Report on Moving Negotiations with Spain to Madrid, 20 April 1787
Report on Moving Negotiations with Spain to Madrid
Office for foreign Affairs 20 April 1787
The Secretary of the United States for the Department of foreign Affairs to whom was referred a motion made the 18th. April Instant by the Honble Mr. Madison in these words Vizt. “Resolved that the present State of the negociations with Spain and of the Affairs of the United States, renders it expedient that the minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of France, should proceed under a Special Commission to the Court of Madrid, there to make such Representations, and to urge such negociations, as will be most likely to impress on the said Court the friendly Disposition of the United States, and to induce it to make such concessions and arrangements touching the Southern Limit of the United States and their Right to Navigate the Missisippi below the same, and to enter into such Commercial Stipulations with the United States, as may most effectually guard against a Rupture of the subsisting Harmony and promote ^the^ mutual Interests of the two Nations.[”]
“Resolved that the Secretary for foreign Affairs prepare and Report the Instructions proper to be given to the said Minister Plenipotentiary, with a proper Commission and Letter of Credence; and that he also report the communications and explanations which it may be adviseable to make to Mr. Gardoqui relative to this change in the mode of conducting the negociations with his Court.[”]1
Reports
The first Question that this motion presents, is whether it will be expedient to endeavour to carry the Spanish negociation from New York to Madrid.
It is generally and with Reason held to be more honorable to a nation that foreign Powers should send Ambassadors to Treat with their Sovereign at his own House, than that they should send Ambassadors to treat with a foreign sovereign at his Court.
It is also, and with equal Reason generally deemed more advantageous to negociate at Home than in a distant Country; because in the latter case, much must be confided to the Discretion of the negociator, and because the Distance prevents his consulting and being directed by his Sovereign on unexpected occasions and Events as they rise and which sometimes require immediate Decision.
As these Considerations afford strong and weighty Reasons for continuing the present negociation at the seat of Congress, those for carrying it to Madrid should clearly preponderate before they are permitted to operate that change.
Two Reasons are assigned for the proposed Change. one of them is exceedingly indefinite Vizt. the present State of our Affairs2—what particular Facts and Circumstances in the present State of our Affairs are alluded to, your Secretary is at a loss to discern; for he does not know of any that would in his opinion be meliorated by the change.
The other Reason is the present State of the negociation3 with that he is perfectly well acquainted, but if the negociation goes to Madrid, he does not conceive that it will leave behind it any of the Difficulties, Questions, or Embarrassments which perplex and retard it at New York.
The Reasons therefore assigned in the motion for the measure in Question do not appear to him adequate to the consequences drawn from them.
Should such a measure be adopted, the Court of Spain will doubtless view it as very singular, and from that circumstance be disposed to suspect that it originated in other than the avowed Inducements—why should Congress forego the Honor and Convenience of treating with us at Home? If discontented with their own negociator, why this circuitous way of changing him? if with ours, how has it happened that no Symptoms of it have appeared? on the contrary we are well informed that he is esteemed and respected in America: as to the Differences between us how are they diminished by this measure? These and a variety of other Questions will more readily occur to the Spanish Court, than satisfactory answers to them and your Secretary apprehends that all these Investigations will terminate in a firm belief that a design to gain Time4 and to amuse was the true Reason. Whether such a suspicion would be well or ill founded, would be unimportant; for its operation would be exactly the same in the one case as in the other. The only Question is whether it is not highly probable, nay almost certain that they would impute it to that cause?
Your Secretary has Reason to believe that Mr. Gardoqui as well as some others, are not ill informed of interesting Debates in Congress, and that the Conversation of members out of Doors does not always remain sub Rosa.5 How or in which^at^ point of Light, the Design of such a measure would strike him, your Secretary can only conjecture. It is however natural to suppose that he would take no pains to prevent its proving abortive, and that his Representations of it to his Court would not be calculated to give it a welcome Reception there, nor to impress them with a favourable opinion of the Purposes intended by it.
When too the Court of Spain finds that Mr. Jefferson is only empowered to confer about the Missisippi and the Boundaries but not to conclude; their suspicions of a Design to Delay and amuse would be confirmed, for it is observable that the motion proposes only to authorize him to enter into commercial stipulations—on the other topics he is to make Representations, to urge such negociations as will be most likely to impress on the Court the friendly Disposition of the United States, and to induce it to make concessions &c. but not a word that gives him power to conclude a Treaty on those Points. Perhaps this may only be an inadvertent Inaccuracy in the motion, if not it gives much Colour to the Inferences above suggested.
All the^se^ considerations and circumstances combined induce your Secretary to think it highly probable that his Catholic Majesty will not consent to treat at Madrid, that his opinion of the candor of the United States will be diminished by the measure in question, and that he will direct his Minister here to state his ultimate propositions explicitly to Congress, and to insist on a speedy and Categorical answer.
If such would be the probable consequence of the measure proposed, your Secretary thinks it would be hazarding too much to adopt it.
If Congress should notwithstanding think it expedient to transfer the negociation to Madrid your Secretary is convinced that it cannot be confided to a Person better qualified to manage it than Mr. Jefferson; and in that case your Secretary will with alacrity and Zeal do whatever may depend upon him to promote the success of it.
All which is submitted to the Wisdom of Congress6
John Jay
DS, DNA: PCC, item 81, 3: 243–50 (EJ: 3972). Endorsed by CT: “Report of the Secy for foreign / Affairs on Mr Madison’s / motion. Spanish Negotiations. / Entd. 20 April 1787. read.—” LbkCs, DNA: PCC, item 124, 3: 65–70 (EJ: 4595); DNA: PCC, item 125, 136–40 (EJ: 3724); NNC: JJ Lbks. 3 and 7; 32: 217–20; 6: 228–32.
1. AD of JM’s 18 Apr. 1787 resolution is in DNA: PCC, item 81, 3: 95–96, referred to JJ to report; 32: 210; 9: 388. For earlier efforts to place negotiation of the treaty in TJ’s hands, see the editorial note “Negotiations with Gardoqui Reach an Impasse,” above. Rufus King’s motion to refer the matter to JJ to report was opposed by Abraham Clark (New Jersey) and James Mitchell Varnum (Rhode Island), on grounds that Congress should not ask JJ’s opinion on a matter of principle on which no further information was required. The motion to refer was, however, approved by a vote of seven states. See 24: 238.
In a letter of 19 Mar., JM informed TJ that William Grayson asked Otto whether Vergennes had expressed any interest in their proposal to open the Mississippi to exports and give France a share in carrying them from a port of deposit on the river. Otto replied that there had been no response, but hoped that TJ might “pump the Count.” JM reported further that “French politicians here” would be pleased if negotiations were put in TJ’s hands and carried on under French mediation. 24: 154.
2. In his “Notes of Debates” of 18 Apr., JM indicated “[meaning the temper & proceedings in the Western Country],” on which see JJ’s Report on George Rogers Clarke’s Seizure of Spanish Property, 12 Apr., above. He also mentioned the unwillingness of the north to risk war to compel Spain to open the river. See 24: 237.
3. Here JM specified “[meaning the step taken under the spurious authority of seven States.]” Ibid.
4. JM mentioned that transferring negotiations would, if it served no other purpose, gain time. Ibid.
5. On breaches of secrecy by the delegates and their contacts with Gardoqui, see the editorial note “Negotiations with Gardoqui Reach an Impasse,” cited above. JM evidently decided to ask Gardoqui how the move might be received as, in his dispatch of 27 May 1787, Gardoqui reported telling JM that even if the United States sent its foremost citizen to Madrid, he would not be received if his instructions specified that he should demand opening of the river. Gardoqui had previously reported that JJ’s opinion on the transfer was supported by many members, that the proposal was unable to win a majority, and that the debate on the issue lasted for four hours. In his dispatch of 9 June 1787, Gardoqui reported that Virginia had proposed naming TJ, whom he described as a strong defender of the American right to navigate the river, as minister to Spain. See 1: 160, 376, 515.
6. Congress considered the above report on 23 Apr. but could not come to a decision about it because only eight states were in attendance. JM commented that JJ had not considered the point of view from which the proposal had been made, i.e. “that it was expedient to retract the step taken for ceding the Mississpi” in the most respectful and conciliatory manner possible. See 24: 248, 251.
In a letter to JM of 20 June, TJ described the proposal to send him to Madrid as “desperate.” He remarked that the strong possibility of failure and the public disappointment that would be directed at him far outbalanced the bare possibility that he would succeed. “Add to this,” he commented, “that jealousy might be excited in the breast of a person who could find occasions of making me uneasy.” See 10: 64–65.