1To George Washington from Brigadier General Duportail, 25 November 1777 (Washington Papers)
To attack the Enemy in their Lines appears to me a difficult and dangerous Project, it has especially this very considerable Inconvenience, the exposing our Army in case it does not succeed to a total Defeat. This is easily demonstrated—One of the principal means proposed is to throw two thousand men in the rear of the Enemy—if we do not succeed these are so many men absolutely lost—as to the...
2To George Washington from Brigadier General Duportail, 1 December 1777 (Washington Papers)
By taking Winter Quarters from Lancaster to Reading, we abandon to the Enemy Jersey, and all the Country adjacent to Derby, Chester and Wilmington, one of the richest Tracts in this part of the Continent—By establishing them at Wilmington we cover the Country, and do not so completely abandon that part of it which is before Philadelphia, nor even Jersey, because our proximity to the Enemy and...
3To George Washington from Brigadier General Duportail, 3 December 1777 (Washington Papers)
I have examined anew with all the attention of which I am capable, the Project of attacking the English and it still appears to me too dangerous—the great Body of Militia with which we might be reinforced for this purpose does not give me any additional hope of succeeding—it is not the number of Troops which is of importance in this case, but it is the quality, or rather their nature and...
4To George Washington from Brigadier General Duportail, 18 January 1778 (Washington Papers)
If Fortification is necessary in any Armies, it is peculiarly so in those, which like ours, from a deficiency in the practice of manoeuvres cannot oppose any to those of the Enemy—being necessitated therefore to receive him on their own ground, they ought always to be protected either by a natural or artificial Fortification, if it were only to have (under favor of the resistance of this...
5To George Washington from Brigadier General Duportail, 7 April 1778 (Washington Papers)
It is by no means doubtful that the addition of a few Redouts will increase the strength of our position—but in my opinion they may be regarded as a superfluous exertion of Strength—if in order to make a proper estimation of the advantages of our position, we take notice that the Enemy begins to be subject to our fire at the extreme range of Musket and Case-Shot—that in order to join us; they...
6To George Washington from Brigadier General Duportail, 13 April 1778 (Washington Papers)
Having been better informed of His Excellencys Intentions, I returned to the Hill, and examined if we could make any inclosed work, which would enable us to maintain the ground with a very small Force but I found no proper Spot. As the Summit of the Hill has both length and breadth, in whatever spot we place the work, it would only see on one or two sides, the ground by which the enemy may...
7To George Washington from Brigadier General Duportail, 20 April 1778 (Washington Papers)
In all great Enterprises, the first thing to be done, is to form a general Plan of Conduct, to which all the particular operations are to have reference, this general plan is as it were the touch Stone by which all the subordinate projects are proved—according as they agree or disagree with it, they are good or ill, deserve to be approved or rejected: now in this great Enterprise of supporting...
8To George Washington from Brigadier General Duportail, 23 April 1778 (Washington Papers)
As to the first question— whether we ought to attack General How in his lines —I adhere to what is contained in my last memorial —Unless we have 25 thousand resolute men armed with good muskets and bayonets (for the latter will be necessary here) we ought not to think of it. It is not in my power to discuss the second relative to the Attack on New York, as I am not acquainted with the...
9To George Washington from Brigadier General Duportail, 18 June 1778 (Washington Papers)
I think we ought not to quit our position of Valley forge—before the enemy has evacuated Philadelphia—he must have lost his reason, to remain in that city without being in a condition to defend it. Thus either the intelligence which says there are no more than 2 or 3000 men there, is false—or the English have it in their power by the measures which they have taken, Signals agreed upon, number...
10To George Washington from Brigadier General Duportail, 23 June 1778 (Washington Papers)
nous avons d’abord eté a sowr land meeting house. Cet endroit se trouve a 7 milles de princetown, la Chaine de montagnes qui pouvoit nous offrir quelque position avantageuse à 3 milles, de facon que de Cette Chaine a princetown il peut y avoir 10 milles. Celá ma paru trop eloignès pour Remplir l’objet que votre excellence paroit avoir. ou Comme dans la Route nous avions passé a un endroit qui...