James Madison Papers
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To James Madison from George W. Erving, 27 September 1806 (Abstract)

From George W. Erving, 27 September 1806 (Abstract)

§ From George W. Erving. 27 September 1806, Madrid. No. 14. “I wrote to you last unofficially on the 9t of this month. In the present very critical posture of European affairs the attention of all political Speculators is turned towards the king of Prussia. I have within these few days obtained a sight of several letters from him to his chargé d affaires here the contents of which are important, & if the sincerity of the writer is to be depended upon, they will afford you the best Explanation of the actual state of things, & the best means of conjecturing as to the future. The first letter was written soon after the Emperor of Austria had relinquished his station as head of the German Empire: In this, he says that the emperor of France had communicated to him the Establishment of the Confederation of the Rhine under his auspices and invited him to form another confederacy at the north, composed of the remaining princes of the old German league in that quarter. That he saw1 many arrangements in the confederation of the Rhine which were dissatisfactory to him but tho he was determined not to make these a ground of dispute with the Emperor, yet he did not very readily accede to the proposition of placing himself at the head of another confederacy. Now however that the Emperor of Austria had himself dissolved the German constitution his principal scruple was overcome and he had therefore determined & was now employed, in forming the northern confederation and shoud declare himself the protector of it by which the peace of the north of Europe woud be sccured.2 In the second & third letters he speaks of his quarrel with the King of Sweden; the question of Hanover as connected with that of peace; & the actual State of affairs between him and the French emperor. He says that The King of Sweden has made Every possible effort to provoke Prussia to hostility, had taken part with England upon a question that did not at all concern him; his insults & outrages had been such, that tho’ the King of Prussia had restrained his resentment as much as possible, he woud however have punished him for his temerity, but for the interference of Russia; the affair woud probably be thus settled. As to Hanover he says that it is for the Interest of Europe that it shoud remain in the possession of Prussia, since on that condition he has guarranteed to France the peace of the north3 against whoever shall undertake to disturb it and it is the only mode by which peace can be maintained in that quarter. He intimates however, that if it shoud be necessary for the purpose of reconciling the two rival powers (England & France) that the King of Prussia shoud give up Hanover he shall do so upon receiving back his own territories, but observes that the durability of a peace made upon that cession cannot be depended on since he must in such case be discharged from his guarrantee and England might find occasion hereafter to form another coalition against France, when it might become his interest not only, not to oppose Russia and England but to declare war against France. As to his relations with France they had been of the most intimate & friendly kind; the King of Prussia had repeatedly manifested his strong attachment to the governmt & person of the Emperor, & had received from him assurances of the most sincere friendship that therefore tho he coud not doubt of the honor and loyalty of the emperor yet that the menacing movements of the French armies towards his frontiers obliged him to such precautionary measures as were necessary to secure4 his dominions from whatever danger might arise, that therefore he had augmented his force &c &c &c. The whole of these letters are in Cypher, but I read the french translation of them interlined. On seeing the above your first sensation will probably be surprize that the king should write5 so fully upon these most important subjects to the person mentioned; & the more so as it certainly does not seem that such communications can be at all necessary to his business here. And again you will wonder why these dispatches have been communicated to me. As to the first point my surprize has been still greater from knowing the man whose character and standing cannot be supposed to entitle him to such peculiar confideence of his sovereign. He is capable active & zealous & by these qualities only has risen from a very humble station. Hence some suspicion arises that the letters were writen on purpose to be shewn and to deceive. As to his pacifick views towards France I think it not improbable that they have been shewn to the prince of peace. But it may be the general practice of the Prussian government to write in this manner to all its agents as it is its practice for the king to sign all dispatches to them & to receive directly all their communications. As to the letters having been read to me; this also I shoud Explain, for I am a little apprehensive lest you may think that I pay too dearly for such communications, or in a contraband medium; but in fact I have only represented to this person (with whom I have had a great deal of Communication) that tho we are Entirely disconnected from these European Concerns, yet we are nevertheless naturally desirous of knowing how they go on, & that if he coud Enable me to transmit to you any interesting intelligence, he might serve me without prejudice to himself & he might depend upon my making no other use of it.

“If these things are to be relied on, & if the restoration of Hanover is a sine qua non with England (which is fully beleived Every where) does it seem probable that peace will be made? The Emperor of France ought to Estimate very highly the reasons urged by Prussia for retaining it. Yet certainly the movements of France manifest a very hostile disposition towards Prussia: if that disposition actually Exists it is probable that the Emperor calculated on the ratification of Mr Oubrils treaty; but that treaty having been rejected it will be more convenient to smooth over the difficulties which Exist with Prussia; thus to break all hopes of a coalition, secure himself from an attack by Russia, & even finally to procure the alliance of Prussia against that power. If this course is taken, the war with England must continue, because Hanover cannot be restored; if the other, then the hopes of a new coalition may tempt her prematurely to break off the subsisting negotiation; & this is more likely since Mr. Fox being dead (of which we are assured here) the affairs of that government must fall into the hands of the Grenvilles whose system is not at all pacifick.”

Adds in a 29 Sept. postscript: “But there is another view of the subject, which conforms more to present appearances & which has no immediate reference to the question of peace with England. Whatever Encouragement the Emperor of France may appear to have given to the formation of a Northern German confederacy, may be supposed to have been calculated only to reconcile Prussia & those Northern States to the confederation of the Rhine, because it is certain, that it was their acquiescence only which induced the Emperor to resign without a struggle; & it is Evident also by the invitation which has been given to many of those states which shoud belong to the Northern confederacy, to join the Southern, that it is the French Emperors intention to unite them all: & he being protector of the confederation, when all the states accede to it, he of course becomes in Effect Emperor of Germany: This then must be presumed to have been his first plan. Now the measures taking by Prussia are calculated to defeat this project; & if he is still determined to Execute it, he must destroy Prussia; this he may calculate to do before she can receive any assistance from Russia, this accounts too for the rapidity of his movements as well as for the actual position of his armies: it may also have prolonged & still prolong the Negotiations with England; these will attend the result of his great projects on the continent. According to Every appearance indeed there must be war. The Prussians are joined by Saxe & Hesse, they have already driven the Bavarian troops from Iphofin & another small place which they had occupied; & the Emperor left Paris to join the Armies on the 22d Inst.

“Here there is nothing ne⟨w⟩. The aff⟨airs⟩ of Portugal remain in the same state. A little money has been sent from hence ⟨to⟩ France, only abt 14 millions of 48,000,000 Reals which were required. The King has been somewhat unwell, but is now better.”

Adds in a 2 Oct. postscript: “I beleive that an immediate War with Portugal has been resolved on here.”

RC (DNA: RG 59, DD, Spain, vol. 10). 7 pp.; marked “Private” and “Duplicate”; docketed by Daniel Brent. Damaged by removal of seal. Italicized words are those encoded by Erving and decoded here by the editors. For the code, see PJM-SS description begins Robert J. Brugger et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison: Secretary of State Series (12 vols. to date; Charlottesville, Va., 1986–). description ends 4:352 n. 2.

1Encoded “he commitw.” Erving presumably intended to write “1068,” the value for “sa,” rather than “106,” the value for “commit.”

2Erving may have intended to write “1075,” the value for “se,” rather than “1073,” the value for “sc.”

3Encoded “peace of the suc.” Erving presumably intended to write “358,” the value for “north,” rather than “385,” the value for “suc.”

4Encoded “scrcure.” Erving presumably intended to write “1075,” the value for “se,” rather than “1074,” the value for “scr.”

5Encoded “that the king should dog.” Erving presumably intended to write “861,” the value for “write,” rather than “860,” the value for “dog.”

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