1. JM enclosed a translation of Vicente Folch’s letter to Robert Smith, 2 Dec. 1810 (2 pp.; printed in ASP description begins American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States … (38 vols.; Washington, 1832–61). description ends , Foreign Relations, 3:398), offering to deliver West Florida to the U.S. “provided I do not receive Succour from the Havanna or Vera Cruz during the present month; or that His Excellency, the Marquis of Someruelos, … should not have opened directly a negociation on this Point.” Folch declared he had no alternative to this step to spare his province “from the Ruin which threatens it,” but he urged the U.S. government to order its forces at Fort Stoddert to compel the “Party under the command of Reuben Kemper to retire within the Limits of the District of Baton Rouge; intimating to him that if, in future, he should repeat his Incursions in the Districts of Mobile & Pensacola, the Troops of the United States, joined to the Spanish Troops, will use force to keep them back.” Folch also pointed out that Kemper’s party had been “recruited, armed and provisioned” within the U.S. Should his proposition be accepted, the governor concluded, he would treat with some authorized person to arrange for the evacuation of West Florida.

2. In his 2 Dec. 1810 letter to John McKee (2 pp.; printed ibid., 3:399), Folch explained his reasons for writing to Robert Smith with a proposal to deliver West Florida to the U.S., and he requested McKee to convey duplicates of his letter to Washington—one copy by mail and the other in person with an “eye witness” account of the situation. Also filed with the RC is a copy of McKee’s 5 Dec. 1810 letter to Eustis (1 p.; printed ibid.), in which McKee enclosed Folch’s letters to Smith and himself and announced his intention to proceed to Washington immediately.

3. In a 15 Dec. 1810 letter, John Philip Morier had protested to Robert Smith the American decision to take possession of West Florida (3 pp.; printed ibid.). Describing the U.S. claim to the province as “manifestly doubtful,” Morier asked why the administration had resorted to force rather than to negotiations with Spain, and he dismissed those Americans who were attempting to subvert Spanish authority in the region as “a band of desperados who are here known by the contemptuous appellation of Land-jobbers.” Morier declared that his sovereign had a “deep and lively interest” in Spain’s affairs and that he could not “see with indifference any attack upon her interests in America.” On that basis, he requested the U.S. government to make such explanation of its conduct “as will at once convince His Majestys Government of the pacific disposition of the United States towards His Majesty’s Allies the Spaniards.” The British chargé repeated this request on 22 Dec. 1810 (1 p.; printed ibid., 3:400), and on 28 Dec. Robert Smith responded that documents before the public made it clear that “no hostile or unfriendly purpose is entertained towards Spain” (1 p.; printed ibid.). Smith declined any further discussion of Morier’s letter with the remark that the American minister in London had “been enabled to give to your Government whatever explanations may comport with the frankness and the Spirit of Conciliation, which have been invariably manifested on the part of the United States.”

4. After several days’ debate behind closed doors, both houses of Congress, on 15 Jan. 1811, agreed on a resolution that the U.S., “under the peculiar circumstances of the existing crisis, cannot, without serious inquietude, see any part of the said territory pass into the hands of any foreign Power; and that a due regard to their own safety compels them to provide, under certain contingencies, for the temporary occupation of the said territory.” On the same day, Congress also approved an act authorizing the president to “take possession of, and occupy” Spanish territory east of the Perdido River in the event of an arrangement being made with the local authorities to deliver the region to the U.S., or in the event of an attempted occupation by any foreign power. The president was authorized to employ any part of the U.S. Army and Navy he deemed necessary, and $100,000 was appropriated to cover the costs. Should the territory come into the possession of the U.S., the president was also authorized to establish a temporary government until Congress made other provisions. On 3 Mar. 1811, Congress passed, and JM signed, a further act stating that neither the resolution of 15 Jan. 1811 nor the act of the same date be “printed or published, until the end of the next session of Congress, unless directed by the President of the United States” (Annals of Congress description begins Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States … (42 vols.; Washington, 1834–56). description ends , 11th Cong., 3d sess., 370–80, 1117–48; U.S. Statutes at Large description begins The Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America … (17 vols.; Boston, 1848–73). description ends , 3:471–72).