would be taken to the Gulf of Mexico to recover West Florida from Spain ( ., V, 845–46, 857). Unknown to Congress, and apparently to the other American commissioners, Jay had proposed that expedition to Oswald (Richard Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 344).
44. JM interlineated “In the event” above a canceled “On the question.” Unmentioned in the official journal of 19 March, the names of the committee members were listed by Charles Thomson in his committee book with the notation of a referral to them of “Report of the secy for foreign Affairs on the communications from the Ministers for negotiatg a peace. 3 Motions thereon. the preliminary Articles. the ministers letters & communications respecting the negotiations” (NA: PCC, No. 186, fol. 89). See JM Notes, 22 Mar. 1783.