Like his longstanding predecessor, George Clinton, Jay used the governor’s office to carry out policies that favored state growth over the needs of the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) and other Indian groups residing in present-day central and western New York and neighboring Canada. Motivated primarily by the goals of financial gain, commercial development, and expanded white settlement, Jay’s administration continued state-sanctioned practices that diminished Indian landholdings and sovereign status.1 Yet even as Jay executed acts and laws that proved detrimental to Indian autonomy, he demonstrated a firmer commitment to constitutional principles and federal jurisprudence than had Clinton and he initiated and passed laws that created a more efficient system for the disbursement of annuities and the provision of resources. In his handling of Indian affairs, Jay was not immune to expressing prejudiced sentiments; on occasion, he identified certain Indian groups as “savages” and censured them for not adopting “civilized practices”.2 Jay was guided in his tasks by a belief that Indian communities deserved “benevolence and protection,” and therefore he sought to use his limited executive power to curb the worst abuses inflicted on them.3

When Jay took office in July 1795, commissioners appointed by the state legislature were in the midst of talks with leaders from the Haudenosaunee nations. Authorized by an act passed a few months earlier, the commissioners—Philip Schuyler, John Cantine, John Richardson, and David Brooks4—traveled from Albany to the Finger Lakes region in order to negotiate land purchases with the Oneida, Onondaga, and Cayuga tribes.5 Schuyler invited Jay to accompany the New York delegation as he anticipated that the presence of the new governor would produce more favorable terms.6 Even though Jay did not attend the proceedings, Schuyler and his colleagues nonetheless obtained major concessions at the resulting Treaty of Cayuga Ferry. The Cayuga reached an agreement with the state commissioners on 27 July, and the Onondaga did likewise on the following day. In exchange for a payment of $1,800 and an annuity of the same amount, the Cayuga representatives ceded a tract of land that left their people with little but their reservation. The Onondaga leaders sold their rights to Salt Lake and surrounding lands in exchange for a cash payment of $700 and annuities amounting to the sum of $1,090 and a hundred barrels of salt.7 The New York commissioners had successfully treated with their Cayuga and Onondaga counterparts, but their negotiations stalled with the Oneida. A council was reconvened at Albany in September, and the Oneida envoys now agreed to part with three tracts of 132,000 acres in exchange for a payment of $2,952 and an annuity of the same amount.8

Prior to the treaty provisions being finalized between the Haudenosaunee and New York, federal officials challenged the validity of the negotiations. Such meetings, they observed, contravened provisions contained in the U.S. Constitution and the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1793. The Constitution forbade individual states from entering into a treaty or alliance with other nations and granted treaty-making power solely to the president with the advice and consent of the Senate, while the 1793 act disallowed land purchases from either Indian persons or nations unless such transactions received the approval of an appointed federal commissioner.9 William Bradford Jr., the U.S. Attorney General, invoked both the Constitution and the 1793 Act in a letter to Timothy Pickering that cited the illegality of land purchases.10 For his part, Pickering, who served as Secretary of War, the department then responsible for overseeing Indian affairs for the federal government, expressed confidence that the new governor would invalidate any resulting agreements reached with the Haudenosaunee. “All difficulties on these subjects will cease,” Pickering assured Israel Chapin Jr., the federal superintendent to the Six Nations, “as soon as Mr. Jay’s administration commences.11 Pickering was due for disappointment, however, as the governor begged off taking any official action to disrupt the negotiating process. Given his former position as the nation’s foremost jurist and his current one as New York’s chief executive officer, as well as his leading role in drafting the state constitution, Jay deemed it inappropriate that he should now formulate an opinion that undermined New York’s legal code and system of governance. Jay felt duty-bound to follow the state’s constitutional proviso12 that empowered the legislature (and not the governor) to oversee “every Convention or Contract with Indian Tribes mediated by the state.”13 Turning his attention to the bill that culminated in the Treaty of Cayuga Ferry, Jay noted that this “act is silent” regarding the national government’s supervision and approval of New York’s Indian affairs.14 The governor offered a final justification with observations that the bill had passed while Clinton held office and that the conference had already begun before Jay learned of the commissioners’ itinerary and that the arrangements had already been made for the Haudenosaunee delegations.

Federal officials acquiesced to Jay’s judgement and deferred from further hindering New York’s efforts to secure land titles from the Haudenosaunee. The recent defeat of the Western Confederacy at the Battle of Fallen Timbers and the subsequent signing of the Treaty of Canandaigua had weakened the Haudenosaunee’s strategic significance in the eyes of the United States government, as it was less likely the Six Nations would form a military alliance with the weakened Ohio Indians. The subsequent passage of the Jay Treaty and the Treaty of Greenville nullified the dual British and Indian threat and further diminished the diplomatic leverage of the Haudenosaunee nations. These developments on the northern borderlands most certainly influenced Pickering when he advised the president that “the intervention of the General Government has not been thought requisite” for talks between New York state and the Oneida, Onondaga, and Cayuga.15 Washington concurred with Pickering’s assessment and declared that his administration would sanction the outcomes resulting from the regularly scheduled talks, as had occurred with the Onondaga and Cayuga. The president added the caveat that Pickering should seek the counsel of others “with a regard to the Constitution and laws” if the talks stalled or were otherwise postponed.16 The national government therefore might have initiated measures to block or overturn the Oneida land cessions since the terms of that agreement were not finalized until mid-September. Pickering and his colleagues opted, however, to take no such action.

Whereas the Indian treaties signed by New York in the summer of 1795 largely bore the imprimatur of the previous administration, subsequent negotiations demonstrated Jay’s willingness to implement policy initiatives and assume a more active role in shaping and overseeing the state’s Indian affairs. Future negotiations held during his administration would now mostly comply with existing federal guidelines. A federal commissioner was present at the three main Indian treaties signed between 1796 and 1798, and each of these agreements were submitted for approval by the U.S. Senate and then forwarded to the president for ratification. Jay also recognized that the stabilization and security of the region came at the expense of Haudenosaunee power, and he sought to use this development for the purpose of creating more harmonious relations between Indians and whites. “It appears to me,” he informed the state legislature in his fourth year as governor, “that in proportion as they become less and less able or inclined to assert or defend their rights by arms, we should… become more and more disposed to protect them by law and measures conducive to their security and comfort.”17 The governor also sought to establish an efficient system for processing the payments and distribution of materials to Indian nations. Under his instigation, lawmakers passed a bill that established a set date and process for paying annuities to the Haudenosaunee.18

Soon after taking office, the new governor received notice from Philip Schuyler and Egbert Benson of the necessity for scheduling a conference in the upcoming months with the Mohawk living at Akwesasne.19 The Akwesasne Mohawk, who belonged to the Seven Nations of Canada, had approached the state government in February 1794 and March 1795 with title claims to land located in northern New York. Seeking to both extinguish these claims and purchase territory from the Akwesasne community, the state legislature voted in April to commence negotiations and allocated the governor a budget of three thousand pounds to cover the treaty expenses.20 Jay proposed that a conference be held in mid-September at Fort George, located at the southern end of Lake George. Addressing the Akwesasne’s representatives as brothers, he extended an invitation to them and expressed a hope that the participants will “meet with Hearts and Minds well disposed to each other.”21 Jay and his subordinates also set about the tasks of compiling official records, arranging accommodations and provisions for the Akwesasne delegation, and appointing Egbert Benson, Abraham Ten Broeck, and James Watson to represent New York’s interests at the proceedings.22 Pickering informed Jay that the president had instructed Jeremiah Wadsworth to attend as U.S. commissioner and further explained that the proceedings must comply with the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1793. Accordingly, the state agents could negotiate only for the price of Mohawk territory and that any resulting land cession to New York must “be in the form of a treaty or convention” that would then be ratified by the president after a consultation with the U.S. senate.23 The parties met as planned at Fort George, but did not come to terms and reach a satisfactory settlement.

Subsequent talks with the Seven Nations of Canada, albeit with delays, occurred the following year. Leaders of the Akwesasne nation visited the governor in February while traveling to Philadelphia to meet with the president.24 On their return journey, the delegates stopped once more in New York City. Jay and the state legislature seized this opportunity to reconvene the diplomatic sessions that had failed at Fort George.25 The governor wrote to James McHenry, who had replaced Pickering as Secretary of War, and requested that a federal commissioner be named to oversee the proceedings, even recommending Abraham Ogden and Elisha Boudinot as prospective candidates.26 Jay urged McHenry to make haste, explaining that the Akwesasne representatives were anxious to return to their community. An official meeting was not forthcoming, however, as questions arose regarding the authority and status of the Mohawk delegates. Important documents authorizing their mission for the Akwesasne nation had apparently been left behind in Philadelphia, leaving Jay unsure as to the legitimacy of the proceedings.27 The Mohawk leaders departed for home before these issues could be fully resolved.

The conference in New York City was therefore postponed until May. Representatives from the Akwesasne Mohawk were now joined by those from the Kahnawake (Caughnawaga) Mohawk of southern Quebec for continued deliberations. For the New York delegation, Jay called on Richard Varick to serve alongside Benson and Watson as state agents.28 Federal officials requested that Wadsworth reprise his role in representing the national government. When Wadsworth declined the posting, Abraham Ogden, one of Jay’s original recommendees for the position, stepped in as commissioner.29 Under the watchful eye of Ogden, the parties opened talks on 23 May and wrapped them up eight days later. In exchange for ceding their territorial claims, the Seven Nations of Canada received a payment of £1,233.6.8 and an annuity in the amount of £213.6.8.30 In a later speech before the legislature, Jay conceded that the Indians’ declaration of land title was “not unquestionable,” but he found that an amicable agreement was “more consistent with sound policy.”31 Jay also expressed confidence that the “justice and moderation” displayed by New York’s government at the recent treaty would serve to improve relations with Indian nations residing outside the state.32

The governor had good reason to be concerned about other Indian groups making territorial claims on New York. Soon after he had met with the Akwesasne deputies in February 1796, Jay received a visit from a delegation of four leaders representing the Mohawk community that resided in the Bay of Quinté region near Kingston, Ontario.33 As the state government was paying for the visitors’ food and lodging expenses, Jay urged the legislators to waste no time in making a decision.34 A month later, the legislature issued a joint resolution that vetoed the possibility of negotiating with these Mohawk in the near future. New York’s lawmakers explained that the “undefined” nature of the land claims rendered a meeting impossible, and that a state-led investigation would first have to verify the validity of these claims before a conference could take place.35

The Bay of Quinté Mohawk delegation was joined in mid-March by two representatives who came to see the governor on behalf of the Mohawks who inhabited the territory along the Grand River between Lakes Ontario and Erie.36 Prior to their defeat at the hands of patriot forces during the revolutionary war, these Mohawk communities had lived in New York in the towns of Canajoharie, located on the southern bank of the Mohawk River, and Tiononderoge, located eastward at the confluence of the Mohawk River and Schoharie Creek. At the close of the conflict, they resettled in Upper Canada on land grants offered by Governor Frederick Haldimand in reward for their loyal service. The Mohawk now returned to New York seeking compensation for their lost territory. Joseph Brant, a key leader of the Grand River community, sought Jay’s advice about how the Mohawk land claims should be presented. The governor counselled on proper procedure and recommended that the Mohawk should grant “two or three deputies with full and well authenticated powers to state those Claims with accuracy and to make a final settlement with the State Respecting them.”37 Jay concluded his letter by assuring Brant that the Mohawk title claims would receive the fullest attention and a fair and just hearing from the state government.

The talks commenced in late March 1797 in Albany, now designated as the permanent seat of state government.38 The Mohawk delegation, including Brant, discussed terms with Abraham Ten Broeck, Egbert Benson, and Ezra L’Hommedieu, the agents representing New York. Isaac Smith was appointed by President Adams to serve as U.S. commissioner and oversee the proceedings.39 Under the terms of the final settlement, the Mohawk representatives agreed to cede their claims to territories in New York in exchange for a payment of $1,000 with an additional $600 to cover travel expenses.40

The state of New York had an opportunity to purchase more territory from the Oneida nation in 1798. A delegation of Oneida leaders travelled to Albany to negotiate a land sale in February of that year.41 The legislature wasted little time in passing a law that authorized the governor to appoint three commissioners to treat with the Oneida in the state capital.42 Jay accordingly named Egbert Benson, Simeon DeWitt, and John Tayler to determine the land parcels and negotiation terms of the prospective transactions.43 Upon learning that the Oneida wished to sell thirty thousand acres within their reservation for a sum of $500—$300 of which would be advanced to them—and a perpetual annuity of $700, and that an allowance would be made for seven Oneida families to continue residing on the land, Jay appointed a new trio of commissioners to hold final talks at the Oneida village of Kanonwalohale on 1 June.44 He also sent the report and related documents to Pickering along with a request that the Secretary of State ask President Adams to appoint a federal commissioner to the talks.45 The state agents, Benson, Tayler, and L’Hommedieu, along with the federal appointee, Joseph Hopkinson, set out on 25 May to conduct negotiations.46 The signed treaty adhered to the terms previously decided upon in Albany.47

Members of the Cayuga nation expressed interest in selling off their remaining parcels of land to New York. In March 1799, the state legislature passed a bill permitting the governor to purchase available Cayuga land.48 Later that year, Israel Chapin Jr. contacted Jay about the possibility of buying a Cayuga tract of “reserved Land.”49 Jay declined to take immediate action, however, explaining that acquiring the tract was not “an important Object to the State.”50 Moreover, Jay noted that the Cayuga were divided as to whether the land should be offered for sale, and he would only approve of the business if the entire community agreed to the purchase and if the land could be bought at a fair price.51 In May 1800, Chapin Jr. again approached the governor with the suggestion that New York State purchase the Cayuga tract. Upon learning that most of the Cayuga had migrated westward, Jay agreed to a purchase of the land on reasonable terms, but apparently did not follow through with the transaction while in office.52

Private entities as well as state agencies carried out land transactions with Iroquois groups. Such was the case in September 1797, when the Seneca residing in western New York ceded millions of acres located west of the Genesee River to Robert Morris and the Holland Land Company. Thomas Morris,53 Robert Morris’s son, conducted negotiations with Seneca leaders, and Jeremiah Wadsworth, the United States Indian Commissioner, oversaw the proceedings. In the resulting Treaty of Big Tree, the Seneca parted with much of their homeland for the sum of $100,000.54

Issues of sovereignty and landholding also shaped relations between the state government and the Christian Indian communities of New Stockbridge and Brothertown that resided among the Oneidas in central New York.55 Both groups sought assistance from state officials in asserting their rights to land ownership. Jay’s administration handled these affairs solely within the confines of the state judicial system and therefore sought neither advice nor approval from federal authorities.

The residents of New Stockbridge twice petitioned the governor to help them secure the title to their tract comprising six square miles.56 A three-person commission—Egbert Benson, Ezra L’Hommedieu, and James Watson—was appointed by Jay in February 1797 to investigate the Stockbridge claims.57 The state legislature then enacted a statute the following month that reaffirmed Stockbridge ownership and that threatened prosecution for trespassing on their land.58 Despite the passage of this law, the problem of white encroachment on Stockbridge territory persisted. In February 1799, John Murray Jr., the Quaker philanthropist, wrote to Jay on behalf of the Stockbridge tribe with a request that the government follow the dictates of “Justice, humanity & sound policy” and thereby redress the group’s grievances.59

The Brothertown Indians likewise requested state assistance for resolving their territorial disputes with New York lessees and speculators. A pair of statutes passed in 1795 and 179560 organized a town government for Brothertown and appointed Samuel Jones, Zina Hitchcock,61 and Ezra L’Hommedieu as commissioners to sort out the contending claims. The subsequent commission report that was submitted to the Senate greatly reduced the geographic size of the Brothertown community. In exchange for cash annuities, livestock, farming tools, cloth, and a schoolhouse, the inhabitants of Brothertown were effectively stripped of 60 percent of their land.62

The governor also played a pivotal role in evaluating missionary efforts among the Oneida. The Presbyterian clergyman Samuel Kirkland63 had been ministering to the Haudenosaunee for nearly three decades and in recent years had established the Hamilton Oneida Academy. The Society in Scotland for Promoting Christian Knowledge, the agency funding Kirkland’s endeavors, received complaints throughout the 1790s that he was neglecting his spiritual duties.64 In response, the Society appointed two Boston-based ministers, Jeremy Belknap and Jedidiah Morse, to investigate the status of the Oneida mission. Since he and Morse were unfamiliar with the region, Belknap first contacted Jay in May 1796, seeking advice on travel, accommodations, and Indian affairs.65 As the governor looked favorably upon the benevolent work undertaken by the Society in Scotland, he gladly obliged Belknap’s request for information. In addition to suggesting travel routes, he offered to provide letters of introduction to Philip Schuyler, Stephen Van Rensselaer, James Duane, and Hugh White66 and put the inspectors in touch with Egbert Benson, Samuel Jones, and James Dean,67 all officials who had previously negotiated with the Oneida on behalf of the state.68 Based on the findings submitted by Belknap and Morse, the Society in Scotland opted to terminate the funding for Kirkland’s activities.69

With Kirkland no longer leading the mission, the question arose as to who would assume responsibility for the spiritual welfare and religious education of the Oneida community. Writing on behalf of the Society in Scotland, both Jedidiah Morse and Peter Thacher, a Congregationalist minister and Secretary for the Society’s Boston branch, recommended that New York’s government should take on the duties of promoting Christianity among the Indians. Morse and Thacher further suggested that a new minister should be hired and that his salary should be deducted from the cash annuities provided by the state.70

Jay praised the work of the Oneida mission, yet nonetheless questioned whether ministerial efforts had done enough to sufficiently “civilize or christianize” the residents.71 The Oneida, he asserted, had thus far rejected practices involving permanent homes, private property, masculine labor, and a farm-based economy.”72 Since the Oneida persisted in defying attempts at their acculturation, the governor concluded that state lawmakers would probably not approve funding for future missionary activities.73