1. On this date, GW approved drafts of letters from Pickering to Georgia governor George Mathews and Creek agent James Seagrove as well as a talk to invite the Creeks to the negotiations (see JPP, description begins Dorothy Twohig, ed. The Journal of the Proceedings of the President, 1793–1797. Charlottesville, Va., 1981. description ends 330). The letter to Seagrove and talk to the chiefs have not been identified, but the letter to Mathews evidently was a duplicate of Pickering’s letter to the governor of 29 June. While the manuscript of that letter has not been found, a lengthy extract appeared in the Columbian Herald or the New Daily Advertiser (Charleston, S.C.) on 26 October. Pickering acknowledged Mathews’s letter of 16 April and noted his reply to the governor of 20 March (see James Gunn and Thomas P. Carnes to GW, c.2 March, n.2, and Pickering to Bartholomew Dandridge, Jr., 15 May, n.2). He proceeded to inform Mathews: “The views which have since been taken of the subject, and the information received of a more pacific disposition among the Creeks, have determined the President … to assent to the wishes of the people of Georgia.” GW therefore authorized treaty negotiations for Georgians to extinguish the Creek title to tracts of land between the rivers of Oconee and Ocmulgee and between the Altamaha and the St. Marys.

“But,” stipulated Pickering, “it is to be understood, that neither this assent, nor the treaty which may be made, are to be considered as affecting any question which may arise upon the supplementary act, passed by the legislature of the state of Georgia, on the 7th of January last, upon which enquiries have been instituted in pursuance of a resolution of the senate and house of representatives, and that any cession, or relinquishment of the Indian claims, are to be made in the general terms of the treaty of New-York.” In addition, the state of Georgia must pay half of the expenses for provisions given to the Creeks at the negotiations. “The President,” wrote Pickering, “also conceives it necessary to observe peculiar caution in conducting the treaty. The justice, honor, and interest of the United States, demand, that the Indians … be secured, not only from personal insult, and injury, but against surprise, or any unfair management in the negociation.”

Pickering proposed four principles to guide the negotiations. First, the Creek chiefs should “come prepared to express the mind of the nation, and have no grounds afterwards to complain of deception or surprise.” Therefore, the invitation to the chiefs and warriors “will be given in the manner most likely to ensure a complete representation of the nation, and every object of the treaty will be explicitly mentioned in the invitation.” Second, negotiations must remain limited to the two tracts stated above. Third, talks would be held and concluded “agreeably to the act of the general government, for regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, consequently any agreement which shall be made with the Creeks by your commissioners, will become part of a treaty which will have no validity until approved, and ratified by” the president and the U.S. Senate. Finally, “Every circumstance which will tend to intimidate the Indians when assembled, to excite their jealousy, or to produce quarrels must be carefully avoided.” Therefore, other than U.S. troops, only federal and state commissioners and others deemed necessary to the negotiation could attend the session. They could not carry firearms, and the total number of citizens, including individuals who brought provisions, must not exceed fifty. The federal commissioners also would receive “pointed instructions” about the procedure.

Pickering proposed that the negotiations start in late October “at or near Fort Fidius,” unless Seagrove were to determine a different location upon consultation with Mathews. The secretary added: “The United States will take this occasion to investigate all the causes of hostility on the part of the Creeks, which have produced so much mischief on the frontiers, since the treaty of New-York; and endeavour to remove them, and to make a firm peace.”

2. GW also approved instructions for the federal commissioners on this date (see JPP, description begins Dorothy Twohig, ed. The Journal of the Proceedings of the President, 1793–1797. Charlottesville, Va., 1981. description ends 330).

3. In Virginia governor Robert Brooke’s letter to Pickering of 19 June, he reported that “the concourse of strangers of every description who daily resort to Norfolk and the neighbouring ports in different pursuits and under evident and strong impressions of jealousy and enmity to each other, naturally keep the inhabitants of those places under a general anxiety for the public peace as well as for the safety of their property which the abduction of the Garrisons from the forts in that Country has not had a tendency to alleviate.” In consequence Brooke had “been requested to throw a small detachment of militia into those Works … as a cautionary step to check the petulance and ebulitions of parties and secure the public property … from some risk.” Because “the Superintendance and direction of these objects are exclusively vested in the president,” Brooke had replied that he “would … suggest the measure to him” through Pickering, and if such a measure was “deemed proper and necessary,” then “any authority and direction to that effect will be with al[a]crity pursued” (Vi: Executive Letterbook).

GW requested a report concerning Brooke’s information, and on 3 July, Pickering informed the president: “The form of a letter occurred as a convenient and not improper mode of reporting. The draught of a letter therefore, in answer to Governor Brooke’s, is now respectfully submitted. If approved, it will be sent by this day’s post” (ALS, DLC:GW; LB, DLC:GW). GW approved the draft (not found) that same day (see JPP, description begins Dorothy Twohig, ed. The Journal of the Proceedings of the President, 1793–1797. Charlottesville, Va., 1981. description ends 330).

In his formal letter to Brooke, also dated 3 July, Pickering summarized Brooke’s letter and continued: “I am now directed by the President to inform your Excellency, That he does not conceive himself authorized to call out the militia for the preservation of the peace of any place, because the inhabitants entertain apprehensions that it is in danger. If the security of public property required a guard of militia, the service of the guard would be confined to that object. Had the federal artillerists remained at Norfolk, their duty must have been equally confined. To suppress a riot, it is presumed the magistrates of Norfolk would have judged it expedient to call forth, not the regular troops, but the citizens, the posse of the place or county-in arms, if the occasion should so require.”

Pickering then stipulated: “The power of the President to call forth the militia is limited to these objects.

“1. To repel the invasion of an enemy.

“2. To suppress an insurrection in any state against the government thereof, upon the application of the legislature of such state, or of its executive, when the legislature is not convened.

“3. When the laws of the United States are opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.

“But even in these cases of insurrection, when the President should judge it necessary to call forth the militia, the law requires that he forthwith issue a proclamation, commanding such insurgents to disperse.

“This statement, founded on the law of the United States passed on the 28th of February last, demonstrates that the case exhibited by your Excellency does not fall under the cognizance of the President of the United States” (Vi: Executive Papers of Governor Robert Brooke, 1794–1796).