As this day has given me Some respite, from the Hurry of Public Business, I embrace the favorable moment to give you some intelligence on our common Concern. The Convention who Elected our Continental Delegates, being unanimous in that choice, and the last Congress having in a full House recognized that act; it was Judged inexpedient by the Present convention, (as they are ^not^ a full representation of the Colony,) to alter the Delegates, but, to lessen the expence to the Colony, they have determined that Five of the Delegates do represent it; and that no more than this number, be on the Public Service, at one time from the first of January next; and that they make such an arangement among themselves, as will answer the end of that resolution; But if one or two of the Delegates, thus appointed for a Fixed time to represent the Colony, should be sick, or by any other unavoidable accident prevented from attending for time appointed, in that case, the other Three or Four, who do attend are authorised to represent the Colony. Many other reasons suggested this measure, in preference to a New Election, which I believe will occur to you, without enumerating them. The Secretaries are ordered to Transmit, the Vote to our Delegates, and the act of the last Congress above mentioned.1 The Congress adjourned the day before yesterday, till the first of February; and appointed a Committee of Safety, consisting of thirteen members, with very ample powers. I wish they had the means of Carrying them into execution.2

If the Congress should take any other measures with Queens County, than those we have taken, they should have ^Security^ for their object; for although, the majority of the County, are not against the Public measures, Yet a majority of those who are active are against them; and therefore if Delegates should be sent by these, if ^the^ measures are to have this for their end, they would only be spies on our Conduct; without any Security of the County’s abiding by Congressional Determinations. I know of no Steps that have not many objections. If you suffer them to continue in their present State, Kings will follow their example, as Richmond has done; and whenever a Considerable number of Troops arrive, the Mal-Contents in Queens will join them.3 If you disarm the latter, and take their chiefs as Hostages; it will raise their passions, and when the Troops arrive, if they have spare arms, (which they have probably will have) the mal-Contents will receive them, to be revenged of their Country men. But notwithstanding these difficulties; the latter mode offers itself in preference to the Former. For I take it for granted, they will oppose us with arms, when they have it their Power; and by dissarming them now, we shall have their arms, to put in the Hands of our Friends; and our Enemies in the other Counties will be taught by our treatment to Queens, not to oppose the measures of the Continent. But if we passivly Suffer them to declare against the Confederacy, they will have their arms, to use against us, which we want, and the defection in the Colony will be increased by their conduct, passing with impunity.

Should the Congress adopt the measure of disarming Queens, the farther ^distant from it^ the Persons come, who are to execute the work, the safer it will be for them, and the Friends of the Cause in the County for should it be done by Suffolk, and those attached to the Cause in Queens, the malcontents would be tempted to wreak their Vengance on those neighbours. For these reasons, and those mentioned by the Convention to you, I think it will be safest for the confederacy to have our Friends in New-England deal with Queens. As many of the Jersey Vessels, which bring wood, hay, and provisions of all kinds to the City, are under the Denomination of Richmond’s, will it not be prudent to let them alone for some time, till it is seen how they will relish the treatment to Queens? I am well informed, that Colonel Dalrymple4 is on board ^the^ Phenix. As there are no Vessels here bound to England, I suspect his business here, is to examine and reconitre the state of this Colony, to enable the ministry or the General5 to form the opperations against it in the spring, or to head the adherents of the ministeral party, if they should dare to hold up their heads, or to command the Regiment And the Three Companies of Light Horse lately embarked at Boston, probably destined for Queens County, for the purpose of Securing fresh provisions for the army at Boston. For as Nassau Island6 is so distant from the main, ^but where they command^ they may think, and with too much reason, that the experiment may be tried without any great risque in that County. If they succeed in any degree, it will amply pay them in their disstressed state for fresh provisions, if not as they command at sea, they can easily embark in the Sound under the Protection of three or Four Frigates. It is Probable, the fears of their Creatures in that county, has ^induced them to^ promised them more sucess, than they can secure to them, in order to tempt the army there for their protection. We shall do the best we can, to prepare our Friends in that county ^& Suffolk^, against Such an event. But a certain necessary article is long a coming. Should not that part of New England, nearst ^to^ that county, have some intimation to be ready to give aid, if the Troops should land in Queens?

I am very anxious to hear what is determined in your cabinet, with respect to Canada, for the next Campaign. Colonel Ritzema and Captain Goforth,7 both write me ^from Montreal^ that 10,000 ^men^ will be necessary to secure the Colony and engage the Canadians heartily in the Cause; They also urge very much, the sending the army up ^Troops from hence^ on the Ice, over the lakes to be ready in the Spring. This does not indicate any Zeal in the Canadians. If my memory serves, me, General Murray, gave it as his opinion, that it would require 6,000 men to man the works of Quebec, which he assigned as the reason for hazarding the Batle of April 1760.8 I think this has been ^the^ received opinion. As our Enemies have the command of the sea, and very little Provissions are salted in Canada, suppose Quebec now in our possession, how is ^it^ to be furnished with Salt Provissions during the next Summer, in case it should be Blockaded by sea, and by Land? Remember that Ships of the Line, got by Quebec in the seige of 1759; and some of the Frigates went a Considerable distance up above it.

We are in suspence here about the destination of your Fleet. If they go to Virginia, I fear they will be ruffly handled, as some Ships of War, have been dispatched there from Boston. The Americans individuly considered, know the use of a Musket better than the best of the Kings Troops; to this in a great degree is to be ascribed the advantages, the former have gained over the Latter, when secured against their descipline. But the saylors we have picked up for our Vessels, do not understand the use of Cannon, equal to those who are continually exercised with them on board the Kings Ships, nor are ^they^ so attached to the Country, from connextions as our soldiers are, besides many of the saylors have been taught the superiority of the British Navy officers, to all others in world. Sir, there is no entrenching or covering behind Trees at sea. Superior Force or address ^only^ must determine the Victory, if the engagement once commences. You are not to measure your expectations of the success of this Fleet, against the men of war, by the success of our Troops against the Kings, or the success of our Cruisers against Transports. You may be now ready to ask me, are we then never to send out armed Vessels against the men of war, because they have been superior to all the world with equal Force at Sea. Yes. But the first experiment, should not be made, where there is danger of the force being near equal, before your officers and men are practised in Sea Engagments. If it is, our american Fleet I fear will not be long in our Possesion. I know that so much depends on address, & preparation founded on experience; that I tremble for the Consequences. A small omition determines the fate of a Sea engagement, I speak with confidence, because it is from experience. It has been the business of my life.9 A Superiour force at sea, divided in different Bottoms, is not equal to two thirds of it in fewer, because if one or two of the small vessels, on which the force is estimated should be disabled, the disparity against that side becomes instantly great. I have seen this Position exemplified at the Yea age of 14, ^when one Million of Dollars was depending^ and Since cast about for the principle. Three things must be attended to in equiping this Fleet, if they are designed to act against the Enemy on this Coast, at this stormy season. They must be able to carry a stiff sail. This does not depend so much on their being deep loaded, as on the Center of Gravity being properly placed, in stowing them, for they may be deep in the water, and yet carry a Poor but a small Sail, owing to the Center of gravity being too high. They must not be loaded deep, for if they are, they will not be able to come up with a weak Enemy, in good sailing Trim, nor escape from a stronger one. The officers, marriners, and marines should be exercised in their stations, with the Cannon and musketry with Powder before they quit the river; as they may soon expect the enemy, and stormy weather may deprive them of that advantage, before they engage. One Ton of Powder however scarce it may be, ^properly expended in this way^ will three save Five in an engagment, if not save the Fleet. New and hasty sea equipment armaments meet cruizing Ships, of near their Force on very-unequal ground. The former is generally all confusion and not properly aranged; the Latter in order, and ready for action. Hence it was that the Privateers fitted out ^of France^ the last warr fell so easy a Prey to our Frigates, altho the Ships of the Former were Superior in Size, men and Guns to ours. They same thing frequently happened to their Cruisers in the West Indies, when they came out of Port, Expressly to take ours Cruizing within their sight. I have wrote you in the confidence of Friendship, and from an anxiety for the Cause of our bleeding Country; and not with any intention the lessen the merit of any of the Gentlemen, who command those Vessels. I am in Haste your affectionate Friend