In my Letters of the 3d Instant to the Secretary of State,1 I took the Liberty to propose our embarking the Garrisons of New York, Charles Town & Penobscott,2 & employing them in retaking Pensacola, and other places in West Florida, so as to recover possession of that Colony, by driving the Spaniards intirely out of the Country, on that side of the Missisippi. The Motives to this Undertaking were said to be as follows. Viz:

1. The Benefit of Colony possession & profit as far as the Limits of West Florida will go.

2. Having the Command of the Mouths of the Missisippi, and the Navigation thereof to & from the Gulph of Mexico.

3. And consequently making our Settlement there an Entrepôt of the Trade of the great back Country of all the Provinces of the 13 States, that would naturaly go to the Southward, & in the same manner as the other part to the northward would center & issue from Quebec.

4. And putting both together would satisfy the Nation, that in a Mercantile view, We should still enjoy a beneficial Connection with those States. And considering that the Atlantic Side of said States lies open to the same Correspondence with us as formerly, there would be reason to hope that in a mercantile view, We should not lose much by the Change that has happened.

One of the Commissioners tells me that we should lose nothing, & should be saved the Expence & trouble of governing them. These are his words. And as an Encouragement to the Undertaking has agreed to give us in the Treaty a full freedom of Navigation on the Missisippi, all along their back Country as settled in the Treaty of Paris, without Duties of any kind, the same as for their own People; and I suppose will allow of the like privilege from Canada.

5. Another just motive to the Undertaking is that of indulging a Request of the Americans. I may say conferring an Obligation on them, as they detest the Thought of having the Key of that Trade, in the hands of the Spaniards.

6. In my own mind I think it is not unworthy of notice, that were the Spaniards to be left in West Florida, & should find their situation uneasy there, on account of the incurable Inveteracy of the Indian Tribes in the neighbourhood, Chactaws, Chicasaws, Creeks &c. they might find it convenient to compromise some Agreement with the French, & give up the port of Trade into their hands; and so by letting in that active Rival upon us, & thereby fixing a new Commercial Connection with the great stretch of that frontier Country to the westward, they might gain such an Ascendancy of Interest amongst those States in general, as to hurt Great Britain more ways than in that of Commerce.

7. Another Motive to the Undertaking is that of the Americans being thus interested in the Success of it, We might expect to get away our Garrisons, Effects, Artillery & Stores in a decent way, without danger or affront to the Troops, or any Loss of the abovementioned Articles. A Consideration which I must confess has lain upon my Mind as of some Consequence, ever since I saw that we must evacuate those places; which is a long time ago. For the Americans being tied up so as not to make peace, there was no certainty but they might act hostiley against us, upon this occasion of a Retreat Especially as there lyes in the neighbourhood of New York, as I am told a Body of French Troops, about 4000 men, under the Count de Rochambeau.3 These though not to be feared in case of a trial in the Field yet hanging upon the skirts of a retreating Army, & perhaps wishing to occupy our Outlines as We quit them, might, without exposing themselves, occasion some confusion & hurry in the Embarkation that would not be creditable, & in some degree not safe, even supposing the Americans should continue in a neutral position which We could not be sure of; And might be certain that numbers of their Individuals would, on such an Occasion, take part with the French in incommoding our Troops, & putting every Affront upon them in their Power. Those brave Troops have behaved so nobly & patiently during the whole of this distressing War, that one cannot help partaking of their feelings upon foreseeing the possibility of any Stain being thrown upon their Reputation, on so critical an Occasion as this might happen to be; considering the Delicacy of their Situation, in being tied up to a plan, strictly defensive, & the possibility of its being necessary to take a different part to get away in safety: and afterwards to prove the expediency & necessity of doing so; without which We might come again to have the Circumstances of a new quarrel to explain & settle with those States, with whom we are now endeavouring to settle a Peace.

These Inconveniences, as hinted at in my late Letters, I am hopeful might be prevented by obtaining from the Commissioners here, such Recommendations to Congress & General Washington with respect to the Evacuation of those Garrisons, as shoud allow of the Troops quitting their posts, & withdrawing their Artillery Stores & other Effects, in an easy safe & convenient manner. And in consequence of such Orders, all Interference or Interruption from the Enemy, might either be forbidden, or so discountenanced, that We should have nothing to fear from them.

In the Harbour & upon the Coast no doubt We must be so guarded against Squadrons or Cruizers, French or Americans, as to be under no Apprehension after We are embarkt. Considering the vicinity of Rhode Island, that must be effectualy taken care of.

That the american Commissioners will do what is necessary and consistent with their French Treaty, I make no doubt, in securing a safe & decent Retreat to those Garrisons.— I shall take the Liberty to give one Reason for thinking them well disposed to any such like Accommodation, where they are not strictly tied up by their Treaty with France.

About six or seven weeks ago seeing the absurdity of War being carried on between them & us at Sea, whilst We had declared Peace at Land; and considering that the Americans were so tied up by their Treaty with France, that they cou’d agree to no kind of formal Cessation, untill We had finaly closed with that Nation, I wish’d to try to make a sort of artificial Truce between the Americans & us, and stating the Awkwardness of the Situation to Dr. Franklin, he admitted it, but said, a Remedy would be difficult; However he promised to think of it, as I had the honour to report in my Letters to Lord Shelburne.

However there was nothing further said of the Matter until lately, when seeing that we were likely to give the Americans Satisfaction in the main Question, I thought it proper to try Mr. Jay on the same Subject of a Truce at Sea, so as, independent of the proceedings of the French in their Treaty at this place, We might be getting on in our Amnesty & Friendship with the Americans: And so might not only more quickly forward a Conclusion with France, but also on better Terms than perhaps it might be otherways possible to do. And in any Event were this to succeed, We should be more indifferent as to a longer Continuance of the War with France.

In these sentiments I stated to Mr. Jay the Impropriety of our Situation in the above respect, of being at Peace on shore, whilst, We were capturing each others ships at Sea &c. And said that I thought our Government ought to make an Offer to them, to cease Captures at Sea, of every Ship that was not arm’d for War; and had not Cannon onboard, & a Crew of men above 20 or 30 in number; so that all american ships of that description might go free to France England or other Country— In which I intended to propose to except naval Stores, altho’ I did not mention it. That this shou’d be declared to last a certain time, six months or so; and if the Americans should in like manner desist from their Depredations, the forbearance on our part shou’d be renewed & continued: And so, the War at Sea might be carried on, on both sides, against Ships of War only: By which means their people would get the just Value of the produce of their Estates, and be plentifuly supplied in foreign Merchandize, at a much cheaper rate than at present. And so our commercial Correspondence might open afresh, & quickly; without regard to the Operations of the French, Dutch or Spaniards. I told Mr. Jay at some time that I observ’d in their Demands on us, they made great use of the Word Magnanimity; and that their Congress would probably be soon in such Situation as to have a right to adopt the same term with propriety: and if this Scheme could be render’d practicable, & my advice could be of any Weight with our Gouvernment, it should be to trust their Congress, that upon our making such an Offer, they would act up to the pitch of that Character.

His answer was (for I will give his own Words,) that it was a noble proposal, and that altho’ they were so tied up, that such Compromise cou’d not have the Sanction of a public Act of their States, yet We might very well trust to the Consequences, & that after such an Order on our part, no man of Character would fit out a Privateer, nor any Body else would be well lookt upon, that would be concern’d in them. Upon the whole, this Gentleman so strongly approved of the Scheme, that I proposed, with his leave, to go to Passy, & open it again to [Franklin]. He agreed, & I went thither.— Whilst repeating what is abovemention’d regarding the proposal, I was greatly pleas’d to find that he equaly approv’d of it, and at last said, He thought they might write to Congress about it; But first wish’d to see Mr. Jay. I return’d to Paris, & informed Mr. Jay. He accordingly went out to Passy. When they came to consider the matter together, I suppose, they found that such an Understanding between them & us, however adjusted, would not be consistent with their restraining Article in the Treaty with France; for Mr. Jay upon his return, told me they found, it wou’d not do: and so there it rests.

Altho’ the plan has not succeeded, yet I have thought proper to mention it, to shew that where those Gentlemen can consistently with their particular Engagements open a way to a Speedy Restoration of Peace, (& perhaps partly prompted thereto by a friendly Disposition still remaining towards England,) they will readily lend their helping hand. And on that foundation I may be justified in supposing as I have done, that in giving their Countenance to our withdrawing our Garrisons in a desirable manner, & proceeding to the recovery of West Florida (as being in such case under no positive Restraint,) they will not be backward in any thing depending on them: Altho’, for the sake of the Connection of Spain with their Ally, they might still wish to keep their part as much out of sight as possible.

As to what has yet passt it has been only between them & me; and which I know, they wish may remain so, and I should be very sorry they should have any Reason to repent of their Confidence: Being sensible that in the present Situation of things, it ought to be considered ^with respect to me^ as a matter of delicate Trust. And yet in the Channel through which it passes it can do them no harm; but as it may possibly be some sort of Guide in our future proceedings in American Business, I think it my Duty to give this Intelligence the Chance of being taken into Consideration.

I shall only beg leave to add one thing, that if an Attempt on the Spaniards should be agreed to, it was recommended that the utmost Secrecy should be observ’d, as to the particular Object.

The above was wrote two days ago to lye ready for a Courier as it could not be got ready to ^go^ by Northup I have the honour to be Sir your most obedient humble Servant