Your Letter of the 26 Instant was this Evening delivered to me. When I was called last from Convention, a Clause in the Report of the form of Government had been by a [illegible] very great Majority agreed to, instituting a Council for the appointmt of military and many civil Officers, including Clerks of Courts; and tho’ I publicly advocated and voted for that Clause, you express much Surprize at my disapproving a material alteration of it.1

Had you retained the most distant Idea of the part I took relative to the various modes proposed for the appointment of officers, I am confident you would not have asserted “that I was fully of opinion to appoint by Judges of the Sup. Court, not only Clerks, but all other civil Officers in the Government.” Had such a Representation of my opinion relative to the best mode of appointing those officers, fallen from some Persons whom I could name, I should have called it very disengenuous and uncandid—

The Fact was thus— The Clause directing the Governor to nominate officers to the Legislature for their approbation being read and debated, was generally disapproved. Many other methods were devised by different Members, and mentioned to the House merely for Consideration. I mentioned several myself, and told the Convention at the Time, that however I might then incline to adopt them, I was not certain but that after considering them, I should vote for their Rejection. While the Minds of the Members were thus fluctuating between various Opinions, Capt. Platt moved for the only amendment which was proposed to the House for introducing the Judges. I told the House I preferred the amendment to the original Clause in the Report, but that I thought a better mode might be devised. I finally opposed the adoption of Capt. Platts amendment, and well remember that I spent the Evening of that Day with Mr Morris at your Lodgings, in the Course of which I proposed the Plan for the Institution of the Council as it now stands, and after conversing on the Subject, we agreed to bring it into the House the next Day— It was moved & debated and carried with this only amendment, that the Speaker of the General Assembly for the Time being was then (to avoid the Governors having frequent opportunities of casting Vote) added to the Council.2

As to the Alteration in question, vizt. transferring the appointment of Clerks &c. of Courts from the Council to the respective Judges, I dislike it for many Reasons which the Limits of a Letter will not admit of being fully enumerated and discussed.

You say that “great Inconveniencies must arise from suffering Clerks to be independent of such Courts, and of Consequence frequently ignorant, always inattentive.” If Ignorance and Inattention would by some necessary Consequence unknown to me, characterize all such Clerks as the Council (of which the Governor is President, and consisting of the Speaker of the Genl. assembly and four Senators elected in that House) should appoint, I grant that the appointment should ^ought to^ be in other Hands. But I am at a Loss and unable to Conjecture by what subtle Refinement or new Improvement in the Science of Politics it should be discovered, that a Council acknowledged to be competent to the Choice and appointment of the first Judges of the Land, were insufficient to the nomination of clerks of Courts; or from whence it is to be inferred that they, by whose will & pleasure the duration of many other offices is limited by the Constitution, would either appoint or continue in office ignorant or inattentive Clerks more than ignorant or inattentive Judges Sheriffs or Justices of the Peace. Nor can I perceive why the clerks in chancery appointed by the Council, should be more ignorant & inattentive than the Examiners, who you are content should still be appointed by that Body; unless Ignorance and Inattention be supposed less dangerous and important in the one than the other.

That Clerks should be dependent is agreed on all Hands—on whom? is the only question. I think not on the Judges— Because

The chancellor, and the Judges of the Sup. Court holding permanent Commissions, will be tempted not only to give those appointments to their Children Brothers Relatives & Favorites, but to continue them in Office against the public Good. You, I dare say, know Men of too little Probity Abilities and Industry to fill an office well, and yet of sufficient art and attention to avoid such gross Misbehavior, as might justify loud Clamors against them—

Besides— Men who appoint others to offices, generally have a Partiality for them, and are often disposed, on Principles of Pride as well as Interest, to support them. By the Clerks of Courts being dependent on the Judges Collusion becomes more easy to be practiced, and more difficult to be detected—and instead of publishing and punishing each others Transgressions, will combine in concealing palliating or excusing their mutual Defects or Misdemeanours.

From the Clerks &c. being appointed by the Council, these ^advantages^ would result.

The council might avail themselves of the advice of the Judges without being bound by their Prejudices, or interested in their Designs.

Should the Council promote their Favorites at the Expence of the public, that Body, having a new Set of members every Year, a bad officer thus appointed would lose his office on his Patrons being removed from the Council—

It would avoid that odium to which that part of the Constitution will now be exposed vizt. that it was framed by Lawyers, and done with Design to favor the Profession.

The new Clause respecting the licensing of attornies, to speake plain, is in my opinion the most whimsical crude and undigested Thing I have met with—

There will be between thirty & forty Courts in this State, and as that Clause now stands, an Attorney (however well qualified, and licensed by the Sup. Court) ^must^ before he can issue a writ in a little Borough or Mayors Court, obtain their Licence also— The Reasons assigned for this, seem to be

That it would be improper for one Court to do this Drudgery for the Rest—

That it would be difficult to distinguish which Court it would be most proper to impose it upon—

That the Judges of the inferior Courts might be offended at being relieved from this Drudgery—thinking themselves as capable of judging of the Merits of an Attorney as of a Cause; and that they had equal Right with others to say who shall and who shall not be entitled to Practice—

To say that it would be improper for one to do this Drudgery for the Rest—is begging the Question. Other Courts than the Sup. Court never had this Drudgery to do; and I believe never will have in any part of the world, except in the State and by the Constitution of New York.

Why the Examination and licensing of Attornies should with more Propriety be stiled a Drudgery, than striking a Jury, or any other Business incident to the office of Judge, I know not. If it be, I should think it ought not to be multiplied by thirty or forty, and then imposed on all in the State, and compelling an Attorney to sollicit, and pay fees for admission to thirty or forty Courts, when one would have sufficed.

How it should be difficult to distinguish the proper Court for the Purpose, is to me misterious.

The Sup. Court controuls all the Courts in the State which proceed according to the Course of the common Law, and its Jurisdiction is bound only by the Limits of the State. An Attorney is an officer of a common Law Court. That Court therefore by which the Constitution is made superior to the others, must be supposed most competent not only to the Determination of causes, but of the Qualification of the attornies who manage them. The lesser Courts cannot be deemed equally qualified for either; and being dependent and inferior in every other Respect, ought not to have concurrent, independent or equal Authority in this. Justice as well as Decency forbids that a Mayor & four Alderman should constitutionally have a Right to refuse Admission to Attornies licensed by the Sup. Court.

Whence is it to be inferred that the Judges of the inferior Courts, unless gratified with this novel unprecedented power, would complain? It is not to be found among the Rights enjoyed by them prior to the Revolution; and I much doubt whether, unless within this Fortnight or three Weeks, there was a single man in the State who ever thought of such a Thing.—

It would be arrogance in them to expect to be endulged in a Right to examine question and reject the Judgment of the Sup. Court respecting the Qualifications of Attornies, when that very Court is appointed among other things to correct their Errors in all other Cases—nay in this Case the mere will of these little courts is to be the Law; and an Attorney of Reputation and Eminence in the Sup. Court is without Remedy in Case an inferior Court should unjustly refuse to admit him.

According to the present System an Attorney must, if he chuses to have general Licence, obtain admission into the Sup. Court, three Mayors Courts—thirteen inferior Courts of common pleas for Counties, fourteen Courts of Sessions for the peace, and the Lord knows how often, or in how many Courts of oyer and Terminer & Gaol Delivery.

Remember that I now predict, that this same clause which thus gives inferior Courts uncontrouled & unlimited authority to admit as many Attornies as they please, will fill every County in the State with a Swarm of designing cheating litigious Pettifoggers, who like Leaches and Spiders will fatten on the Spoils of the Poor the Ignorant the Feeble and the unwary—

The Division of the State into Districts for the purpose of facilitating Elections I well remember was agreed to be referred to the Legislature—and I well remember too, several members as well as myself were of the opinion that a short Clause should be inserted in the Constitution, which should give the People a Right Claim on the Legislature for it—

The Connecticut Plan of nominating or holding up Senators, I warmly espoused. I thought it bore strong Marks of Wisdom and sound Policy—nor have I forgot that others opposed it; or that I undertook with the Leave of the House, to reduce it to writing and offer it to their Consideration. The opinion that the rotatory mode of electing renders it entirely useless, I have neither heard nor can I percieve any Reason for.

The Difficulty of getting any Governmt. at all, you know has long been an apprehension of little Influence on my mind; and always appeared to be founded less in Fact, than in a Design of quickening the Pace of the House—

What the Secretary may have written to Mr. Benson, I know not. I expressed the same Sentiments to him that were inserted in my Letter to Mr Hobart, and no others—

The other parts of the Constitution I approve, and only regret that like a Harvest cut before it was all ripe, some of the grains have shrunk. Exclusive of the clauses which I have mentioned, & which I wish had been added; another material one has been omitted—vizt. a Direction that all Persons holding Offices under the Governmt. should swear allegiance to it, and renounce all Allegiance & Subjection to foreign Kings Princes and States in all matters ecclesiastical as well as civil.3 I should also have been for a Clause against the continuation of domestic Slavery,4 and the Support and Encouragement of Literature; as well as some other Matters tho’ perhaps of less Consequence—

Tho’ the Birth of the Constitution is in my opinion premature, I shall nevertheless do all in my power to nurse and keep it alive—being far from approving the Spartan Law which encouraged Parents to destroy such of their Children as perhaps by some cross accident, might come into the World defective or misshapen— I am &c.