To John Jay from the Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Robert R. Livingston), 27 April 1782
From the Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Robert R. Livingston)
Philadelphia, 27th. April 17821
Dear Sir,
I informed you in my Letter of the 16th. inst. that yours of the 3d. of October2 had been received & submitted to Congress during my absence, and, (as I had then reason to think) that it would be answered by them, this I wished because I was persuaded it would express their approbation of your conduct, & afford you that intimate knowledge of their Sentiments, which the delicacy of your situation renders peculiarly important— They have however, judged it proper to refer the Letter to me— I shall endeavour to preserve the advantages I have mentioned to you by reporting this answer.3
Acquainted with the expectations of Congress, and the grounds on which they formed them you will easily believe that they are equally Surprized & concerned at the little attention hitherto shewn by Spain to their respectful sollicitations— They had learned from every quarter, that His Catholic Majesty among the princely virtues he possesses, was particularly distinguished for his candor, and that open dignity of character which is the result of having no views which he found any reluctance in disclosing, and that the ministers in whom he confided, breathing the spirit of the Prince, were above those artifices which form the politics of inferior powers—4 They knew the insults which Spain had received from Great Britain and they could conceive no reason why she should conceal or refuse to return them5 by supporting openly the people Britain unjustly endeavoured to oppress; these principles confirmed by the frequent recommendations of those whom they believe to be acquainted with the sentiments of the court of Madrid, induced them to send a minister to solicit the favourable attention of his Catholic Majesty to a people who were struggling with oppression, and whose success or miscarriage could not but be important to a sovereign who held extensive dominions in their vicinity; Give me leave to add, Sir, that in the choice of the person, they were not inattentive to the dignity of the Court, or to the candor & integrity by which they supposed it to be influenced—6 I would not have you infer from what I have said, that the favourable sentiments which the United States have hitherto entertained of the Court of Madrid, have undergone the least alteration; They are satisfied nothing would be more injurious to both nations, than to permit the seeds of distrust or jealousy to be sown among them.
But tho’ those who are well informed feel no abatement of respect or esteem for the virtue & magnanimity of his Majesty, and do full justice to the integrity & abilities of his ministers accepting the appologies you mention, & attributing to their true causes the delays & neglects which you have unhappily experienced, yet they are in the utmost pain, lest they should work some change in the sentiments of the people at large, in whom with us, the sovereignty resides, & from thence diffusing themselves in to the government, be productive of measures ruinous to that friendly intercourse, that spirit of amity, which it is the wish of those who are acquainted with the true interests of both Countries to promote.
After the War was declared by Spain, those among us who had formed the highest ideas of her magnanimity;7 persuaded themselves that she would act decidedly for us when she found us in distress— They grounded their beliefs upon the avowed Spirit of the nation, & the policy of adopting measures to reanimate us, & damp the ardor of the Enemy, and to make such impressions upon our hearts, as to give them in future, a considerable influence on our councils— Our disappointment in this expectation, tho’ perhaps to be accounted for upon very natural principles, has been greatly agravated by the sedulous endeavours of the enemies of both countries to create distrusts & jealousies, they artfully insinuate that Spain seeks only to draw advantages from our wants, without so far interfering in our affairs as to involve herself, if we should be unsuccessful— These insinuations are gaining ground, and it becomes daily more necessary for Congress to be furnished with reasons to justify to their constituents the concessions they have proposed to make, or to withdraw those concessions when they are found ineffectual. Yet they feel such reluctance in discovering the least want of confidence in the court of Madrid, that tho’ their present situation might fully justify them in not parting with the important rights you are empowered to concede,8 without stipulating some very valuable equivalent— Yet they cannot be induced to make any alteration in your instructions on this subject, till you shall have reason to conclude that nothing can be done towards forming the alliance they have so much at heart, not only because of the influence it will immediately have in accellerating the peace, but because of the advantages which Spain & America may reciprocally promise each other in future, from the lasting connexion which will be erected thereon.9
Tho’ the delays you have met with afford room to suppose that Spain wishes to defer a particular treaty with us till a general peace, yet I see so many political reasons against such a measure, that I can hardly presume they will adopt it.
At the close of a Successful War, a great & powerful nation, to whom a character for justice & moderation is of the last importance, can in no case demand more than a compensation for the injuries received; this compensation will indeed be measured by their success, but still it has bounds beyond which a nation can not go with dignity— Spain has insisted upon the cession of Gibralter, as a preliminary to a peace; this is of itself a considerable compensation for any damage she may have sustained Should she carry her demands further, and agreable to the ideas of Spanish Ministers, expect to have an exclusive right to the gulph of Mexico, & the river Mississippi— She must not only demand East & West Florida of the British, but she must support the claims of Great Britain against those of America, the claims of an enemy against the rights of a friend; in order that she may make still further demands.
Will it consist with the dignity of His Catholic Majesty, to ask for the short space in which he has been engaged in the war, not only Gibralter, but the two floridas, the Mississippi, the exclusion of Great Britain from the trade to the Bay of Hondura’s &c while the other branch of the House of Bourbon, who engaged early in the controversy, confines her demands to the narrowest limits? Will she expose herself to the imputation of dispoiling an ally (for such we are in fact tho’ we want the name) at the instant that she is obtaining the greatest advantages from the distress which that ally has, at least in part, contributed to bring upon her enemy? and this too, without the least necessity, when she may by accepting & purchasing our title10 appear to to have contended for the rights of the United States— This will then make no part of the satisfaction to which She is entitled from Great Britain; She may justly extend her demands to other objects, or exalt her character for moderation by limiting them to narrower bounds; this mode of reasoning will come with more weight when we display our rights before impartial mediators, and shew that recent conquests have been added to our ancient title, for it cannot be doubted that we will at the close of the war make the most of those rights, which we obtain no equivalent for while it continues.
I persuade myself therefore, that Spain will not risque the loss of so important an object as the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi, by postponing the treaty to a general peace, more particularly as a treaty with us will secure our concurrence in their views at a general Congress, as well as save them the necessity of making demands inconsistent with that character for moderation which their great power renders important to them.
Congress flatter themselves that the Surmizes on this subject are groundless, & that before this reaches you, the treaty will be far advanced, should they be mistaken, you will take measures to know from Spain whether She accepts your concession as the price of an Alliance, and upon what terms— If they are such as you can not close with, and the treaty must break off, be persuaded that any steps you have taken or shall take not inconsistent with the respect due to his Catholic Majesty to prevent the cessions you are empowered to make from militating against our rights, will be approved by Congress.
Congress presume you will find no difficulty in knowing the intentions of his Majesty on this subject since they wish you to treat his Ministers with that unreserved confidence, which becomes the Representative of a Nation, which has no views, that it does not avow, and which asks no favor which it does not hope to return, and as in the present happy state of his Majesty’s Affairs, they can conceive no reason for disguising his designs, they are satisfied that your frankness will meet from his Ministers with the confidence it merrits.
I make no observation on the hint the Count de Florida Blanca gave you with respect to the restitution of such sums as Spain might be pleased to advance to us,11 because whatever claims we might set up to a subsidy, from the share we take in the burden of the war, & the utility of our exertions in the common cause, we are far from wishing to lay ourselves under any pecuniary obligations for a longer time than is absolutely necessary— A few years of peace will enable us to repay with interest any sums which our present necessities compel us to borrow.12
I can not close this Letter without expressing the grateful sense which Congress entertain of the disinterested conduct of Spain in rejecting the proffers of Great Britain13 which must undoubtedly have been considerable, if they bore that proportion to the importance of his Catholic Majesty in the great System of politicks which those that have been frequently thrown out to lead the United States to a violation of their engagements have done to their comparatively small weight in the general scale— But as America never found the least inclination to close with the insidious proposals of Great Britain, so she finds no difficulty in believing that the wisdom and magnanimity of his Catholic Majesty, will effectualy guard him against every attempt of his natural Enemy to detatch him from those who are daily shedding their blood to avenge his injuries in common with their own. I have the honor to be, Sir with great respect & esteem Your most obedient & most humble Servant
Robt R Livingston
Honble. John Jay, Esqr
LS, NNC (EJ: 7932). Marked: “No. 7.” Dft, NHi: Robert R. Livingston (EJ: 819). Endorsed. Dft, dated 26 Apr., NHi: Robert R. Livingston (EJ: 818). LbkCs, DNA: PCC, item 79, 1: 409–16 (EJ: 11364); item 118, 150–62 (EJ: 9922).
1. Docketing on the LbkCs indicates RRL sent the first copy of this letter on a frigate from the Chesapeake Bay, the second on the Intrepid from Boston, a third to Baltimore, a fourth on the Washington, and a fifth on the Queen of France. According to JJ’s account book of letters sent and received, NNC, he received this letter on 18 July 1782. JJ does not appear to have replied.
2. See the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to JJ, 16 Apr. 1782, and JJ to the President of Congress, 3 Oct. 1781, both above.
3. In the 27 Apr. Dft, the previous sentence reads: “so that you will consider it will ^as^ containg: nothing which they have not explicitly ^dis^approved.” In a resolution of 30 Apr., entered only in its Secret Journal, Congress declared that it entirely approved of JJ’s conduct “as detailed in his letter of the 3d of October last; that the limitation affixed by him to the proposed surrender of the navigation of the Mississippi in particular, corresponds with the views of Congress; that they observe, not without surprise and concern, that a proposition so liberal in itself, and which removed the only avowed obstacle to a connexion between the United States and his Catholick Majesty should not have produced greater effects on the counsels of the latter; that the surrender of the navigation of the Mississippi was meant as the price of the advantages promised by an early and intimate alliance with the Spanish monarchy; and that if this alliance is to be procrastinated till the conclusion of the war, the reason of the sacrifice will no longer exist; that as every day which the proposed treaty is delayed, detracts from the obligation and inducement of the United States to adhere to their overture, it is the instruction of Congress, that he urge to the ministers of his Catholick Majesty the obligation it imposes on Spain to make the treaty the more liberal on her part, and that in particular he use his endeavours to obtain, in consideration of such delay, either an enlargement of her pecuniary aids to the United States, a facilitating of the use of the Mississippi to the citizens thereof, or some peculiar indulgences in the commerce of the Spanish colonies in America.” , 22: 219.
4. On the expectation of mutual candor, see JJ to Floridablanca, 6 Mar. 1780; and Notes on John Jay’s Conference with Floridablanca, 11 May 1780, both above.
5. Here the 27 Apr. Dft adds “with interest.”
6. Miralles, an appointee of Gálvez, and Gérard had encouraged Congress to believe that Spain would be receptive to American overtures for an alliance. On the dignity Spain attributed to JJ’s position as president of Congress, see the editorial note “Congress Appoints John Jay Minister to Spain,” : 714.
7. Here in the 27 Apr. Dft, RRL excised “found consolation in the hour of their greatest distress by from a persuasion that Spain would then most readily declare in our favor.”
8. See the President of Congress to JJ, 15 Feb. 1781, above. For RRL’s personal suspicions about the reasons Spain had not responded to Congress’s concession, see his letter to JJ of 28 Apr. 1782, below.
9. Here in the 27 Apr. Dft, RRL excised the following paragraph: “It has you say been frequently hinted to you that that we ^the United States^ have hither to only discovered their attatchment to Spain by words. What then is expected of them? Had Spain explicitly declared her expectations they should honestly have told her how far it was in their power to comply with them. But we have been left to guess at them. The concessions we have offered to make because we presumed it would be agreeable to his Catholic Majesty, is certainly no insignificant proof of the value we put upon his friendship. You will easily conceive the mortification ^of^ Congress on ^learning^ the cold & indifferent manner in which this important offer has been received, more particularly when the only return they asked, was alliance of with his majesty—& such concession priviledges as Spain might conceive could be obtained granted with out injury to herself & such a loan or subsidy to would enable her to ^be employed^ ^in^ distress^ing^ more effectively the common enemy. While Spain continues the war the ^United States^ flatter themselves that they are of some use to her while they
not only distract the enimies councils, but keep the greatest part of their force employed thereby facilitating the designs of the belligerent powers France & Spain upon their other possessions— The first of these powers alone has thought that this consideration alone entitled us to the aids which they have so liberally continued to afford without ever complaining that we had not purchased them by the sacrafice of our commerce or territory.”
10. Here the 27 Apr. Dft reads: “by accepting our cession of the navigation of the river Mississipi ^& purchasing our right appears to have contended for the rights^.”
11. See Notes on John Jay’s Conference with Floridablanca, 19 Sept. 1781, above, in which the Spanish minister responded to Robert Morris’s appeal for a substantial loan to capitalize the Bank of North America.
12. In the 27 Apr. Dft, this paragraph follows the deleted paragraph beginning, “It has, you say, been frequently hinted” (see note 9, above). RRL indicated in the margin how it was to be positioned.
13. The Hussey-Cumberland mission, on which JJ had reported in 1780.