[Below is the initial convention speech by John Jay on Art. I, sec. 2, cl. 3, supporting the ratio of one representative to 30,000 persons. JJ stresses areas of agreement, such as the need for a strong, energetic federal government, and distinguishes between state and federal concerns.]

The honorable Mr. Jay. I will make a few observations on this article, Mr. Chairman, though I am sensible it may not appear very useful to travel over the field, which has been already so fully explored.

Sir, it seems to be on all sides agreed, that a strong, energetic, federal government, is necessary for the United States. It has given me pleasure to hear such declarations come from all parts of the house. If gentlemen are of this opinion, they give us to understand that such a government is the favorite object of their desire; and also that it can be instituted; That, indeed, it is both necessary and practicable; or why do they advocate it.

The gentleman last on the floor [Melancton Smith], has informed us, that according to his idea of a complete representation, the extent of our country is too great for it.—[here he called on Mr. Smith, to know if he had mistaken him; who replied—My idea is not that a proper representation for a strong federal government is unattainable; but that such a representation, under the proposed constitution, is impracticable.]1 Sir, continued Mr. Jay, I now understand the gentleman in a different sense—However, what I shall say will reach equally his explanation. I take it, that no federal government is worth having, unless it can provide for the general interests of the United States. If this constitution be so formed as to answer these purposes, our object is obtained. The providing for the general interests of the Union requires certain powers in government, which the gentleman seems to be willing it should possess; that is, the important powers of war and peace. These powers are peculiarly interesting—Their operation reaches objects the most dear to the people; and every man is concerned in them. Yet for the exercise of these powers, the gentleman does not think a very large representation necessary: But, Sir, if the proposed constitution provides for a representation adequate to the purposes I have described, why not adequate to all other purposes of a federal government? The adversaries of the plan seem to consider the general government, as possessing all the minute and local powers of the state governments. The direct inference from this, according to their principle, would be that the federal representation should be proportionably large: In this state, as the gentleman says, we have sixty-five: If the national representation is to be extended in proportion, what an unwieldy body shall we have! If the United States contain three millions of inhabitants, in this ratio, the Congress must consist of more than eight hundred. But, Sir, let us examine whether such a number is necessary or reasonable—What are the objects of our state legislatures? Innumerable things of small moment occupy their attention—matters of a private nature, which require much minute and local information. The objects of the general government are not of this nature—They comprehend the interests of the States in relation to each other, and in relation to foreign powers. Surely there are many men in this state, fully informed of the general interests of its trade, its agriculture, its manufactures: Is any thing more than this necessary? Is it requisite that our representatives in Congress should possess any particular knowledge of the local interests of the county of Suffolk, distinguished from those of Orange and Ulster? The Senate is to be composed of men, appointed by the state legislatures: They will certainly choose those who are most distinguished for their general knowledge: I presume they will also instruct them; that there will be a constant correspondence supported between the senators and the state executives, who will be able, from time to time, to afford them all that particular information, which particular circumstances may require. I am in favour of large representations: Yet, as the minds of the people are so various on this subject, I think it best to let things stand as they are. The people in Massachusetts are satisfied with two hundred: The gentlemen require three hundred: Many others suppose either number unnecessarily large.— There is no point on which men’s opinions vary more materially. If the matter be doubtful, and much may be rationally said on both sides, gentlemen ought not to be very strenuous on such points. The convention, who decided this question, took all these different opinions into consideration, and were directed by a kind of necessity of mutual accommodation, and by reasons of expediency: It would therefore be unfair to censure them. Were I asked if the number corresponds exactly with my own private judgement, I should answer, no.— But I think it is best, under our present circumstances, to acquiesce. Yet, Sir, if I could be convinced that danger would probably result from so small a number, I should certainly withhold my acquiescence— But whence will this danger arise? Sir, I am not fearful of my countrymen: We have yet known very little of corruption:— We have already experienced great distresses and difficulties: We have seen perilous times; when it was the interest of Great-Britain to hold out the most seducing temptations to every man worth gaining. I mention this as a circumstance to shew, that in case of a war with any foreign power, there can be little fear of corruption; and I mention it to the honor of the American character.— At the time I allude to, how many men had you in Congress? Generally fewer than sixty-five.

Sir, all the arguments offered on the other side serve to shew, that it will be easier to corrupt under the old, than under the new government: Such arguments, therefore, do not seem to answer the gentleman’s purpose. In the federal government, as it now stands, there are but thirteen votes, though there may be sixty or seventy voices.— Now, what is the object of corruption? To gain votes. In the new government there are to be ninety-one votes. Is it easier to buy many than a few? In the present Congress, you cannot declare war, make peace, or do any other important act, without the concurrence of nine states. There are rarely more than nine present. A full Congress is an extraordinary thing. Is it necessary to declare war, or pass a requisition for money to support it? A foreign Prince says, this will be against my interest— I must prevent it— How? By having recourse to corruption. If there are eleven states on the floor, it will be necessary to corrupt three: What measure shall I take? Why, it is common for each state to have no more than two members in Congress. I will take off one, and the vote of that state is lost: I will take off three, and their most important plan is defeated. Thus in the old government, it is only necessary to bribe the few: In the new government, it is necessary to corrupt the many. Where lies the greater security? The gentleman says, the election is annual, and you may recall your delegates when you please. But how are you to form your opinion of his conduct? He may excuse himself from acting, without giving any reason. Nay, on a particular emergency, he has only to go home, for which he may have a thousand plausible reasons to offer, and you have no mode of compelling his attendance.— To detect corruption is at all times difficult; but, under these circumstances, it appears almost impossible. I give out these hints to shew, that on the score of corruption, we have much the best chance under the new constitution; and that if we do not reach perfection, we certainly change for the better. But, Sir, suppose corruption should infect one branch of the government, for instance, the house of representatives; what a powerful check you have in the senate! You have a double security— You have two chances in your favor to one against you. The two houses will naturally be in a state of rivalship: This will make them always vigilant, quick to discern a bad measure, and ready to oppose it. Thus the chance of corruption is not only lessened by an increase of the number, but vastly diminished by the necessity of concurrence. This is the peculiar excellence of a division of the legislature.

Sir, I argue from plain facts— Here is no sophistry; no construction; no false glosses, but simple inferences from the obvious operation of things. We did not come here to carry points. If the gentlemen will convince me I am wrong, I will submit. I mean to give them my ideas frankly upon the subject. If my reasoning is not good, let them shew me the folly of it. It is from this reciprocal interchange of ideas, that the truth must come out. My earnest wish is, that we may go home attended with the pleasing consciousness that we have industriously and candidly sought the truth, and have done our duty. I cannot conclude, without repeating, that though I prefer a large representation, yet considering our present situation, I see abundant reason to acquiesce in the wisdom of the general convention, and to rest satisfied, that the representation will increase in a sufficient degree, to answer the wishes of the most zealous advocates for liberty.