A PATRIOT of 1776, and uniform friend to his country, to the federative system, and the navy, who has had false accusations heaped upon him in secret, by inimical, undeserving, invidious and jealous men of intrigue, as is believed by those of discernment, takes the liberty, notwithstanding, from pure amor patriæ principles (as a professional man) to lay before the President of the United States, a few facts and observations, which he hopes may be useful, without any retrospect of the person or persons directing the helm of the navy abroad.

The writer of this sheet does not think it expedient to give his name, as that is of no moment at present, but he pledges himself to the President, that a proper attention to the hints here thrown out, under judicious and scientific management in the Mediterranean, will cause a new and brilliant constellation to appear and adorn our naval history, by a speedy and glorious peace with Tripoli, which will terrify all the Barbary powers from the manner it is obtained.

Mr. President,

It has appeared obvious to me for several years past, that, single-handed, or in other words without foreign aid, the expensive and as yet unsuccessful war with Tripoli, was only to be ended with honour and advantage to the United States, and at the same time, insure security to our commerce in the Mediterranean and its neighbourhood thereafter, by prompt and efficient measures taken solely on our own bottom; or arising entirely from our own resources, and carried into effect by our own enterprises.

To accomplish, then, this important object in a speedy manner, I would recommend a force to be prepared and employed, so constructed as to enter and go into the harbour of Tripoli every where—where their flotilla can move or take shelter; for it is well known that our frigates cannot go into that harbour on account of its shoalness, so as to approach the town sufficiently near to effectually bombard and destroy the city, although they may approach several military works and demolish them, without entering the harbour, which is formed by a long chain of rocks to the northward and eastward of it—but the destruction of these works will not reduce the Tripolitans to American terms (if they are a brave enemy,) which it is to be hoped are humiliating terms, and such as those pirates ought to be reduced to, for the unprovoked aggressions committed against the United States; and by such means give them and their Barbary neighbours a proper idea of the true American character, which, there is well-founded belief, has been depreciated within the walls of all their towns by interested and private enemies to our country and government.

Under this impression, Sir, made strongly on my mind, added to the opinion entertained by the governments and people of Barbary, as to our desire for peace and riches, and great aversion to war, a suspension of arms with Tripoli obtained for money cannot be lasting; for there is certainly reason to believe, when we judge of the character of this people, that their government, or one or more of the Barbary governments, will embrace the first favourable opportunity of breaking such peace, so soon as our forces are withdrawn from their seas, or principally withdrawn, and either commence immediately a predatory war on our commerce, or exact, in some shape or other, a farther tribute; and under this belief of a nation never bound by the strict principles of honour and good faith, but by calculation of what they may gain or lose by a war with a Christian power—I am of opinion, that we should do as France did in the seventeenth century, with a squadron of easy draught of water, that destroyed a large portion of Tripoli, compelled the Bashaw to sue for peace, under the mouths of her cannon, and obtained from that people 500,000 livres, besides all their wives’ bracelets, jewels, &c. together with the French ships and prisoners they had pirated; and this peace, which the Tripolitans so dearly bought, has been held undisturbed ever since, and is it not reasonable to suppose that they would equally remember a peace exacted from them by us, on similar terms; whereas these pirates, and their neighbours, on the contrary, will laugh us to scorn, at having viewed our ships, been menaced by them, and thereafter receive from us thousands of dollars, whether the same be considered as the purchase of peace or ransom of prisoners. Under this view of the subject our best policy would surely be, to command from them submission to our terms, under the muzzle of our cannon arranged in a line within their harbour, before the city, and close to its walls—I say, close to the city; as distant firing from ships or other vessels afloat, have in most cases, every where proved ineffectual; and with the people in question, it must have a tendency to harden and familiarize them to the hazard of active military operations, wihout any good consequence to us; and my own experience has taught me, that the nearer ships engaged with ships the better, so that they preserve sufficient room for manœuvres on the true principles of naval tactics, and without getting on board each other, unintentionally, as accidentally falling foul in battle, renders the issue extremely uncertain, and retreat impractible in case of need.

It is also equally advantageous for ships to engage close when anchored with springs; for, the nearer to military works on shore which are assailable from ships, when they are intended to be attacked, the better. Ships closely anchored to a place with springs in a seaman-like and officer-like manner, can bring their broad-sides to bear on any one object desired, or that it may be found advantageous to direct their fire at, while they lie steadily in such position, until the commanding officer thinks proper to alter it, and take another; and then the alteration may be made in a moment, according to circumstances, by veering out the cable and heaving in the spring at the capstern, or veering out the spring and heaving in the cable, according to the new direction wished to be given to the cannon—but another great advantage, Sir, in anchoring when an attack is made against a fort or other military works, is this: a ship thus anchored, with her sails handed or closely hauled up for handing, is a smaller object for your enemy’s aim in firing, and being a smaller object is not of course so much exposed in her rigging and sails to the enemy’s operations; nor are the crew so much exposed, because the being at an anchor precludes the necessity of men being stationed at every point for working the ship during a bombardment; a ship too being compelled to cease continuing a bombardment, and to retire from before an enemy’s works, will be in a better situation when got under way by slipping or cutting the cable, &c. to haul off, by preserving her sails, rigging, and men as much as possible, than by having had them exposed as much as possible by being under way.—But besides these advantages, which a knowledge of naval tactics gives, and reason and common sense will prove, wherever the experiment is properly tried by real sea officers of skill, there are other great and solid advantages to be gained by being at anchor in an attack, as I have stated, and a very important one is the preservation of a ship from the dangers of getting on shore, when under way in a narrow pass or between reefs, added to the difficulty of bringing her guns very often to bear as desired, which Captain Preble (for whom I have great esteem) found and acknowledges in his official letter—hence, attacks on military works should be always made by ships anchoring (where there is anchorage) with springs and worming chains, &c. to preserve the cables, unless sufficient chains for riding the ship or ships are prepared for the purpose.

GUN BOATS.

Gun boats properly constructed and equipped with furnaces and grates for heating red-hot shot—bomb-ketches, calculated to throw shells and carcasses—fire-ships, properly prepared to burn a certain time and then explode, with proper sally-ports for their crews escape, and boats to attend them, and all these of small draught of water, is the only force to enter the harbour of Tripoli with, destroy their marine, and reduce the city to proper terms; and such a force, managed with system and vigor, would, in one single day favourable to the enterprise, take, burn, and destroy entirely, the enemy’s flotilla, and when thus destroyed in part, and taken in part, together with the ships of trade in the harbour, the remaining business would be simply to place our whole flotilla and the enemy’s taken and preserved, against the town and works as near as might be necessary, when red-hot and cold shot, grape-shells, and carcasses, &c. &c. &c. should be well applied until the enemy become sick of the feast, or have their city reduced to ashes; observing, at the same time, that while this business is going on within the harbour under proper arrangements and management, the ships that may be employed on the service should perform their part against the works from without the harbour: and this plan I repeat, as I have often repeated in conversation, would insure us a peace, and a lasting peace, with Barbary, and immortalize the American name for ages to come.

It will be observed, that I have, in recommending this plan, mentioned more than once, proper arrangements and good management—for proper arrangements and good management are more than one-half towards gaining a victory. I do not, by any means, intend, however, to reflect on past proceedings; but I think we should be extremely circumspect and cautious in giving any of the Barbary powers an opportunity of feeling an advantage gained over us; and that, in sending into their harbours at any time, any infernal, or fire-ships, they should be so guarded, and so covered, by a proper force, until the match is put to, and the fire is lighted up, that the project in no event could be defeated, or the men endangered in making their escape, by any of the enemy’s craft boarding; for the capture of a fire-vessel by an enemy, or the preventing her from getting amongst their shipping, and of doing all the mischief calculated by such contrivance, is a matter of primary importance, inasmuch as volunteeers from a fleet, and even from the shore, will run every hazard, where the smallest success is probable, to defeat such a project, as was proved in the case of Somers, who was a lad under my tuition and orders in an Indiaman.

That we have more ships in the Mediterranean than are necessary for carrying on the war with Tripoli, is certain: yet I will not pretend to say it is bad policy to have them there. Large ships, however, are not the sort of vessels calculated for this warfare, for such vessels (as I have mentioned already) cannot enter their harbour, and may be driven off from an attack on their works made without the harbour, by red-hot shot well directed at them, should the Tripolitans take advantage of the time that has been allowed them to prepare furnaces, &c. for such purpose; whereas the gun-boats being such small objects, especially when placed END ON before the city of Tripoli in an attack, they will scarcely be affected by such preparations, as not one shot in an hundred would touch them. In carrying on the war by blockade or cruising, large ships are not necessary; either, because the enemy have no large ships to combat with, and smaller vessels can keep in shore to prevent supplies entering the harbour, more effectually than large ones; and they can, in case of running vessels on shore bound in, cover their boats by approaching close to the shore, while the boats are in the act of burning or bringing them off: whereas large ships cannot, on many parts of the coast of Tripoli, approach it, and large ships must, in bad weather or in doubtful weather, on account of their heavy draught of water, keep a good offing to avoid the shoals and dangers hereabouts; and by thus being far off, the enemy’s supply-vessels and others, by keeping close in with the coast, from having the best of pilots and drawing little water, evade the vigilance of large ships, while, on the contrary, they would be intercepted by small corsairs stationed for that purpose. Hence I am persuaded, that two frigates, with the brigs and schooners of war, now on the Mediterranean service, is an ample force to reduce, in a single campaign, Tripoli to any terms we please (without having any thing to do with the ex-bashaw’s projects, which may or may not be good policy or advantageous to us, the government being much more competent to judge from their information on that subject than I am) when combined with ——— gun-boats ——— bomb-ketches and ——— fire-craft, all properly prepared and conducted.

The writer, though not averse to being known, is, at present, not desirous of being known, and has, therefore, caused several copies of this paper to be printed, at his own expense, for the use of government; and his best wishes attend the campaign in the Mediterranean, which ought to commence by the first of June, with great vigor, as it would then end with honour and glory to the United States, before the first of September.

From the most honourable and the best of motives, I at one time, wrote a couple of letters to two gentlemen then at Washington, expecting they would be communicated to the government, or at least my opinions contained therein; one of them was not communicated, as the gentleman wrote me, for reasons he gave; the other I do not know whether it was communicated or not; the one that I know was not communicated, was in substance the same as this, and as I did not approve of the reasons given, as useful to our country, for not exhibiting it, or the purport of it, to the President, or Secretary of the Navy, I have been induced to present this sheet; and am, Sir, Very respectfully,