Notes on Debates, 14 April 1783
Notes on Debates
MS (LC: Madison Papers). For a description of the manuscript of Notes on Debates, see , V, 231–34. The words italicized in the present copy are those which were underlined by JM.
The Committee on the report of Secretary of foreign Affrs. reported as follows, Mr. Hamilton dissenting:2
1. That it does not appear that Congress are any wise bound to go into the ratification proposed. “The Treaty” of which a ratification is to take place, as mentioned in the 6th. of the provisional articles, is described in the title of those articles to be “a Treaty of peace proposed to be concluded between the Crown of G. B and the said U. S. but which is not to be concluded until terms of peace shall be agreed upon between G. B. & France”; The act to be ratified therefore is not the provl. articles themselves; but an act distinct, future, and even contingent:3 again altho’ the Declaratory act entered into on the 20th Jany. last, between the American & British Plenipotentiaries relative to a cessation of hostilities, seems to consider the contingency on which the provl. articles were suspended as having taken place, yet that act cannot itself be considered as the “Treaty of peace meant to be concluded[”]; nor does it stipulate that either the provl. articles or the act itself should be ratified in America; it only engages that the U. S. shall cause hostilities to cease on their part, an engagement which was duly fulfilled by the Proclamation issued on the 11th. instant4—lastly it does not appear from the correspondence of the American Ministers, or from any other information either that such ratification was expected from the U. S. or intended on the part of G. B: still less that any exchange of mutual ratifications has been in contemplation.5
2. If Congress are not bound to ratify the articles in question, the Come. are of opinion that it is inexpedient for them to go immediately into such an act; inasmuch as it might be thought to argue that Congress meant to give to those articles the quality & effect of a definitive Treaty of peace with G. B. tho neither their allies nor friends have as yet proceeded farther than to sign preliminary articles;6 and inasmuch as it may oblige Congs. to fulfil immediately all the stipulations contained in the provl. articles tho’ they have no evidence that a correspondent obligation will be assumed by the other party.7
3. If the ratification in question be neither obligatory nor expedient, the Come are of opinion, that an immediate discharge of all prisoners of war on the part of the U.S. is premature and unadvisable; especially as such a step may possibly lessen the force of demands for a reimbursement of the sums expended in the subsistance of the prisoners.8
Upon these considerations the Come. recommend that a decision of Congs. on the papers referred to them be postponed.
On this subject a variety of sentiments prevailed:
Mr. Dyer, on a principle of frugality was strenuous for a liberation of the Prisoners.
Mr. Williamson thought Congs. not obliged to discharge the prisoners previous to a definitive treaty, but was willing to go into the measure as soon as the public honor would permit. He wished us to move pari passu with the British Commander. He suspected that that place would be held till the interests of the Tories should be provided for.9
Mr. Hamilton contended that Congress were bound by the tenor of the Provl. Treaty immediately to Ratify it and to execute the several stipulations inserted in it; particularly that relating to discharge of Prisoners.10
Mr. Bland thought Congs. not bound.
Mr. Elseworth was strenuous for the obligation and policy of going into an immediate execution of the Treaty. He supposed that a ready & generous execution on our part wd. accelerate the like on the other part.
Mr. Wilson was not surprized that the obscurity of Treaty sd. produce a varity of ideas.11 He thought upon the whole that the Treaty was to be regarded as “contingently definitive.”
The Report of the Come. being not consonant to the prevailing sense of Congs. it was laid aside.
1. The journal of Congress omits mention of a session on this date (, XXIV, 241, and n. 2).
2. JM Notes, 12 Apr. and n. 9. The manuscript of the committee’s report has not been found. In view of Alexander Hamilton’s dissent, the report must have been drafted either by JM, chairman, or Richard Peters. See JM Notes, 15 Apr. 1783, n. 2.
3. Barring differences in abbreviation, punctuation, and capitalization, JM quoted accurately from “the title” or preamble of the “articles of the proposed treaty” agreed upon by the commissioners of the United States and Great Britain on 30 November 1782 (, XXIV, 244–45; JM Notes, 12–15 Mar., and nn. 1, 2, 13; Delegates to Harrison, 12 Mar. 1783, and nn. 6–12, 14). In the concluding article, IX, the document is also designated as “these articles” rather than as a treaty (, XXIV, 250). Except in the preamble, the word “treaty” is used in the document only in the phrase in Article VI, reading “at the time of the ratification of the treaty in America” (, XXIV, 249). The phrase, together with the preamble and Article IX, justifies JM’s position that Congress was not “bound to ratify” the provisional document. An acceptance of it by Congress could not formally end the war but would reconfirm the suspension of hostilities and make known that a definitive treaty of peace embodying those articles would be ratified. See JM Notes, 31 Mar., and nn. 2, 4–6; 12 Apr. 1783.
Besides being justified by the text of the document, JM and a minority of the delegates in Congress probably also opposed ratification because it would imply that all the provisional articles, including those favoring British creditors and owners of confiscated property, should immediately become effective (, V, 81, n. 5; 112, n. 11; JM Notes, 16 Jan., and n. 4; 12–15 Mar., and n. 2; 20 Mar.; Delegates to Harrison, 12 Mar., n. 12; JM to Randolph, 12 Mar., nn. 4, 5; 8 Apr., and n. 2; Randolph to JM, 29 Mar. 1783, and n. 10; , VII, 136). An opposing consideration was the possibility that the postponement would prevent an immediate release of prisoners of war and reduce the number of slaves, taken by the British, which they eventually would return (, V, 111–12; 112, nn. 1, 11; 113; Delegates to Harrison, 12 Mar., and n. 14; JM Notes, 12 Apr. 1783, and n. 7; , VII, 139).
4. For the “Declaratory act,” see JM Notes, 24 Mar., and n. 1; 10 Apr., and n. 2; 11 Apr., and nn. 1, 3, 4; JM to Maury, 24 Mar., n. 2; Delegates to Harrison 10 Apr., and nn. 8, 10; JM to Randolph, 10 Apr. 1783.
5. JM Notes, 12–15 Mar., n. 1; 24 Mar., and n. 1; Delegates to Harrison, 18 Mar., nn. 2, 4; JM to Randolph, 10 Apr. 1783.
6. JM Notes, 11 Apr. 1783, and n. 3.
7. The “correspondent obligation,” besides that mentioned in n. 3, would include withdrawal by Great Britain of her troops from wherever they were stationed within the territory ceded by her to the United States (, 246–47, 249–50; JM Notes, 26 Feb. 1783, and n. 22).
9. By “that place,” Hugh Williamson meant New York City. For its discontented Tories (Loyalists), see , V, 46; 48, n. 7; 51, n. 6; 102, n. 6; 109; 223; Delegates to Harrison, 12 Mar. 1783, and n. 22.
10. In a letter of 15 April 1783 to Washington, Hamilton remarked that “the usual practice of nations” was to release all prisoners upon “the ratification of the preliminary treaty.” He advised Washington, in view of the “great diversity of Opinion in Congress,” without communicating “our doubts to the British, to extract their sense of the matter from them” (, III, 325–26). For a further quotation from this letter, see JM Notes, 16 Apr. 1783, n. 1.
11. For additions to the “varity” mentioned in JM’s notes for this day, see , VII, 138, 141, n. 3, 149; ., VI, 386–87; JM to Randolph, 15 Apr.; JM to Jefferson, 22 Apr. 1783.