From George Washington to Major General Robert Howe, 20 November 1779
To Major General Robert Howe
West-point Novr 20th—79.
Dear Sir,
Herewith you will receive Mr Pulteney’s lucubrations—and my thanks for the perusal of them.1 He has made I perceive, the dependance of America essential to the existance of Great Britain as a powerful Nation—This I shall not deny—because I am in sentiment with him in thinking her fallen state in consequence of the seperation too obvious to be disputed—It was of magnitude sufficient to have made a wise & just people look before they leaped. But I am glad to find that he has placed the supplies necessary to support that dependance upon three things which I am perswaded will never again exist in his nation—namely Public virtue—public œconomy—and public union in her grand Council.
Stock jobbing, speculation dissipation luxury & venality with all their concomitants are too deeply rooted to yield to virtue & the public good. We that are not yet hackneyed in vice—but infants as it were in the arts of corruption—& the knowledge of taking advantage of public necessity (tho’ I am much mistaken if we shall not soon become very great adepts at them)—find it almost, if not quite impossible to preserve virtue enough to keep the body politic & corporate in tolerable tune—It is scarcely to be expected therefore that a people who have reduced these things to a system & have actually interwoven them into their constitution should at once become immaculate.
I do not know which rises highest—my indignation or contempt for the Sentiments which pervade the Ministerial writings of this day—these hireling scriblers labour to describe & prove the ingratitude of America in not breaking faith with France—& returning to her Allegiance to the Crown of Great Britain after its having offered such advantageous terms of accomodation—Such Sentiments as the[s]e are insulting to common sense & affrontive to every principle of sound policy & common honesty. Why has She offered these terms? because after a bloody contest, carried on with unrelenting & savage fury on her part the issue (which was somewhat doubtful while we stood alone) is now become certain by the aid we derive from our Alliance—notwithstanding the manifest advantages of which, and the blood and treasure which has been spent to resist a tyranny which was unremitted as long as there remained a hope of subjugation we are told with an effrontery altogether unparrallelled that every cause of complaint is now done away by the generous offers of a tender parent—that it is ungrateful in us not to accept the proffered terms—and impolitic not to abandon a power (dangerous I confess to her but) which held out a saving hand to us in the hour of our distress—What epithet does such Sentiment merit? How much shd a people possessed of them be despised? From my Soul I abhor them! A Manly struggle, had it been conducted upon liberal ground—an honest confession that they were unequal to conquest—& wished for our friendship, would have had its proper weight—but their cruelties, exercised upon those who have fallen within their power—the wanton depredations committed by themselves and their faithful Allies the Indians—their low & dirty practices of Counterfeiting our money—forging letters2—& condescending to adopt such arts as the meanest villain in private life would blush at being charged with has made me their fixed enemy.
I have received your letter by Colo. Moylan of yesterdays date3—The Instructions given to —— are full and compleat—I have no thought of withdrawing the effective horse till the other Troops go into quarters.4 I am—Sincerely & Affectly Yrs
Go: Washington
ADfS, DLC:GW; Varick transcript, DLC:GW.
1. GW probably returned a copy of William Pulteney’s Considerations on the Present State of Public Affairs, and the Means of Raising the Necessary Supplies (London, 1779), a publication of more than fifty pages that appeared in at least two editions during its first year in print. In the cited edition, Pulteney wrote: “The object now, I apprehend, is, to preserve such a connection with the Colonies in North America, as to unite the force of the whole empire, in time of war, for the common safety; so that no one part may be thrown into the scale of a foreign enemy, to the prejudice of the other part.
“This object, it is imagined, will be attained, if the Colonies acknowledge the same King, which involves the power of peace and war, and the rights of mutual naturalization and succession; and this point is at the same time consistent, with the most ample ideas, of a free constitution in each of the Colonies, and even of a Congress, in the nature of a general Parliament, to take care of the general interests of the whole. It is perfectly consistent too, with the idea, of an exclusive power in the Colony Assemblies, and Congress, to impose taxes in that country, and of an exclusive power, to vote the number of troops to be kept up in their respective provinces, similar to the control of the British Parliament, upon the Crown, with respect to troops in Great Britain; still more is it consistent, with the idea, of their enjoying a trade, almost free from restriction, not only to Great Britain, but to all parts of the world” (5–6).
He continued “that the object of compelling the disaffected part of the Thirteen Colonies, to embrace, that fair and honourable connection, which is now held out to them, is not only desirable, but essentially necessary, to our own existence, as an independent people.
“Persons of all ranks are interested in this, and however the heat of party, and former opinions, may for a time deceive a part of this country, I am convinced, that when they come to consider attentively the train of consequences, which are necessarily connected with this object, they will forget their animosity, and unite in the proper measures, for preserving, from such imminent danger, the state to which they belong.
“That the object is attainable, I am also most fully convinced; but not unless the administration of public affairs, is directed, by men of fortitude and exertion, equal to the great occasion, by men … who are not to be depressed or elated, by every little change of fortune; whose minds are not only capable of taking in the whole views of this great subject, and of deciding with wisdom and dispatch upon every occurrence, but of prosecuting with vigor, perseverance, and industry, such plans, as, after full information, are found to be most fit, and with such frugality and œconomy of the public money, as may enable us to persist in the contest, as long as shall be necessary” (16–17).
To finance the kind of war that would persuade the Americans to abandon independence for a new connection with Great Britain, Pulteney argued against borrowing and increasing the burdensome public debt. His plan “for carrying on the war during two years” called for “1½ per cent. of every man’s capital, to be paid by installments, in the course of two years.” The collected sum, Pulteney contended, “upon one thousand millions of property” amounted “to fifteen millions, which, without supposing much œconomy, ought, with the ordinary supplies, to support a vigorous war of two years at least” (31). Pulteney then wrote: “But it may be asked, how is it possible to suppose, that this nation, torn to pieces, as it has been, by dissentions, and dissatisfied with the management of its affairs, if it were even able to raise, within the year, so large a sum, in addition to its present burdens, would ever consent to pay it, much less to entrust it, to the Ministers of the Crown? Or how would it be possible to devise a mode, of levying to this extent, an equal proportion, of every man’s fortune, for the service of the State?
“I believe, indeed, that such a plan, however important, could not be carried into execution, without a very general concurrence and approbation, of the people at large, who must first be convinced, of the absolute necessity, of the utmost exertion, in the present crisis, to avert the black storm, which threatens us from every quarter; and, secondly, the nation must be convinced, that it is, in every view, their real interest, to raise the supplies within the year, not only to avoid the extravagant demands of money-lenders, but to prevent the imposition of new taxes, oppressive to industry, and above all, that it is their interest to do so, in order, at this crisis, to exalt the national character in the eyes of all Europe. In the third place, the people must be convinced, that the conduct of public affairs, is entrusted, not merely to men of honour and of good intentions, but to the ablest, the firmest, and the most disinterested men, that are to be found in this extensive country” (32–33).
Scottish-born William Pulteney (1729–1805) changed his surname from Johnstone after his wife, Frances Pulteney, received a large inheritance. Pulteney practiced law, became immensely wealthy, and served many years as a member of Parliament. He secretly met Benjamin Franklin in Paris during 1778 to discuss peace terms between England and the United States (see 26:94–97, 173–74, 188–90, 195–96; see also Pulteney’s Thoughts on the Present State of Affairs with America, and The Means of Conciliation [London, 1778], a publication of more than 100 pages that appeared in several editions). In the late eighteenth century, Pulteney speculated successfully in western New York lands.
2. For GW’s outrage at forged letters attributed to him, see GW to Richard Henry Lee, 25 May 1778, and to Landon Carter, 30 May 1778; see also Lee to GW, 2 Jan. 1778, and n.3 to that document, and
3. Howe’s letter to GW of 19 Nov. has not been found.
4. GW is referring to winter quarters.