To George Washington from Brigadier General Duportail, 17 May 1780
From Brigadier General Duportail
Charlestown [S.C.] 17 may 1780
Sir
You will have probably heard of the Surrender of Charlestown by the time you will receive this Letter.1 I arrived there the 25th of april at Seven in the morning, after having past during the night in the middle of the Ennemies, through the Woods, with the assistance of good Guides.2 I found the Town in a desperate State, allmost intirely invested by the British Army & Fleet, which had passed the Bar and fort Moultrie;3 they had Surmounted difficulties which were generally looked upon as insurm[ountable] without experiencing Scarce any resistance. The Enemy had brought their Trenches upon the Necks4 within about 120 or 130 Yards from the fortifications; in a word, the fall of the Town was unavoidable unless an Army came to her assistance, which then did not appear likely. after having examined the Situation of things, I thought an evacuation highly advisable and I proposed it; but the Council found an impractibility in the measure, although for my own part it only appeard to me difficult & hazardous and Such as we ought to risque in our present Situation. that Plan being rejected, the only object was to protract the term of our Capitulation: I have done on my part every thing that was in my power to fulfil that object, in the same manner as Colonel Laumoy had before my arrival;5 but time brought us to lose sight of the term of our resistance; the Ennemy Succeeded in draining part of our ditch which was in front of our entrenchments and raised new Batteries in their third Parrallel.6 the day they opened them they sent a Flag with a Letter to summon General Lincoln to Surrender, upon this a Counsil of General & field officers were called, and after having asked whether terms ought to be proposed to the Ennemy—it was carried in the affirmative by great majority, I myself was of that number. the first proposals were from the Ennemy, ⟨we⟩ might expect advantagous Conditions, I had even Some hope that we might have Saved the Garrison, besides a positive refusal to treat with an Ennemy who within a few days could have been in a condition of giving us the Law appeared imprudent and unseasonable. it was then determind in Council that propositions Should be made, but afterwards, by an extraordinary oversight they left to the General officers the care of determining what was to be proposed. This is the Moment where I left off taking any part in what has been done, being of a contrary opinion to that of the General Officers. They agreed to propose t[h]at the Continental Troops Should be prisonners of war. I opposed that Measure with all my might, I represented that if even our Situation required it, it was not our business to propose it, and that we Show’d an ignorance of what is practised in those Cases which would make us appear in a Ridicule light, I Represented that if I had been of opinion with the greatest number to propose terms to the Ennemy I meant that they Should be honorable terms both advantageous to the Army and Continent. as for instance to Surrender the Town alone with the artillery, Stores and Ships, but to save the Troops, that if the army must be prisonner of war it was more eligible to hold out in order to justify Such unfavorable conditions by a longer resistance and a more distressing Situation.
My representation had not the desired effect, the propositions were made Such as you will See them. fortunately, Such as they were the Ennemy would not grant them and proposed others less ad[v]antageous, which General Lincoln did not however think proper to accept. The Truce was broke and the operations of the Seige vigorously continued.7 but the Second day after the Militia refused to do duty General Lincoln thought from this that the Capitulation was absolutely necessary, and called the Council who countenanced the Measure.8 for my own part I thought that we ought to try before to bring the Militia to their Duty by all possible means, by acts of authority and if necessary by exemplary punishments. this was likely demed impracticable and the Capitulation took place to my great regret, not that I think that we could have held out longer than three or f⟨our⟩ days, but that time would have put the Ennemy in Such a Situation as to render a further resistance on our part blamable to every body, then our defence would have done us much more honor; it is true that in that case the conditions would not have likely been the Same, but I was for Sacrifising that advantage to a little more glory—Fortunately in all this the honor of the american arms is Secure and the Ennemy have not yet great Subject to triumph. To remain fourty Two days of open trenches before a Town of an immense extent, fortified by Sandy intrenchments raised in two Months wouthout covered way without outworks, open in several Places on the water Side exposed every where to an open attack, and defended by a Garrison which was not Sufficient by half to remain I Say forty two days before Such place and display all the apparal of a regular Siege is nothing very glorious. The British General, has perhaps followed the Rules of prudence in this conduct but at least the Troops under his commands will never have Subject of boasting of the audaciousness and Enterprising Spirit. The American Troops on the Contrary have given certain proofs of their firmness in supporting a tremendous—fire and remaining all the while exposed to the danger of a Surprise and open attacks, of which the success was almost certain if the Ennemy had taken proper Measures.9 I have the honour to be with the greatest Respect Your excellency’s the most humble and obedient servant
Duportail
LS, DLC:GW. Duportail wrote the complimentary closing and postscript. GW’s aide-de-camp Tench Tilghman inaccurately docketed the letter “19th May 1780.”
1. Following complete encirclement in late April, the American forces at Charleston, S.C., surrendered on 12 May. Aware of the strength of the British forces, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln held several councils of war in late April to consider evacuation of his army and to propose terms of surrender. Most Continental officers held Lincoln’s view, but South Carolina lieutenant governor Christopher Gadsden and some members of the state privy council disagreed. Gadsden claimed that “the Militia were willing to Live upon Rice alone rather than give up the Town upon any Terms” (, 104).
Finding retreat problematic, Lincoln concurred with his officers and sought terms of surrender from British general Henry Clinton. Unable to reach agreement, the British forces increasingly threatened the American lines and finally completed the investiture in late April by cutting the city’s last lines of communication. Military engineer Ferdinand Joseph Sebastian de Brahm recorded in his journal under 28 April: “Last night our Fort at Lamprier’s was evacuated, and taken possession of by the enemy to-day. It was not until this moment that Charlestown was completely invested; the enemy having possession of James Island, Wappoo, Charlestown Neck, Hobcaw Point, Lamprieres, and Haddrell’s Point; and his fleet anchored in the Road-stead before the town” (Gibbes, Documentary History, 2:127).
Heavy cannon fire continued on both sides after the British completed the third parallel of their siege lines in late April. Clinton summoned Lincoln to surrender on 8 May, but they continued to disagree over terms, and the artillery engagement resumed. Relentless British cannon fire and a closer enemy approach to American lines prompted state officials to agree with the officers upon the need to request terms of surrender. Militia submitted four petitions to Lincoln on 11 May with a similar entreaty. Upon the acceptance of terms, over 5,000 Continental troops, militia, and private citizens officially capitulated.
Lt. Christian Friedrich von Bartholomai, an Anspach-Bayreuth jaeger, described the surrender in his diary under 12 May: “At four o’clock in the afternoon, the garrison, consisting of between 4,000 and 5,000 men, moved out of the city, playing a Turkish march and, as prisoners of war, stacked their weapons between the two abatis. One company of English and one company of Hessian Grenadiers, with two cannons, occupied the defenses; the 7th, 42nd, and 63rd Regiments occupied the city; and the admiral [Arbuthnot] occupied the works which covered the harbor.
“Upon entering, a large English flag was raised over the city gate which was saluted by 21 shots from the cannons in our positions.
“All the siege troops moved out and formed two lines.” Bartholomai commented on the appearance of captured American officers, including brigadiers general William Woodford, Charles Scott, and Duportail. He also viewed the American “prisoners of war” as “thin, miserable, ragged, and very dirty,” with “Chagrin and anger” on their faces. The British took “fifteen flags, 343 cannons … and 2 mortars, as well as several howitzers and coehorns, and 5,416 rifles, mostly of French and Portuguese manufacture.” Bartholomai also named several captured American ships—“a total of 49”—in addition to the vessels that had been sunk (, 389–90; see also , 88–109, and , 182–94).
2. Duportail, chief engineer of the Continental army, had been sent to the southern department to assist in the defense of Charleston (see Samuel Huntington to GW, 29 March; see also GW to Duportail and to Huntington, both 27 March). In his journal entry for 26 April, Brig. Gen. Lachlan McIntosh wrote that Duportail “arrived from Philadelphia which he left the 3d Insta.—where he says there was no Prospect of our getting any Reinforcement soon from our grand Army.—Congress having only proposed to G. Washington (then at Morristown) the Sending the Maryland Line” (, 108).
3. British ships entered Charleston Harbor in late March and passed Fort Moultrie on 8 April despite receiving heavy fire from the fort (see Lincoln to GW, 9 April).
4. Duportail is referring to Charleston Neck.
5. Duportail attended a council of war held on 26 April during which Lincoln asked whether “the evacuation of this garrison was an expedient & practicable measure.” Duportail and seven other officers signed council minutes expressing their unanimous agreement that the measure was “impracticable” (DNA:PCC, item 158).
At a council of war held on 20 April, Col. Jean-Baptiste-Joseph de Laumoy had proposed that honorable “Terms of Capitulation should first be offered, which possibly might be accepted by Genl. Clinton, or, if it did not succeed that we might then attempt a retreat if we thought it could be accomplished” (, 105).
6. The British had completed two parallels on Charleston Neck by 20 April (see , 221–24). British officer Archibald Robertson indicated in his late April diary entries that the British had finished constructing a third parallel “close to their [the Continentals’] outer Ditch and Abbattis.” In his diary entry for 1 May, around 6:00 P.M., Robertson noted that “the Drain to the ditch was opened.” He wrote on 2 May that the ditch was “emptying fast” (, 225–26). In his journal for 2 May, McIntosh recorded: “Last Night the Enemy made a ditch on the right to drain our Cannal” (, 111).
McIntosh had written on 1 May that the British “appear to be about another Battery in their third paralel” (, 111). The British batteries, under construction until 4 May, included one for two 12-pounders and another for up to five 24-pounders and some mortars (see , 225–27).
7. The failed surrender negotiations occurred on 8 and 9 May. In his diary entry for 8 May, Robertson reported that with “the Cannon and Mortars … ready to Open, Sir Henry from motives of humanity sent a Flag to Town to desire they would Accept of the terms offered to them in his first Letter [10 April]” (, 228; see also Peter Muhlenberg to GW, 8 May, n.12). Lincoln called a council of officers, and a majority resolved to request surrender terms. They drafted a proposal that included twelve articles of capitulation, most notably: surrender of the town; designation of soldiers and sailors as prisoners of war; return of militia to their homes; and permission for officers to retain sidearms, horses, and baggage (see DNA:PCC, item 158). Clinton and Adm. Marriot Arbuthnot revised several articles and demanded the surrender of artillery, shipping, and stores. They would allow militia to return home “as Prisoners upon Parole” (DNA:PCC, item 158). Robertson wrote in his diary for 9 May that Lincoln sent “a very haughty Answer … that Our Proposals were inadmissable.” Hostilities recommenced that evening. In the same diary entry, Robertson continued: “At 9 the Rebels began with huzaaing and a violent Cannonade from every Gun they could fire” (, 228). Loyalist lieutenant Anthony Allaire noted in his diary for 9 May that around 8:00 P.M. “began a most tremendous cannonade, throwing of carcases and shells into the town, and an incessant fire of musketry all night” (, 16).
8. On 10 May, McIntosh wrote in his journal: “Militia abandon the lines and cannot be prevail’d upon to Join” (, 120; see also n.1 above). Robertson wrote in his diary for 11 May that Lincoln “sent out a flag expressing that by a recent Application from the Militia and Citizens wishing to Accept of the terms offered, He complyed. All hostilities ceased” (, 228–29).
9. GW commented on the siege when visiting Charleston on 4 May 1791: “I visited and examined the lines of Attack & defence of the City and was satisfied that the defence was noble & honorable altho the measure was undertaken upon wrong principles and impolitic” (, 6:130).
10. Duportail sent a duplicate of this letter to GW with his letter to Samuel Huntington, president of Congress, also written on this date (see DNA:PCC, item 164).
11. Duportail remained a prisoner until he was exchanged in November 1780 (see GW to Huntington, 7 Nov., DNA:PCC, item 152).