Alexander Hamilton Papers

Constitutional Convention. Notes Taken in the Federal Convention, [1–26 June 1787]

Constitutional Convention.
Notes Taken in the Federal Convention1

[Philadelphia, June 1–26, 1787]

[Notes for June 1, 1787]2
[Madison] 1— The way to prevent a majority from having an interest to oppress the minority is to enlarge the sphere.
Madison 2— Elective Monarchies turbulent and unhappy—3 Men unwilling to admit so decided a superiority of merit in an individual as to accede to his appointment to so preeminent a station.
If several are admitted as there will be many competitors of equal merit they may be all included—contention prevented—& the republican genius consulted.
 
Randolph4 I   Situation of this Country peculiar.
II— Taught the people an aversion to Monarchy.
III   All their constitutions opposed to it.
IV— Fixed character of the people opposed to it.
V— If proposed it will prevent a fair discussion of the plan.
Voice of
America
}
VI— Why cannot three execute.
—Great exertions only requisite on particular occasions.
Safety to liberty
the great object
}
{



Legislature may appoint a dictator when necessary.
Seeds of destruction—Slaves5 might be easily enlisted.
May appoint men devoted to them—& even bribe the legislature by offices.
Chief Magistrate must be free from impeachment.
Wilson6 extent—manners—
Confederated republic unites advantages & banishes disadvantages of other kinds of governments.
rendering the executive ineligible an infringement of the right of election—
Bedford7 peculiar talents requisite for executive, therefore ought to be opportunity of ascertaining his talents—therefore frequent change.
Princ8 1   The further men are from the ultimate point of importance the readier they will be [to] concur in a change.
2   Civilization approximates the different species of governments.
3   Vigour is the result of several principles—Activity wisdom—confidence.
4   Extent of limits will occasion the non attendance of remote members & tend to throw the government into the hands of the Country near the seat of government—a reason for strengthening the upper branch & multiplying the Inducements to attendance. Sent9
A free government to be preferred to an absolute monarchy not because of the occasional violations of liberty or property but because of the tendency of the Free Government to interest the passions of the community in its favour beget public spirit and public confidence.
Re: When public mind is prepared to adopt the present plan they will outgo our proposition. They will never part with Sovereignty of the state till they are tired of the state governments.
 
[Notes for June 6, 1787]10
Mr. Pinkney. If Legislatures do not partake in the appointment of [the first branch of the national legislature] they will be more jealous.
Pinckney— Elections by the state legislatures will be better than those by the people.11
Principle— Danger that the Executive by too frequent communication with the judicial may corrupt it. They may learn to enter into his passions.
Note—12 At the period which terminates the duration of the Executive there will be always an awful crisis—in the National situation.
Note— The arguments to prove that a negative would not be used would go so far as to prove that the revisionary power would not be exercised.
Mr. Mason—13 The purse & sword will be in the hands of the legislature.
 
Principles
I— Human mind fond of Compromise—
Maddisons Theory—14
Two principles upon which republics ought to be constructed—
I that they have such extent as to render combinations on the ground of Interest difficult—
II By a process of election calculated to refine the representation of the People—
Answer—There is truth in both these principles but they do not conclude so strongly as he supposes.15
The Assembly when chosen will meet in one room if they are drawn from half the globe—& will be liable to all the passions of popular assemblies.
If more minute links are wanting others will supply them. Distinctions of Eastern middle and Southern states will come into view; between commercial and non commercial states. Imaginary lines will influence &c. Human mind prone to limit its view by near & local objects. Paper money is capable of giving a general impulse. It is easy to conceive a popular sentiment pervading the E states.
Observ: { large districts less liable to be influenced by factions demagogues than small.16
 
Note— This is in some degree true but not so generally as may be supposed. Frequently small portions of the large districts carry elections. An influential demagogue will give an impulse to the whole. Demagogues are not always inconsiderable persons. Patricians were frequently demagogues. Characters are less known & a less active interest taken in them.
I   One great defect of our Governments are that they do not present objects sufficiently interesting to the human mind.
I— A reason for leaving little or nothing to the state legislatures will be that as their objects are diminished they will be worse composed. Proper men will be less inclined to participate in them.
[Notes for June 7, 1787]17
Dickinson II— He would have the state legislatures elect senators, because he would bring into the general government the sense of the state Governments &
II— because the more respectable choices would be made.
Note— Separate states may give stronger organs to their governments & engage more the good will of Ind: while Genl Gov
Consider the Principle of Rivalship by excluding the state Legislatures.
 
Mason18 { General government could not know how to make laws for every part—such as respect agriculture &c.
particular governments would have no defensive power unless let into the constitution as a Constituent part.
[Notes for June 8, 1787]19
Pinckey20 For general Negative—
Gerry Is for a negative on paper emissions—21 New states will arise which cannot be controuled—& may outweigh & controul.22
Wilson Foreign influence may infect certain corners of confederacy which ought to be restrained.23
Union basis of our oppos & Ind24
 
Bedford—25 { Arithmetical calculation of proportional influence
in General Government—
{ Pensyl. & Delaware may have rivalship in commerce—& influence
of Pens—sacrifice delaware.
If there be a negative in GG—yet if a law can pass through all the forms of SC it will require force to abrogate it.26
Butler—27 Will a man throw afloat his property & confide it to a government a thousand miles distant?
[Notes for June 16, 1787]28
Mr. Lansing—29 NS—proposes to draw representation from the whole body of people, without regard to S Sovereignties.
Subs: proposes to preserve the state Sovereignties.
Powers— { Different Legislatures had a different object.
Revise the Confederation.
Ind. States cannot be supposed to be willing to annihilate the States.
State of New York would not have agreed to send members on this ground.
 
In vain to devise systems however good which will not be adopted.
If convulsions happen nothing we can do will give them a direction.
Legislatures cannot be expected to make such a sacrifice.
The wisest men in forming a system from theory apt to be mistaken.
The present national government has no precedent or experience to support it.
General opinion that certain additional powers ought to be given to Congress.
Mr. Patterson— 1— plan accords with powers
2— accords with sentiments of the People.
If Confederation radically defective we ought to return to our states and tell them so. Comes not here to sport sentiments of his own but to speak the sense of his Constituents.
States treat as equal.
Present Compact gives one Vote to each state.
alterations are to be made by Congress and all the Legislatures.
All parties to a Contract must assent to its dissolution.
States collectively have advantages in which the smaller states do not participate—therefore individual rules do not apply.
Force of government will not depend on proportion of representation—but on
Quantity of power—
 
Check not necessary in a geral government of communities—but
in an individual state spirit of faction is to be checked—
How have Congress hitherto conducted themselves?
The People approve of Congress but think they have not powers enough.
Body constituted like Congress from the fewness of their numbers more wisdom and energy—
than the complicated system of Virginia
Expence enormous—
18030 —commons
 90 —Senators
270
Wilson— Points of Di[s]agreement—
V[irginia] NJ
1 2 or three branches { One branch
2 Derives authority from People from states—
3 Proportion of suffrage Equality—
4 Single Executive Plural—
5 Majority to govern Minority to govern—
6 Legislates in all matters of general Concern partial objects—
7 Negative None—
8 Removeable by impeachment on application of majority of Executive
9 Qualified Negative by Executive None
10 Inf. tribunals None—
 
11 Orig: Jurisdiction in all cases of Nat: Rev None—
12
National Government to be ratified
by People
}
to be ratified
by Legislatures—
Empowered to propose every thing
to conclude nothing.
Does not think state governments the idols of the people.
Thinks a competent national government will be a favourite of the people.
Complaints from every part of United States that the purposes of government cannot be answered.
In constituting a government not merely necessary to give proper powers—but to give them to proper hands.
Two reasons against giving additional powers to Congress.
First it does not stand on the authority of the people.
Second—It is a single branch.
Inequality—the poison of all governments—31
Lord Chesterfield speaks of a Commission to be obtained for a member of a small province.32
Pinkney—33
 
Mr. Elseworth—34
Mr. Randolp— Spirit of the People in favour of the Virginian scheme.
We have powers; but if we had not we ought not to scruple.
[Notes for June 19, 1787]35
Maddison Breach of compact in one article releases the whole.36
Treaties may still be violated by the states under the Jersey plan.
Appellate jurisdiction not sufficient because second trial cannot be had under it.37
Attempt made by one of the greatest monarchs of Europe to equalize the local peculiarities of their separate provinces—in which the Agent fell a victim.38
 
Mr. Pinckney39 is of opinion that the first branch ought to be appointed in such manner as the legislatures shall direct.
Impracticable for general legislature to decide contested elections.
[Notes for June 20, 1787]
Mr. Lansing— Resolved that the powers of legislation ought to be vested in the United States in Congress.
If our plan be not adopted it will produce those mischiefs which we are sent to obviate.
Principles of system—
—Equality of Representation—
Dependence of members of Congress on States—
So long as state distinctions exist states prejudices will operate whether election be by states or people
If no interest to oppress no need of apportionment40
Virginia 16—Delaware 1—41
Will General Government have leisure to examine state laws?
 
Will G Government have the necessary information?
Will states agree to surrender?
Let us meet public opinion & hope the progress of sentiment will make future arrangements.
Would like my system if it could be established.42
System43 without example.
Mr. Mason— Objection to granting power to Congress arose from their constitution.44
Sword and purse in one body—
Two principles in which America are unanimous
1 attachment to Republican government.
2 — to two branches of legislature.
Military force & liberty incompatible.
Will people maintain a standing army?
Will endeavour to preserve state governments & draw lines—trusting to posterity to amend.
Mr. Martin—45 General Government originally formed for the preservation of state governments.
Objection to giving power to Congress has originated with the legislatures.
 
10 of the states interested in an equal voice.46
Real motive was an opinion that there ought to be distinct governments & not a general government.
If we should form a general government would break to pieces.
For common safety instituted a General government.
Jealousy of power the motive.
People have delegated all their authority to state governments.
Coertion necessary to both systems.
Requisitions necessary upon one system as upon another.
In their system made requisitions necessary in the first instance but left Congress in the second instance—to assess themselves.47
Judicial tribunals in the different states would become odious.
If we always to make a change shall be always in a state of infancy.
States will not be disposed hereafter to strengthen the general government.
Mr. Sherman—48 Confederacy carried us through the war.
Non compliances of States owing to various embarrassment.
Why should state legislatures be unfriendly?
 
State governments will always have the confidence & government of the people: if they cannot be conciliated no efficacious government can be established.
Sense of all states that one branch is sufficient.
If consolidated all treaties will be void.
State governments more fit for local legislation customs habits &c.
[Notes, Probably for June 26, 1787]49
I Every government ought to have the means of self preservation
II Combinations of a few large states might subvert
II Could not be abused without a revolt
II Different genius of the states & different composition of the body Note. Senate could not desire to promote such a class
III Uniformity in the time of elections.
Objects of a Senate
To afford a double security against Faction in the house of representation
Duration of the Senate necessary to its
Firmness
Information
sense of national character
Responsibility

AD, Hamilton Papers, Library of Congress.

1This document consists of rough notes made by H of debates in the Constitutional Convention. Not so complete as those taken by Madison, Yates, Lansing, or King, H’s notes, unlike other records of the debates in the Convention, include his opinion of the remarks made by other delegates.

H’s notes have been printed, as nearly as possible, in chronological order. The order in which they were made cannot be precisely determined, for H’s versions of the remarks made by the various delegates do not always correspond with those reported by Madison, Lansing, Yates, or King. Nor is it always possible to determine whether an opinion recorded in his notes was made by one of the delegates or represented his own thoughts, for he sometimes inserted his own ideas into the record he made of remarks by others. The arrangement of H’s notes printed here differs in minor particulars from that made by Worthington C. Ford in “Alexander Hamilton’s Notes in the Federal Convention of 1787,” The American Historical Review, X (October, 1904), 97–109, and from the order in which they are arranged in the Hamilton Papers, Library of Congress.

2On June 1 the Convention debated the seventh resolution of the plan of government proposed by Edmund Randolph of Virginia. The resolution provided for a national executive to be chosen by the national legislature for an unspecified number of years.

3Madison made no record of his remarks on this date, but Rufus King’s version of this statement reads as follows: “If [the Executive Power is] large, we shall have the Evils of Elective Monarchies” (King, The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King description begins Charles R. King, The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King (New York, 1894). description ends , I, 588).

4Madison’s version of Edmund Randolph’s remark reads:

“Mr. Randolph strenuously opposed a unity in the Executive magistracy. He regarded it as the foetus of monarchy. We had he said no motive to be governed by the British Governmt. as our prototype. He did not mean however to throw censure on that Excellent fabric. If we were in a situation to copy it he did not know that he should be opposed to it; but the fixt genius of the people of America required a different form of Government. He could not see why the great requisites for the Executive department, vigor, despatch & responsibility could not be found in three men, as well as in one man. The Executive ought to be independent. It ought therefore in order to support its independence to consist of more than one.” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 38.)

5H substituted “slaves” for the words “former Continental army” which he wrote and crossed out.

6James Wilson, delegate from Pennsylvania, spoke five times on June 1. None of his remarks as recorded by Madison (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 37–41) closely corresponds to the remarks attributed to him by H.

7Gunning Bedford, delegate from Delaware. James Madison recorded the following version of Bedford’s speech:

“Mr. Bedford was strongly opposed to so long a term as seven years. He begged the committee to consider what the situation of the Country would be, in case the first magistrate should be saddled on it for such a period and it should be found on trial that he did not possess the qualifications ascribed to him, or should lose them after his appointment. An impeachment he said would be no cure for this evil, as an impeachment would reach misfeasance only, not incapacity. He was for a triennial election, and for an ineligibility after a period of nine years.” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 40–41.)

8According to the several recorded versions of debates in the Convention, Bedford did not make the observations which H recorded under the rubric “Princ[iple].” They probably were H’s own comments.

9The notes following the word “Sent[ence]” are probably H’s own ideas rather than a summary of the remarks of someone else and do not necessarily pertain to the debate of June 1. They appear at the top of the MS page which records the first statement made by Charles Pinckney, delegate from South Carolina, on June 6.

10On this date the Convention considered a motion by Charles Pinckney “that the first branch of the national Legislature be elected by the State Legislatures, and not by the people” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 62).

11The remarks by Charles Cotesworth Pinckney were recorded in greater length by Madison (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 66). The remarks immediately following were also made by Charles Cotesworth Pinckney.

12Charles Pinckney’s motion (see note 10) was negatived; and the Convention took up a motion by James Wilson “to reconsider the vote excluding the Judiciary from a share in the revision of the laws and to add after ‘National Executive’ the words ‘with a convenient number of the national Judiciary’” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 67). H’s comments, recorded under “Principle” and “Note,” were apropos of Wilson’s motion.

13According to Madison, George Mason, delegate from Virginia, “was for giving all possible weight to the revisionary institution. The Executive power ought to be well secured agst. Legislative usurpations on it. The purse & the sword ought never to get into the same hands whether Legislative or Executive” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 68).

14H’s statement of “Maddisons Theory” is based on Madison’s speech of June 6 in which, in the course of arguing that one branch of the legislature should be elected by the people, Madison discussed the ideas which he believed should be the basis for a new government (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 64–65).

15This and the two paragraphs which follow are, of course, H’s objections to Madison’s theory.

16This is presumably a rough paraphrase of the following remarks made by Madison: “The gentleman (Mr. Sharman) had admitted that in a very small State, faction & oppression wd. prevail. It was to be inferred then that wherever these prevailed the State was too small. Had they not prevailed in the largest as well as the smallest tho’ less than in the smallest; and were we not thence admonished to enlarge the sphere as far as the nature of the Govt. would admit. This was the only defence agst. the inconveniences of democracy consistent with the democratic form of Govt” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 64).

17On this date John Dickinson, delegate from Delaware, spoke in support of his motion that members of the second branch of the government be chosen by the state legislatures. H reported the first of two speeches which Dickinson made on this date (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 70, 72).

18According to Madison’s account of George Mason’s speech, Mason contended that some powers under the proposed new form of government must be left with the states. The states, he concluded, should be made “a constituent part of, the Natl. Establishment” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 74).

19On this date the Convention debated a motion by Charles Pinckney “that the National Legislature shd. have authority to negative all laws which they shd. judge to be improper” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 75).

20Charles Pinckney.

21Elbridge Gerry, delegate from Massachusetts, according to Madison’s account, was opposed to giving the national legislature power to negative any state law it should consider improper. He favored “a remonstrance agst. unreasonable acts of the States” and proposed the use of force if the remonstrance was unavailing. Gerry, however, “had no objection to authorize a negative to paper money and similar measures” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 76).

22Madison reported Gerry as saying that new states would not enter the union if the national legislature were given a negative on state laws (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 76).

23H was probably mistaken in attributing this remark to James Wilson. Madison attributed it to Elbridge Gerry who, he reported, argued that the national legislature should not be given a negative on state laws because new states entering the union “may even be under some foreign influence; are they in such case to participate in the negative on the will of the other States?” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 76).

24This statement presumably was made by Wilson. The meaning of the laconic statement written by H is that the union of the states was responsible both for their opposition to Great Britain and the establishment of their independence. This meaning conforms to Madison’s account of Wilson’s remarks (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 77).

25Gunning Bedford, delegate from Delaware.

26Madison gives a different version of this statement. He states that Bedford said, “if a State does not obey the law of the new System, must not force be resorted to as the only ultimate remedy, in this as in any other system” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 78).

27Pierce Butler, delegate from South Carolina. Madison’s version of Butler’s remarks is as follows: “Mr. BUTLER was vehement agst. the Negative in the proposed extent, as cutting off all hope of equal justice to the distant States. The people there would not he was sure give it a hearing” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 79).

28On this date the Convention debated the merits and deficiencies of the two major plans for a new government which had been submitted, the New Jersey Plan, introduced by William Paterson, and the Virginia Plan, introduced by Edmund Randolph.

29John Lansing, Jr., H’s fellow delegate from New York.

30William Paterson, according to Madison’s record of the Convention debates, said: “The plan of Mr. R. will also be enormously expensive. Allowing Georgia & Del. two representatives each in the popular branch the aggregate number of that branch will be 180. Add to it half as many for the other branch and you have 270” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 107).

31Madison’s version of this statement by Wilson reads as follows: “He would not repeat the remarks he had formerly made on the principles of Representation. He would only say that an inequality in it, has ever been a poison contaminating every branch of Govt.” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 108).

32Madison’s account of Wilson’s statement reads: “When Lord Chesterfield had told us that one of the Dutch provinces had been seduced into the views of France, he need not have added, that it was not Holland, but one of the smallest of them” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 108–09).

33Charles Pinckney, whose remarks H failed to record, said, according to Madison, that “the whole comes to this, as he conceived. Give N. Jersey an equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples, and concur in the Natl. system. He thought the Convention authorized to go any length in recommending, which they found necessary to remedy the evils which produced this Convention” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 109).

34Madison reported that Oliver Ellsworth, delegate from Connecticut, “proposed as a more distinctive form of collecting the mind of the Committee on the subject, ‘that the Legislative power of the U. S. should remain in Congs.’” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 109).

35On this date the Convention again took up the plan offered by William Paterson of New Jersey.

36Madison’s version of his own remarks reads as follows: “It had been alledged (by Mr. Patterson), that the Confederation having been formed by unanimous consent, could be dissolved by unanimous Consent only. Does this doctrine result from the nature of compacts? does it arise from any particular stipulation in the articles of Confederation? If we consider the federal union as analogous to the fundamental compact by which individuals compose one Society, and which must in its theoretic origin at least, have been the unanimous act of the component members, it can not be said that no dissolution of the compact can be effected without unanimous consent. A breach of the fundamental principles of the compact by a part of the Society would certainly absolve the other parts from their obligations to it” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 121).

37Madison, as proof of his contention that the New Jersey Plan would fail to prevent state encroachments on the federal authority, pointed out the provision in the Plan which gave only appellate jurisdiction to the Federal Court. “Of what avail,” he questioned, “cd. an appellate tribunal be, after an acquittal?” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 123).

38This illustration was given by Madison to assure the smaller states that under the proportional representation proposed by the Virginia Plan they would not be under the complete dominance of the larger states. The monarch to whom Madison referred was the King of France (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 126).

39Charles Cotesworth Pinckney’s remarks were placed by H with his notes on the debates of June 19. According to Madison’s record, these statements were made by Pinckney on June 21.

40Madison’s version of this statement is as follows:

“It had been asserted by his colleague (Col. Hamilton) that there was no coincidence of interests among the large States that ought to excite fears of oppression in the smaller. If it were true that such a uniformity of interests existed among the States, there was equal safety for all of them, whether the representation remained as heretofore, or were proportioned as now proposed.” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 133.)

41This phrase is not in any other account of Lansing’s speech.

42Lansing did not, according to Madison, endorse the whole of the system of government proposed by H but said only that he believed “the National Govt. must have the influence arising from the grant of offices and honors. In order to render such a Government effectual he believed such an influence to be necessary. But if the States will not agree to it, it is in vain, worse than in vain to make the proposition” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 133).

43That is, the system proposed by Edmund Randolph of Virginia.

44This statement, as recorded by H, is not closely paralleled in Madison’s record of debates. According to Yates’s account of the debates, Mason stated that the opposition of the people to a unicameral legislature arose from their state constitutions (Yates, Secret Proceedings and Debates description begins Robert Yates, Secret Proceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled at Philadelphia, in the Year 1787, For the Purpose of Forming the Constitution of The United States of America (Albany, 1821). description ends , 144).

45Luther Martin, delegate from Maryland.

46Madison wrote that Martin said, “Nor could the rule of voting have been ground of objection, otherwise ten of the States must always have been ready, to place further confidence in Congs” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 136).

47This remark by Martin is not found in other versions of the Convention debates. Madison’s version, which also mentions requisitions, states only that the Virginia Plan “must depend for the deficiency of its revenues on requisitions & quotas” (Hunt and Scott, Debates description begins Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, eds., The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison (New York, 1920). description ends , 136).

48Roger Sherman, delegate from Connecticut.

49On June 26 the Convention debated the proposals for forming a Senate. These remarks by H were probably recorded on that date. They do not, however, conform to the record of debates given by any other notes of debates on that date, and they may have constituted H’s ideas on the proper organization of the Senate.

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