Portuguese-American Diplomacy: Editorial Note
Portuguese-American Diplomacy
On 7 May 1784, Congress instructed its commissioners in Europe to negotiate treaties of amity and commerce with a series of European nations, of which Portugal was one. On 9 September, they informed the Portuguese ambassador at Versailles, Conde Vicente de Souza Coutinho, of their instructions, commissions, and full powers to negotiate a treaty as soon as Portugal designated a representative with equal powers. On 30 November, the commissioners provided Souza Coutinho with a draft treaty, which he forwarded to Lisbon. Only after Jefferson inquired about its fate in the fall of 1785 did the Portuguese ambassador inform him that Portugal was indeed interested in pursuing negotiations. Jefferson reported this to Jay on 11 October 1785.1
Jefferson’s overtures were superseded when Portugal designated its ambassador to Britain, Chevalier Luis Pinto de Sousa Coutinho, Visconde de Balsamão, to negotiate the treaty with Adams in London, where Britain’s reaction to a Portuguese-American commercial treaty could be tested.2 Adams reported that Portugal would not allow Americans to trade directly with Brazil or to export American flour to Portugal and that Portugal wanted Congress to send a minister and a consul to Lisbon after which it would reciprocate by naming a diplomat of equal rank to the United States.3
Jefferson joined Adams in London for negotiations with Pinto in the spring of 1786. On 5 July 1786, Jay received their joint letter of 25 April announcing that the treaty had been concluded as far as Pinto was authorized to proceed.4 In a circular letter of 6 July, Jay informed the governors of the states that he anticipated that Portugal would soon conclude a commercial treaty with the United States.5 When no treaty had arrived by January 1787, he correctly assumed that it had met with obstacles. Although Pinto claimed to be uninformed about what the obstacles were, Jefferson speculated that negotiation of an Anglo-French commercial treaty would lessen Portugal’s “care” about the United States.6
The uncertainty unresolved, Congress ordered William Stephens Smith to visit Portugal, ostensibly to present a letter to the Queen thanking her for ordering a Portuguese squadron to extend protection from the Barbary pirates to American ships in the Mediterranean, but also to learn what he could about why the treaty had not been signed and to promote conclusion of the treaty.7 Although they refused to specify a reason for the delay, the Portuguese insisted that the negotiations be continued by an American minister in Lisbon rather than in London. It was not until February 1791, when Congress responded to Portugal’s appointment of a minister to the United States by naming David Humphreys minister to Portugal, that formal diplomatic relations were established between the United States and Portugal. The treaty was never concluded.8
1. The resolution of 7 May 1784 empowered JA, TJ, and BF “or the greater part of them, … to negotiate and sign treaties of amity and commerce, … transmitting them to Congress for their final ratification.” The term of their commissions was four years. See 26: 357–62; 7: 419–21, 551. For the commissioners’ letter transmitting a draft treaty to Sousa Coutinho, see 16: 437–38. For his remarks on the draft treaty, see JJ’s report of 17 May 1785, above. For his suggestion that the treaty with Portugal should include provisions for mutual defense against the Barbary pirates and for restricting importation of Portuguese and American products to the ships of either nation, see JJ’s report to Congress, 20 Oct. 1785, above.
2. For Portuguese concerns about damage to its relationship with Britain, see TJ to JJ, 13 Aug. 1786, ALS, DNA: PCC, item 87, 1: 367–68; and 10: 241–42 (EJ: 10132).
3. See TJ to JJ, 11 Oct. 1785 (EJ: 10108); 7: 419–20, 428, 573; 8: 608; and JA to JJ, 26 Feb. 1786, below. At this time Ignace Palyart, a Portuguese merchant resident in Philadelphia, had informed JJ that the Portuguese secretary of state for foreign affairs had asked him verbally to determine whether the United States was interested in negotiating a treaty of commerce with Portugal. JJ was open to establishing relations with Portugal but refused to commit to anything specific with an unaccredited individual. See Palyart to JJ, 15 Sept. 1785, ALS, in French with draft translation by John Pintard, DNA: PCC, item 78, 18: 573–78 (EJ: 10497); LbkC, in French with translation by Pintard, , 1: 463–65 (EJ: 1773); and 4 Oct. ALS, DNA: PCC, item 78, 18: 579–82 (EJ: 10498); LbkC, , 1: 463–65 (EJ: 1787); JJ to Palyart, 23 Sept. 1785, C of Dft, dated September 1785, DNA: PCC, item 80, 414 (EJ: 146); Dft, NNC (EJ: 5774); LbkC, , 1: 477 (EJ: 1778).
4. See the American Commissioners to JJ, 25 Apr. 1786, 9: 406–7. Pinto (1735–1804) had powers to negotiate, but not to sign a treaty. See TJ to Carmichael, 5 May 1786, 9: 448–49. For the draft treaty, and the observations of the American and Portuguese ministers on it, see 9: 410–33.
5. See JJ to Carmichael, 4 Jan. 1787, below; 11: 29, 35, 66–67, 77–78. On 26 Sept. 1786, JJ forwarded to Congress JA’s letter of 27 June, DNA: PCC, item 84, 6: 307–10 (EJ: 11893); Giunta, Emerging Nation, 3: 206, in which he reported that the Queen of Portugal had ordered a squadron that protected Portuguese shipping from Barbary corsairs to extend its protection to American vessels. In his report of 25 Jan. 1787, JJ submitted a draft letter thanking the Queen and recommended that it be sent to JA, whose secretary, Smith, should deliver it in person. On 3 Feb. 1787, JJ reported the final text of the letter. See 31: 692; 32: 16–17; DNA: PCC, item 81, 3: 181–82; 11: 512–13; and 24: 84. On Smith’s mission to Portugal, see his letter to JJ of 12 Sept. 1787, ALS, DNA: PCC, item 92, 304–19 (EJ: 10849). For protection of American commerce by Portugal, see 27: 197–98, 264–66.
6. Ongoing negotiations for an Anglo-French commercial treaty threatened Portugal’s long-time special relationship with England, embodied in the treaty of Methuen (1703), which provided for close diplomatic relations and beneficial commercial arrangements for Portuguese brandies. Sheffield had sharply criticized the Methuen treaty and asserted that it was against the interest of all the great maritime powers to protect Americans from the Barbary corsairs, or to encourage the American carrying trade in the Mediterranean. See Observations on the Commerce of the American States (London, 1784), 204–5, 232–34; and the editorial note “The Barbary Powers: A Problem with No Ready Solution,” above. On the Anglo-French commercial treaty, see Oscar Browning, “The Treaty of Commerce between England and France in 1786,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, new series, 2 (1885): 349–64; and W. O. Henderson, “The Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of 1786,” Economic History Review, new series, 10, no. 1 (1957): 104–12.
7. For his lengthy report on his visit, see Smith to JJ, 12 Sept. 1787, ALS, DNA: PCC, item 92: 304–19 (EJ: 10849); 3: 570–87; and JJ’s report on Relations with Portugal, 12 Mar. 1788, below.
8. See 19: 320–21, 572–74.