1The Federalist No. 17, [5 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. AN objection of a nature different from that which has been stated and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise urged against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America. It may be said, that it would tend to render the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb in itself those residuary...
2The Federalist No. 79, [28 May 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. NEXT to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. The remark made in relation to the president, is equally applicable here. In the general course of human nature, a power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will . And we can never hope to see realised in...
3The Federalist No. 56, [16 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE second charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents. As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed number of representatives, with the great extent of the United States, the number of their inhabitants, and the diversity of their...
4The Federalist No. 81, [28 May 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. LET us now return to the partition of the judiciary authority between different courts, and their relations to each other. “The judicial power of the United States is (by the plan of the convention) to be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” Article 3. Sec. 1. That there...
5The Federalist No. 58, [20 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE remaining charge against the House of Representatives which I am to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of population may demand. It has been admitted that this objection, if well supported, would have great weight. The following observations will shew that like...
6The Federalist No. 61, [26 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE more candid opposers of the provision respecting elections contained in the plan of the Convention, when pressed in argument, will sometimes concede the propriety of that provision; with this qualification however that it ought to have been accompanied with a declaration that all elections should be had in the counties where the electors resided....
7The Federalist No. 18, [7 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. AMONG the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was that of the Grecian republics associated under the Amphyctionic Council. From the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated institution, it bore a very instructive analogy to the present confederation of the American States. The members retained the character of independent and sovereign...
8The Federalist No. 83, [28 May 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE objection to the plan of the convention, which has met with most success in this state, and perhaps in several of the other states, is that relative to the want of a constitutional provision for the trial by jury in civil cases. The disingenuous form in which this objection is usually stated, has been repeatedly adverted to and exposed; but continues...
9The Federalist No. 59, [22 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE natural order of the subject leads us to consider in this place, that provision of the Constitution which authorises the national Legislature to regulate in the last resort the election of its own members. It is in these words—“The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the...
10The Federalist No. 63, [1 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. A FIFTH desideratum illustrating the utility of a senate, is the want of a due sense of national character. Without a select and stable member of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already mentioned; but the national councils will not possess that...
11The Federalist No. 20, [11 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather of aristocracies, of a very remarkable texture; yet confirming all the lessons derived from those which we have already reviewed. The Union is composed of seven co-equal and sovereign States, and each State or province is a composition of equal and independent cities. In all important cases...
12The Federalist No. 24, [19 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. TO the powers proposed to be conferred upon the Federal Government, in respect to the creation and direction of the national forces, I have met with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it rightly is this— that proper provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace; an objection which I shall now...
13The Federalist No. 85, [28 May 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers, announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for discussion, two points, “the analogy of the proposed government to your own state constitution,” and “the additional security, which its adoption will afford to republican government, to liberty and to property.” But these...
14The Federalist No. 65, [7 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE remaining powers, which the plan of the Convention allots to the Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their participation with the Executive in the appointment to offices, and in their judicial character as a court for the trial of impeachments. As in the business of appointments the Executive will be the principal agent, the provisions...
15The Federalist No. 22, [14 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IN addition to the defects already enumerated in the existing Fœderal system, there are others of not less importance, which concur in rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the Union. The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be of the number. The utility of such a power has been anticipated...
16The Federalist No. 26, [22 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IT was a thing hardly to be expected, that in a popular revolution the minds of men should stop at that happy mean, which marks the salutary boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy of government with the security of private rights. A failure in this delicate and important point is the great source of the inconveniences we...
17The Federalist No. 67, [11 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE Constitution of the executive department of the proposed government claims next our attention. There is hardly any part of the system which could have been attended with greater difficulty in the arrangement of it than this; and there is perhaps none, which has been inveighed against with less candor, or criticised with less judgment. Here the...
18The Federalist No. 70, [15 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation...
19The Federalist No. 28, [26 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THAT there may happen cases, in which the national government may be necessitated to resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own experience has corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of other nations; that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all societies, however constituted; that seditions and insurrections are unhappily maladies...
20The Federalist No. 1, [27 October 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New York. After an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting Fœderal Government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences, nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is...
21The Federalist No. 72, [19 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE Administration of government, in its largest sense, comprehends all the operations of the body politic, whether legislative, executive or judiciary, but in its most usual and perhaps in its most precise signification, it is limited to executive details, and falls peculiarly within the province of the executive department. The actual conduct of...
22The Federalist No. 30, [28 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IT has been already observed, that the Fœderal Government ought to possess the power of providing for the support of the national forces; in which proposition was intended to be included the expence of raising troops, of building and equiping fleets, and all other expences in any wise connected with military arrangements and operations. But these are not...
23The Federalist No. 34, [5 January 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. I FLATTER myself it has been clearly shewn in my last number, that the particular States, under the proposed Constitution, would have CO-EQUAL authority with the Union in the article of revenue, except as to duties on imports. As this leaves open to the States far the greatest part of the resources of the community, there can be no color for the...
24The Federalist No. 32, [2 January 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. ALTHOUGH I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of the consequences, which seem to be apprehended to the State Governments, from a power in the Union to controul them in the levies of money; because I am persuaded that the sense of the people, the extreme hazard of provoking the resentments of the State Governments, and a conviction of the...
25The Federalist No. 36, [8 January 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. WE have seen that the result of the observations, to which the foregoing number has been principally devoted, is that from the natural operation of the different interests and views of the various classes of the community, whether the representation of the people be more or less numerous, it will consist almost entirely of proprietors of land, of...
26The Federalist No. 6, [14 November 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE three last numbers of this Paper have been dedicated to an enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now proceed to delineate dangers of a different, and, perhaps, still more alarming kind, those which will in all probability flow from dissentions between the...
27The Federalist No. 8, [20 November 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general confederacy, would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighbouring nations not...
28The Federalist No. 75, [26 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE president is to have power “by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur.” Though this provision has been assailed on different grounds, with no small degree of vehemence, I scruple not to declare my firm persuasion, that it is one of the best digested and most unexceptionable...
29The Federalist No. 9, [21 November 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. A Firm Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty Republics of Greece and Italy, without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid...
30The Federalist No. 77, [2 April 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IT has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the co-operation of the senate, in the business of appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint. A change of the chief magistrate therefore would not occasion so violent or so...