1The Federalist No. 78, [28 May 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. WE proceed now to an examination of the judiciary department of the proposed government. In unfolding the defects of the existing confederation, the utility and necessity of a federal judicature have been clearly pointed out. It is the less necessary to recapitulate the considerations there urged; as the propriety of the institution in the abstract is...
2The Federalist No. 79, [28 May 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. NEXT to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. The remark made in relation to the president, is equally applicable here. In the general course of human nature, a power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will . And we can never hope to see realised in...
3The Federalist No. 80, [28 May 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. TO judge with accuracy of the proper extent of the federal judicature, it will be necessary to consider in the first place what are its proper objects. It seems scarcely to admit of controversy that the judiciary authority of the union ought to extend to these several descriptions of causes. 1st. To all those which arise out of the laws of the United...
4The Federalist No. 81, [28 May 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. LET us now return to the partition of the judiciary authority between different courts, and their relations to each other. “The judicial power of the United States is (by the plan of the convention) to be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” Article 3. Sec. 1. That there...
5The Federalist No. 82, [28 May 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom may distinguish the work, cannot fail to originate questions of intricacy and nicety; and these may in a particular manner be expected to flow from the establishment of a constitution founded upon the total or partial incorporation of a number of distinct sovereignties. ’Tis time only that can...
6The Federalist No. 83, [28 May 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE objection to the plan of the convention, which has met with most success in this state, and perhaps in several of the other states, is that relative to the want of a constitutional provision for the trial by jury in civil cases. The disingenuous form in which this objection is usually stated, has been repeatedly adverted to and exposed; but continues...
7The Federalist No. 84, [28 May 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IN the course of the foregoing review of the constitution I have taken notice of, and endeavoured to answer, most of the objections which have appeared against it. There however remain a few which either did not fall naturally under any particular head, or were forgotten in their proper places. These shall now be discussed; but as the subject has been...
8The Federalist No. 85, [28 May 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers, announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for discussion, two points, “the analogy of the proposed government to your own state constitution,” and “the additional security, which its adoption will afford to republican government, to liberty and to property.” But these...
9The Federalist No. 77, [2 April 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IT has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the co-operation of the senate, in the business of appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint. A change of the chief magistrate therefore would not occasion so violent or so...
10The Federalist No. 76, [1 April 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE President is “to nominate and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the Constitution. But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior...
11The Federalist No. 75, [26 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE president is to have power “by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur.” Though this provision has been assailed on different grounds, with no small degree of vehemence, I scruple not to declare my firm persuasion, that it is one of the best digested and most unexceptionable...
12The Federalist No. 74, [25 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE President of the United States is to be “Commander in Chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States.” The propriety of this provision is so evident in itself; and it is at the same time so consonant to the precedents of the State constitutions in...
13The Federalist No. 73, [21 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE third ingredient towards constituting the vigor of the executive authority is an adequate provision for its support. It is evident that without proper attention to this article, the separation of the executive from the legislative department would be merely nominal and nugatory. The Legislature, with a discretionary power over the salary and...
14The Federalist No. 72, [19 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE Administration of government, in its largest sense, comprehends all the operations of the body politic, whether legislative, executive or judiciary, but in its most usual and perhaps in its most precise signification, it is limited to executive details, and falls peculiarly within the province of the executive department. The actual conduct of...
15The Federalist No. 71, [18 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. DURATION in office has been mentioned as the second requisite to the energy of the executive authority. This has relation to two objects: To the personal firmness of the Executive Magistrate in the employment of his constitutional powers; and to the stability of the system of administration which may have been adopted under his auspices. With regard to...
16The Federalist No. 70, [15 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation...
17The Federalist No. 68, [12 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE mode of appointment of the chief magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit, that the election of the...
18The Federalist No. 67, [11 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE Constitution of the executive department of the proposed government claims next our attention. There is hardly any part of the system which could have been attended with greater difficulty in the arrangement of it than this; and there is perhaps none, which has been inveighed against with less candor, or criticised with less judgment. Here the...
19The Federalist No. 66, [8 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. A review of the principal objections that have appeared against the proposed court for the trial of impeachments, will not improbably eradicate the remains of any unfavourable impressions, which may still exist, in regard to this matter. The first of these objections is, that the provision in question confounds legislative and judiciary authorities in...
20The Federalist No. 65, [7 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE remaining powers, which the plan of the Convention allots to the Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their participation with the Executive in the appointment to offices, and in their judicial character as a court for the trial of impeachments. As in the business of appointments the Executive will be the principal agent, the provisions...
21The Federalist No. 63, [1 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. A FIFTH desideratum illustrating the utility of a senate, is the want of a due sense of national character. Without a select and stable member of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already mentioned; but the national councils will not possess that...
22The Federalist No. 62, [27 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. HAVING examined the constitution of the house of representatives, and answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the examination of the senate. The heads into which this member of the government may be considered, are—I. the qualifications of senators—II. the appointment of them by the state legislatures—III....
23The Federalist No. 61, [26 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE more candid opposers of the provision respecting elections contained in the plan of the Convention, when pressed in argument, will sometimes concede the propriety of that provision; with this qualification however that it ought to have been accompanied with a declaration that all elections should be had in the counties where the electors resided....
24The Federalist No. 60, [23 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. WE have seen that an incontroulable power over the elections for the federal government could not without hazard be committed to the state legislatures. Let us now see what would be the dangers on the other side; that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the union itself. It is not pretended, that this right would ever...
25The Federalist No. 59, [22 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE natural order of the subject leads us to consider in this place, that provision of the Constitution which authorises the national Legislature to regulate in the last resort the election of its own members. It is in these words—“The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the...
26The Federalist No. 58, [20 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE remaining charge against the House of Representatives which I am to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of population may demand. It has been admitted that this objection, if well supported, would have great weight. The following observations will shew that like...
27The Federalist No. 57, [19 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE third charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be taken from that class of citizens which will have least sympathy with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few. Of all the objections which have been framed against the Fœderal Constitution, this is...
28The Federalist No. 56, [16 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE second charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents. As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed number of representatives, with the great extent of the United States, the number of their inhabitants, and the diversity of their...
29The Federalist No. 55, [13 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE number of which the House of Representatives is to consist, forms another, and a very interesting point of view under which this branch of the federal legislature may be contemplated. Scarce any article indeed in the whole constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention, by the weight of character and the apparent force of argument, with...
30The Federalist No. 54, [12 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives, relates to the apportionment of its members to the several States, which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes. It is not contended that the number of people in each State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to represent the...
31[The Federalist No. 53], [9 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
The [New York] Independent Journal: or, the General Advertiser , February 9, 1788. This essay was printed on February 12 in New-York Packet . In the McLean The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by J. and A. McLean, 1788). edition this essay is...
32The Federalist No. 52, [8 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. FROM the more general enquiries pursued in the four last papers, I pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts of the government. I shall begin with the House of Representatives. The first view to be taken of this part of the government, relates to the qualifications of the electors and the elected. Those of the former are to be the...
33The Federalist No. 51, [6 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. TO what expedient then shall we finally resort for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the...
34The Federalist No. 50, [5 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IT may be contended perhaps, that instead of occasional appeals to the people, which are liable to the objections urged against them, periodical appeals are the proper and adequate means of preventing and correcting infractions of the Constitution . It will be attended to, that in the examination of these expedients, I confine myself to their aptitude...
35[The Federalist No. 49], [2 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
The [New York] Independent Journal: or, the General Advertiser , February 2, 1788. This essay appeared on February 5, 1788, in New-York Packet , and on February 6, 1788, in The [New York] Daily Advertiser . In the McLean The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York:...
36The Federalist No. 29, [9 January 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE power of regulating the militia and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defence, and of watching over the internal peace of the confederacy. It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the...
37The Federalist No. 36, [8 January 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. WE have seen that the result of the observations, to which the foregoing number has been principally devoted, is that from the natural operation of the different interests and views of the various classes of the community, whether the representation of the people be more or less numerous, it will consist almost entirely of proprietors of land, of...
38The Federalist No. 34, [5 January 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. I FLATTER myself it has been clearly shewn in my last number, that the particular States, under the proposed Constitution, would have CO-EQUAL authority with the Union in the article of revenue, except as to duties on imports. As this leaves open to the States far the greatest part of the resources of the community, there can be no color for the...
39The Federalist No. 35, [5 January 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. BEFORE we proceed to examine any other objections to an indefinite power of taxation in the Union, I shall make one general remark; which is, that if the jurisdiction of the national government in the article of revenue should be restricted to particular objects, it would naturally occasion an undue proportion of the public burthens to fall upon those...
40The Federalist No. 32, [2 January 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. ALTHOUGH I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of the consequences, which seem to be apprehended to the State Governments, from a power in the Union to controul them in the levies of money; because I am persuaded that the sense of the people, the extreme hazard of provoking the resentments of the State Governments, and a conviction of the...
41The Federalist No. 33, [2 January 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. The residue of the argument against the provisions in the constitution, in respect to taxation, is ingrafted upon the following clauses; the last clause of the eighth section of the first article of the plan under consideration, authorises the national legislature “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper , for carrying into execution the...
42The Federalist No. 31, [1 January 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IN disquisitions of every kind there are certain primary truths or first principles upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend. These contain an internal evidence, which antecedent to all reflection or combination commands the assent of the mind. Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed either from some defect or disorder in the organs of...
43The Federalist No. 30, [28 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IT has been already observed, that the Fœderal Government ought to possess the power of providing for the support of the national forces; in which proposition was intended to be included the expence of raising troops, of building and equiping fleets, and all other expences in any wise connected with military arrangements and operations. But these are not...
44The Federalist No. 28, [26 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THAT there may happen cases, in which the national government may be necessitated to resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own experience has corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of other nations; that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all societies, however constituted; that seditions and insurrections are unhappily maladies...
45The Federalist No. 27, [25 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IT has been urged in different shapes that a constitution of the kind proposed by the Convention, cannot operate without the aid of a military force to execute its laws. This however, like most other things that have been alledged on that side, rests on mere general assertion; unsupported by any precise or intelligible designation of the reasons upon...
46The Federalist No. 26, [22 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IT was a thing hardly to be expected, that in a popular revolution the minds of men should stop at that happy mean, which marks the salutary boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy of government with the security of private rights. A failure in this delicate and important point is the great source of the inconveniences we...
47The Federalist No. 25, [21 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IT may perhaps be urged, that the objects enumerated in the preceding number ought to be provided for by the State Governments, under the direction of the Union. But this would be in reality an inversion of the primary principle of our political association; as it would in practice transfer the care of the common defence from the fœderal head to the...
48The Federalist No. 24, [19 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. TO the powers proposed to be conferred upon the Federal Government, in respect to the creation and direction of the national forces, I have met with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it rightly is this— that proper provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace; an objection which I shall now...
49The Federalist No. 23, [18 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the preservation of the Union, is the point, at the examination of which we are now arrived. This enquiry will naturally divide itself into three branches—the objects to be provided for by a Fœderal Government—the quantity of power necessary to the accomplishment of...
50The Federalist No. 22, [14 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IN addition to the defects already enumerated in the existing Fœderal system, there are others of not less importance, which concur in rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the Union. The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be of the number. The utility of such a power has been anticipated...