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To George Washington from Major General Robert Howe, 16–17 March 1780

From Major General Robert Howe

Highlands [N.Y.] 16th[–17] March 1780

Dear Sir

I have been honourd with your Excellencys favours of the 11th Instt, one of them Reach’d me on the Evening of the 14th, the o⟨ther⟩ Early in the morning of the 15th.1 I had received informations Similar to yours and had written to your Excellency upon the subject and was just Sending off by Express whe⟨n⟩ your letter arrived and render’d his goi⟨ng⟩ un[n]ecessary.

I had also written to Governor Clinton handing him the intelligence I had receiv’d, and had by express order’d Poors Brigade to hold it Self in Readiness to act on a moments warning, and I flatter my self had taken all the measures necessary that my situation would admit. After giving Governor Clinton A detail of the intelligence I had receiv’d I wrote him thus—“In consequence of this Sir I have order’d Poor’s Brigade to hold it Self in readiness to move on a moments warning, & shall have all here prepar’d to Act as Occasion shall require If I find this Post not their Object (A Circumstance however far from being impossible tho’ their Operations at present wear a different Aspect) and that they are moving in Force against his Excellency—I shall with Poors, and with all the Troops that can with propriety be spared from hence Call their Attention to their Rear by a movement towards their lines, Against which I shall Act as Circumstances point out. In which case Sir, or if they come out against me, I shall, it is probable, need the assistance of a Part of your Militia, and tho’ I would by no means wish them Embodied or Call’d forth Unless necessity makes it requisite, (of which your Excellency shall receive the Earliest Information) yet I take the liberty to suggest as a measure not u[n]necessary, that they should be warned to be ready lest Occasion should require it, & If Militia must be called into the Field, I would hint to your Excellency, that they should be Order’d to bring with them twelve or fourteen days Provision our Stores not affording an Adequate supply”—This sir is an Extract from What I wrote the Governour.2

I have nothing of importance that is new from the lines, all accts Concur to shew that the Enemy meant some movement and by their preparations those movements were to be important. By the way of long Island I hear that the militia of King and Queen Counties are regularly traind once a week, that they have been orderd to wear Uniforms but have refus’d, that most of the Hessians who were canton’d on long Island had remov’d or were removing to york Island that three Regiments were said to be Destin’d for west Indies, & that the Hessians were Exceedingly unruly and discontented.3 I have Persons down for intelligence that I expect will give me fuller information.

I would not wish at any time to trouble Your Excellency with a Detail of Grievance that can not be remedied from your Quarter, and which I have Excerted my self by every means in my power to remedy by Operations here, But it is my Duty to inform you that I apprehend an Approaching want of provision Our present Stock is by no means adequate to the Critical Situation of Affairs, and unless the Roads mend it will be lessening every day. Reiterated orders have been sent to the Commissaries of Every sort in this Department, to forward what they have on hand, and to strain Every Nerve to procure all they can, Every necessary Application to the Civil Authority has been had, for Even every magistrate has been Individually Address’d, and his assistance requested in the most pointed terms, and I believe all have been and are Strenuously Endeavouring to supply us But sir I fear that the supplies can not be had in the requisite quantities, and should this be the case the Efforts tho’ laudable will not be attended with the wish’d for success. Should the Roads however mend an immediate want will be prevented, and as some Active Commissaries have not written in a manner totally discouraging, I hope for the best and that we may Spin it out till the new crop arrives.

The works progress much More slowly than I wish,4 Our numbers will not admit of a very large Fatigue, beside this the want of Teams which we have no Forage to support, is a capital hindrance; I have written to the Governour to Assist us with Teams, by Calling Out those of the substantial Farmers who are Capable of bringing or sending their own Forage and if we obtain them we shall go on with More Facility5—I should have Ventured to have taken Teams in the Neighbourhood, but those who had them have no Forage & have mostly sent their Horses to Places remote.

I am preparing the chain and shall put it Accross the moment the River will admit of it Now I have mentiond the Chain permit me in a few words to Express to your Excellency, the doubts I have of its Sufficiency (in this private manner) when I Consider the amazing impetus with which a Vessel Under full sail and Calculated for this purpose may be made to come in contact with this kind of Obstruction tho’ Even so well Constructed, I have my fears that no single work of this kind will be Effectual, Especially as it is to be expected that more than one Vessel will be appropriate to the Business, that should the first be brought up, her whole weight assisted by Tide and wind will be upon the chain, and will aid and Cooperate with the shock of the next Vessel One Chain behind another the last so near the first that the Vessels will not have space to regain their way would be most likely to Succeed, and if this can not be done Every single Chain should in my humble opinion be assisted with a proper number of Anchors and Cables.

I am aware that it is Said that the turn in the River will Occasion a Vessel so Much to lose her way, that she will not much more than drift against the chain, but I have taken the Angles and am fully persuaded this Circumstance of security is Overated. Excuse my Dear General my mention of this matter, the Opinion impress’d it self upon me, and I should not have treated your Excellency with that sincerity I ought, and always mean to do, had I not mention’d it.6

The number of Fatigue men not being sufficient to carry on the new works and properly secure the Old & most important I have thought it adviseable to Confine the Engineers to the latter, as those in this time of Expectation, are our principal dependence.

I would wish to receive your Excellency’s particular instructions as to Stoney & Verplanks Points, Your Excellency cannot but be sensible that should the Enemy think proper to make them an Object, they will come out with a force adequate in their Opinion to the Undertaking, and Endow’d with Every military requisite. In that case would you have the Garrisons take the consequences of an Investiture, and Defend the Posts to the last Extremity, And shall I attempt to support them in Force or by Harrassing and annoying the Enemy retard & perplex their Operations.

These and Every other instructions I receive from you shall be obey’d with As much Exactness as pleasure. I come now my Dear sir to a part of my letter as disagreeable to my Self as I fear it will be to you, and which I would not pain you with did not duty Exact it of me, I mean the Exceeding weak state of our Troops. Having direct’d Officers to make themselves Perfectly Acquainted with their Posts & the means of Defending them General Paterson writes me that “I am surpris’d at our weakness, it will not be in my power to Parade in a case of sudden Emergency more than six hundred men”—The inconvenience however Sir if alarm happend would be remedied by moving over Troops from their cantonments on this side, but an almost proportionate weakness pervades the whole—Under these Circumstances it may possibly be requisite to call down a part of Poors Brigade, but you are the best Judge of this. There are many men however Return’d not fit for duty from their want of shoes, and these notwithstanding will act with Vigour Should an Enemy approach, and under Providence I shall not [fail] to make the Enemy think the Task an arduous one should they undertake it. Shoes are to be had as I am inform’d in this Neighbourhood, but an order of General Heaths having not been complied with, & no new order at present to direct the Clothier as from the Character I have of him I suppose he Acts upon proper foundation. information upon this Head given me by your Excellency would much Oblige me.7

I do not think that I have any Right to give orders to the Horse in their present situation, and if I had at this season I should not Excuse it but from absolute Necessity and with great caution I however thought it necessary to drop Colo. Moylan a hint of the information receiv’d of the Enemy’s movements, that he might not be Wholly unprepar’d should it become necessary for him to move.8

Colo. Govion is at work at Verplanks & is in a good way. ⟨mutilated9 Sir the Defences shall proceed with the Expedition our Situation will admit. With Every Circumstance of the highest Respect & sincerest Affection I am Sir Your Excellency’s Most obt Very hum. servt

R. Howe

17th at night The Express Could not be provided till now.

ALS, DLC:GW.

1GW’s letters to Howe of 11 March [letter 1, letter 2] conveyed intelligence of a possible British attack toward either the Continental army’s winter encampment at Morristown or positions in the Highlands and warned him to prepare countermeasures.

2The full letter from Howe to New York governor George Clinton dated 15 March is in Hastings and Holden, Clinton Papers description begins Hugh Hastings and J. A. Holden, eds. Public Papers of George Clinton, First Governor of New York, 1777–1795, 1801–1804. 10 vols. 1899–1914. Reprint. New York, 1973. description ends , 5:541–43. Phrasings in that rendering frequently differ from those in this extract. The opening paragraph, with apparently erroneous intelligence that Howe did not extract for GW, reads: “I yesterday did myself the Honor to inform your Excellency that I had rec’d Intelligence, that the Enemy were preparing for some grand Maneuvre, & that it apparently seem’d to tend towards Morris-Town. I had not Time then to be particular, &, therefore, take the Liberty to write you more fully by Express to Day. One of my Emissaries who left New-York the 9th Inst. told me yesterday, that the Enemy were collecting their Troops, Horse, Vessels, & Boats, & were preparing to operate in Force upon some Occasion of Importance, & their Object seem’d to be the Army at Morris-Town. Another who left York the 11th at Night says they had prepared all the Houses on the North & west Sides of Staten Island as Barracks for the Reception of Troops; that a great many Vessels were Taken up; that on the 8th a considerable Body of Horse, & some Artillery cross’d over to Staten Island; that on the 9th, 10th & 11th they were preparing to send over a large Body of Infantry; that the Hessians from Long Island were crossing to York-Island, & that their Intention manifestly was to attack the Genl. at Morris Town. The Persons who give me this Intelligence, are those who have sometime acted for me, & have been intelligent and faithfull; they do not know each other, & derive their Information from different Sources.”

3Hessian major Carl Leopold Baurmeister may have been describing these troop movements in his dispatch from New York dated 26 March: “As soon as the cold let up and the North River was navigable, his Excellency Lieutenant General von Knyphausen ordered the first winter quarters to be occupied again in good order. The changes had been made only as a precaution against an attack upon Staten Island and Powles Hook during the severe winter.

“On the 4th of this month these orders were carried out, except that Lord Rawdon’s Volunteers of Ireland went from Staten Island into quarters in Jamaica, Long Island, while von Diemar’s Corps of Hussars, which had been stationed between Lloyd’s Neck and Oyster Bay, moved to Richmond under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe” (Baurmeister, Revolution in America description begins Carl Leopold Baurmeister. Revolution in America: Confidential Letters and Journals, 1776–1784, of Adjutant General Major Baurmeister of the Hessian Forces. Translated and annotated by Bernhard A. Uhlendorf. New Brunswick, N.J., 1957. description ends , 331–47, quote on 342).

4For GW’s interest in continuing work on the fortifications at West Point, N.Y., see his letter to Howe, 10–11 March, and n.6 to that document.

5Howe’s letter to Clinton of 15 March ends with this appeal: “The Necessity of pushing with Expedition the Works necessary for the Defence of this very important Post, and the Impossibility of doing it without Teams, which we have not a Grain of Forage to support, induces me to request the Favour of your Excellency if it can with Propriety be done, to order in about thirty Teams of the substantial Farmers of your State, who are able to bring their own Forage. They may be relieved occasionally by others, &, therefore, the Duty be made as little oppressive as possible. Permit, Dear Sir, the Necessity of this Application to appologize for the Trouble I give you in it” (Hastings and Holden, Clinton Papers description begins Hugh Hastings and J. A. Holden, eds. Public Papers of George Clinton, First Governor of New York, 1777–1795, 1801–1804. 10 vols. 1899–1914. Reprint. New York, 1973. description ends , 5:541–43; see also n.2, above). Clinton responded to Howe from Poughkeepsie, N.Y., on 24 March that he lacked “Authority of Law” to furnish teams and that proper application should be made “to a Justice of the Peace who, only, is authorized to grant Impress Warrants, for this Purpose” (Hastings and Holden, Clinton Papers description begins Hugh Hastings and J. A. Holden, eds. Public Papers of George Clinton, First Governor of New York, 1777–1795, 1801–1804. 10 vols. 1899–1914. Reprint. New York, 1973. description ends , 5:553–54).

6The defensive chain across the Hudson River at West Point was put in place after considerable difficulties on 5 April (see Howe’s second letter to GW, 3 April, and Palmer, The River and the Rock description begins Dave Richard Palmer. The River and the Rock: The History of Fortress West Point, 1775-1783. New York, 1969. description ends , 228–29; see also Alexander McDougall to GW, 6 Nov. 1779, and n.5 to that document). James Manning, a Baptist minister and president of Rhode Island College (now Brown University), had described the chain in his diary entry for 16 Sept. 1779: “Went down to West Point by water. … Up to the top of the Point is a great ascent, and there a plain on which stands Fort Arnold, at the last part of the Point. A very strong fortress, with excellent bomb-proofs, and bastions below to defend the great chain stretched across just after the river turns west. The opposite shore is also strongly fortified to defend the chain, from what is called the island, and all the heights also on the east side of the river, to prevent their landing and bombarding the fort. These works, viewed from the Point, look most beautiful. These were shown us by Gen. McDugal” (Guild, James Manning description begins Reuben Aldridge Guild. Life, Times, and Correspondence of James Manning, and the Early History of Brown University. Boston, 1864. description ends , 282). For a general history, see Lincoln Diamant, Chaining the Hudson: The Fight for the River in the American Revolution (New York, 1989).

7For clothing shortages among the troops at West Point, see William Heath to GW, 26 Dec. 1779; see also Heath to GW, 27 Dec., and notes 7–9 to that document.

8Howe’s communication to Col. Stephen Moylan, if written, has not been identified. Moylan was then in Middletown, Conn. (see Moylan to GW, 29 Feb. and 28 March 1780).

9No more than two or three words appear lost from the mutilation.

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