541The Federalist No. 26, [22 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IT was a thing hardly to be expected, that in a popular revolution the minds of men should stop at that happy mean, which marks the salutary boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy of government with the security of private rights. A failure in this delicate and important point is the great source of the inconveniences we...
542The Federalist No. 32, [2 January 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. ALTHOUGH I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of the consequences, which seem to be apprehended to the State Governments, from a power in the Union to controul them in the levies of money; because I am persuaded that the sense of the people, the extreme hazard of provoking the resentments of the State Governments, and a conviction of the...
543The Federalist No. 9, [21 November 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. A Firm Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty Republics of Greece and Italy, without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid...
544The Federalist No. 55, [13 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE number of which the House of Representatives is to consist, forms another, and a very interesting point of view under which this branch of the federal legislature may be contemplated. Scarce any article indeed in the whole constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention, by the weight of character and the apparent force of argument, with...
545The Federalist No. 82, [28 May 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom may distinguish the work, cannot fail to originate questions of intricacy and nicety; and these may in a particular manner be expected to flow from the establishment of a constitution founded upon the total or partial incorporation of a number of distinct sovereignties. ’Tis time only that can...
546The Federalist No. 62, [27 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. HAVING examined the constitution of the house of representatives, and answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the examination of the senate. The heads into which this member of the government may be considered, are—I. the qualifications of senators—II. the appointment of them by the state legislatures—III....
547The Federalist No. 21, [12 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the principal circumstances and events, which have depicted the genius and fate of other confederate governments; I shall now proceed in the enumeration of the most important of those defects, which have hitherto disappointed our hopes from the system established among ourselves. To form a safe...
548The Federalist No. 25, [21 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IT may perhaps be urged, that the objects enumerated in the preceding number ought to be provided for by the State Governments, under the direction of the Union. But this would be in reality an inversion of the primary principle of our political association; as it would in practice transfer the care of the common defence from the fœderal head to the...
549The Federalist No. 73, [21 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE third ingredient towards constituting the vigor of the executive authority is an adequate provision for its support. It is evident that without proper attention to this article, the separation of the executive from the legislative department would be merely nominal and nugatory. The Legislature, with a discretionary power over the salary and...
550The Federalist No. 74, [25 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE President of the United States is to be “Commander in Chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States.” The propriety of this provision is so evident in itself; and it is at the same time so consonant to the precedents of the State constitutions in...
551New York Ratifying Convention. Remarks (Melancton Smith’s Version), [12 July 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
Mr. Hamilton—Rises with reluctance. 1. because he wishes to conciliate. 2. That he is plausiable— Beleives it will not answer the purpose—though he thinks the Genn. means it to be so. The impost, acceded to—instanced—shd admonish us. 2 questions arise— 1. Our own powers 2d. The powers of Congress to receive and ye proby. No power except to accept or reject. 1st. Acts. The Resolution of the...
552New York Ratifying Convention. Third Speech of June 28 (Melancton Smith’s Version), [28 June 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
The Gent. of Ulster seems to suspect ⟨ags.⟩ were intrd. to shew inconsisty. The papers read, to prove the distress ys. State suffered. The inefficacy of Requisn.—the sentt. of ye Legislar—Dictator ye ebullition of ardent What is energetic fedl. govt—one operatg. on States or individs. Impost once passed—then repeald, afterwds. defeated—his opn. always for it—takes it for granted—but opposed in...