Lafayette, John Jay’s Self-Appointed “Political Aide-de-Camp” Takes on the Spanish Editorial Note
Lafayette, John Jay’s Self-Appointed “Political
Aide-de-Camp,” Takes on the Spanish
Several months after the victory at Yorktown Congress gave Lafayette permission to return to France where, it hoped, he would press the French to continue to support the United States with money and military forces. The Marquis, however, did not confine himself to this assignment. He frequently attended the conferences of the American Commissioners with Oswald during the fall of 1782 and actively communicated with the French court.1
As Anglo-American negotiations drew to a close, Lafayette was offered a commission to command the land forces in a Franco-Spanish expedition that d’Estaing was to lead against the British West Indies,2 and asked the American commissioners for authorization to accept the assignment. At a meeting at Passy on 23 November, he presented them with two letters, the first, written to Vergennes the day before,3 urging “instantaneous succor” for the United States, and the second, his letter to them of 21 November 1782, above.
Neither letter pleased the commissioners. That to Vergennes, outlining American finances and stating the need for further French aid “nettled F[ranklin] as it seemed an Attempt to take to himself the Merit of obtaining the Loan if one should be procured.”4 His claim that he had been “detained” in Europe by Jay and Franklin “upon Political Accounts” irked them, since Lafayette had explicitly asked Franklin to justify his delay in returning to America the previous June.5 Adams remarked in his diary: “He grasps at all civil, political and military, and would be thought the Unum necessarium in every Thing. He has so much real Merit, such Family Supports, and so much favour at Court, that he need not recur to Artifice.”6 Despite their irritation the three commissioners provided him with a letter releasing him from any diplomatic duties, and he left soon after for Spain.7
At Cádiz, Lafayette became impatient with the fleet’s delay and pressed Vergennes for permission to solicit funds from Spain for his adopted country. After reporting to Jay on his activities and impressions,8 he traveled to Madrid, where Carmichael welcomed his assistance in securing Spain’s formal recognition of him as chargé d’affaires of the United States, without which he was unwilling to act now that Britain had recognized American independence.9
Once Spain and France signed the Preliminaries with England on 20 January 1783, the armada assembled at Cádiz was broken up, and Lafayette was free to devote his attention to Carmichael and to enlightening the “prejudices of the Spanish ministry” about America. Wearing the uniform and sword of an American major-general, and acting in concert with Montmorin, he was received at the Pardo by Charles III. The king, he commented, had “odd notions” about the American Revolution and feared it would encourage the Spanish colonies to seek independence, while Floridablanca seemed to like America little, and not to know it at all. In a conference memorialized in his letter to Floridablanca of 19 February, Lafayette obtained his pledge to send a minister or chargé d’affaires to Congress, and persuaded him to accept Carmichael’s credentials as secretary to the American mission and to present him to the king as soon as Jay could be informed and had signified his approval.
A discussion of even more substantive matters followed. Prior to the meeting Lafayette and Montmorin had concluded that, if Spain accepted the western boundary as conceded by Britain to the United States in the Anglo-American treaty, it would be “for fear of a dispute that would fulfill Lord Shelburne’s object”—rapprochement between the United States and England. Although Lafayette believed he had persuaded the Spanish to adopt the boundaries, when asked to confirm this, Floridablanca was evasive and would go no further than to say that the king was presently “inclined” to follow them, but was awaiting information as to whether there were “difficulties or disadvantages in this plan.” When pressed by Lafayette for further clarification, Floridablanca commented that the information pertained only to “unimportant Details which he wished to receive from the Spanish Commandants, which would be amicably regulated and would by no Means oppose the general Principle.” With regard to the Mississippi, Floridablanca suggested that “fear of raising a subject of dispute” (contraband) was the only objection he would have to free navigation of it. Montmorin believed that this might be negotiable, although with difficulty. Lafayette, however, indicated that he had found Floridablanca “Very Repugnant” to considering it. Trade matters, he said, would be settled through reciprocal agreements in a treaty with the United States. Lafayette did not confine his efforts to Floridablanca. He also raised boundary issues with José de Gálvez. Although he met resistance, Lafayette believed that he had left the Spanish ministers “in a Sincere and Steady Intention to Cultivate the Friendship of America . . . and Earnestly desirous to Maintain a Good Harmony and live in friendship and Good Neighboourly Union With the United States.”10
Without waiting for Jay’s consent, Floridablanca invited Carmichael to a dinner he was giving in Madrid for the ambassadorial corps. Lafayette also attended. The sudden haste to accept Carmichael, whom Lafayette described as “Much and universally Beloved and Respected in that Country,” was prompted at least as much by fear that Jay would return to Madrid as by diplomatic necessity. It was not, however, until 22 August that Carmichael was formally presented at Court as chargé d’affaires of the United States.11 On his return to France in March 1783 Lafayette apparently presented Jay an account, not found, of his activities in Spain that Lafayette mentioned in a letter to Robert R. Livingston.12
1. See John Jay’s Diary of the Peacemaking, 12–29 Oct. 1782, above.
2. On this mission, see Jonathan R. Dull, The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774–1787 (Princeton, N.J., 1975), 317–19.
3. See Lafayette to Vergennes, 22 Nov. 1782, , 6: 67–60.
4. See , 3: 71; and for more extensive comments, , 14: 417–18.
5. See Lafayette to BF, and BF to Lafayette and to RRL, all 25 June 1782, , 37: 534–35, 537; and Lafayette to RRL, 5 Feb. 1783, , 5: 89.
6. See , 3: 71–72; and , 14: 417–19, where JA remarked that Lafayette had “gained more applause than human nature at 25 can bear.” JA warned James Warren about the marquis’s ambition and complained that Congress had lowered itself and their foreign ministers by instructing them to consult him.
7. The marquise de Lafayette also asked JJ, on her husband’s behalf, for a written authorization for his leave. See the American Peace Commissioners to Lafayette, 27 Nov. 1782, above; Adrienne de Noailles, marquise de Lafayette to JJ, 27 Nov. 1782, ALS, NNC (EJ: 6748 and 90008), and : 510; and JJ’s reply to her of 28 Nov. 1782, above.
8. As JJ predicted, Lafayette obtained no money from Spain. See Lafayette to JJ, 26 Dec. 1782, and JJ to Lafayette, 19 Jan. 1783, both above; and Lafayette to Vergennes, 1 Jan. 1783, FrPMAE: CP-EU, 23: 48.
9. See Carmichael to RRL, 30 Dec. 1782, 18 Jan. and 21 Feb. 1783, , 6: 184–85, 216, 259; and Lafayette to Carmichael, 20 Jan. 1783, , 5: 81–82.
10. Floridablanca reported this encounter with Lafayette to Gardoqui in a letter of 28 Jan. 1786. Lafayette, he said, had insisted that Spain accept the Florida boundaries that Britain and the United States had agreed on. This, Floridablanca claimed he had said, he would do only temporarily, until Spain and Britain had concluded a definitive treaty with one another. He indicated that he had told Lafayette, however, that Spain would never accept the boundaries set in the Anglo-American treaty because it attempted to convey land that belonged to neither, and did not think the Americans would do them the “injustice of thinking we were so stupid or weak that in something which concerns us we would accept the injustice which they and the English wished to impose.” See Lafayette to Vergennes, 18 Feb., to Floridablanca, 19 Feb. with the appended note, and to RRL, 2 Mar. 1783 (, 5: 99–107); and , 3: 80. JJ, as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, embedded the first two letters in his report to Congress of 17 Aug. 1786 as part of a discussion about the territorial claims of Spain east of the Mississippi River and about French support for American claims to navigate the Mississippi. See , 31: 537–52.
While Lafayette indicated to Vergennes that Spain’s disposition toward the U.S. was conciliatory, Montmorin was more realistic about the likelihood that Spain would conclude a treaty with the United States, grant navigation of the Mississippi, or make trade concessions. See Montmorin to Vergennes, 19 Feb., and Vergennes to Montmorin, 1 Apr. 1783, FrPMAE: CP-E, 610: 253–57, 392. On the failure of JJ’s negotiations in Paris, see the editorial note “John Jay Opens Negotiations with Aranda” on pp. 29–32.
11. Lafayette to Vergennes, 18 Feb. and to RRL, 2 Mar.; and Montmorin to Vergennes, 19 Feb. 1783, cited in note 10 above; and Carmichael to RRL, 13 Mar. 1783, , 6: 294.
Lafayette and Montmorin both reported that Floridablanca found JJ’s manner of negotiating distasteful, and suggested to Vergennes that he could facilitate negotiations in Spain if he could find some pretext for keeping JJ in Paris. JJ, however, expected to return to Spain as late as 22 Apr. 1783. See , 5: 98; and Montmorin to Vergennes, 22 Feb. 1783, FrPMAE: CP-E, 610: 265–66. Congress received information in August 1783 about Carmichael’s reception in Carmichael’s letter of 13 Mar. 1783. See , 20: 570, 631; and , 6: 294–98. Floridablanca agreed to present Carmichael to the king only after being reminded that he had promised to do so in letters to both Carmichael and Lafayette. See Carmichael to RRL, 30 Aug. 1783, , 6: 663–67.
12. See JJ to Lafayette, [5] Mar. 1783, : 518–19; and Lafayette to RRL, 2 Mar. 1783, , 6: 268; , 5: 106.