Absent from the first draft of the preliminary articles was an item that appeared in the second draft as the controversial “separate article” that would have altered the southern boundary of the United States in Britain’s favor if she had recovered West Florida from Spain. Oswald and Jay had been discussing the topic since at least 11 September. On that day, Oswald reported to Townshend that he had “mentioned to Mr. Jay a wish that the Limits of West Florida could be Stretched further to the Northward even though it should be at the Expence of Georgia.” Jay did not say this would be impossible, and seemed to remember that “Some time after last peace there was Some Change of Boundaries in those Colonies, by proclamation.” If so, Oswald told Townshend, he would like to be informed of the “particulars.” Townshend was unable to supply any additional information.1

Jay’s willingness to support a British military campaign against the territory that Spain had reconquered during the war is mentioned in several of Oswald’s subsequent reports.2 It seems to have been primarily dictated by his desire to win free navigation of the Mississippi River. British possession of the eastern bank at its mouth would have provided a basis for a joint U.S.-British claim that would otherwise have been difficult to press under prevailing international law against a power that controlled both banks of a river at its mouth, as Rayneval had already reminded Jay.3 As an incentive to persuade Britain to undertake the reconquest, Oswald reported, Jay had argued that Florida, like Canada, would afford Britain “keys” to “an exclusive monopoly of a large share of North American commerce” that would compensate Britain for granting American independence, cost her “nothing (in the way of trade)” and save her “the expense and trouble of governing.”4 Jay may also have hoped to see Spain deprived of Florida because, in 1779, Americans had been led to believe that support for Spanish reconquest of Florida might smooth the way to an alliance and Jay’s recognition as minister of the United States, neither of which had occurred.5 He had also been angered by the terms of the Pensacola capitulation.6 Finally, he may well have felt that a British decision to undertake the campaign would speed the evacuation of British troops from posts they still retained— New York, Charleston, and Penobscot.7 Oswald, in turn, saw a West Florida redeployment as a means of safeguarding British troops and stores during their evacuation of American ports, as he disclosed in the letter below, and possibly as a boundary concession offsetting American refusal to concede other territories.

Townshend expressed reservations about the plan on grounds that it put great trust in the Americans, “very newly Reconciled to us,” and because it might endanger British possessions in the West Indies.8 Shelburne, however, had other ideas about how Florida might figure in negotiations with Spain. Rayneval had informed Vergennes that, in the course of their mid-September discussions,9 the British minister had proposed that Spain should cede “the Floridas with a district in the environs of New Orleans joined to the vast lands that are situated between the Mississippi, the Lakes, and the western frontiers of the United States of America” as an equivalent for Gibraltar. This, he had suggested, would be “sufficient to flatter and to satisfy the English nation,” and “would not expose the Minister who would consent to such an arrangement to paying for it with his head.” Vergennes believed the idea had merit in that Spain might consider it worthwhile to distance from her frontiers “a people whose rapid growth will render it always very enterprising to procure for itself new lands.” Montmorin reported that Spain was considering the proposal and indicated that the king was willing to make some sacrifices in America in return for security in Europe. Although eventually discarded, this possibility and British strategic and military concerns effectively removed Oswald’s proposal as an option.10