1. French minister Pierre-Auguste Adet notified Randolph on 30 June that he had received the treaty “of which the President has been pleased that I should be possessed, in order to enable me to make such observations thereon as I might judge proper. This frank measure is to me a sure guarantee of the friendship of the American Government towards France, and of the fidelity with which it always marks its conduct towards a faithful ally.” Adet informed Randolph that he would not comment “upon general questions; they shall be confined merely to the stipulations of the treaty … which, contrary to the interests of France, appear to me to destroy the effect of her treaty with the United States.” To illuminate his objections, Adet highlighted sections of Articles XVII, XVIII, XXIV, and XXV of the Jay Treaty and contrasted them with Articles XVII, XVIII, and XXIV of the 1778 Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and France.

Near the end of his letter, Adet quoted from Article XXV of the Jay Treaty: “‘But the two parties agree that, while they continue in amity, neither of them will in future make any treaty that shall be inconsistent with this or the preceding article.’” He complained that the statement “seems to prevent the establishing of a new negotiation between the United States and France, since, in a new treaty, France could not renounce the advantages secured to her by article 17th of her former treaty, and it is possible that they would be refused to her in virtue of that article” (ASP description begins Walter Lowrie et al., eds. American State Papers. Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States. 38 vols. Washington, D.C., Gales and Seaton, 1832–61. description ends , Foreign Relations, 1:594–95).

2. When Randolph replied to Adet on 6 July, he prefaced his response to the minister’s objections with the hope of open discussion and rapport with the French minister and his country. The secretary further assured Adet that the president repeatedly had declared that the U.S. “engagements” with France “shall not, with his assent, be infringed. As far therefore as he is concerned, you need only prove at any time, that a given measure will infringe it; and he will not countenance that measure. … But,” Randolph added, “after a close scrutiny of the points, which alone you have selected for animadversion, it is not discerned, that the rights of France are in any degree impaired.”

When the secretary began to analyze Adet’s first objection, he wrote: “The United States have certainly opposed the extension of contraband, whenever the British government has sought to swell the catalogue. But it never could be denied, under the law of nations, and independently of a treaty, that materials for the building and repairing of vessels are contraband. The proposed treaty then does not grant, but recognizes only, a right to Great Britain, which even without that recognition she would have possessed and exercised. … It was indeed anxiously desired to diminish the list, as much as possible. But if no reciprocity could accomplish this end; if no equivalent could be offered by us to Great Britain, powerful enough to induce her to renounce her rights under the law of nations; what was to be done?”

“The United States,” Randolph reiterated, “have therefore wilfully surrendered no right, relative to contraband. Nor is the treaty with France contravened by this acknowledgment of contraband. It stipulates, that if France be at war, and the vessels of the United States carry naval stores to her enemy, French cruisers shall not capture them. The proposed treaty admits the right of Great Britain to seize such vessels, going to her enemy. The inference is, that France has relaxed her strict rights, in consideration, that the United States have relaxed theirs in this respect; but that Great Britain will not relax hers. The treaty with France therefore remains uninfluenced by the proposed compact with Great Britain …

“Our treaty with France was entered into with a perfect knowledge on both sides, that they were striking out from the class of contraband, articles, which the law of nations denominated such. They were both apprized, that, if the United States should be at war with Great Britain, the Shipping of France, carrying naval stores to Great Britain could not be seized by American cruizers; while the same shipping, bringing naval stores to the United States might be seized by British cruizers. They saw therefore the reciprocity of the prohibition.”

Randolph concluded his explanation concerning Adet’s first objection by stating: “Hitherto, however, I have spoken upon principles of right. Upon any other principles, and more especially upon those of hardship and injury to a friend, it shall be a topic of the negotiation, now opening betwee us. With the temper, which will pervade the whole of it, I cannot doubt, that some modification may be devised; and it may be separated from the general treaty, so as not to be delayed by it” (DNA: RG 59, Domestic Letters; see also ASP description begins Walter Lowrie et al., eds. American State Papers. Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States. 38 vols. Washington, D.C., Gales and Seaton, 1832–61. description ends , Foreign Relations, 1:595–96).

3. As Randolph turned to Adet’s second objection, he stated: “you misconceive the proposed treaty, when you imagine, that the English will have a right to claim the execution of the 23d and 24th articles of it, in derogation of the 17th article of our treaty with France … For ‘nothing,’ in the proposed treaty ‘contained, shall be construed or operate, contrary to former and existing public treaties with other Sovereigns or States.’” Randolph assured Adet that John Jay “was here admonished of our prior engagements, and of our determination to postpone to them any new contract with Great Britain. Our treaties with France are saved by the general description; which … is the same form of expression with that, which was adopted in the year 1786, in the treaty between France and Great Britain.

“The 40th article of the last mentioned treaty, and the 25th of the proposed treaty are in substance alike; and yet it was clearly and properly understood, when the French and English treaty was made, that our commercial treaty with France was not in this respect shaken.” As for Adet’s assertion that Article XXIII of the Jay Treaty permitted English “vessels … to be received with hospitality in the ports of the United States,” Randolph replied: “They are the ‘Ships of war,’ the public navy, not the privateers, which are to be so received. Now the British Ships of war are not prohibited by our treaty with France from visiting our ports, unless under certain exceptionable circumstances. From these they are not released by the proposed treaty; because our treaty with France, which is a supreme law of the land is decisively contrary.

“The 24th article of the proposed treaty is, with a very small and unessential difference, the same with the 16th article of the French treaty with Great-Britain. And here this remark occurs: that the proposed treaty saves every right of France, arising from our treaty of commerce; but the treaty between France and Great-Britain does not by any general or particular expression save the rights of the Unied States, which might stand in opposition to that 16th article” (DNA: RG 59, Domestic Letters).

4. As he discussed Adet’s third objection, Randolph informed the minister: “You shall continue to enjoy your rights under the 17th article of our treaty with France. We will not ask you to renounce the advantages, which that article assures to you. The prohibition, on which you lay so much stress, is not against past but future treaties. If a new treaty of commerce with France, including the same matter with the old one, would be prevented by the 25th article; the consequence may be easily avoided, by declaring, that so much of the old one, as is connected with any particular, for which it may be desireable to retain a priority, shall remain in force. This is a remedy so obvious, that … it will remove any difficulty in the way of a new negotiation” (DNA: RG 59, Domestic Letters).