Your letter to Congress of April last having been read & answered by Congress,1 tho’ not so minutely as I would wish, I forbear making any remarks upon it, because I am not yet perfectly acquainted with their sentiments (& would not risk any which might interfere with them) having just entered upon the office, in consequence of which I open this Correspondence, tho’ long since appointed. I beg of you, agreeable to the directions of Congress to address in future your public Letters to me, & to notify the Count de Florida Blanca of this alteration in our System, our unacknowledged situation rendering it improper to do it formally.

Congress have at length compleated the organization of their executive departments by the choice of general Lincoln for their secretary at war.2 It is expected that order & system will arise out of this mode of doing business, & the strictest œconomy. A little aid from Europe with this might serve to reestablish our finances without which our exertions will be feeble. If the great powers of Europe, with every advantage that settled governments enjoy feel themselves under the necessity of making foreign Loans, can it be expected that a war of six years in the heart of our country should not have abridged the resources of a state which had every necessary for their army to import, which never manufactured for itself, which had no marine, and which with a number of internal enemies in their bosom, had civil governments to establish—perhaps it would be impossible to offer a better picture of the resources of this Country, & the stability of her funds, when they shall be well managed, than by comparing our present debt with the duration of the war, & the exertions we have made. For tho’ our enemies may alledge that our debt was relieved by the depreciation of our bills, yet it must be remembered that that very depreciation was a tax, tho’ an unequal one, borne by the people of these States, and as it has not produced national ruin, it must follow that the States had sufficient resources to bear this burthen. Those resources, tho’ lessened still remain. But publick credit is too much weakened to enables us to avail ourselves of them without foreign loans. None are to be made here while circulating medium is so small as it is at present, while bills continue low, & while commerce yields such great profits. Every thing therefore depends if the war is continued with spirit in America upon procuring a foreign loans. Nor can any of the billigerent powers lay out their money to half the advantage in any other way— The only object for which Britain continues the war is the recovery of this country, what better plan of finance than can be adopted by France or Spain than by timely aids of ships & money, to blast this hope, & by a speedy peace to terminate their Expenses? If on the contrary they wish to linger out the war till Britain is more exhausted, this country affords them the easiest means of doing it. Furnish us with money armies may be maintained here for one third of the expense that Britain lays out upon hers. This France has experienced. Tho’ her affairs were not perhaps managed with the strictest œconomy, tho’ her bills were extremely low, her supplies cost at least two thirds less than the British paid at New York, without taking into account the hire of transports, the seamen employed paid & fed in that Service, & the number of them that fell into our hands. Be persuaded yourself, and endeavour to persuade others that if this is a war of finance, which all modern wars are, Britain is most vulnerable in America.

I congratulate you upon the important success of our arms in South Carolina & Virginia, of which I enclose you official accounts.3 On the returns you will remark a number of British American ^nominal^ Regiments— These were recruiting in Virginia & North Carolina, & their success will shew the truth of what Britain advances with respect to the number of her partizans in America. I will venture to say that with similar advantages, their recruiting parties would have been more successful in any Country in Europe. Besides, the troops mentioned in the returns, the Enemy lost during the siege near two thousand Negroes. Previous to the Surrender, in a naval engagement with the Count de Grasse, the Terrible, a British 74, was burnt.4 So that our affairs here stand upon the most respectable footing imaginable with one exception. You will not, I am persuaded, neglect to avail yourself of this moment of success to press a treaty, loan, or subsidy. They are essential to vigorous exertions next Campaign & to extricate us from the difficulties into which the failure of publick credit has involved us. This, Sir is a great & leading object, upon which the happiness of your Country very much depends. You will undoubtedly endeavour to penetrate the views of the court represent them fully to us accommodate yourself to them as far as your instructions will justify. For my part, I never was fully convinced that Spain was materially interested in our independence unless lead to it by some present advantage. Your Letters have held up different Ideas, I wish you to explain more fully upon what they are founded. You have doubtless received your commission for negotiating a peace. You may form some Judgement of the views of Congress by the instructions which accompany it—how far they should influence your conduct in Spain must in some measure depend upon what you suppose the engagements between France & Spain & the sacrifices France may make to Spain or England at the general peace of what we suppose to be our territory.5

But this is a delicate subject, & I quit it ’till I am more fully acquainted with the views of Congress thereon, for I confess to you that the sentiments I have hazarded are rather my own than any that I know to be theirs, & should weigh accordingly with you. The provision trade with the Havanna being very considerable & important to Spain, while she has fleets & armies to maintain there, it might be proper to suggest to the Spanish Ministry the advantage of allowing small convoys of frigates, which would enable us to carry it on in vessels of greater burden & by that means diminish the expense of freight & insurance, both of which eventually, fall upon Spain— A few frigates would answer the purpose as the stations of the enemies ships are almost always known on this Coast, & indeed, they seldom have any out but frigates cruizing singly.

Another thought strikes me, which perhaps, if digested, might be ripened into a plan advantageous to France, Spain & America. While France keeps an army here, she must draw bills or export money, She has for the most part preferred the former at the loss of forty per Cent, the money of Spain is lodged at the Havannah, & cannot be brought to Europe without great hazard, whereas the risk of sending it here under convoy is extremely small. It may be vested in European bills to such advantage as to pay the whole expence of transportation, & even an interest, ’till the bills are negotiated in Europe. This plan affords France a market for her bills, Spain a cheap & easy way of bringing her money home, & America a circulating medium, which enables her to tax with advantage.6

As I know the confidence you once had in D—,7 I must caution you against any communication with him, some Letters have been published by Rivington said to be his, which being compared with others received here, bear the marks of authenticity. The enclosed act of Congress informs you of the appointment of Mr Hanson of Maryland to the Presidentship.8 I must beg the favor of you to be particular in your information with respect to the views and politicks of the Spanish Minister. I shall write very frequently to you, & shall in return expect that you will omit no opportunity of letting me hear from you. A Court Kalendar, if one is printed with you, with notes of your own thereon, might be of some service to us. I shall use our private Cypher, as corrected by that sent by Mr Tocsan,9 till you receive the one transmitted by Mr Thomson, in which case, as it is less troublesome, be pleased to use that, if you are sure it came safe.10 I am, dear Sir, with the Sincerest regard & esteem Your most obedient & most humble Servant