Spanish affairs

Objects of difference

1. Boundaries of Louisiana—east & west

2. Spoliations—refusal to ratify convention & French-Spanish captures

Modes of acting

1. War—2 Active negotiations—3 Suspension of discussions

War

1. its justice

as it relates to boundaries

The claim of the U. States is not evident, but is derived, for the east, by construction from the treaty of S. Idelfonso, & rests, for the west, on the accidental landing of La Salle at S. Bernard and on the French establishments of the Mississippi being prior to those of Spain east of Rio Norte. It is not presumed that the last object (the west boundary) shall by any one be considered as a just subject of war. To me the claim has always appeared doubtful. The doctrine of European rights to uncivilized countries as derived from discovery & possession is not reducible & never has been reduced to fixed rules. The positive right of discovery extends in this case only to the Mississippi: that of occupancy, beyond what is actually possessed by us on the sea-shore west of that river, is confined to the accidental & transient settlement of La Salle. Crozat’s charter, being a public act acquiesced in by the silence of Spain, gives the most valid title, but embraces only the waters emptying into the Mississippi. On the other hand the Adayes & Nagodoches settlement, whatever was its origin, (and Spain may assert that it was as legal as that of La Salle,) was formed before the short war between the Quadruple alliance & Spain (the Regent & Alberoni). During that war Pensacola was three times taken & retaken. At the peace it was restored & Perdido fixed as the boundary of Florida & Louisiana. But although it does not appear that the western boundary was then fixed, the Adayes settlement was suffered to remain. That acquiescence on the part of France, confirmed by her subsequent silence & by the undisturbed possession & exercise of the rights of sovereignty of Spain during more than forty years (1718-1762) throws such uncertainty on our claims, that a resort to arms for that cause will, I think, appear unjustifiable in the opinion of mankind & even of America. That we have still an undefined claim is true; this may, when a proper opportunity shall offer, be used for the purpose of obtaining a convenient Eastern boundary; for it will certainly be the interest of unbiassed Spain to obtain from us a relinquishment to the country bordering on the Mexico settlements: but if no arrangement should take place on that subject during the present generation, the natural growth of the U. States will hereafter naturally enforce the claim to its full extent.

The claim of the U. States on the east as far as Perdido is much better founded. The word “retrocede” is the only expression in the treaty of S. Idelphonso which countenances the construction of Spain. She insists that that expression confines her cession to so much only as she had received from France. But every other expression & sentence of the Treaty supports the construction of the U. States. Yet it must again be repeated that the claim is not self evident but constructive: and the following considerations seem to render the justice of a war, in its support, extremely doubtful. 1st. whether ascribed to policy or to precipitancy, or to any other cause, it is not less the fact that the acquisition of Louisiana without any fixed boundaries was the act of the United States, for the act of their negotiators is theirs; if they intended at all events, to obtain the now disputed territory between Mississippi & Perdido, if they then attached such value to it as to risk a war for securing it, they would not have signed the treaty without placing the subject, beyond the possibility of dispute. The manner in which the treaty is drawn betrays either unpardonable oversight or indifference to that object & a disposition to trust to a mere contingency for securing it. 2dly. Not only we neglected when the treaty was made to obtain from France, if not as guarantee, at least an official declaration of what she considered as the boundary of the territory ceded to her by the treaty of San Idelphonso; but Spain was not consulted on the subject. If, therefore, a previous explanation had taken place between Spain & France on that subject, however we may complain of the duplicity of France for having withheld such communication, Spain may justly oppose it to our demands. If A purchases from B a tract of land & the boundaries are not precisely defined by the deed; if by subsequent articles the parties explain the meaning of the deed; if neither the deed nor articles have been made matter of public record; and if afterwards C shall purchase from A on the face of the first deed, and notwithstanding its want of precision shall, neither ask from A a guarantee or even explanation of the boundaries, nor enquire from B what he had intended to convey; it is true that he may have recourse against A for the deception in not showing the articles; but it is very doubtful whether the disputed land can be recovered from B who has in the meanwhile never given possession, & who had even, before C’s purchase was ratified, warned him not to purchase. 3dly. We cannot deny that we had, before the ratification of the treaty, a knowledge of the intention of the parties to the treaty of San Idelphonso so far as related to the eastern boundaries. For we knew that Laussat was instructed to demand & the Spanish officers to deliver, east of the Mississippi, that part only which is in our possession.

as it relates to the spoliations

This appears a more just cause of war; and if the original offence was of a recent date, if the refusal to restrain or compensate for the aggressions had been made whilst they continued to exist, the question would certainly become one of policy alone. The conduct of Spain was not, however, at the time, considered as a cause of war: and it may be said at this moment, that in the relation in which she then stood towards France, of alliance against an enemy, & of vassalage to that great power, her conduct was a natural consequence of our hostilities with that nation. It is certain that when we were negotiating for the purpose of obtaining reparation for our merchants, we had no idea of going to war in case of failure. It is her refusal to ratify what by the convention itself she had acknowledged as justly due to us which is the cause of offence. And supposing that the other objections of Spain have been removed, the only ground of dispute on this point is the modification which they ask, & which although they have no right to demand it, amounts only to expressions which, without impairing the reserved rights of either party, shall only prevent a constructive admission of our right by Spain to be informed from the instrument. The only words to which Spain objects are those which seem, by construction, to convey an idea that she recognizes in the abstract the justice of our claim for French aggressions originating or countenanced in her ports. Is the preservation of those equivocal words which give us very little more than a more general reservation of the rights of the parties, a just cause of war?

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That, in case of rupture on the grounds on which we stand, plausible, & in some respects solid arguments may be urged in answer to the preceding remarks, I have no doubt: but from the nature of the subject, they will be so refined that they cannot carry that conviction of the justice of our cause which is necessary to justify a war in the public opinion and to our own hearts. The high station which America, & I flatter myself, Mr J.’s administratn. now occupy in the eyes of other nations, is principally due to the opinion which is entertained of their wisdom, justice and moderation; and I think it, (exclusively of every reason derived from duty,) of primary importance that nothing should be done to weaken those favorable impressions; & that if war must ultimately be resorted to, we should previously place the controversy on such ground as will evidently put Spain in the wrong.

2. its policy

Whether the issue of the war be favorable or not, some unavoidable consequences must ensue—1st. we will be shut up from our commercial intercourse with Italy, Spain, France & Holland—2dly our remaining commerces, particularly with the West & East Indies will to a certain extent be injured. 3dly our existing revenue will be diminished. It is not possible to form any precise calculation or even probable estimate of the degree to which we will be injured in those several respects: but it would be a much more favorable conjecture than comports with my view of the subject, to suppose that the unavoidable effect of even a successful war on our revenue would be to reduce it to a level with our current peace-expenditure (sink-fund 8 millions—war, navy, foreign interc. civil list & miscellaneous demands 2½ to 3 millions—in all 11 millions) & that all the expences of the war must be supported by loans or new taxes. The extent of these would depend on that of our operations: their nature would be a matter of subsequent consideration. I will only name the principal resources in the order in which they would probably be resorted to—Increase of impost—Sales of land on cheap terms by wholesale—Stamps—Direct tax—Taxes on manufactures.

Our expected gain by the war (I do not speak of the injury done to the enemy) would be, the improbable ratification of the convention; a probable establishment of boundaries eastwardly to Perdido, westwardly on just terms; and perhaps the acquisition of Florida. We would at any time, even after a successful campaign, accept of the terms proposed by Mr Munroe vizt. establish the boundaries of Louisiana & take Florida in exchange of the convention. What are both Floridas worth? for this is exactly what we may gain. What were we willing to give for them? & what would be the cost of one year’s war? not merely the positive expense but the national loss. [Here let it be observed that in case of rupture it is to be expected that France & Spain will seize or sequester property to an immense amount. Amsterdam, Antwerp, and even Bordeaux, Cadix & Leghorn are filled with our merchants property exclusively of vessels which might be there at the time. With all those nations the American commerce is now carried on with American capital, & the exchange 5 to 10 pr cent in our favor]

I think that every view of the subject will enforce a conviction that a war, even more successful than our resources render it probable, would, as a matter of calculation, be most unprofitable; and that the only ground on which it can be defended is the necessity of asserting our rights from a fear that passive endurance will provoke a succession of injuries. That there is a point where forbearance must cease cannot be doubted: whether we have reached that point in relation to Spain I doubt; and it may be questioned whether both as a real injury & as a point affecting the national dignity, the annual blockade of our ports & the perpetual impressment of our seamen be not more essential wrongs than any we have suffered from Spain.

But what will be the probable result of a war, and how shall we carry it on. I believe that we may with our existing military resources or at least with little addition take possession of both Floridas—perhaps reach, through the wilderness, the miserable establishments of Santa Fé & San Antonio and alarm the outposts of Mexico. But it does not appear to me that we can go beyond that without a waste of treasure & of men which we cannot supply. The taking of Havannah, the most decisive stroke for forcing a peace, would require some naval co-operation on the part of the British, an army of 15 or 20 thousand men, six months siege & from ten to twenty millions of dollars. Vera-Cruz might perhaps cost less but would be less important. If we were not able to take either, peace must depend less on our exertions than on the course which the French Govt. may pursue. If Bonaparte, haughty & obstinate as he is, shall think proper to persevere notwithstanding our taking Florida then our fate becomes linked to that of England, and the conditions of our peace will depend on the general result of the European war. And this is one of the worst evils which the United States could encounter; for an entangling alliance, undefined debts, & taxes, and in fine a subversion of all our hopes must be the natural consequence.

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Negotiations

Three advantages may result from a renewal of negotiations in some shape or another—1st the hope of a permanent & complete, or at least temporary & partial arrangement, in which last case war will be at least prevented—2dly such modification of our demands as will, in case of refusal, place the justice of our cause on evident ground—3dly. some time gained which may enable us to be somewhat better prepared for the conflict.

By active negotiations I meant such as would have for object a complete arrangement of every existing difference; by suspension of discussion, I contemplated some temporary agreement which without affecting the question, might save the rights & the credit of both nations, leaving the final result to future contingencies. In whatever shape those negotiations may be carried on they will still relate either to the boundaries or to the convention; to which I would add the subject of new & existing aggressions especially from Cuba.

1. boundaries—The present moment does not appear favorable for pressing a renewal of negotiations for a final arrangement on that subject. Unless a very unexpected revolution should take place in the political situation of Spain, it seems that such arrangement must depend on France, and that it is with her that we ought to negotiate. But there is so little hope of success with either that the attempt would only, in all probability, aggravate the evil we mean to parry. Yet, as it is impossible to foresee the fluctuations which may take place in the councils of both nations & the events which may offer a favorable opportunity, it would be prudent to vest our ministers at Paris & Madrid with such powers as may enable them, not to urge a negotiation, but to be ready to enter into one if it shall be offered: and for that purpose an ultimatum may be prepared & sent to them. The terms may be the subject of further consideration; I will only say that I would think it for the interest of the United States & no improper relinquishment of their rights to take the Sabine & Perdido for boundaries on the sea shore, including always within Louisiana all the waters of the Mississippi.—In the mean while two propositions may be made for a temporary arrangement, which had already been suggested to our ministers, but do not seem to have been mentioned by them—vizt. a statu quo, & the free navigation of the Mobile.

Statu quo. Although this seems to be a simple & reasonable demand in the abstract, its application presents some difficulties. 1st. If Spain be sensible that she can strengthen her positions only by an encrease of military force, whilst we strengthen ourselves by forming new settlements, she may object to a plan which would preclude only her progress & would not affect us. 2dly. If the arrangement should be proposed for the disputed territory only; as the whole is in the possession of Spain, & as we might in the mean while encrease our force at New Orleans & in the non-disputed part of Louisiana west of the Mississippi, whilst she should be precluded from adding to her posts from Perdido to the Mississippi & to those of Nagodoches & San Antonio; the conditions would be substantially unequal, since we would then be enabled at any time to take possession of the whole at a single stroke. And on the other hand we could not agree generally not to encrease our force at N. Orleans &a., nor Spain to a similar condition for Havannah, Pensacola &a.: so that there is an equal difficulty in forming an arrangement which will preclude either party from reinforcing its existing posts, whether that arrangement be confined to the disputed territory or embrace the adjacent establishments.—The only proposition which appears practicable is that neither party should form any new military post in advance of what they have, nor particularly between Natchitoches & San Antonio, leaving both at liberty to reinforce all existing military posts. If Spain shall insist that not only military posts but also new settlements be precluded, the precise lines must be defined, and to save the pride of Spain, by abandoning our right to settle for the present some part of what she acknowledges to be our’s, the river Mermentao or Carcasia at her choice (both lie a little east of the Sabine) might be fixed on our side, and the Colorado on hers: but it would be preferable to say nothing about settlements; for it must be recollected that the offer of a desert for 15 years was intended, in case the Western boundary could not be settled, as an inducement for a relinquishment on the part of Spain of her claim to the country between Perdido & Mississippi. For as the condition of no new military post being erected is sufficient, both as an honorable means to extricate ourselves from our present embarrassment, and as a matter of security; for if an arrangement is made, it is not very material that Spain should encrease her existing posts, nor will she be very able now to do it. To this there is but one exception; she must not, if possible, be permitted to erect new posts on the Mississippi nor to strengthen her works or military force at Baton rouge. Nor would it be necessary to consider a refusal on the part of Spain to accede formally to the statu quo as a cause of war. For although, if she shall act in such manner in every respect as to force a war, that refusal will strengthen the justice of our cause; yet, if other matters be arranged, it might be sufficient on that subject to state that we would advance in case they should, leaving to Spain the odium both of the encroachment & of the rupture, if She should think proper to oppose by force such advance on our part.

Mobile Although this subject may be mentioned, I would not consider it as an ultimatum, or a refusal on the part of Spain as cause of war—1stly because its importance is not at present sufficient to run any great risk on that account—2dly because the right is not by the law of nations generally acknowledged. It is undoubtedly a natural right, but usage & treaties have modified it amongst European nations in so many different ways, that I believe there is not a single similar case in which the right when used does not rest on prescription or positive treaty.—It will also be well to consider that if acceded to by Spain, she will probably claim the same privilege for Baton rouge; and yet the cases are not similar, since our settlements on Mobile lie within our boundaries as acknowledged by Spain, and Baton rouge is within the disputed territory.

2. Convention. This under existing circumstances seems to be the most delicate part of the business. If we insist on it & fail, it leads to a war; and we cannot abandon it altogether without some disgrace, blended as the subject is with the other negotiation. For had it stood alone, our delay during 15 months to ratify it, by showing that we did not set a very high value on it, would in fact have Served as an apology for our not resenting the refusal of Spain to ratify. It was for that reason that I was of opinion last fall that it was better to lose the whole instrument than to accept the modification, nominal as it was, proposed by Spain. But now that the question presents itself under a very different aspect, it seems to me that it is of primary importance, having failed in the other objects, to obtain the ratification even on terms somewhat similar to those proposed by Spain. What I would then suggest is that demanding in the first place a pure ratification, should no other objection be made by Spain than that of its containing an admission (by inference) on her part of our right to compensation for French spoliations, our minister should accept a ratification with a bien entendu or a declaration & counter declaration in the procès verbal of the exchange of ratifications, that nothing contained in the instrument shall be construed as a recognition or relinquishment by either party of the claims not provided for, or any other words to that effect.

3. new aggressions. These are to a great extent & afford a just ground of complaint. I am told that the rate of insurance which is but 3½ per cent to the British windward Islands is from 10 to 15 to Jamaica, and that almost solely owing to the French & Spanish privateers often armed in Cuba & who uniformly take their prizes there & plunder them. It might not be advisable, under other circumstances, to take any other measures on this subject than we do in relation to the aggressions of other nations; but it may be proper, particularly if the refusal of Spain to give us any kind of satisfaction on the other subjects shall render a war probable, to press the subject with great force upon them. I think that it will, at all events, have a good effect on the whole negotiation, and in case of rupture will place the justice of our cause on the best possible ground. For then, supposing the other ideas to have been, under proper modifications, adopted; instead of giving, for principal cause of the war, a dispute for boundaries on which opinions would be divided & which might lay us under an imputation of ambition, we would say: The boundaries of Louisiana were not fixed; we proposed to Spain that until they were, no new posts should be established by either party, & Spain will not agree to that proposal: Spain had, by a convention, acknowledged wrongs formerly done by her & promised compensation; she afterwards objected to the ratification under pretence that some expressions in the instrument might be construed to bind her beyond her intention; we agreed to a modification in the form of ratification which would remove that objection; and she refuses to ratify: Not satisfied with former wrongs, she suffers in her ports the most flagrant violation of the law of nations, the plunder without trial & condemnation of our vessels employed in an innocent trade; and she refuses redress. Unless Spain is predetermined to risk a war in order to obtain a positive relinquishment of our claim to the disputed territory, it appears extremely improbable that she would place herself in such awkward situation.

Nothing else has struck me on the subject of negotiations; and I would only add that if it shall appear, which may easily be previously ascertained by our minister, that Spain will ratify the convention in any admissible shape, it would be more eligible to urge each subject by itself & as entirely unconnected with each other. But if no ratification is expected, all three, Convention, Statu-quo, and new aggressions should be pressed together on Spain.

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Preparations

Some time will be gained by the negotiation, which if it produces no other advantage than to accumulate two or three millions of dollars in our treasury exhausted by the payment of the French bills, will not have been altogether useless. The militia & military preparations which cost little or nothing & which might be necessary, to take possession at once of both Floridas the moment a rupture should take place, might also be made. But it is principally on Congress that the decision of these points & of all other preparations will rest: and it is ever proper to recollect that as the power of making war is constitutionally vested in that body, it is the duty of the Executive to leave it so substantially, & to do no act which may put the peace of the country in jeopardy. This alone should induce particular moderation in the manner of negotiating; and such course being adopted, the next question will be whether the President should lay the subject before Congress at their next session, & if so, in what shape? As it is not doubted, however, that, in some shape or another, the subject will be communicated to the Legislature, it will be sufficient to examine what preparatory measures can be taken by that body, on the supposition that they will not as yet vote any additional taxes, nor on the other hand diminish, as had been contemplated, the existing revenue, but will even for the present, notwithstanding the Tripolan peace, continue the additional duty of 2½ pr cent. Which after discharging all current expenditures (including the 8 millions for the sinking fund & 600,000 dollars for the current navy expences) will have a probable annual surplus of two millions of dollars.

It is probable that the greater part of that surplus will be applied to the formation of a navy: and if Congress shall decide in favor of that measure, I would suggest that the mode best calculated in my opinion to effect it and to impress other nations that we are in earnest about it would be a distinct act enacted for that sole purpose appropriating for a fixed number of years (or for as many years as would be sufficient to build a determinate number of ships of the line) a fixed sum of money say one million of dollars annually which will be about equal to the 2½ pr cent duty heretofore appropriated for the Tripolan war: and in order effectually to prevent the fund being diverted to current, contingent or other purposes, to place it under the general superintendence of commissioners in the same manner as the sinking fund, but leaving of course the immediate application & direction, under that superintendence, to the navy department. The money to be exclusively applied to the building of ships of the line; for there would still be a sufficient surplus to add immediately a few frigates to our navy. These last might be built by contract within the year: what progress might be made within the same time with the ships of the line I cannot say; but that it would lay the foundation of an efficient navy I have no doubt; and that the act would have a favorable effect on our foreign relations & even on the pending negotiation is also certain. Nor indeed, supposing Congress to be at all events averse to a war with Spain for the present, would it be an undignified course to make efficient provision for the preparation of a force that would prevent a repetition of wrongs which the U. States did not at this moment feel prepared properly to resent.

Whether the creation of an efficient navy may not, by encouraging wars & drawing us in the usual vortex of expences & foreign relations, be the cause of greater evils than those it is intended to prevent, is not the question which I mean to discuss. This is to be decided by the Representatives of the Nation; and although I have been desirous that the measure might at least be postponed, yet I have had no doubt for a long time that the United States would ultimately have a navy. It is certain that so long as we have none, we must perpetually be liable to injuries & insults, particularly from the belligerent powers when there is a war in Europe; and in deciding for or against the measure, Congress will fairly decide the question whether they think it more for the interest of the United States to preserve a pacific & temporising system, and to tolerate those injuries & insults to a great extent, than to be prepared, like the great European nations, to repel every injury by the sword. The Executive will, from their decision, know the course which it behoves them to pursue in our foreign relations & discussions.

There is another measure which might be adopted by Congress, if they were determined on peace for the present at all events. It would be the appointment of Commissioners to settle the claims for Spanish spoliations, showing thereby that though not willing to enforce at this time that just demand, they were determined not to abandon it & to wait a favorable opprtunity to press it. It is on a somewhat similar principle that the British Govt. has lately ordered a distribution of the Spanish prize money taken before the declaration of war, amongst a certain description of merchants who had claims for former captures & contracts against Spain.

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I have but one subject more on which to make any observations; it is on the interference of a war with our revenue system & on the great advantage of a perseverance in the pacific system if it was only for 3 or 4 years longer. Our existing revenue has been calculated to meet our current expence: our neutrality & the Tripolan addit. duty may give us a surplus of about two millions which, and it is a very low calculation, I consider as lost in case of war. These two millions alone applied to the building of a navy during the four ensuing years would, with what we have, give us ten or twelve ships of the line besides frigates, a force nearly equal in point of efficiency, considering the superiority of the Men, to the Spanish navy. But this is not the most important consideration. Eight millions of our revenue are pledged for the sinking fund until the redemption of the whole debt, with a proviso, (designedly inserted that the resources of the nation might not be palsied beyond a certain period) that when the whole debt, the old six pr cent deferred & 3 pr cent excepted, shall have been paid, there will be no necessity to apply the whole sum of eight millions annually. There now remain to be paid, (besides the six three & deferred thus excepted) only 6½ millions eight per cent & about 4 millions foreign, five & half & navy six per cent. The redemption of those ten millions & half will be effected during the ensuing three years. And from the year 1809 inclusively we shall not be compelled to pay any more annually than the interest on the remaining debt, & the annual reimbursement on the six pr % & deferred stocks amounting altogether to less than 4½ millions of dollars, and leaving therefore 3½ millions of dollars annually, which may be applied either to the purchase of the debt or to more pressing demands according to circumstances. If the savings or preparations of the three ensuing years be added to the circumstance of having at once three millions & half of dollars annually at our disposal beyond what we now have; & that exclusively of our intermediate growth, the importance of our preserving peace during those three years will be easily understood.

Respectfully submitted