Notes on John Jay’s Conference with Floridablanca, 11 May 1780
Notes on John Jay’s Conference with Floridablanca
Aranjues 11th. May 1780.
Mr. Jay having waited on the Count D’Florida Blanca in Consequence of a Message received on the Evening of the 10th.1 The latter commenced the Conversation by observing that he was sorry that his Ignorance of the English Language prevented him from speaking with that Ease and Frankness, with which he wished to do in his Conferences with Mr. Jay, and which corresponded with his own Disposition and Character.
He observed that he intended to speak on two Points,— The first related to the Letter Mr. Jay had written to him, on the Subject of Bills of Exchange drawn on him by Congress, that being an affair the most pressing and more immediately necessary to enter upon.2 He said that the last year he should have found no Difficulty on that Head, but that at present, although Spain had money, she was in the situation of Tantalus, who with Water in View could not make use of it—alluding to the Revenue arising from their Possessions in America, which they were not able to draw from thence.3 That their Expenses in the Year 1779 had been so great, particularly for the marine, as to oblige them to make large Loans, which they were negotiating at present. He entered into a Summary of those Expenses, and particularized the enormous Expense of supporting thirty five Ships of the Line and Frigates in French Ports. He observed that to do this they had prepared a very expensive and numerous Convoy at Ferrol and other Ports of Spain, loaded with Provisions naval Stores and every other Article necessary for the Squadron before mentioned, which Convoy did not arrive at Brest, until the Day on which the Spanish Fleet sailed from thence. That the Supplies so sent had emptied their Magazines at Cadiz, Ferrol and their other Ports, and had consequently obliged them to buy at enormous Prices the necessary Stores to supply the Fleet under the admirals Cordova and Gaston,4 on their arrival in the Ports of Spain. That they had been forced to Sell these Stores thus sent to France, and others purchased for the same purpose at Bordeaux, Nantes and elsewhere, at half Price; and added that their Loss on this occasion could scarce be calculated. This joined to the other Expenses and the great Losses they had sustained in their Marine and Commerce, but chiefly in the former and the great Expenses they were at in Consequence thereof, rendered it difficult for the King to do for America what he could have done easily the last Year, and which he declared repeatedly and in the strongest manner it was his intention to do, as might be judged from his Conduct heretofore, touching slightly on the Succours sent us from Spain, the Havana and Louisiana, but dwelling on his Conduct in the negotiation last year with great Britain, in which he would on no account be brought to sacrifice the Interest of America—5 Such being his majesty’s Disposition and Intentions previous to the War, Mr. Jay might easily judge, that he was not less determined at present to support their Interests, whether formally connected with America by Treaty or not. That notwithstanding the Losses and Misfortunes sustained, the King’s Resolution, Courage and Fortitude induced him to continue the War, and therefore they were obliged to incur much Expense in order to fill their Magazines and make the necessary Preparations for this Campaign and the next, yet that it was his Majesty’s Intentions to give America all the assistance in his Power. That it was as much his Inclination as Duty to second these Dispositions, and that he had received the Kings orders to confer with his Colleagues theron. He observed however that although he was first Secretary of State, he must first confer with them on this Subject, and from his own personal Inclinations to second the King’s Intentions and to serve America, he was desirous of concerting, with Mr. Jay, measures in such a manner as would prevent him from meeting with opposition from his Colleagues and therefore he spoke to him not as a minister but as an Individual. In order to facilitate this, he said it was necessary to make some overtures for a Contract, in case Mr. Jay was not absolutely empowered to make one, and then he pointed out the object most essential to the Interests of Spain at the present Conjuncture. He said that for their Marine they wanted light Frigates, Cutters, or swift sailing Vessels of that Size. That for Ships of the Line, they could procure them themselves; That if America could furnish them with the former, they might be sent to their Ports in Biscay loaded with Tobacco or other Produce, and, discharging their Cargoes, be left at the Disposition of Spain. He also mentioned Timber for Vessels, but said that was an article which was not so immediately necessary, though it might be an Object of Consequence in future.6 He observed that he mentioned this at present in order that Mr. Jay might turn his thoughts on that Subject as soon as possible, and that he would in order to explain himself with more Precision, send him either on Saturday or Sunday next Notes containing his Ideas on this Subject, and adding that he hoped that the one, Vizt Jay, would assist the other, meaning himself, to manage Matters in such a Way as to procure the means of obtaining for America present aid.7
With respect to the Bills of Exchange which might be presented, he said that at the End of the present Year or in the Beginning of the next, he would have it in his Power to advance 25,000, 30,000 or 40,000 Pounds Sterling, and in the mean Time, should these Bills be presented for Payment, he would take such measures as would satisfy the owners of them Vizt. By engaging in the name of his Majesty to pay them, observing that the Kings good Faith and Credit, was so well known, that he did not imagine this would be a difficult matter.8 He also said that in consequence of what Mr. Jay had written with Respect to Clothing for the American Army, it might be in his Power to send Supplies of Cloth, &c. which he would endeavor to do.9
Mr. Jay in answer assured him of his high Sense of the Frankness and Candor with which he had been so obliging as to communicate the Kings Intentions and his own Sentiments, and gave him the strongest assurances that he should for his Part with the same Frankness and Candor give him all the assistance and Information in his Power, to forward his generous Intentions in Favor of his Country, and that he might depend that in doing this, he would neither deceive him in his Information, or mislead him by ill grounded Expectations.
The Count then expressed his Confidence in these assurances, said he had been well informed of the characters both of Mr. Jay and Mr. Carmichael (who was present at the Conference) said that he considered them as les Hommes honnetes, and that no Consideration could have prevailed upon him to have treated with Men who did not sustain that Reputation.
The Count then proceeded to the second Point Vizt with Respect to the Treaty in Contemplation between Spain and America. He began by observing that he now spoke as a Minister, and as such that he would be as candid and frank as he had just been speaking as a private Man; and that it was always his Disposition to be so with those from whom he expected the same Conduct. He then proceeded to observe, That there was but one obstacle, from ^which^ he apprehended any great Difficulty in forming a Treaty with America, and plainly intimated that this arose from the Pretensions of America to the navigation of the Mississippi. He repeated the Information which the Court had received from Monsieur Miralles, that Congress had at one Time relinquished that Object;10 That he also knew from the same Source that afterwards they had made it an essential Point of the Treaty. He expressed his uneasiness on this Subject, and entered largely into the views of Spain with Respect to the Boundaries. (He mentioned Cape Antonio and Cape 11 and expressed their Resolution if possible of excluding the English entirely from the Gulf of Mexico) They wished to fix by a Treaty which he hoped would be perpetual between the two Countries. He spoke amply of the King’s anxiety, Resolution and Firmness on this Point, and insinuated a wish that some method might be fallen upon to remove this Obstacle. He observed that the King had received all his Impressions with Respect to the necessity of this measure previous to his being in Place,12 and appeared to regard it as a Point from which his Majesty would never recede, repeating that still however he was disposed to give America all the Aid in his Power, consistent with the Situation of his Affairs, to distress the common Enemy;13 That this Point being insisted on, it would be necessary for the Court of Spain to obtain the most accurate knowledge of local Circumstances, with which he supposed Mr. Jay and his Constituents were more fully appraised than his Majestys Ministers could be. That for this Purpose he had already written to the Havanna and Louisiana, in order to obtain all the necessary Information, which he gave Reason to believe they had not yet received. He dwelt on the necessity of this Information previous to any Treaty, and expressed his own Regret that Ways and Means could not be found to obviate or overcome this Impediment. Mr. Jay here took an Opportunity to mention that many of the States were bounded by that River, and were highly interested in its navigation, but observed that they were equally inclined to enter into any amicable Regulations, which might prevent any Inconveniences with Respect to Contraband or other objects which might excite the Uneasiness of Spain.14 The Count still however appeared to be fully of Opinion that this was an Object that the King had so much at Heart, that he would never relinquish it, adding however that he hoped some middle way might be hit on which would pave the way to get over this Difficulty and desired Mr. Jay to turn his thoughts and attention to the Subject, in which he assured him he was as well disposed to assist him, as in the means of procuring the Assistance and Succours for America before mentioned; always repeating the Kings favorable Disposition, his inviolable Regard to his Promises &c. &c. On this Subject he also subjoined that whenever Mr. Jay chose to go to Madrid, he desired to have previous notice of it; for in those Cases he would leave his Sentiments in Writing for him with Mr. Carmichael, or, if he should also, that he would then write to Mr. Jay there, to which he might return an Answer by the Parle, (a Post which goes to and from Madrid) to Aranjues, every Twenty four Hours.
Mr. Jay expressed his full Confidence in what the Count had done him the Honor to communicate to him, and assured him of his Satisfaction and Happiness in having the good Fortune to transact a Business so important to both Countries with a Minister so liberal and candid in his manner of thinking and acting.
The Conference ended with much Civility on the one Part, and on the other, and with an Intimation from the Count that he should take an opportunity of having the Pleasure of Mr. Jay’s Company at Dinner and of being on that friendly Footing on which he wished to be with him.
LbkCs, DNA: PCC, item 110, 1: 132–42; NNC: JJ Lbks. 1 and 5; CSmH. Embedded in JJ to the President of Congress, 26 May 1780, below.
2. JJ to Floridablanca, 29 Apr. 1780, above.
3. Floridablanca had anticipated this problem a year earlier, shortly before Spain declared war on Britain. He became the leading proponent for establishing a national bank that could issue notes to supply currency needs and offer credit against specie held in the Americas for merchants engaged in trade with Spain’s possessions when specie shipments were blocked by war. Floridablanca’s proposal was not accepted at this time. The financial stresses created by Spain’s entrance into the war necessitated the issue of the vales reales described in the editorial note above. These stresses were acute at the time of this conference. On Floridablanca’s plan, see Earl J. Hamilton, “Plans for a National Bank in Spain, 1701–83,” Journal of Political Economy 57, no. 4 (August 1949): 329–33.
4. Admiral Luis de Córdova y Córdova, commander of a Spanish squadron of 16 ships, and Lieutenant General Miguel Gaston; both commanded squadrons involved in the invasion force. , 31.
5. Spain had previously attempted to persuade Britain to give it Gibraltar in return for Spain’s neutrality in a war between France and Britain. This having failed, Spain decided that only an invasion and occupation of part of England would induce that country to give up Gibraltar, and Spain made French participation in an invasion of England in 1779 a condition for signing the Convention of Aranjuez in April of that year. See , 77–80. On the mismanaged invasion, see David Syrett, The Royal Navy in European Waters during the American Revolutionary War (Columbia, S.C., 1998), 61–79; and , 27–42. Spain had also suffered several other heavy naval losses in January 1780.
JJ would later suggest that “fruitless altercation” in Congress over whether Arthur Lee should be designated minister to Spain had delayed the mission until after Spain entered the war and thereby cost the United States the opportunity to obtain loans, since Spain was then using “all her money to defray the expense of it.” , 1: 328; , 31–32, 49, 64–69; , 46, 50, 52–53, 60–61, 78–82.
6. In the course of the debate on the instructions to be given to the minister to Spain, John Dickinson had proposed that the United States should attempt to persuade Spain to grant navigation of the Mississippi to the sea and a subsidy by committing itself to providing Spain with whatever ship masts it could spare once its own needs were satisfied. His proposal was not adopted. , 15: 1042–43. Montmorin reported that the remaining ships of the Spanish navy were in poor condition and that Spain was devoid of naval supplies. He also noted that the ineffective naval minister, the marquis de Castejón, was allied with Floridablanca in restraining the ambitions of José de Gálvez. Floridablanca may also have been aware that Miralles, Spain’s unofficial representative in Philadelphia, had been negotiating a mast contract with Silas Deane. See , 178–80; and, on the mast proposal, Deane to JJ, 4 Sept. 1780, LbkC, CtHi (EJ: 2899); and Robert F. Jones, “William Duer and the Business of Government in the Era of the American Revolution,” , 3rd ser., 32 (July 1975): 397. For Congress’s response to Floridablanca’s interest in obtaining vessels from the United States, see , 16: 149, 150. Naval stores remained an element in postwar negotiations between Spain and the United States.
7. See Floridablanca to JJ, 7 June, and JJ to Floridablanca, 9 June, below. In his letter to the President of Congress of 26 May, below, JJ noted that he had not received Floridablanca’s ideas as soon as promised.
8. The king had, in fact, seriously impaired his credit by having defaulted on debts incurred by his predecessors in the early years of his reign. Earl J. Hamilton, “War and Inflation in Spain, 1780–1800,” Quarterly Review of Economics 59 (November 1944): 38.
9. See JJ to Floridablanca, 25 Apr., above. Floridablanca later decided that clothing captured from the British would be used to supply the Americans. See Gardoqui to JJ, 15 Sept., and notes; and Notes on John Jay’s Conference with Floridablanca, 23 Sept. 1780, below.
10. See the editorial note “Congress Appoints John Jay Minister to Spain,” : 712; , 13: 369; 14: 924–26; , 18–20.
11. Space left blank in manuscript.
12. Floridablanca had replaced Grimaldi as first secretary of state in 1777.
13. One of Spain’s most important war objectives was recovery of the Floridas. Bernardo de Gálvez had begun a campaign to recover them immediately after the war began. Floridablanca’s pledge of support here was no doubt related to his hope for American support for this effort. See the editorial note “Congress Appoints John Jay Minister to Spain,” : 710, 713.
14. JJ later claimed that he was “early convinced” that, if the United States could obtain independence and a speedy peace, it should not protract the war to conquer the Floridas or to obtain navigation of the Mississippi, which, he believed, the United States had no immediate need for and which Spain would probably allow “partial use of.” He believed that if Spain would acknowledge American independence, contribute to the war effort, grant a “proper sum of money or an annual subsidy,” and give the Americans a free port on the Mississippi guaranteed by treaty, the United States should not demand navigation of it “below our territories.” See , 1: 329.